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This article reviews the corporate tax system within the con-
text of the historical bias and current effects of the current sys-
tem of taxation of corporations and shareholders. Drawing on
public finance theory, financial markets microstructure research,
and perspectives on corporate governance, Professor Rudnick
proposes a profits tax on the liquid equity of firms. She finds this
to be a normative rationale for a double tax system under opti-
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mal tax principles due to the inelasticity of demand for and sup-
ply of liquidity and the economic rent it produces. The value of
liquidity in different capital markets is the crucial determinate.
Under traditional tax policy criteria of horizontal and vertical
equity and efficiency, this approach correctly classifies those
firms that can normatively be included in a double tax system
after an interest return on equity is deducted. Drawing the line at
liquidity allows the fullest expansion of passthrough regimes
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THIS ARTICLE attempts to answer the question: "Who should
pay the corporate tax?" It formulates a defensible, normative,
rationale for a classical corporate income tax or a profits tax on
firm income after allowance is made for interest on firm capital,
and then uses that rationale to distinguish firms to which a two-
tier double tax system should apply from firms to which a passth-
rough system of taxation should apply. The approach taken is
catholic in its outlook, drawing freely from traditions in neoclassi-
cal economics, financial markets microstructure, and perspectives
on corporate governance, as well as traditional and non-traditional
public finance theory.2
Under the classical corporate tax system,3 the profits of a
1. Normative principles seek equity, efficiency, and neutrality. They are based, at
least in the equitable tax-tion tradition, on a general ability to pay. Taxation, however, also
causes economic responses that affect the efficiency of the economy and the ultimate wel-
fare of its participants. With respect to the double tax system, normative policies suggest
strongly that no form of income should receive discriminatory taxation at the expense of
long-term efficiency and the appropriate accounting for the cost of capital. See Warren,
The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585, 1597
(1974)[hereinafter Warren, Interest](noting some reasons for not deducting payments to
the firm's labor, supplier, and especially debt capital providers under the structure of an
income tax and specifically recommending nondeductibility of corporate interest). But see
Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94
HARV. L. REV. 717, 734 n.43 (1981)[hereinafter Warren, Integration](retracting sugges-
tion of nondeductibility of corporate interest on efficiency grounds). If efficiency is too diffi-
cult to model, then the best the tax system can do is to promote neutrality. The correct
response to the normative form of the double tax system also depends upon the assumptions
about the form that system ought to take and the transactions that can be viewed as cir-
cumventing the proper formulation of the system. See Warren, Recent Corporate Restruc-
turing and the Corporate Tax System, 42 TAX NOTES 715 (1989)[hereinafter Warren,
Restructuring] (detailing the countervailing corporate and legislative cures for the apparent
defects in the preference for debt, the tax disadvantage of equity, and the proper taxation
of distributions to shareholders). See also Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible
Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1179, 1183 n.14 (1987). I readily acknowledge the tensions
between policy goals of income-tax structure and long-term social-welfare concerns.
A short version of this Article appeared as Rudnick, Corporate Integration and Invest-
ment Liquidity, 42 TAX NOTES 1107 (1989).
2. Views of nonlegal problems in public finance from a lawyer's perspective have in
the past given useful insights. See Klein, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax. A
Lawyer's View of a Problem in Economics, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 576, 580-87 [hereinafter
Klein, Incidence] (identifying limitations in econometric models of corporate tax incidence
derived from a lawyer's point of view); Anthoine, Tax Reduction and Reform: A Lawyer's
View, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 808, 822-24 (1963)(review of then current legislation and offer-
ing an agenda for the future, including harmonizing the taxation of corporations and
individuals).
3. For a description of the classical system, see ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. CO-OPER-
ATION AND DEv., THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 13
(1974) [hereinafter O.E.C.D.](Under the classical system corporate profits are taxed to the
firm and dividends are independently taxed as personal income to the recipient with no
1988-891
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firm, including those used to pay interest-like returns on equity
capital, are taxed at the firm level and again when distributed to
the owners. Thus, a classical corporate tax may operate as a tax
on corporate capital as well as on profits.8 By contrast, under inte-
grated taxation regimes, only one level of tax is paid on the in-
come generated by the firm's activity.6 Under one kind of inte-
interplay between these two levels of taxation.); Sato & Bird, International Aspects of the
Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 22 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS
384, 387-88 (1975)(The "corporation is recognized as a separate entity for income tax
purposes, and virtually no relief is provided to shareholders for further personal income
taxes levied on distributed corporate earnings."); A. VAN DEN TEMPEL, CORPORATION TAX
AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 7 (1970)(The classical
system accomplishes double taxation by using a corporation tax plus a second and indepen-
dent individual income tax.).
4. Variations on the classical system include differentiating at the shareholder level
the tax consequences of distributions of earnings from those of sales of stock and, under
split-rate systems for all or only certain corporations, taxing undistributed earnings differ-
ently from distributed earnings at the firm level. O.E.C.D., supra note 3, at 13-14 (noting
number of O.E.C.D. countries that had adopted split-rate systems); Sato & Bird, supra
note 3, at 389-90 (describing Germany's then split-rate system); A. VAN DEN TEMPEL,
supra note 3, at 7. Split-rate systems can also operate under integrated systems, See STAFF
OF THE JT. COMM. ON TAX'N, 101ST CONG., 1ST SESS., FEDERAL INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF
CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES 89 (Comm. Print 1989)[hereinafter CORPORATE FI-
NANCIAL STRUCTURES] (noting current German system taxing retained earnings at 56%,
distributed earnings at 36% and a full credit for the 36% corporate tax).
5. This is a very traditional view under the assumption that marginal investment is
made with equity. See A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 129
(1980)("If there are constant returns to scale, and hence no 'pure profits,' and if interest is
not deductible, then it seems clear that the corporate profits tax ought to be viewed [as a
tax on the return to capital.]"); COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., lST SEss., TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM: COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX BASE, Pt. 1,
231, 241 (Comm. Print 1959) [hereinafter TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM] (paper submitted
to the committee by Arnold C. Harberger entitled the Corporation Income Tax: An Empir-
ical Appraisal)("[I]t is a tax on a factor of production: corporate equity capital.");
Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215, 215
(1962)("[T]he [corporate] tax will necessarily be borne out of the earnings of fixed capital
equipment .... "). For other views, see infra notes 60-69.
6. Passthrough systems occur in one of three basic types: (1) one that "causes losses
and undistributed income to pass through to the owners;" (2) one that causes undistributed
income to pass through but not losses; and (3) one that "taxes the owners on distributed
income and allows the entity to deduct the distributions," but does not allow the losses to
pass through. See J. EUSTICE & J. KUNTZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF S CORPORA-
TIONS I 1.03[2][a], at 1-40 to 1-42 (1985).
The Internal Revenue Code recognizes at least five examples of the first type. See
I.R.C. §§ 1501-1504 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989)(consolidated returns); I.R.C. § 701 (West
1988)(partnerships); I.R.C. § 1366 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989)(S corporations); I.R.C. §§
671-677 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989)(grantor trusts); I.R.C. § 851(0 (West 1988 & Supp.
1989)(unit investment trusts).
Similarly, the Code contains at least five examples of the second type. See I.R.C. §§
551-558 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989)(foreign personal holding companies); I.R.C. §§ 991-
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grated system, generally designated full integration, the income of
the firm is allocated and taxed only to the owners; under another,
denominated an imputation system, the firm pays the tax and the
owners receive credit for the firm taxes paid; under a third, the
firm gets a deduction for distributions of earnings.7 These latter
two systems give a credit or deduction for all or part of the tax or
distribution at the firm level.
There is a strong body of opinion, in which I generally join,
that if we could deal adequately with all windfall gains and losses'
997 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989)(domestic international sales corporations); I.R.C. §§ 951-
964 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989)(controlled foreign corporations); I.R.C. § 501(d) (West
1988 & Supp. 1989)(certain religious and apostolic organizations); I.R.C. § 565 (West
1988)(corporations using the consent dividend system). Other variations include I.R.C. §
1291-1298 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989)(passive foreign investment companies).
The Code also recognizes at least five examples of the third type. See I.R.C. §3
642(h), 652, 662, 663 (West 1988)(trusts and estates); I.R.C. §§ 851-855, 852(b)(3)(D)
(West 1988 & Supp. 1989)(mutual funds); I.R.C. §§ 856-859 (West 1988 & Supp.
1989)(real estate investment trusts); I.R.C. 3§ 860A-G (West 1988 & Supp. 1989)(real
estate mortgage investment conduits); I.R.C. §§ 1381-1388 (West 1988)(cooperatives). In
addition, the passthrough treatment has been recognized for various forms of financing
structured as collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). See Adelman & Lorence, Tax
Considerations, in THE ASSET SECURITIZATION HANDBOOK 298-334 (P. Zweig ed. 1989).
The ability of firms to create deductible payments to owners for leasing, rents, salary,
and debt may mean that there is no need to use the full extent of the firm's borrowing
power to eliminate a firm-level tax.
7. Integration systems, and particularly the method by which the shareholders re-
ceive a credit for firm-level taxes paid, are referred to as "imputation" systems in foreign
and some United States discussions of corporate taxation. For a comprehensive discussion
of various integration techniques, see R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 395-400 (4th ed. 1984); Warren, Integration, supra note 1; Sato
& Bird, supra note 3, at 384-95; O.E.C.D., supra note 3, at 13-16; CORPORATE FINANCIAL
STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 86-89. For a comprehensive view of the classical, split-rate,
or dividend deduction, and imputation systems of company taxation in a multinational con-
text, see J. ALWORTH, THE FINANCE, INVESTMENT AND TAXATION DECISIONS OF MULTINA-
TIONALS 38-66 (1988).
8. The previous integration proposals, beginning in 1975, have foundered at least in
part on the problem of the undesirable windfall gains for existing shareholders. See infra
note 11. Windfall gains arise because "[m]ost current owners of corporate shares acquired
their shares at [a discount because of the] expected double tax." 2 DEP'T TREASURY, TAX
REFORM FOR FAIRNESS. SIMPLICITY, AND ECON. GROWTH 143-44 (1984)[Volumes 1 and 2
are hereinafter TREASURY I STUDY]. The extent of this windfall depends on how the corpo-
rate tax rate, or alternatively the shareholder level tax on distributions, is capitalized into
the value of shares. See infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the debate
over retroactivity begins with the assumption that the likelihood of future tax changes has
been capitalized by the market. Compare Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroac-
tivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 57-58 (1977)(arguing that the mar-
ket assesses all positive and negative probabilities of future events in setting prices and
opposing all but delayed or phase-in relief for transitions) and Kaplow, An Economic Anal-
ysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986)(opposing all transitional relief)
with Shachar, From Income to Consumption Tax: Criteria for Rules of Transition, 97
1988-89]
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HARV. L. REV. 1581 (1984)(supporting transition rules to place burden .on superior risk
bearers) and Ramseyer & Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply
to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REv. 1155 (1989)(arguing that Graetz and
Kaplow fail to take the political context of tax reform into account, thereby overlooking
why Congress will reject grandfather clauses and instead concentrating on why Congress
should reject transitional relief). Much of the economic literature assumes that the prob-
lem created by windfall gains is the result of at least a portion of the corporate tax being
capitalized into the value of the shares. See, e.g., M. FELDSTEIN, CAPITAL TAXATION 156,
176-77 (1983)(equity owners bear a portion of the corporate tax burden); Head & Bird,
Tax Policy Options in the 1980s, in COMPARATIVE TAX STUDIES 3, 16-17 (S. Cnossen ed.
1983)(abolition of the corporate profits tax would generate windfall gains for sharehold-
ers). Because of windfall from capitalization of the firm-level tax, integration "would be an
extremely inefficient way of achieving the benefits of increased equity finance or improved
resource allocation associated with de novo enactment of an integrated corporate-personal
income tax." See McLure & Zodrow, Treasury I and the Tax Reform Act of 1986: The
Economics and Politics of Tax Reform, J. EcoN. PERSP., Summer 1987, at 37, 53 (cost in
fiscal 1990 of full integration $31 billion, "and this revenue loss would represent windfall
gains to present owners of corporate shares."). Accord Summers, Taxation and Corporate
Investment: A Q-Theory Approach, I BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 67, 105
(1981)(integrating old equity is a disfavored strategy for encouraging capital formation).
Not all experts believe that windfall gains would occur. See Sheppard, Corporate Tax
Integration, the Proper Way to Eliminate the Corporate Tax, 27 TAX NOTES 637, 640 &
n.7 (1985)(summarizing the contrasting viewpoints of Professors Warren and Andrews).
Not all agree that there is sufficient empirical evidence of capitalization of the firm level
tax. See infra notes 66-69; see also infra note 127.
The Treasury Department accepted the existence of the threat of windfall gains and
stated that "any relief from the double taxation of corporate earnings distributed to share-
holders should be phased in over time." 2 TREASURY I STUDY, supra, at 143-44. A phase-in
period could eliminate the presumed windfall effect for old equity by allowing the market
to readjust and could be accompanied by a compensatory tax on distributions of retained
earnings.
Proposals to compensate for a perceived windfall gain include:
(1) Institute a firm-level deduction or a shareholder-level credit for dividends paid,
and combine it with a firm-level tax on accumulated earnings and profits (perhaps payable
over several years). See Senate LBO Hearings, infra note 16, at 62 (prepared statement of
Alan J. Auerbach). This option is similar to the 1985 proposal on reducing windfalls from
corporate rate reduction. See OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS
TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH AND SIMPLICITY 120-23 (1985) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S STUDY];
(2) Grant dividend relief only for new equity issues and subjecting old equity issues to
a firm-level tax on nondividend corporate distributions withheld at the corporate level and
creditable at the shareholder level, see Senate LBO Hearings, pt. 2, infra note 16, at 62-64
(prepared statement of Alan J. Auerbach)(discussing the approach taken by the American
Law Institute Reporter in GROUP DRAFT No. 18, infra note 54, and noting distortions in
share repurchases, leveraged buyouts and cash acquisitions and noting further that this
proposal is complex but politically palatable);
(3) Equalize tax treatment of debt and equity either (a) by combining a dividends
paid deduction with a partial denial of the interest deduction, see Senate LBO Hearings,
pt. 2, infra note 16, at 64 (prepared statement of Alan J. Auerbach)(noting that its cost of
discouraging corporate investment could outweigh the benefit of neutrality between corpo-
rate financing decisions), or (b) by allowing a credit for a portion of the dividends paid to
shareholders equal to a disallowed portion of firm level interest payments and a credit to
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and with the treatment of tax preferences, 9 we would only need to
tax corporate income once at the appropriate rate.10 In the United
States, integrating firm and shareholder taxes has received consid-
erable attention,1" as it has abroad 2 especially as the European
bondholders, see id. at 73-76 (prepared statement of Michael J. Graetz)(The proposal is
structurally revenue neutral since the bondholder tax credit would not be refundable for
tax exempt and foreign bondholders. Furthermore, the windfall gain enjoyed by sharehold-
ers is exactly offset by the burden placed on these tax exempt and foreign bondholders.).
Even without direct transitional relief, a form of integration is preferred. See House
LBO Hearings I, infra note 16, at 404 (prepared statement of Alvin Warren)(best solution
is to begin integration, perhaps coupled with a limit on interest deductibility in certain
cases involving substitution of debt for equity). For the view that integration is both desira-
ble and essential, see Warren, Integration, supra note 1, at 744-53.
9. See, e.g., C. MCLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? 217
(1979)(Under an integrated system tax preferences would necessitate keeping "accounts
for accumulated and current taxable income and for accumulated and current preference
income" where now it is only necessary to keep accounts for "current and accumulated
earnings and profits."). See also Popkin, Correspondence, 87 YALE L.J. 1319, 1323-25
(1978). This issue has become less important after 1986.
10. For favorable discussions of integration, see D. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY
TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM xxii (rev. 2d ed. 1984) [hereinaf-
ter BLUEPRINTS]; C. MCLURE, supra note 9; McLure, Corporate Income Tax: Restoration,
Integration, or Elimination?, in To PROMOTE PROSPERITY: U.S. DOMESTIC POLICY IN THE
MID-1980s, at 303 (J. Moore ed. 1984); Break, Integration of the Corporate and Personal
Income Taxes, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 39 (1969); Feldstein & Friseh, Corporate Tax Integra-
lion: The Estimated Effects on Capital Accumulation and Tax Distribution of Two Inte-
gration Proposals, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 37, 40-48 (1977)(integration increases investment,
reduces economic waste from distortion between corporate and noncorporate production,
and increases progressivity); Warren, Integration, supra note 1. For the contrary viewpoint
see R. GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 24-43 (1951)(public finance theory will
sometimes permit an individual income tax and also a corporate income tax); Surrey, Re-
flections on "Integration" of Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J.
335 (1975)(labeling as "tax theology" the view that full integration is demanded).
11. As capital markets become more perfect, following trading partners with inte-
grated systems may be the preferred approach. See Senate LBO Hearings, pt. 2, infra note
16, at 199-200 (prepared statement of Lawrence Summers). The Administration has re-
cently viewed the issue of corporate-shareholder taxation as follows:
Our trading partners also have the advantage when it comes to tax treat-
ment of corporate earnings. They all, to some extent, integrate individual and
corporate taxes to prevent fully taxing the same income twice. . . .Changing
the policy of double taxation would provide an incentive for long-term growth by
lowering the overall cost of capital ... [and] removing the double taxation of
dividends would eliminate the bias towards debt without raising the cost of
capital.
Statement of Treasury Secretary Brady (Oct. 11, 1989). See also Taylor & Aidinoff, Ap-
proaches to Debt: Is Integration the Answer?, 67 TAXES 931 (1989)(reviewing integration
methods in context of foreign integration by tax credit systems). The current interest in
integration stemming from the 1989 leveraged buyout hearings, see infra note 16, has its
predecessors. See The President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 6, at 3389-557 &
pt. 9, at 6063-274 (1978)[hereinafter House Integration Hearings]; BLUEPRINTS, supra
1988-89]
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Economic Community seeks to harmonize the taxation of corpora-
tions under a system of integration and a shareholder credit for
firm taxes paid.13 This body of opinion maintains that given an
note 10, at 4; C. MCLURE, supra note 9, at 227-30 (discussing the Treasury views during
the Carter Administration); Tax Reform, Public Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and
Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 3852-61 (1975)(statement of Treasury Secretary
Simon). On the Ullman proposal, see id. at 143-45; Graetz, Dividend Relief Via Share-
holder Credits: Tax Preferences under Chairman Ullman's Proposal, 7 TAX NOTES 667
(1978). For discussion of the Ullman proposal, the 1984 Treasury proposal, and the 1985
administration proposal and as modified in H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 311 (as
passed by the House Dec. 17, 1985), see CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note
4, at 90-103. On other integration proposals, see Comm. on Corps., Tax Section, N.Y.
State Bar Ass'n, Report on the Integration of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes, 31
TAX LAW. 37 (1977); Special Comm. on Simplification, Section of Taxation, Am. Bar
Ass'n, Evaluation of the Proposed Model Comprehensive Income Tax, 32 TAX LAW. 563,
595-620 (1979); Committee on Integration, Section of Taxation, Am. Bar Ass'n, Analysis
of Treasury Tax Reform Proposals (Apr. 19, 1985); NTA-TIA Symposium, The Taxation
of Income from Corporate Shareholding, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 255 (1975).
12. INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAX-
ATION 245-46 (1978)[hereinafter MEADE REPoRT](chaired by J.E. Meade); SELECT COM-
MITTEE ON CORPORATION TAX, 1970-1971, CMND. No. 4630, at 737; P. Keating, Reform of
the Australian Tax System: Draft White Paper (published by the Australian government
in June 1985) [hereinafter White Paper]. For discussions of proposals as of 1977, see M.
NORR. THE TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS (1982), reviewed in Mc-
Nulty, Integrating the Corporate Income Tax?, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 661 (1983). For an
early view in Canada, see J. PETRIE, THE TAXATION OF CORPORATE INCOME IN CANADA
(1952).
13. For a recent summary, see Bird, Corporate-Personal Tax Integration, in TAX
COORDINATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 227 (S. Cnossen ed. 1987). Studies follow-
ing the adoption of an integrated system by the Common Market countries in their com-
pany tax harmonization efforts have questioned the efficacy of the imputation system in
raising or accumulating additional capital by business and have suggested that the ineffi-
ciency costs of the classical system were exaggerated, see Gourevitch, Corporate Tax Inte-
gration: The European Experience, 31 TAX LAW. 65, 79-84 (1977)(citing O.E.C.D., supra
note 3, at 20, Wiseman and Davenport's 1974 O.E.C.D. study, and Severiens's study of the
French stock market after enactment of the avoir fiscal system). For a report on harmoni-
zation, see Chown, Company Tax Harmonization in the EEC: A Progress Report, TAX
PLANNING INT'L REV., Nov. 1988, at 3 (detailing issues to be faced in harmonization in-
cluding borrowing, capital gains, foreign tax and imputation credits, and capital neutral-
ity). The integrated tax system of the EEC includes double taxation of corporate income
and a preference for unincorporated entities. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITIES. REPORT ON THE SCOPE FOR CONVERGENCE OF TAX SYSTEMS IN THE COMMUNITY
46-47 (Bulletin of the European Communities - Supplement 1/80, 1980)(demonstrating a
difference between the credits as a percentage of gross dividend and as a percentage of the
corporate tax (100% of the tax in Germany, 25.5% of the tax in Denmark, with no tax
credit in Luxembourg or the Netherlands)). The preferred system would only allow a 45-
55% credit for firm taxes paid. For a discussion of the taxation of partnerships and the
difficulty in harmonizing the systems and closer alignment of rates, see id. at 60-62. See
also CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 89 (noting current levels of
elimination of the double tax by United States trading partners). For the view that the
U.S. should follow the European lead, see A.B.A. SECTION OF TAXATION/N.Y. STATE BAR
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income tax on individuals, a corporate tax is needed only to assure
that undistributed corporate income does not escape taxation.14
On the other hand, integration is not mandated if, as I propose in
this Article, a normative model for a classical corporate tax or a
profits tax can be designed. The pressures for the migration of
firms to a noncorporate status outside of the classical corporate
tax regime15 and the continued concerns over high leveraging of
United States corporations16 are symptoms of the failure to imple-
ment a nondistortionary normative policy of taxation of corporate
profits.
The influential Canadian Carter Commission Report,"1 issued
in 1966, stated that a similar rate structure for corporate income
and individual income is a prerequisite to an integrated tax system
Ass'N TAX SECTION, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: A REPORT OF THE INVITATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE ON SUBCHAPTER C 256-58 (1988)[hereinafter SUBCHAPTER C CONFER-
ENCE](statement of Charles Gavin).
14. Graetz, Can the Income Tax Continue to Be the Main Revenue Source?, in OP-
TIONS FOR TAX REFORM 39, 53 (J. Pechman ed. 1984). Under this view, the firm is an
accrual-basis proxy for the individual tax. See COMMITTEE ON TAXATION OF THE TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY FUND, FACING THE TAX PROBLEM 414 (1937)[hereinafter TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY FUND REPORT](the corporate tax should be used as a means of collecting at the
source and in advance a personal income tax on resident holders of corporate stock and as
the only means of collecting tax on nonresident holders); Bradford, The Choice Between
Income and Consumption Taxes, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE
1980's, at 229, 241-42 (C. Walker & M. Bloomfeld eds. 1983)(noting that "the double
taxation of dividends as practiced in the United States [is] hard to justify").
15. See infra notes 30, 133-35, 139-57 and accompanying text.
16. See Hearings on Leveraged Buyouts and Corporate Debt Before the Senate Fi-
nance Comm., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 24-26, 1989)[hereinafter Senate LBO Hearings,
pt. 1, pt. 2, or pt. 3]; Hearings on The Tax Policy Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 31-Feb. 2 &
Mar. 14-15, 1989)[hereinafter House LBO Hearings 1]; id. (May 16-17, 1989)[hereinafter
House LBO Hearings If]. Other aspects of the tax treatment of debt and equity have
received congressional attention as well. See Oversight Hearing on the Role of Pension
Funds in Corporate Takeovers Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of
the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 9, Mar. 2, 3 & 7,
1989) [hereinafter Pension Fund Hearing]; Hearing on the Protection of Shareholders and
Other Interest Holders in Management Buyouts and Leveraged Buyouts Before the House
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 22 & 26, 1989)[hereinafter House Protection Hear-
ing]; Hearing on Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. Leveraged Buyouts Before the House
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (May 25, 1989) [hereinafter KKR Hearing]; Hearings on
Leveraged Buyouts and Corporate Takeovers Before the House Comm. on Banking, Fi-
nance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 6-8, 1989).
17. 4 CANADIAN ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION, REPORT OF ROYAL COMMISSION
ON TAXATION (1966)[hereinafter CARTER COMMISSION REPORT].
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for the taxation of corporations and their shareholders.18 Similar-
ity in rate structure would allow the firm level tax to operate as a
withholding tax. 19 Under such a view, now would be an opportune
time to pursue integration in the United States. 20 With some dif-
ferences, rates are now virtually the same for corporations and
individuals, and distortions from a preferential capital gains rate
are not present.21 But so far Congress clings to the notion of a
separate corporate tax on income as a part of its tax theology and
as a revenue source. While the initial Treasury study22 and the
President's study23 leading to the Tax Reform Act of 198624 pro-
posed forms of integration that generated somewhat more support
18. Id. at 7, 35, 26776.
19. The Carter Commission proposed setting a withholding rate on corporate earn-
ings at the top individual marginal tax rate and then allowing corporations to allocate
retained profits to shareholders for tax purposes. This would be done by sending each
shareholder a statement indicating his or her pro rata share of retained profits together
with the tax withheld on that share. The total sum would then be included on the share-
holder's return and the withheld tax credited, with refunds to individuals in lower tax
brackets. Id. at 83-84. Canada did not adopt the proposal but it did adopt distinctions
between public and private firms. See Bird, supra note 13, at 236-38. The Carter Commis-
sion Report is a useful guide in a flat-tax world. For a description of the proposal, see
Break & Pechman, Relationship Between the Corporation and Individual Income Taxes,
28 NAT'L TAX J. 341, 347-48 (1975).
20. SUBCHAPTER C CONFERENCE, supra note 13, at 178 (participant noting that
Carter Commission direct tax to shareholders on retained corporate earnings was "particu-
larly attractive now in the U.S. with an individual rate that is lower than the corporate
rate" and that the system would be simpler than Subchapter C). Integration could be ac-
complished either with a refundable credit upon distribution of earnings or no credit except
for individuals taxed at the 15 % rate. This low tax bracket exception could be justified on
the theory that the disparity between 34% and 15% is simply too large. Cf McNulty,
supra note 12, at 670-71 (noting that the 1981 rates fulfilled the Carter Commission parity
requirement, although the effective corporate rate was in fact much lower). The present
debate is the same as it was prior to 1981. Is the corporate tax an adjunct to the individual
income tax base or is it a separate tax on corporate profits? See Warren, The Relationship
Between the Corporate and Individual Federal Income Taxes After the Economic Recov-
ery Tax Act of 1981, 1981 PROC. NAT'L TAX ASS'N 27, 30 [hereinafter Warren,
Relationship].
21. The present differences between corporations and individuals include a higher
corporate rate (34% versus 33% or 28% at the top), graduated corporate rates for smaller
firms which place the highest marginal rate at 39% for the phase-out of the graduated
rates, see infra note 77, and limited graduation for individuals. Capital gains distributions
and sales have been viewed as eliminating the simplicity of integration. See Popkin, supra
note 9, at 1321-25. Even without a capital gains distortion, nondividend distributions to
shareholders by repurchases and substitution of debt for equity continue a distortion within
the classical corporate tax system.
22. 2 TREASURY I STUDY, supra note 8, at 134-44.
23. PRESIDENT'S STUDY, supra note 8, at 120-29. The administration proposal with
some modifications was passed by the House. See supra note 11.
24. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
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in the business community than prior proposals,2" the final Act
both reaffirmed the classical system28 and increased incentives to
earn business income as a passthrough entity. 7 Treasury studies
on the corporate and passthrough tax regimes have been man-
dated by Congress but have not yet been reported, while the study
on integration should be reported in 1990.28
In 1987, Congress expanded the scope of the corporate tax
system by including publicly traded partnerships 29 among the
firms taxed as corporations, in order to relieve the presumed pres-
sure to disincorporate.30 In September of 1988, the Internal Reve-
25. Previous proposals lacked business community support and managers preferred
retained earning financing. See Sheppard, supra note 8, at 645. Firm managers still may
not want pressure to pay out earnings and only want tax reductions on retained, as opposed
to distributed, earnings. See SUBCHAPTER C CONFERENCE, supra note 13, at 161 (state-
ment of Michael Graetz).
26. See Leonard, A Pragmatic View of Corporate Integration, 35 TAX NOTES 889,
891-93 (1987).
27. See Canellos, Corporate Integratiorn By Design or By Default, 35 TAX NOTES
999 (1987)(master limited partnerships are being used to effect integration). Later changes
have continued the trend. See Zolt, Corporate Taxation After the Tax Reform Act of
1986: A State of Disequilibrium, 66 N.C.L. REV. 839, 857-58 (1988)(enumeration of
changes in the 1987 Act that affect corporate taxation).
28. The 1986 Tax Act mandated a study of Subchapter C. Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 634, 100 Stat. 2282. The Treasury Study on Integration will appar-
ently be released in 1990. The 1987 Act directed a Treasury study of the administrative
and other tax policy issues surrounding publicly traded limited partnerships. Omnibus
Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10215, 101 Stat. 1330,
1330-408.
29. These were also known as master limited partnerships ("MLPs"). The term
"master" referred to a two-tiered structure that was used to satisfy the laws of many states
governing limited liability. Many states required that the names of the limited partners be
stated, an impossible task for a publicly traded partnership. Thus, the requirement was
satisfied by "making the parent 'master' partnership whose units were traded the sole lim-
ited partner of [the] subsidiary limited partnership formed in the state," with the master
partnership organized in the state that did not require a filing of the names of the limited
partners. McKee, Master Limited Partnerships, 45 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 23.01,
at 23-1 n.1 (1987).
30. The legislation was preceded by hearings. See Master Limited Partnerships:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 100-39 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 House MLP
Hearings]; Master Limited Partnerships: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and
Debt Management of the Senate. Finance Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 100-485 (1987)
[hereinafter 1987 Senate MLP Hearing]. The Congress made its initial inquiry into the
nature of passthrough taxation in 1986. See STAFF OF THE JT. COMM. ON TAXATION, ISSUES
RELATING TO PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON SELECT REV-
ENUE MEASURES OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986); Hearings Before the Sub. Comm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means on Passthrough Entities, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)[herein-
after 1986 House Passthrough Hearings].
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nue Service completed a six-year study of the Morrissey3l resem-
blance test for classification of unincorporated entities as
"associations" taxable as corporations.32 Upon completion of this
study, the Service issued a ruling a that nominally applied Morris-
sey as interpreted in the Kintner regulations, 4 but that unoffi-
cially Xesolves the characterization question based on the public-
trading standard of I.R.C. section 7704.11
The 1986 legislation exacerbated two of the three most prom-
inent distortions of the old classical corporate tax regime - the
bias toward unincorporated firms and the preference for debt
rather than equity financing. The first of these was tempered by
the third distortion - the bias toward retention of earnings -
but this third distortion was largely eliminated by the 1986 Act's
inverted rate structure that unmistakably tipped the scales in
favor of passthrough taxation. The bias toward retained earnings"6
31. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
32. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (West 1988).
33. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-38 I.R.B. 14. Applying the four-factor association test -
limited liability, centralized management, continuity of life and free transferability of in-
terests - the Service ruled that the presence of limited liability for all firm members in
combination with representative corporate management for a real estate firm of 25 mem-
bers formed under the Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-
101 to -136 (1977), will not result in association status if the firm technically dissolves
under state law by membership changes and it limits the right to transfer an interest enti-
tled to management participation, but not profit participation, only by unanimous consent.
Neither the number of members nor the type of property was determinative and the Wyo-
ming Act is not limited in either respect. See Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-103 (1977)(limited
liability companies may be organized for any purpose except banking or insurance). As-
suming that state law fills the breach by adopting acts such as the Wyoming Act or the
Georgia Uniform Limited Partnership Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-9A-1 to -130 (Supp.
1988), for unlimited numbers of participants and purposes and for new firms, especially
where control is not greatly valued, the operative test for corporate production will be the
publicly traded standard. The existence of the Service's position on the Wyoming Act pro-
vides planning opportunities and raises the question of whether for tax and nontax purposes
the characterization of the firm as a limited liability company and a tax partnership will
prevail if used by non-Wyoming residents in their home states.
34. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 (1988).
35. I.R.C. § 7704 (West Supp. 1989). See infra notes 640-71 and accompanying
text. The relationship of the new Service position, see Rev. Rul. 88-76, supra note 33 (al-
lowing a de facto public trading test for unincorporated firms) to the forthcoming Treasury
studies has not been stated. See also infra notes 281-85.
36. See M. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY
233-34 (1987)(1961 study indicating a strong preference for internal financing was up-
dated by Fox with a similar result for 20 randomly selected Fortune 500 firms during the
years 1977-1981); see also Greenwald, Stiglitz & Weiss, Informational Imperfections in
Capital Markets in Macroeconomic Fluctuations, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 194 (1984)(the fact
that only 3.9% of the funding sources for 799 industrial firms reported on the Value Line
database in 1984 were common or preferred stock issues explained on a theory of capital
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arose from the desire to defer shareholder taxes into the future,
and it gave rise to the 1984 American Law Institute (ALI) view
of the classification issue, which presumed equivalence between
the corporate and passthrough tax regimes.3 Today, very few
firms are able to take advantage of the deferral of shareholder tax
because, except for firms able to utilize the graduated corporate
rate structure, corporate rates are higher than individual rates.
Accumulations no longer enjoy lower taxes than if the income had
been taxed directly to the owner.3 In a flat tax world without a
capital gains preference and with the repeal of the General Utili-
ties doctrine - which now requires taxation of corporate asset
appreciation at the firm level upon liquidation - the corporate
strategies of earnings retention and bailout are rarely advanta-
geous.39 Even if preferential treatment for capital gains were rein-
troduced, a corporate rate that is higher than the individual rate
eliminates the deferral value of corporate retention. However, the
capital gains preference would create a bias against dividend dis-
tributions of earnings and would further favor redemptions.
The distinctly increased bias toward corporate debt financing
that began in 1981 continues,40 despite the increased relative tax
cost of debt financing (in 1989 relative to 1985) and the decline in
the individual marginal rate on interest income below the corpo-
markets signaling). See infra notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
37. Am. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER K ON PARTNERS
AND PARTNERSHIPS 378 (1984); accord Zolt, supra note 27, at 845 (analysis of "compen-
sating" tax bias created by corporate and individual tax systems).
38. The estimated revenue loss of the new corporate graduated rates is estimated at
$6.34 billion for 1987, $4.72 billion for 1988, and $4.55 billion for 1989. See CONGRES-
SIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET FOR 1987-1989, reprinted in Special
Analysis G: The Fiscal 1989 Tax Expenditure Budget, 38 TAX NOTES 979, 996
(1988)(figures derived from outlay equivalence analysis).
39. Timing of the second tax and the occurrence of full double taxation has always
been subject to deferral. See W. VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 155-56
(1947)(deferral is equivalent to an interest-free loan from the government). See also infra
note 106. The double tax can be avoided through use of the stepped-up basis at death. See
I.R.C. § 1014(a) (West 1988). Furthermore, its effects can be mitigated through the
purchase of debt that generates deductible interest, a form of tax arbitrage now covered by
I.R.C. § 163(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989), see 1987 Senate MLP Hearing, supra note
30, at 62 (statement of J. Roger Mentz), or other deductible rent and salary payments to
owners. Moreover, prior to the 1986 Tax Act, such major capital transactions as a liquidat-
ing distribution and the sale of appreciated assets incident to liquidation were exempted
from the corporate level tax. Id.
40. See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 314 (3d ed.
1988).
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rate rate.4' However, the bias toward debt financing relative to
retained earnings financing for individual firms depends on the
change in their marginal tax rates and the marginal rates of their
investors. A consequence of equity retirements through corporate
repurchases of equity and debt replacing equity, an increased level
of new borrowing, and new equity issues amounting to less than
one third of equity retirements has been "negative financing" by
new equity beginning in 1984.42 Also beginning in 1984, the value
of stock repurchases and cash distributions to shareholders
through acquisitions now surpasses the value of dividend distribu-
tions for the major public corporations.4 a Indeed, mergers and ac-
41. See Hausman & Poterba, Household Behavior and the Tax Reform Act of
1986, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1987, at 101, 110 (The marginal tax rate on interest in-
come has fallen by just over 4% under the 1986 Tax Act. This decline is much less than
the decline in the corporate tax rate. Debt-financed investment may have been discouraged
in significant measure by this new development.). In fact, it has not. See infra notes 158-74
and accompanying text. The particular firm leverage incentive after 1986 depends upon
whether the firm's tax rate increased or decreased after 1986 and whether its investors are
taxable at the top marginal rates, the middle income level, or are tax exempt. See Poterba,
Tax Policy and Corporate Saving, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 455,
489-91 (1987)(demonstrating that debt finance is only preferable for existing firms where
the firm and shareholders are taxed at the highest rates both before and after 1986, or for
all shareholder clienteles where the firm's tax rate increased after 1986).
42. CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 7-8 (Table I-A). Corpo-
rate debt borrowing rose from $54.4 billion in 1983 to $170.3 billion in 1984 and has
remained and was $132.4 billion in 1985, $173.8 billion in 1986, and $136.8 billion in
1987. Id. Retirement of equity securities were $118.6 billion in 1986 and $112 billion in
1987. Id. The excess of equity retirements over new equity issues was $80.8 billion in 1986
and $76.5 billion in 1987, resulting in negative financing by new equity in the respective
amounts. Id.
43. See CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 9-10 (Table I-
B)(discussing data from Bagwell & Shoven, Cash Distributions to Shareholders, J. ECON.
PERSP., Summer 1989, at 129, and noting that dividends were 80 percent of distributions in
1977 and only 40 percent in 1986). See also Shoven, The Tax Consequences of Share
Repurchases and Other Non-Dividend Cash Payments to Equity Owners, in TAX POLICY
AND THE ECONOMY 29, 37-44 (L. Summers ed. 1987)(increase in repurchases beginning in
the 1970s). The repurchase strategy has been widely noted. See, e.g., Bernheim & Shoven,
Taxation and the Cost of Capital. An International Comparison, in THE CONSUMPTION
TAX: A BETTER ALTERNATIVE? 61, 74-75 (C. Walker & M. Bloomfield eds. 1987)(corpo-
rate buyback of shares provides preferred tax treatment for shareholders, compared to divi-
dends). Notwithstanding these increases in repurchases, other evidence suggests that divi-
dends per unit of equity have not fallen and that stock repurchases and acquisition of
shares in other companies have allowed firms to retain relatively constant debt to equity
ratios. Recent criticisms focus on the ability of shareholders to realize corporate value in a
capital (sale or exchange) transaction rather than a dividend distribution. See Bryan,
Leveraged Buyouts and Tax Policy, 65 N.C.L. REV. 1039, 1071 (1987). Even if the gain is
not taxed at a preferential capital gains rate, the ability to offset basis in nondividend
distributions arguably creates a bias that should be compensated. Id. at 1072-74. The in-
crease in repurchases occurs for many reasons, many of which are defensive measures
CORPORATE TAX
quisitions, including leveraged buyouts and debt for equity recapi-
talizations" in which the loss in future corporate tax revenue is
against hostile acquisition. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1377 (1986).
The rise in stock prices effects an automatic unleveraging of the firm as the market
value of debt to equity decreases. Share repurchases are a mechanism by which the firm's
leverage increases. Shoven, supra, at 34. The same occurs if the firm buys the stock of
another corporation which works as an investment in-equity. Id. at 35. Shoven demon-
strates the near equivalence of cash acquisitions (purchases of outstanding corporate equity
of another corporation) and the effect of a share repurchase (the cash acquisition of a
firm's own shares). Id. at 34-36. These forms of repayment began to exceed dividends for
New York Stock Exchange firms in 1984, see id. at 38 (table 2), but the dividend payout
did not decrease (perhaps due to the discipline of market expectations as to dividends),
which "weakly supports the hypothesis that firms are repurchasing equity with debt-fi-
nanced funds to achieve their target leverage ratios [within the rising stock market]." Id.
at 46-47 (noting that the United States corporations have been issuing debt and absorbing
equity with a relatively constant leverage ratio). Furthermore, by choosing to absorb equity
and issue debt while holding leverage constant, firms have saved large amounts of taxes.
Shoven, supra, at 46. Another way to view the tax savings and revenue loss is through the
interest expense as a percentage of taxable income before interest. This percentage has
increased from 24.01 percent in 1976 to 47.05 percent in 1985. CORPORATE FINANCIAL
STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 80 (Table IV-F). See, e.g. Canellos, supra note 27 (arguing
that tax incentives for highly leveraged acquisitions threaten to undermine the corporate
income tax). This results in an increasing loss of revenue in the corporate tax base as the
firms avoid the future imposition of the corporate tax, even though there is a present tax
increase due to the realizations at the shareholder level. Id. at 48-49. The value of the
offsetting tax gain is hotly debated. See infra note 45. Obviously, there are arbitrage incen-
tives for the lowest taxed shareholders to accept the repurchase offer, and the fact that
there is no capital gains preference limits the arbitrage possibility for shareholders in the
highest brackets to a recovery of basis. However, whether there is a benefit for the continu-
ing shareholders, even though the firm has fewer assets and has merely adjusted its finan-
cial claims from equity to debt, is the issue. Since the value of leverage inures to the benefit
of the continuing shareholders, see infra notes 211, 215, 230 and accompanying text, the
use of leverage, as opposed to the mere transference of corporate capital to shareholders in
repurchases, argues that the correct response is to limit the interest deduction for these
restructuring transactions. This argument is not new, but the linkage to the value of lever-
age to the continuing shareholders, as distinguished from the value of a repurchase to the
continuing shareholders, is new.
44. The value of mergers and acquisitions also dramatically increased beginning in
1984, corresponding to the increased percentage of LBOs as a percentage of mergers and
acquisitions. See CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 10-11. LBOs and
hostile acquisitions have received ample academic attention. Much of the commentary fo-
cuses on the fairness to shareholders, the economic efficiency of these transactions, and the
tax policy implications. See Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and the
Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1985); Lowenstein, Management
Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 730 (1985); Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The
Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
891 (1988); KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS (J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Acker-
man eds. 1988); S. Kaplan, Management Buyouts: Efficiency Gains or Value Transfers
(University of Chicago Working Paper No. 244, 1988) [hereinafter S. Kaplan, Efficiency]
(no underpricing of management buyouts); Canellos, The Over-Leveraged Acquisition, 39
TAX LAW. 91 (1985); M. Fox, supra note 36, at 369-70; Kaplan, Management Buyouts:
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not fully compensated by current taxation on the restructuring
transaction, 5 have generated great interest and led to proposals
prior to 1989 to reduce the tax attractiveness of replacing equity
with debt." They have also led to renewed calls for congressional
study,'4 7 recent hearings,4 8 and proposals contained in the Omni-
Evidence on Taxes as a Source of Value, 44 J. FIN. 611 (1989)(taxes as a source of value
includes new depreciation, asset basis step ups, ESOPs and interest deductibility, with
gains from debt-financed depreciation totaling 21.1% to 142.6% of the gains in sample
group to public shareholders with this gain offsetting the cost of the capital gains tax to
buyout shareholders); Bryan, supra note 43, at 1040-42. Another important focus is the
debate over the risk of bankruptcy and costs of financial distress inherent in the use of
leverage. See infra notes 905, 909-10, 913, 916-25 and accompanying text.
45. Various studies attempt to demonstrate that there is a gain to the Treasury
through the capital gain of shareholders in restructuring transactions. See, e.g., Jensen,
Kaplan & Stiglin, The Effects of LBOs on Tax Revenues, 42 TAX NOTES 727 (1989);
Newport, Why the IRS Might Love Those LBOs, FORTUNE, Dec. 5, 1988, at 145. How-
ever, the classical corporate tax regime requires that tax be collected on the entire amount
distributed and not merely the gain on the transactions after a recovery of basis. See House
LBO Hearings I, supra note 16, at 393 (statement of Alvin Warren).
46. See STAFF OF JT COMM. ON TAX WITH STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS &
MEANS, 100TH CONG., IST SEss., DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS TO INCREASE REVE-
NUES 171-74 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter 1987 REVENUE OPTIONS]; HOUSE COMM. ON
THE BUDGET OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1987, H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 1085 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 HOUSE REPORT](proposing I.R.C.
§ 279A, that would disallow deduction of acquisition indebtedness in excess of $5 million a
year if the debt is substantially subordinated, carries equity participation and the issuer is
thinly capitalized or projected earnings do not exceed three times annual interests costs).
Further, the committee expressed:
concern that the excessive leveraging that has manifested itself in recent years
reduces the corporate income tax base by replacing corporate equity with debt,
particularly in circumstances where no corporate-level tax has been paid on ap-
preciated assets and the earnings derived from these assets are sheltered by post-
acquisition interest deductions . . . and that such leveraging may be particularly
likely to occur in the context of an acquisition or significant redemption and may
threaten the health of the corporate sector and the economy in general.
1987 HOUSE REPORT, supra, at 1085. The proposals in the House Bill were viewed by
some as a precipitating cause of the market break on October 19, 1987. This claim is now
supported by an 1987 Stock Market Crash: Antitakeover Provisions in the Proposed House
Ways and Means Tax Bill? 1-3 & 27-32 (1989)(S.E.C. staff study announced May 4,
1989 in news release 89-27)(finding a statistically significant correlation between approval
of the House Bill and the Market Break).
Other proposals are listed in SUBCHAPTER C CONFERENCE, supra note 13, at 164-65
(statement of Michael Graetz)(limit the interest deduction to a percentage of capital in-
cluding debt and equity and finance lease transactions). See also id. at 246 (debt and
equity can be distinguished on the basis of their relative market yields).
47. The fact of increased debt and leverage through going private transactions
spurred by the proposed $25 billion leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco, Inc. by Kohlberg,
Kravis, Roberts & Co. prompted the Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, to pro-
pose to the Senate a change of the tax laws to discourage borrowing to finance takeovers.
See Kilborn, Greenspan Hints of Need to Curb Debt, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1988, at DI,
col. 6. The insolvency risk of savings and loans is also cited as an impetus for change. Id.
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bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,," which mark the begin-
ning of an exploration of options related to debt and equity fi-
nance under the current system and of the desirability of
integrating the corporate and shareholder taxes. 50 It has also be-
come increasingly clear that not even a single tax is collected on
corporate debt owned by tax-exempt institutions and foreigners
enjoying tax-exempt status. 51
48. For the 1989 hearings, see Senate LBO Hearings, supra note 16; House LBO
Hearings, supra note 16.
49. See THE REVENUE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1989, (Title VII of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989), Pub. L. No. 101-239, - Stat. -, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter OBRA]. Portions of this legislation are directly relevant to
this Article. First, it amends I.R.C. § 385 to allow the Treasury Department to character-
ize an instrument having significant debt and equity characteristics as part debt and part
equity. Id. at § 7208(a). Such characterization would represent a major change in the way
the law is applied. Second, it adds I.R.C. § 163(e)(5) to provide for bifurcated treatment of
certain high yield OlD obligations. This treatment provides that the yield on these "appli-
cable high yield discount obligations" with maturities in excess of five years will be treated
as an interest cost up to six percent over the applicable federal rate and will be deductible
only when paid in cash, and that the yield above such amount will be treated as a dividend
when paid for which no interest deduction is allowed but a dividends received deduction
can be used. Id. at § 7202; see also infra note 186. Third, it adds I.R.C. § 163(j) to
disallow the deduction for payments of interest to foreign related persons that are not sub-
ject to United States tax on such receipts to the extent that the excess of the payor's total
interest expense over interest income is greater than 50 percent of the corporation's taxable
income, where the corporation has a debt-equity ratio exceeding 1.5 to 1. Id. at § 7210. In
other proposed legislation by Senator Bensten, see S. 1506, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989),
135 CONG. REC. 9935 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989), a limitation would be imposed on corpora-
tions seeking to obtain a refund of taxes by carrying back net operating losses arising from
excess interest deductions allocable to transactions reducing corporate equity. This provi-
sion was added by OBRA, supra, § 7211, which added § 172(b)(1)(M) to the I.R.C.
50. In addition to the 1989 legislation, options include other forms of limitations on
interest deductibility, taxes upon corporate restructurings, and forms of equalization of
debt and equity financing, and limitations on the use of Employee Stock Ownership Plans
("ESOPs") and pension funds in corporate financing. For options and the context in which
they exist, see CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 82-124.
51. In 1987, only 8 percent of corporate bonds were owned by the taxable household
sector. Foreigners held 13 percent and the tax perferred life insurance companies, and tax
exempt pension funds held 57 percent and other financial intermediaries held the remain-
der. CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 13. See also Jacobs & Rud-
nick, ABA Tax Section Task Force Looks at Passthrough Entities, 42 TAX NOTES 607,
608 (1989)[hereinafter ABA Passthrough Report](report of the ABA Tax Section Task
Force on Passthrough Entities). The weighted average tax rate paid on interest receipts in
1988 is estimated at 7.3 percent. See Senate LBO Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 16, at 196
(prepared statement of Lawrence Summers) (Table 1). For a discussion of the tax treat-
ment of foreigners and tax-exempt entities, see infra note 147-48. Partnerships do not pro-
vide the same benefits as interest receipts. Partnership income from operations triggers the
unrelated business income provisions for tax-exempt entity partners and results in.taxation
of gross income from MLP equity that is not allocable to dividends, interest, royalties, and
capital gains. I.R.C. § 512(a) & (c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989); Turlington & Beeson,
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While there is a need to study the deductibility of interest
under the present system, there is also an increasingly widespread
view that the problem with the corporate tax system may be the
treatment of equity capital, rather than the allowance of the inter-
est deduction. 2 My conclusion following recent hearings is that
for the foreseeable future study should focus on not only whether
we will have the classical double tax as it presently exists, or as
reinforced by provisions to limit interest deductibility and the tax
favoritism for nondividend distributions, but also to which firms
should it apply.
Limited attention has been given to the effect of double taxa-
tion of the equity return if a deduction for an interest return on
new or existing equity is allowed to neutralize the debt-equity
choice and to lessen the risks of bankruptcy and financial distress
through equity rather than debt financing. For a number of years
the ALI has been studying Subchapter C.13 Sensitive to both a
Master Limited Partnerships, Current Issues, Techniques and Strategies, in PARTNERSHIP
TAXATION 1988: AN ADVANCED PROGRAM 211, 296-98 (1988). This fact was not lost on
industry supporters.of MLPs. See, e.g., 1987 Senate MLP Hearing, supra note 30, at 146
(statement of John Chapoton). Moreover, foreigners are taxed on their effectively con-
nected business income. See I.R.C. §§ 871(b) & 882(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
52. All of the major speakers at the Senate LBO Hearings testified to the distortion
that disfavors equity finance. See Hershey, Greenspan Shuns Curb on Buyouts, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 27, 1989, at 25, col. 6 (Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan testified that
the best legislative measure would be to reduce or eliminate the corporate tax or offer a
form of relief from double taxation of dividends); Nash, Dividend Tax Cut Is Favored,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1989, at 25, col. 6 (S.E.C. Chair David Ruder favored equal treat-
ment of dividends and interest); Kilborn, Brady Voices Concern Over Takeover Debts,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1989, at 23, col. 4, & at 30, col. 2 (Treasury Secretary Nicholas
Brady testified to "overtaxation of corporate equity"). See also Bierman, Debt, Stock, and
Junk Bonds, 41 TAX NOTES 1237, 1238 (1988). In the Senate hearings, both Alan
Auerbach and Lawrence Summers expressed their concern over the need for neutrality
between debt and equity financing. See Senate LBO Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 16, at 29-
30 (prepared statement of Alan Auerbach); id. at 20 (prepared statement of Lawrence
Summers). The same concern was shared in the House. See House LBO Hearings I, supra
note 16, at 227-28 (prepared statement of Benjamin Friedman)(any policy that is adopted
should "correct the nonneutrality of the tax code between debt and equity financing"); id.
at 216-17 (prepared statement of Martin Feldstein)(proposal for a cash flow business tax
that besides leveling distinctions between depreciation of investment assets would "elimi-
nate the current tax bias to use excessive debt"); id. at 359-60 (prepared statement of
Michael Blumenthal)( neutrality between debt and equity is a necessary "first step"); id. at
204 (prepared statement of Felix Rohatyn).
53. The current version of the ALI focus on acquisitions and distributions is AM.
LAW INST.. FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C (SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY), RE-
PORTER'S STUDY DRAFT (June 1, 1989)(supplemental study)[hereinafter REPORTER'S
STUDY DRAFT]. The prior version of this supplemental study was contained in AM. LAW
INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C (SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY). TAX AD-
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perceived windfall-gain problem and the known distortions of the
double-tax regime for new investment,54 the ALI Reporter's Study
of 1982 included a proposal, recently revived, 55 to limit the distor-
tion between debt and equity financing caused by the classical
corporate tax regime. Under this proposal, a firm-level deduction
for an interest-like return to new equity would be allowed, so that
only the return in excess of that interest-like return would be
taxed twice. That proposal recasts the tax on corporate equity
capital as a tax on corporate equity profit.
This Article argues that liquidity of ownership interests56
should be the bright-line distinction that justifies a double tax of
equity under equitable taxation, optimal taxation, and neutrality
VISORY GROUP DRAFT No. 18 (Nov. 3, 1988)[hereinafter GROUP DRAFT No. 18]. The
1988 and 1989 supplemental studies re-worked the 1982 ALI Proposals and Reporter's
Study. See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C, PROPOSALS
ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS AND REPORTER'S STUDY ON CdRPORATE
DISTRIBUTIONS (1982)[pages 327-523 are hereinafter referred to as REPORTER'S STUDY ON
CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS].
54. See infra note 810 and accompanying text.
55. The ALI Reporter's approach to integration was first made in 1979. See AM.
LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2
(1979)[hereinafter ALl TENTATIVE DRAFT]. The approach focused upon newly contributed
equity capital alone. Id. at 48-80. It was critiqued in Warren; Integration, supra note 1, at
720-72. The new equity proposal was published in 1982 as Reporter's Proposal R1. RE-
PORTER'S STUDY ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS, supra note 53, at 366-400. Reporter's
Proposal RI also contained an interest disallowance provision. Id. at 368-69 & 381-86.
The attempt to grant relief to new equity continued with the supplemental study. See
GROUP DRAFT No. 18, supra note 53, at 96-115 (proposal 2); REPORTER'S STUDY DRAFT,
supra note 53, at 88-97 (proposal 3). For a discussion of the new equity proposals, see infra
notes 806-28 and accompanying text.
56. Various ways of analyzing liquidity are discussed infra notes 553-74. In the wake
of the October 19, 1987 market break, the secondary market characteristics of liquidity on
the major exchanges has been put in doubt. Wallace, Big Traders' Caution Remakes the
Market, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1988, at D1, col. 3 (Traders' unwillingness to play the mar-
ket has caused lessened liquidity of equities, since volume is down by half of the corre-
sponding figure for 1987. This resulted from an unwillingness to engage in index arbitrage
and dividend captures and other market-based strategies. The slight increase in cost due to
illiquidity contributes to the overall lessening of liquidity in the market and market partici-
pants may now be accepting that the stock market, like other markets, has periods of abso-
lute illiquidity.).
The problems with publicly traded partnerships have recently shown that the interests
may lack significant liquidity characteristics. See infra notes 590-91. A low degree of mar-
ket liquidity, time risk liquidity, and valuation liquidity exist because of the small institu-
tional participation, the actual weakness of liquidity and other guarantees of these firms
compared to the first market perception of their value, and the limited information now
available from market information brokers after the generally adverse 1987 legislation. See
Donnelly, Pitfalls of Master Limited Partnerships Are on the Rise, Wall St. J., Oct. 12,
1988, at Cl, col. 3.
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principles. Any double tax on business enterprises faces many crit-
ics, but one may be justified for firms in which liquid equity own-
ership interests are present. While the proposal advanced in this
Article is descriptive of the current system with the migration of
firms from the public market, the proliferation of S corporations
and partnerships, and the increase in the use of debt financing, the
proposal is not drawn from a description of the current regime but
is based on a normative foundation. It is not a proposal advanced
under a populist or small business notion that large corporations
should pay a tax, an argument generally made under a mistaken
notion of incidence analysis. The liquidity standard is also not a
convenient proxy for taxing large firms, but is based upon the
emerging research in financial economics as to the value of liquid-
ity in pricing residual claims. It is the value of liquid equity as
perceived by the market that justifies a double tax. Liquidity at-
tracts investors who value the exit rights or the financial strategies
that can be pursued with liquid equity ownership. It also attracts
investors who, due to fiduciary limitations, must invest their port-
folios substantially in firms in which a measure of liquidity is pro-
vided. A double tax can reasonably and equitably be applied to
firms with liquid equity without economic distortion and violation
of neutrality principles.
There are three ways in which a tax is a profits tax. The first
refers to profits in the accounting sense, which are the difference
between revenues and the corresponding historic costs including
any returns treated as interest costs."' This Article uses the term
"profits tax" in two ways other than the accounting sense. The
profits referred to in this Article are (1) the return to equity capi-
tal after a deduction is allowed for the interest component either
directly or through the financing of marginal investment with debt
and (2) profits in an economic sense as an excess return or pure
profit, which is an economic rent that exists only due to market
imperfections such as market power and is in excess of what
would be required to attract capital.58 Interest has two compo-
nents: (1) the time value of money component which is made up
of the real rate of interest plus inflation and a term liquidity pre-
57. See A. BELKAOui, ACCOUNTING THEORY 141-43 (1981).
58. For a discussion of the return to equity capital after a deduction for interest, see
infra notes 728 & 749. For a discussion of the financing of marginal investment with debt,




mium and (2) the risk premium component which is based on the
issuer's default risk.5"
The view of liquidity advanced here justifies a profits tax on
the return to liquid equity; it does not justify a classical corporate
tax on corporate equity capital. It is a proposal for a tax on the
value of liquidity as an economic rent - referred to as excess
profits, pure profits, and profits-as-surplus - and for a computa-
tion of the tax base for the double tax after a deduction for the
time value of money component on equity capital is made. The
proposal also leaves open the question of whether profit is appro-
priately defined as a part of the total economic income of the firm
by limiting the interest deduction on interest-denominated debt. In
support of my profits view of the corporate tax, several assump-
tions about firm financing decisions and the capitalization of taxes
must be made. Financial theory demonstrates the irrelevance of
debt and equity financing on firm financial structure in a no-tax
world.60 Financial theory also holds that even if taxes are imposed
on the firm and its shareholders, firm level leverage can offset the
effects of the corporate tax on at least the interest return on eq-
uity6' and shareholder leverage can offset limits in firm level lever-
59. See infra notes 219 & 482.
60. The Miller-Modigliani view of corporate financial structure is that absent taxes,
"the value of the firm is independent of its capital structure and is determined . . . solely
by capitalizing the expected stream of operating income at a discount rate appropriate to
thL company's business risk." V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 372-
73 (3d ed. 1987). The Miller-Modigliani view, which was spelled out in their historic 1958
article, Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of
Investment, 48 AN,. ECON. REv. 261 (1958) (Proposition I) [hereinafter Modigliani&
Miller I], and then later refined, see Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and
the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411 (1961); Modigliani & Miller, Corporate Income
Taxes and the Cost of Capital. A Correction, 53 Am. ECON. REV. 433 (1963) [hereinafter
Modigliani & Miller II], rests on the notions of perfect capital markets, perfect categoriza-
tion of firms into risk categories, and the same probability of distributions for all investors.
While the propositions have been under attack, see V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra
at 372-73, they are generally accepted, see CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra
note 4, at 53 & n.88 (accepting the Miller-Modigliani view of the irrelevance of capital
structure in a no tax world and noting that the only required update of the proposition is
that there be no unexplored arbitrage positions, see Ross, Comment on the Miller-Modi-
gliani Propositions, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1988, at 127 (1988)). Both debt and equity
merely represent financial claims and the right to future ownership of the firm's income.
61. If firms finance their marginal investments with debt, the effect of the corporate
level tax is eliminated if interest payments are deductible. Even if firms are not fully lever-
aged, the favorable taxation of retained earnings distributed as capital gains and the defer-
ral of the shareholder level tax on capital gains produce value, at least where the corporate
rate is lower than the individual tax rate on dividends. See Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J.
FIN. 261 (1977). Currently, this is not the case.
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age62 and the effects of a tax on dividends.6" If so, the corporate
tax is at most a single level profits tax. The unlimited firm level
debt finance hypothesis reflects the Stiglitz view of the corporate
tax as a tax on profits to the extent that all marginal investment is
funded by debt.64
62. Shareholder "homemade" leverage exists when the shareholders undo the effects
of the firm to change its debt-equity ratio through sale of new equity by their own personal
borrowing. See Gordon & Malkiel, Corporation Finance, in How TAXES AFFECT ECO-
NOMIC BEHAVIOR 131, 133 (H. Aaron & J. Pechman eds. 1981). In a world without taxes
and bankruptcy costs, the result is that "[s]ince personal borrowing is a perfect substitute
for corporate borrowing, the firm cannot profit from additional leverage, and since individ-
uals can undo any degree of corporate leverage by buying bonds and shares of the levered
company, the firm is not hurt by a capital structure that is more levered than investors
desire. In fact, not only is any one firm's financial policy irrelevant, but the aggregate
financial policy of the corporate sector is too." Id. See also W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, supra
note 40, at 296-97. The proposition that the shareholders can undermine firm level leverage
in a taxable world is the same and leads to the Miller-Modigliani argument of capital
structure irrelevance. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
383-401 (1988). Shareholder leverage is not unlimited as margin limitations, see infra note
319, and other restrictions on borrowing would suggest.
63. Under the argument advanced by Miller and Scholes, homemade leverage can
also avoid the tax on dividends. See Miller & Scholes, Dividends and Taxes, 6 1. FIN.
ECON. 333 (1978)(both (1) investment in high dividend stocks, borrowing with interest
equal to the dividend, and investing proceeds in a tax deferred account and (2) the invest-
ing in high dividend paying stocks to offset interest deductions limited by the investment
interest deduction limitations can avoid the shareholder level tax on dividends). But see
Poterba, How Burdensome are Capital Gains Taxes?, 33 J. PUB. ECON. 157, 158 & 164-69
(1987)(unlikely that individual taxpayers were sophisticated enough to use these strate-
gies). Extended to its logical outcome, it means that all taxes can be "laundered." The
existence of individual taxes on dividends, see Poterba & Summers, infra note 66, at 235-
37, and limitations on the actual usage of the strategies advanced by Miller and Scholes
demonstrate that dividends taxes are not irrelevant. See Peterson, Peterson & Ang, Direct
Evidence on the Marginal Rate of Taxation on Dividend Income, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 267,
272-80 (1985)(demonstrating that the marginal and effective rate of tax for dividends,
40% and 30%, respectively, are greater than the capital gains tax, and supporting the
premise of the Feenburg results that only a small portion of taxpayers, 0.4%, receiving a
small portion of the dividends, 2.5%, are actually utilizing the provisions outlined by
Miller and Scholes to reduce their marginal rate on dividend income to less than their
marginal rate on capital gain). This argument may be more plausible given the limitations
on consumer interest deductions after 1986, even though the limitation on investment inter-
est deductibility was of little interest to individual investors in devising strategies to obtain
dividends to offset unused investment interest expense. See CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUC-
TURES, supra note 4, at 55 n.89. This is also related to the manner in which the market
values retained earnings (capital gains) and dividends. See infra note 106.
64. On the assumption that marginal investment is made solely with borrowed funds,
Stiglitz and King demonstrate that a properly designed corporate tax, including perfect
depreciation offsets, falls on pure profits and rents and is allocatively neutral. See Stiglitz,
Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy, and the Cost of Capital, 2 J. PuB. ECON. 1
(1973)[hereinafter Stiglitz, Taxation]; Stiglitz, The Corporation Tax, 5 J. PUB. ECON. 303
(1976)[hereinafter Stiglitz, The Corporation Tax]; King, Taxation, Corporate Financial
Policy, and the Cost of Capital: A Comment, 4 J. PUB. ECON. 271 (1975). Even if depreci-
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To the extent that these assumptions do not hold (and to as-
sume unlimited debt is unrealistic),65 the corporate tax is a tax on
ation is not perfect, Stiglitz and King view the corporate tax as a profits tax, if not one on
pure economic profits. Under this view, the corporate tax is nondistortionary since firms
that can resort to debt financing will under marginal production theory invest to the point
where the marginal revenue is equal to the interest cost. Stiglitz then viewed the corporate
tax in each of its roles with the incidence on the owners of the firm or the entrepreneur
incorporating a firm as a tax on capital in the corporate sector, if there is economic depre-
ciation and is a tax on imputed interest income; a tax on pure profits, if there is immediate
write off of capital of expenditures; a tax on entrepreneurship; and a tax on risk taking. See
Stiglitz, The Corporation Tax, supra.
65. The fact that firms do not borrow to make all investments is explained in many
ways: (1) the existence of tax clienteles which may have favored taxation of equity rather
than debt, such as prior to the 1986 Act when individuals were taxed higher on interest
income than on capital gains from stock and currently where capital gains can be deferred,
(2) the declining value of leverage due to less than perfect loss offsets at the firm level, and
(3) the increased cost of debt related to the cost of bankruptcy and moral hazard risks. See
Auerbach, Taxes, Firm Financial Policy, and the Cost of Capital: An Empirical Analysis,
23 J. PuB. EcoN. 27, 28 (1984)[hereinafter Auerbach, Empirical Analysis]; see also
Auerbach, Real Determinants of Corporate Leverage, in CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUC-
TURES IN THE UNITED STATES 301 (B. Friedman ed. 1985)(empirical analysis of bank-
ruptcy/agency cost, tax shield, and tax clientele models with assumption of borrowing as a
continuous process and variables corrected for inflation). The traditional view is that the
marginal source of equity financing in the corporate sector is the issuing of new shares,
whereas another view holds that the marginal source of equity financing is retained earn-
ings. See Poterba & Summers, Dividends, Taxes, Corporate Investment, and "Q"; 22 J.
PUB. ECON. 135, 137-40 (1983). Still a third view regards debt as the marginal source of
funds for investment. See Stiglitz, Taxation, supra note 64, at 18. Newer models show that
*at least where retained earnings are taxed more favorably than distributions, marginal in-
vestment is made first with retained earnings, then debt, as compared with new equity. See
AuLrbach, Empirical Analysis, supra, at 27, 32-33. Neutrality between debt and retained
earnings financing also exists, although the rate of return required for retained earnings
financing may be lower if the firm level tax is lower than the personal income tax rate on
dividends. See Bradford, supra note 66; Zolt, supra note 27, at 843 (detailing limitations
on the unlimited debt hypothesis). A weighted cost of capital approach counters the Miller-
Modigliani model and holds that the risk level in firms increases by the amount of debt
outstanding, and that the cost of capital will be adjusted to reflect the increased risk and
thereby limit the amount of the firm's leverage See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note
62, at 383-402. Finance theory and empirical evidence also find that the issuance of new
equity is at the cost of negative signalling to the market due to the market's presumption
that managers possess asymmetric information about the firm. See R. KORAJCZYK, D. Lu-
CAS & R. McDONALD, UNDERSTANDING STOCK PRICE BEHAVIOR AROUND THE TIME OF
NEw IsSUES (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3170,
1989)(supporting the asymmetric information theory and evaluating the good project and
naive trading theories to explain the rise in equity value before equity announcement and
the drop thereafter); see also Myers & Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Deci-
sions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187
(1984)(model predicts that firms will refuse to issue stock and rely on the stronger signal of
debt issuance or retained earnings finance to avoid the negative signal of new equity);
Greenwald, Stiglitz & Weiss, Informational Imperfections in the Capital Market and
Macroeconomic Fluctuations, 74 Am. ECON. REV. 194 (1984)(debt commitments as a
higher level of signalling and equity issues as negative signals). Nonetheless, many firms
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equity capital at the firm level and has a double tax effect on dis-
tributions to the shareholder. Enter the economists who proclaim,
not unanimously, that investors invest on an after tax basis, that
the value of the publicly traded shares reflects a discount for capi-
talization of the corporate tax, and that shareholder taxes on dis-
tributions may also have an effect on share prices. 6 If the capital-
ization of the firm level tax hypothesis holds, then the original
entrepreneur sees the return on her investment lowered upon in-
corporation by the firm level tax on all or part of the return to
equity capital. 7 Alternatively, some economists proclaim that for
mature companies that can invest out of retained earnings and
view investment decisions as a reflection of the cost of the invest-
ment relative to the replacement cost of capital,68 the appropriate
must rely on equity offerings. See Masulis & Korwar, Seasoned Equity Offerings, 15 J.
FIN. ECON. 91 (1986)(empirical study of firms issuing new equity).
66. The traditional view is that the firm level tax is capitalized into the value of
equity shares. The value of corporate equity is determined under this traditional view by
the tax rate on corporate retentions relative to the shareholder tax rate on retained earn-
ings if earned directly and also by the shareholder tax rate on distributions. See Bradford,
The Incidence and Allocation Effects of a Tax on Corporate Distributions, 15 J. PuB.
EcON. 1, 2-5, 21-22 (1981). A change in the tax rate on both corporate earnings and
distributions will change the value of the firm; and since the firm's capital will be dis-
counted by both, the change in either will produce a windfall gain for the equity holders
who may not be those who originally bore the burden of any capitalized tax. Under this
view, dividend taxes affect the value of the firm as additional taxes on corporate profits
which lower the return to existing shareholders relative to capital gains. Dividend taxes
also affect the firm's marginal investment decision between retained earning financing and
new equity issues by requiring the firm to view the investment choice from both the corpo-
rate and personal level of taxation. Under this view, a reduction in dividend taxes will raise
share values and increase incentives for capital investment precisely because the firm's fi-
nancing view is based on the corporate and individual tax effects. See Poterba & Summers,
The Economic Effects of Dividend Taxation, in RECENT ADVANCES IN CORPORATE Fi-
NANCE 227, 231, 240-44 (E. Altman & M. Subrahmanyam eds. 1985)(model using British
time series data to establish the empirical validity of the traditional view). See also infra
note 127.
For evidence of the effect of shareholder level taxes, see Brinner & Brooks, infra note
100, at 201-02 (Using a model that values the after-tax dividend earnings and the after-tax
proceeds for the sale of stock by discounting each by the relevant tax rate, their principal
finding relative to taxes was that "if one makes fairly simply assumptions about the forma-
tion of expectations, stock prices are highly correlated with the expected present value of
returns from equity investment. Roughly 70 percent of the variation in actual share prices
can be explained by the variation in a present value of future post-tax dividends and capital
gains.").
67. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
68. Q theory helps predict firm valuation after the firm makes an investment. It
"posits that there are adjustment costs in changing the capital stock and derives a one-to-
one relationship between investment and the variable called (marginal) q (the incremental
market value of a firm at the margin of new investment minus the price of investment
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view of capitalization is not the capitalization of the firm level tax
but capitalization of the burden of shareholder taxes on distrib-
uted earnings (dividends) and capital gains taxes on retained
earnings.6 9 Under this view of these companies, a change in the
corporate level tax will not change share values.
These complex questions permeate the formulation of any
normative view of the corporate tax. For purposes of this analysis,
I accept the following views: (1) the firm level tax is generally
capitalized into corporate equities but may not be fully capitalized
into public share prices since there is no effective and full substi-
tute for the financial assets of public corporate equities; (2) while
mature firms can resort to leverage or retained earnings (presently
a more costly route increasing the required return on these re-
tained earnings) to finance their marginal investment decisions,
they are not fully leveraged; (3) taxable shareholders are not fully
leveraged and cannot and do not avoid all dividend taxes; (4)
when a firm finds it necessary to issue new equity, the incidence of
goods)." Hayashi, Corporate Finance Side of the Q Theory of Investment, 27 J. PUB.
EcoN. 261, 261 (1985). TOBIN'S q and the value of q is used to make an evaluation of the
financing decision of the firm whether to use retained earnings or new equity. The value of
the firm is the reproduction cost of the capital it holds, multiplied by q, the ratio of share
value to replacement cost. Firms will finance investment with the sale of new shares only if
share price exceeds reproduction cost; retained earnings will be used so long as share value
is less than reproduction cost. See Auerbach, Share Valuation and Corporate Equity Pol-
icy, II J. PUB. ECON. 291, 292-94, 303 (1979).
69. Auerbach, drawing upon the earlier work of King, elaborated this tax capitaliza-
tion view of the corporate tax. See Auerbach, Wealth Maximization and the Cost of Capi-
tal, 93 Q.J. ECON. 433 (1979). For a discussion of the tax capitalization view of dividend
taxes, see Poterba & Summers, supra note 66, at 230, 237-40. They demonstrate using
dividend payout and investment data from the dividend tax reforms in Britain that divi-
dend taxes are not capitalized. Id. at 264-74. Another way of viewing the difference in the
shareholder level capitalization and firm level capitalization is through the use of the long
run value of q. The first model predicts a value of q less than one due to the tax savings of
investment through retention and the fact that future dividend taxes are capitalized and
not borne by new investment. The second model predicts a q of one. Auerbach, Empirical
Analysis, supra note 65, at 30.
This economic modeling does not take into account the tax benefit of repurchases and
has been labeled a "trapped equity" hypothesis. See M. KING & D. FULLERTON, THE TAX-
ATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL (1984). It assumes that the only way for stockholders to
receive cash from their companies is through the payment of a dividend and implies that a
dollar of retained earnings will be capitalized on the market as one minus the tax rate on
dividends over one minus the effective tax rate on accrued capital gains. This formula
establishes the rate of return required by the equity holders relative to debt but the trapped
equity hypothesis has not been proved. See Warren, Integration, supra note 1, at 727-28;
Kraakman, supra note 44, at 897 n.19 (suggestion that other discount hypotheses are bet-
ter than trapped equity theory). The trapped equity hypothesis continues to be contested.
See Poterba, supra note 41, at 470.
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the tax is on the existing shareholders of that firm regardless of
whether it is the firm level or shareholder level tax that is capital-
ized; (5) the incidence of a profits tax that excludes the interest
return on capital from the tax base is determined under the Stig-
litz assumptions set forth above, and to the extent that the
"profit" taxed is not pure or economic profit, the tax creates a
long-run shift of capital which places the ultimate incidence of the
tax on capital under the traditional Harberger closed economy
model; and (6) even if the firm level tax is written as a profits tax
allowing an interest deduction, it is not "shifted" to consumers in
the form of higher prices or to labor in the form of lower wages."
70. While the foregoing are apparent from the previous discussion, the assumption of
lack of capitalization for public equities and the assumptions of tax incidence are not.
The public market for equity offers an efficient means for an equity return relative to
an equity risk in a manner that, through the application of portfolio theory, can be effi-
ciently diversified. Cf. Auerbach, Corporate Taxation in the United States, 2 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 451, 482 (1983)("One of the fundamental reasons for the
existence of public corporations is to allow risks to be efficiently diversified through the
stock market."). The characteristics of the value of public equities in some way are unique
and their value as an investment may mean that the full tax cost, under any view of tax
capitalization, are not borne for that reason. The argument draws from the view over the
mobility of corporate capital through a fluidity of investment choice and the properties of
common stock as a unique financial investment. See Break, The Incidence and Economic
Effects of Taxation, in THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 119, 147-48 (The Brookings
Institution 1974)(recounting the Smith-Stockfisch debate of the early 1950s). See also
infra note 474 and accompanying text.
The issue of incidence is an important one. Under the profits tax advanced in this
Article, liquidity is viewed as a quality in the nature of "pure" economic profit for entre-
preneurs and shareholders in firms that resort to new equity financing and as an excess
return for those firms. See infra notes 460-531 & 757-83 and accompanying text. In the
closed economy model, taxing excess profits and allowing a firm level deduction for the
interest component of the cost of capital will produce an incidence on the entrepreneur who
takes her firm public by causing it to issue liquid equity or the residual equity holder in a
firm that issues new equity to the extent that the demand for liquidity is inelastic, but will
not produce an allocation of capital to the illiquid sector. To the extent that such an alloca-
tion does occur, however, it may have a beneficial effect by freeing capital for risky and
start-up firms. See infra notes 729-83, 791 & 897 and accompanying text. In other words,
the incidence of any profits tax will be borne by residual equity holders and entrepreneurs,
and in the long run assets will move in and out of firms, industries, and economic sectors in
response to after tax rates of return resulting in the equalization of after tax returns in all
sectors. However, capital will not necessarily migrate from the taxed sector to the untaxed
sector if the double tax is based on liquidity, since there will exist through the market's
valuation of liquidity a superior return in the taxed sector.
If firms produce to the point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue, a profits
tax lowers the profit to the firm but does not affect price or output since a net profits tax is
a marginal cost only so long as the good produced is profitable. Therefore, we should as-
sume that the incidence of the income tax is not shifted. See J. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX
282-83 (1989). While it is argued that the corporate tax is shifted to labor or consumers,
the ability to shift a profits tax belongs to all firms that possess economic power or choose
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I also accept that for mature firms, there may be as recently sug-
gested a "bifurcated view" of the capitalization of shareholder
taxes together with the firm level tax."1
behavior that is not profit-maximizing. See infra notes 348-50 & 361-67 and accompany-
ing text. Furthermore, any firm level tax (whether in the form of a two-tiered tax or inte-
grated with the taxation of the owners) may be shifted to labor or consumers by a firm
changing its output and pricing decisions in the face of the tax. See infra note 350. Any
firm level tax may or may not have an incidence different from a direct tax on the individ-
ual firm owners. See Graetz, Assessing the Distributional Effects of Income Tax Revision:
Some Lessons From Incidence Analysis, 4 J. LEGAICSTUD. 351 (1975). It may not be more
difficult for direct owners who are taxed on the profits of the firm to direct the firm to shift
the incidence of the tax to others. The potential for shifting is troublesome for formulating
a tax policy with respect to any income tax on profits. See Klein, Incidence, supra note 2.
The potential for shifting weighs against profits taxation and supports a tax on owners
when they receive distributions from the firm. See infra notes 350 & 361-62 and accompa-
nying text. On the other hand, the potential for shifting does not mean that income taxa-
tion of business profits should be wholly eliminated.
If the firm level tax is capitalized, the incidence assumption for the issuance of new
equity is determined under the Stiglitz model. See supra note 64. If the tax capitalization
view of shareholder taxes is followed, however, the incidence assumption may also be deter-
mined under that view. See Mundstock, Taxation of Intercorporate Dividends Under an
Unintegrated Regime, 44 TAx L. REv. 1, 28 (1988)(arguing that under the tax capitaliza-
tion view the dividends received deduction for common stock produces a windfall gain for
corporate investors).
71. Auerbach has proposed what is in effect a bifurcated view of the shareholder
level tax discount hypothesis and its effect on firm behavior. Under Auerbach's proposal,
firms at the margin obtain equity funds consistent with the tax capitalization view by
utilizing retentions and in other periods by using new equity which is consistent with the
traditional double taxation view that dividend taxes are not capitalized. See Auerbach,
Empirical Analysis, supra note 65, at 29-30, 47-49 (noting that firms view new shares are
more costly, which is verified by empirical results, and that the cost of capital varies signifi-
cantly across firms with different estimated tax clienteles). For a discussion of the alterna-
tive views of tax capitalization for an exclusive proposition, see Warren, Integration, supra
note 1, at 726-28 (arguing as of 1981 that both are not proven). This parallels to a certain
extent the "new view" of the corporate tax: it falls on entrepreneurs or shareholders in
firms that cannot resort to retained earnings finance or debt, the latter where the interest
payment is deductible to the firm, but that since there are other tax clienteles for whom
holding of equity may be attractive, debt finance is not always to be preferred to equity
finance. See Auerbach, Tax Integration and the "New View" of the Corporate Tax: A
1980's Perspective, 1981 PROc. NAT'L TAX Ass'N 21, 22-23, 25 [hereinafter Auerbach,
"New View"]. Acceptance of the view that only shareholder level taxes are capitalized, not
firm level taxes, would eliminate the need to single out new equity for a profits tax ap-
proach because of "windfall gain" concerns with respect to the value of firm capital other
than retained earnings. The shareholder level capitalization view would determine the
"windfall" based on the capitalization of shareholder level taxes. See A. Auerbach, Tax
Policy and Corporate Borrowing 19 (University of Pennsylvania unpublished working pa-
per, Sept. 1989)(forthcoming in the TAx LAw.)("[If] taxes on distributions from existing
equity are capitalized into the value of shares and do not influence the marginal cost of
capital for reinvested funds . . ., [t]his would mean a current effective rate of tax of 34
percent on reinvested equity funds, plus the effective rate of capital gains on accumulated
earnings, compared to the 28 percent or 33 percent tax rate that most investors would face
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Based on the foregoing assumptions, I propose that all firms
with liquid ownership interests, which are generally publicly
traded, should be subject to the double tax,7 1 and firms with illiq-
uid ownership interests, which are generally nonpublic firms,
should have their income taxed directly to their owners unless for
administrative reasons the firm is substituted as a collection
agent a.7  The logic of the proposal dictates that returns on the new
equity of these existing firms should be deductible or creditable,
and that the Subchapter S corporation regime should be available
to the fullest extent possible.74 Firms that want a more complex
capital structure than that allowed by Subchapter S could elect to
be taxed at the entity level with a deduction for distribution of
earnings to owners or a credit for taxes paid. The proposal could
also be the basis for integrating existing corporate capital with
appropriate transitional relief. The proposal made here is not the
same as for a securities transfer tax. 5
under an integrated tax system. Put simply, investors would receive a small cut in their
marginal tax rates and a large windfall, equal to the present value of the capitalized taxes
on distributions forgiven. This would include distributions from all net assets, equal to re-
turns to existing capital plus economic rents less interest payments on preexisting debt."
(emphasis in original)).
72. The capitalization argument suggests that the double tax is not a double tax in
the sense of two overlapping jurisdictions. Nonetheless, it is a useful shorthand for the two-
tier or classical taxation of corporate income.
73. Gene Steurele's simplified integrated tax ("SIT") is in this model. It applies
Subchapter S to a growing number of corporations that are "just beyond the boundaries"
for current Subchapter S and new venture firms, with the additional feature of corporate
based withholding at the highest rate of tax for individuals. See Steurele, A Simplified
Integrated Tax, 44 TAX NOTES 335, 336 (1989).
74. See infra notes 1050-64 and accompanying text.
75. See Brockway, Joint Committee Outlines Securities Transfer Tax Issues, 35
TAX NOTES 595 (1987); Keifer, A Stock Transfer Tax: Preliminary Economic Analysis,
35 TAx NOTES 595 (1987). The argument is made that a securities transfer tax encourages
economic efficiency by curbing excesses associated with short term speculation including
the diversion of resources away from production into financial speculation and promotes a
longer corporate managerial horizon. See L. Summers & V. Summers, When Financial
Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities Transfer Tax 29-30 (Working
Paper presented at the Annenberg Conference on Technology and Financial Markets,
1989)(concluding that the argument that the tax would reduce the role of the U.S. securi-
ties industry, would not be enforceable, and would move the U.S. financial markets offshore
are unfounded given possible approaches to the problems and possible harmonization of
securities transfer taxation worldwide). The securities transfer tax is aimed at producing
revenue and discouraging short run trading strategies, although for long-term investors it
has the impact of increasing their transaction costs associated with holding a security and
is a tax to discount to the present. With that as a policy, the proposal is to exempt debt and
equity of privately held firms which are not readily tradable. Id. at 25-26. At issue is also
whether to exempt debt securities or to tax them at a different rate. Id. at 26-27. The
[Vol. 39:965
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The first step should be to abolish the graduated rate struc-
ture since it deviates from the flat tax perspective, creates a third
category of firms,76 and grants a significant but decreasing tax
subsidy to those firms to which it applies.1 In a flat tax world,78
the inquiry is not whether graduated rates should be used as a
imposition of a firm level tax on liquidity may have the same incidence as an excise tax but
since it is on the anticipated yearly stream of income, it has its incidence on the entrepre-
neur rather than the purchaser of the discounted earnings stream. The tax on liquidity is
less well targeted to speculative trading activity since it affects both traders and fundamen-
tal value investors the same.
76. The Treasury was concerned with the categorization of firms. It sought the elimi-
nation of graduated corporate rates by proposing a flat tax on all corporate income and a
modified flat tax on all passthrough income. See 1 TREASURY I STUDY, supra note 8, at 97;
2 TREASURY I STUDY, supra note 8, at 127-29. For the case against the graduated rates,
see Brooks, Taxation of Closely-Held Corporations: The Partnership Option and the
Lower Rate of Tax, 3 AUSTL TAX FORUM 381, 471-509 (1986)(advocating mandatory
passthrough for closely held firms regardless of form and arguing against a lower rate of
corporate tax); 1987 House MLP Hearings, supra note 30, at 343-52 (statement of John
W. Lee)(mandatory passthrough of income and loss for closely held C corporations). The
case for graduated tax rates for small firms was set forth in J. BUTTERS & J. LINTNER,
EFFECTS OF FEDERAL TAXEs ON GROWING ENTERPRISES (1945). The rationale for the
graduated rates is to allow firms to compete more effectively with larger businesses. If risky
business is not encouraged, specifically targeted incentives should be preferred to capital
accumulation through inside shelter. Harold Groves captured the unfocused nature of the
graduated corporate rates:
Extended consideration cannot be given here to the use of business taxes for
social control. The graduated corporate tax may, through its differentials, aid
small business. Because of their importance in small communities and because of
their possible value as a check upon monopoly, small companies have claim to
special attention. However, small business should not be confused with new busi-
ness, competitive business, or business developing new products, all of which are
the proper objects of social concern. Moreover, the graduated corporate tax aids
not only small business but also large business with a small income ....
H. GROVES, POSTWAR TAXATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 26-27 (1946). For a further
discussion, see infra text at notes 1065-69.
77. For estimates of the revenue loss associated with the new corporate graduated
rates, see supra note 38. Presently under the flat tax, graduated rates are provided and
then phased-out for firms with greater than $100,000 of taxable income. I.R.C. § 11(b)
(West 1988 & Supp. 1989). Under prior law, the benefits of graduated rates were phased-
out for corporations with more than $1,000,000 of taxable income. See The Deficit Reduc-
tion Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 66(a), 98 Stat. 494, 585. The subsidy is now not
available for personal service corporations. See I.R.C. §§ 1 I(b)(2), 448(d)(2) (West 1988
& Supp. 1989).
78. The individual tax base is actually a form of a degressive tax since it has both an
exemption amount through the personal exemptions, and a single rate for middle class
taxpayers through the phase out of the 15 percent rate to equalize the rate to a proportion-
ate 28 percent rate. For the highest income taxpayers, the tax is a true flat tax because
both the personal exemptions and the lower rate as completely phased out. For the contrast
between the degressive rate and the progressive income tax, see Kornhauser, The Rhetoric
of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH..L.
REV. 465, 470-71 (1987).
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subsidy for small business or whether small business should be
forced to be part of a pure passthrough regime, but whether
double taxation of an equity return from any firm is justified on
any grounds. This Article sets forth a justification for the ALI
new equity proposal to redraft the corporate tax as a profits tax,
but goes beyond the ALI proposal by providing a normative ra-
tionale for some instances of double taxation. 9 The proposed prof-
its tax is coupled with an explicit liquid equity ownership standard
to determine the firms subject to a double tax.
The Article is organized into seven parts. Part I considers the
historical and current setting for the classical corporate tax re-
gime and the relevant biases of that system compared to those of
the passthrough system. It takes into account the theory of an in-
come tax as applied to individuals and legal intermediaries, and
criticizes the current system for its inability to articulate a valid
basis for distinguishing between twice-taxed entities and single-
taxed entities. Part I demonstrates that the resemblance test is an
ineffective means of distinguishing between single-taxed and
double-taxed entities, notwithstanding nontax differences between
closely held and public firms that are suggestive of tax conse-
quences. I include in Part I a discussion of the evolution of the
classical system, its place in firm financing decisions, and the pres-
sures existing before and after 1986 to set the stage for the search
for a normative standard for double taxation of an equity return. I
include a discussion of the theory of the income tax and the taxa-
ble unit in Part I to place firm level taxation within the tradition
of the income tax. Finally, I critique the resemblance test for the
distortion that a legal test focusing on "resemblance" creates in
the policy debate on the United States classical corporate tax re-
gime. Readers familiar with these issues may wish to read briskly
79. In reviewing the work of the A.L.I. Subchapter C project and in particular the
proposals related to corporate distributions, Renato Beghe noted that the fundamental
question is who should be subject to the corporate tax regime:
The scheme envisioned by Draft No. 2 would drastically alter the tax bur-
dens of investors who chose to conduct business using an entity subject to the
corporate income tax. Until we have identified the entities that ought to be sub-
ject to that tax, it is impossible to decide whether the increased burden would be
justified. The history of the differences in the effective overall rates of taxation
on public and private corporations and their shareholders underscores the impor-
tance of these questions.
Beghe, The American Law Institute Subchapter C Study: Acquisitions and Distributions,
33 TAX LAW. 743, 773 (1980)(crediting Professor Blum with this insight and noting reli-
ance of closely held firms on deductible payments and nondividend distributions).
[Vol. 39:965
CORPORATE TAX
through Part I to obtain my focus on these issues.
Part II sets forth the separate justification for a double tax
regime. It also briefly considers and rejects four other plausible
rationales for the double tax regime. Part III presents a proposal
for reforming the current system by confining the double tax re-
gime to firms that produce business income for which the owners
have liquid ownership interests. It demonstrates that liquidity has
value that is susceptible to taxation. It then sets forth a definition
of liquidity that does not wholly depend on stock being traded in a
public marketplace, but would include liquidity granted by a pri-
vate contract if the indices of the vdlue of liquidity in a public
market were sufficiently present. Part IV considers other tax pro-
posals that would impose double taxation based on public trading.
Part V considers and rejects various other rationales for a double
tax.
Part VI tests the liquidity proposal against the traditional tax
policy criteria of fairness, efficiency, neutrality, simplicity, and
revenue. Part VII sets forth an agenda for inquiry concerning the
implementation of a liquidity based system. The Article concludes
that drawing the double tax line at liquid equity and as a profits
tax is the best rationale under benefits, equity, and optimal taxa-
tion theories for an arguably inefficient tax. Furthermore, the
scope of Subchapter S corporations and any future fully inte-
grated system should be expanded significantly given the other




1. The Classical Corporate Tax System
To understand the source for a normative basis for a double
tax, it is helpful to review where the classical corporate tax system
began, its relationship to firm-financing decisions, and the threads
holding it together that began to break before 1986. I do not un-
dertake a comprehensive analysis of all the policy considerations
behind the tax treatment of corporate financial structures; an
analysis that is finally possible in 1989 in conjunction with the
hearings on leveraged buyouts.80 Nonetheless, it is important in
80. See CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4.
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advocating the normative view of a double tax on equity returns to
examine the structural biases of the classical corporate tax regime
both before and after 1986.
The 1909 corporation income tax,81 denominated an excise
tax to avoid perceived constitutional limitations,82 was constitu-
tionally upheld under the Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.88 benefits anal-
ysis. After ratification of the sixteenth amendment84 in 1913, a
general income tax was adopted.85 The statute created a normal
tax and a surtax on individuals" and left in place the normal tax
on corporations. It imposed a tax on dividends received by individ-
uals and corporations, 7 although dividends received by individuals
were exempt from the normal tax.88 Until the 1986 Act, the cor-
81. Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11, repealed by Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, §
4(S), 38 Stat. 201. The statute did not apply to partnerships, since it required that the firm
be organized for profit and "have a capital stock represented by shares." Id. at § 38. Mod-
ern PTPs have "shares" in the form of depository receipts.
82. The civil war income tax, which expired in 1872, taxed mercantile and industrial
corporations on a pure passthrough basis. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 15, 16 Stat. 256.
The 1894 act, held unconstitutional in Pollack v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S.
429 (1895), taxed both individuals and corporations. Tarriff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28
Stat. 553.
83. 220 U.S. 107 (1911). The benefit of utilizing the corporate franchise was a ra-
tionale for imposing an entity-level tax. The corporate income tax did not provide the same
problem according to the Court that an individual income tax would have prior to the
adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment. See id. at 148-58.
84. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI (granting Congress power to collect taxes on income
"from whatever source derived" without apportionment).
85. Tarriff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
86. Id. at § II(A)(1), (2).
87. Id. at § II B.
88. Id. at § II D. The result was that, subject only to deferral of the second tax,
corporate income bore the individual tax rate and the corporation acted as a withholding
agent. This was so even though the Act contained a provision for taxing shareholders on
profits improperly accumulated regardless of whether distribution actually took place. Id.
at § II(A)(2). The scope of this provision was, in any case, less than clear from the collo-
quies. See SEIDMAN's LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FED. INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-1861, 984-
86 (1938).
A short-lived retained earnings tax on undistributed income not "actually invested and
employed in the business or retained for employment in the reasonable requirements of the
business" was adopted in 1917. Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1206(2), 40 Stat. 300. This
provision was later replaced with a provision to tax shareholders directly on the retained
profits of firms, which represented a departure from the legal entity view. See Revenue Act
of 1918, ch. 18, § 220, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919). At the same time, the corporate rate became
greater than the individual normal tax rate available to dividend credit, but not greater
than the combined normal tax and surtax. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, tit. II, §§ 210-
241, 40 Stat. 1058-1082 (1919)(compare Parts II and III). Neither capital stock taxes nor
excess profits taxes were creditable. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 222(a), 40 Stat. 1073
(1919); see also Brooks, supra note 76, at 403.
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porate rate remained lower than the highest individual rates.89
Until 1936, the corporate tax was partially creditable against the
individual tax on distributions and then not at all.90 Additionally,
prior to and immediately after 1936, undistributed profits (re-
tained earnings) were generally not taxed separately.91 Beginning
in 1921, proceeds from sales and redemptions of shares were taxed
at a preferential capital gains rate. 92 The fact that for many years
dividends were exempt from taxation under the normal tax meant
that the classical corporate tax regime operated as a progressive
element in the tax base - only individuals with higher levels of
income actually paid a second level tax on dividends received.9 3
This double tax regime, known as the classical corporate tax
system9 4 and typified by both deferral and double taxation of prof-
89. Excess profits taxes may have briefly pushed it higher. See REPORTER'S STUDY
DRAFT, supra note 54, at 48 n.43. It has been argued that incorporated businesses bore a
higher tax burden than did unincorporated businesses from 1919 until the mid-1930s, when
the federal corporation rates began to be higher than the individual normal rates. See
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND REPORT, supra note 14, at 159 (arguing that in 1935 the
greatest discrepancy occurred when the highest individual normal passthrough rate was
4% and the corporation rate was graduated to 15% while the individual surtax rate was
75%). Surtax rates, however, caused the highest individual rate to be higher than the
corporate rate. By the 1930s, the disparity in rates was considerable for individuals subject
to the surtax rates. See J. EUSTICE, J. KUNTZ, C. LEWIS & T. DEERING, TAX REFORM ACT
OF 1986: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY § 2.02[2][a], at 2-8 (1986)(table). The excess of
the corporate rate over the individual normal rate was disadvantageous to incorporated
businesses since stockholders receiving dividends were subject to a higher total of taxes
than were investors in unincorporated businesses. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND RE-
PORT, supra note 14, at 160.
90. Brooks, supra note 76, at 403.
91. The short-lived undistributed profits tax of 1936, the repeal of which was urged
by the Twentieth Century Fund, is the exception. Its enactment demonstrated the view that
the accumulation of undistributed profits in reserves was undesirable and should be dis-
couraged, in part, due to the belief that excessive saving by corporations and individuals
from 1923 to 1929 was a cause of the stock market crash. See J. STAMP, THE FUNDAMEN-
TAL PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION 213-14 (rev. ed. 1936). Its actual effect was limited. Com-
pare G. LENT, THE IMPACT OF THE UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX, 1936-1937, at 33-34
(1948)(33 percent increased dividend payout) with R. HUBBARD & P. REISS, CORPORATE
PAYOUTS AND THE TAX PRICE OF CORPORATE RETENTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM THE UNDIS-
TRIBUTED PROFITS TAX OF 1936-1938 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper No. 3111, 1989)(effect only in 1936 as managers found ways to retain "free cash
flow"). This form of split-rate system, which had an increasing tax rate based on the de-
creasing ratio of dividends to income, was repealed based on the belief that it discouraged
business expansion. See CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 88.
92. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206, 42 Stat. 232-33.
93. This assumes incidence of the tax on shareholders or owners of capital. See infra
text accompanying note 351.
94. The first usage of the term may be in A. VAN DEN TEMPEL, supra note 3, at 7.
See also Phelps, Profits Theory and Profits Taxation, 34 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF
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its, came into the world without any apparent legislative discus-
sion of policy or economic considerations.95 The effects of the
double tax have depended upon the relationship between the firm
level rates (for both large and small corporations) and the individ-
ual rates. 6 The corporate tax prior to the 1986 Act can generally
be viewed as an inefficient single tax system,97 rather than a
PAPERS 674, 681 n.8 (1986); J. CHOWN, THE REFORM OF THE CORPORATION TAX 5
(1971).
95. See Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolu-
tion and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 109 (1977) [hereinafter Clark, Morphogenesis]. The
excise tax requirement under the 1909 Act that the organization be formed for "doing
business" was used by the courts when they construed the income tax. See McKee,
Problems of the Unintentional Corporation: The Association Taxable as a Corporation,
29 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 853, 865 (1971). The courts blindly adopted the "doing business"
requirement without a discussion of the purpose of the excise tax as a privilege tax and the
purpose of the income tax as a tax on net income. See Brooks, supra note 76, at 402 n.71
(no separate taxpaying ability implied because 1909 Act denominated an excise tax for
constitutional reasons). Phelps summarizes the problem:
What was the antecedent wisdom on profits taxation prior to the criticisms of
such a tax made by Harberger? A number of countries have chosen the system
of corporate taxation introduced by the United States in 1909. In broad outline,
the corporation pays a flat tax rate on all taxable profits without any tax credit
going to the shareowner for his share of the profits tax paid. The shareowners
are liable for the personal income tax, if any, on their dividends or capital gains.
Finally, on the principle that only income, not gross receipts, should be taxable,
the corporations (and thus, indirectly, their owners) are permitted to deduct in-
terest expense in the calculation of taxable profit income. The economic historian
is left to infer the intended "economics" of this legislation. There was no formal
defense of it using recognizable economic theory.
Phelps, supra note 94, at 680-81 (footnote omitted). The classical system continued with-
out a thought-out basis, perhaps impelled by considerations of revenue and prevention of
tax avoidance through the use of corporations. Brooks, supra note 76, at 405 n.82 (quoting
Shoup, infra note 125, at 137)(the extra taxation "was almost a by-product of the confu-
sion that arose over the issue of taxing undistributed profits").
96. For a review of these relationships in the United States, the United Kingdom,
Canada, and Australia, see Brooks, supra note 76, at 386-458.
97. Even if capital gains are subject to full taxation only when realized, an
unintegrated corporate tax will be neutral with respect to the payout decision, provided
that the capital gains rate is equal to the marginal personal tax rate of shareholders. See
Warren, Integration, supra note 1, at 731-37 (higher tax bracket individuals prefer equity
investments if retained earnings and capital gains are possible); Warren, The Timing of
Taxes, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 499, 501 (1986) [hereinafter Warren, Timing] (tax on dividends
would not necessarily encourage retention of dividends). Nonetheless, prior to the 1986
changes, viewing corporate financing strategies solely in light of the applicable corporate
and individual rates, a retained earnings strategy produced a higher after-tax valuation for
the firm than did immediate distribution of firm earnings, financing by new equity, or in-
creasing leverage by distributing earnings and reloaning the distribution to the corporation.
See Zolt, supra note 27, at 864-68. This relationship was even more pronounced prior to
the reduction of the individual marginal rate on unearned income to 50 percent from 70
percent. See Warren, Integration, supra note 1, at 719-33. The value of the deferral for
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double tax system, for both public and private firms retaining
earnings rather than paying dividends although even that view can
be contradicted by evidence of the effective tax rates for corpora-
tions and shareholders 8 Nonetheless, the traditional tax clientele
retained earnings was recognized early on. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND REPORT,
supra note 14, at 161-62 (withholding dividends postpones, rather than avoids, payment of
income tax). This concept was apparently forgotten by economists. See Klein, Incidence,
supra note 2, at 585-86 (advantages of the corporate form to individuals has largely been
ignored). See also R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 7, at 394 (comparing pre-
sent double tax with what tax would be under an integrated system). The characterization
of the corporate tax as a double tax system has persisted despite the obvious deferral ad-
vantages in the corporate form. See Beghe, supra note 79, at 769 (discussing ALl proposed
draft of Subchapter C).
The distortion between retention of earnings and payment of earnings is witnessed by
the aborted 1936 undistributed profits tax. See R. BLAKEY & G. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 401-27. This view continues in repeated proposals to increase the scope of the
accumulated earnings tax. See Cohen, Taxing Stock Dividends and Economic Theory,
1974 Wis. L. REV. 142, 174. Taxing only distributed profits favors retained earnings as a
source for corporate finance. The advice to managers relative to using retained earnings has
been long-standing. See J. DEAN, CAPITAL BUDGETING 39-42 (1951)(offering guidelines on
dividing profits between retained earnings and dividends).
A related concern is the appropriate timing of the tax on dividend distributions. It
places newer businesses at a competitive disadvantage in the capital markets compared
with established concerns able to finance with lower taxed retained earnings. W. VICKREY,
supra note 39, at 162-63. Since World War 11 the tax rates for currently distributed earn-
ings have been much higher than the passthrough rate. See J. EUSTICE, J. KUNTZ, C. LEWIS
& T. DEERING, supra note 89, at I 2.02(1)(c), at 2-8 (table 2-1)(both public companies
and closely held C corporations have not distributed all earnings currently but rather have
used retained earnings to finance corporate expansion); see also Clark, Morphogenesis,
supra note 95, at 102-03 (retained earnings avoids double taxation of shareholders and
provides higher after-tax returns than can be obtained by partnerships and sole
proprietorships).
98. The criticism that the corporate tax is a single tax system stems from the belief
and data that regardless of the deferral advantages of the corporate form, in the aggregate
there was double taxation at the corporate and individual ordinary rate that far exceeded
the deferral opportunities. The historical rate relationship leading to the retained versus
distributed earnings distortion may be somewhat overstated as actual dividends received
were taxed at rates lower than the highest individual marginal rate and close to the highest
corporate marginal rate. Evidence on individual effective tax rates provided by Brinner &
Brooks, Stock Prices, in BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, How TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAV-
IOR 199 (H. AARON & J. PECHMAN eds. 1981), suggests that recipients of dividends were
taxed at lower marginal tax rates than the marginal tax rate applicable to the tax on the
earnings at the corporate level. Studying the historical patterns of taxation of corporate
capital from 1955 to 1978 they find a dividends tax rate, based on a weighted average of
people who reported dividends in adjusted gross income, of between 5 and 10 percentage
points less than the corporate profits tax rate until about 1974. The rate differential then
began moving towards parity. By 1978 the dividend rate was less than one percentage point
below the corporate rate. Brinner & Brooks, supra, at 226-27. Accord Peterson, Peterson
& Ang, supra note 63, at 280 (dividends taxed at an average marginal rate of 40% for
taxable recipients). Viewing the issue from an effective tax rate perspective leads to a dif-
ferent conclusion. The Brinner and Brooks data was updated in Feldstein & Jun, The Ef-
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view99 for both public and private corporations is that the pure
fects of Tax Rates on Nonresidential Fixed Income: Some Preliminary Evidence from the
1980s, in THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 101, 137-51 (M. Feld-
stein ed. 1987). Feldstein and Jun demonstrate that the effective federal income tax rate of
individual dividend recipients was, beginning in 1958, always higher than the effective fed-
eral corporate tax rate. Id. at 143-48 (tables 4.6 and 4.7).
Due to assumptions about the efficiency of corporate producers relative to
noncorporate producers and the distortion between current consumption, which is favored
by the existence of the corporate tax, and future consumption, the increased taxation of the
corporate sector is argued to lead to reduced national income. See Feldstein & Frisch,
Corporate Tax Integration: The Estimated Effects on Capital Accumulation and Tax Dis-
tribution of Two Integration Proposals, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 37, 38-39 (1977)(noting esti-
mates of waste by Harberger and Shoven). The advantages of equity relative to debt lead
to arguments under the prior rate relationships that the individual tax burden on equity is
lower than debt. See Miller, supra note 61. Whether that is true depends upon whether the
taxes on dividends are capitalized by the market, see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying
text. If not, the corporate tax on equity plus the individual level tax on dividends is higher.
A model by Marcus, Palmon and Yaari argues that where both the dividend tax has been
capitalized and where cash flow can be realized by stock trading among shareholders which
does not transfer corporate cash out of the firm, the tax effect of the retention followed by
a capital transaction through a sale on the market or a corporate repurchase is at a higher
tax cost than if the firm distributes income currently: "By depriving shareholders of a cash
flow, retention induces trading at appreciated prices causing an immediate tax payment on
realized gains over and above any tax that must be paid on incremental future distribu-
tion." Marcus, Palmon & Yaari, Growth and the Decision to Incorporate: A Financial
Theory of the U.S. Tax System, 6 Ras. FIN. 29, 36-37 (1986)(taxation of distributions
should favor distribution of earnings rather than the commonly accepted retention of earn-
ings since the deferral period is unknown under the assumption of capitalization of the
dividend tax and the actual capital gains tax). Even if deferral is advantageous vis a vis
investment in a proprietorship, the period for evaluating that deferral remains imprecise
despite numerous studies attesting to its beneficial effects. See id. at 39-43.
99. The tax clientele view reflects the belief that investors diversify their ownership
interests in a firm by the type of security that provides the desired tax preferred return -
debt, preferred stock, or common stock. It also reflects the belief that with respect to com-
mon stock, firms with high payout ratios are owned by shareholders in lower tax brackets.
See infra notes 100 & 189. This relationship has been tested with ex-dividend day data
which finds that the expected ex-dividend day relationship of a drop in the value of the
stock by the exact amount of the dividend is not present due to the fact that there are
taxpayers holding the stock for whom dividends are more favorably taxed than capital
gains. See Elton & Gruber, Marginal Stockholder Tax Rate and the Clientele Effect, 52
REv. EcON. & STAT. 68, 71-73 (1970). This data also supports the view that dividend taxes
are not avoided. See Poterba & Summers, supra note 66, at 252-53. Ex-dividend day re-
turns have been used to predict marginal stockholder tax rates. See Elton & Gruber,
supra. These tests have been controversial in establishing a clientele effect. Compare Elton
& Gruber, supra, at 71-73 (Ex-dividend day behavior shows that differential rates of taxa-
tion cause investors to discount the value of taxable cash dividends relative to capital gains.
This creates a tax clientele effect in which investors with high marginal tax rates hold
stocks yielding low dividends and vice-versa.) and Litzenberger & Ramaswamy, The Effect
of Personal Taxes and Dividends on Capital Asset Prices, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 163, 189 (1979)
and Barclay, The Ex-Dividend Day Behavior of Common Stock Prices Before the Income
Tax, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 31, 32 (1988)(finding that investors in the pre-tax period value
dividends and capital gains as perfect substitutes and that differential taxation of dividends
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deferral opportunities for high bracket investors and owners in-
vesting in low-payout, high-retention firms allowed these individu-
als to reduce their personal marginal tax rates and reduced the
progressivity of the income tax system.'00 Penalty taxes were the
statutory answer to deferral. 110  While deferral was advantageous
and capital gains has since caused investors to discount the value of taxable cash dividends)
with Kalay, The Ex-Dividend Day Behavior of Stock Prices: A Re-examination of the
Clientele Effect, 37 J. FIN. 1059 (1984)(rejecting prior studies showing ex-dividend day
price drops by less than the amount of the dividend and demonstrating a positive correla-
tion between relative price drops and dividend yields indicating that dividends are taxed
more heavily than capital gains) and Eades, Hess & Kim, On Interpreting Security Re-
turns During the Ex-Dividend Period, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1984) and Grinblatt, Massulis
& Titman, The Valuation Effects of Stock Splits and Stock Dividends, 13 J. FIN. ECON.
461 (1984)(Finding abnormal ex-dividend day returns for a variety of non-taxable distribu-
tions including stock dividends, stock splits, and nontradable cash distributions. This raises
the possibility that ex-dividend day stock returns do not reflect marginal stock holder tax
rates, but are instead related to transaction costs or to a larger ex-dividend day anomaly.).
See also R. MICHAELY, Ex-DIVIDEND DAY STOCK PRICE BEHAVIOR: THE CASE OF THE
1986 TAX REFORM ACT 20 (Salomon Brothers Center for the Study of Financial Institu-
tions, Working Paper No. 472, June 1988)(Corporate traders dominate trading in the high
yield groups. This finding is consistent with the favorable tax treatment of dividends for
corporate investors through the dividends received deduction. It also acts as a rejection of
the tax clientele hypothesis for other groups such as short-term traders and it shows how
corporate traders dominate the price determination. The adverse effect of dividends for
long-term individual investors has no significant effect on ex-dividend day stock price
behavior.).
Depending on how shares are priced, tax clienteles can create both shareholder value
and a windfall under the view that the extra burden of dividend taxes is capitalized by the
market or just shareholder value under the traditional view of the role of shareholder taxes
on distributions. See Mundstock, supra note 70, at 29 (capitalization view); Miller, supra
note 63, at 270 (traditional view with high bracket shareholders holding low payout shares
for extra value).
100. See Klein, Incidence, supra note 2, at 585-86.
101. The lower corporate rates prior to the 1986 Act tempted taxpayers to use a
corporation to shelter income and sheltering led, in turn, to the accumulated-earnings and
personal-holding-company tax penalties. See H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION
185-89 (1938).
The accumulated-earnings tax provisions impose a penalty tax on a corporation
"formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its share-
holders . . . by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or
distributed." I.R.C. § 532(a) (West 1988). The provision applies to accumulations "beyond
the reasonable needs of the business," I.R.C. § 533(a) (West 1988), subject to a $250,000
credit, was originally intended to prevent accumulations at corporate rates lower than the
individual tax rates and is argued to be inapplicable after the 1986 rate inversion. See
Kwall, Subchapter G of the Internal Revenue Code: Crusade Without a Cause?, 5 VA.
TAX REV. 223 (1985); J. EusTiCE, J. KUNTZ, C. LEWIS & T. DEERING, supra note 89, at 2-
11. The provision has been expanded statutorily to public corporations, thus reversing Gol-
conda Mining Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 139, 58 T.C. 736 (1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 507 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1974). See I.R.C. § 532(c) (West 1988). The extension to
widely held corporations was based on the ability to convert the distribution from ordinary
income to capital gain. See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1039 (1984).
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for many firms and was the operative pattern for closely held cor-
porations, the net result of the classical corporate tax is main-
tained to be a higher rate of taxation for corporate as compared to
noncorporate profits.' 02
Despite this double taxation of dividend paying firms, the
ranks of public companies continued to grow. 03 Assuming that
taxes on dividends do matter to investors, under what has been
termed a "traditional view,"104 many studies have been under-
Such a premise has limited validity in a flat tax world, other than its utility in accomplish-
ing the recovery of basis. If the accumulated earnings tax continues for earnings earned in
1988 and beyond, it will amount merely to a tax on the deferral of the dividend tax. On the
other hand, Treasury may take the suggestion offered by numerous sources and recommend
repeal of this penalty tax at least for post-1987 earnings. See, e.g., Wolfman, Subchapter C
and the 100th Congress, 33 TAX NOTES 669, 674 (1986); J. EusTicE, J. KUNTZ. C. LEWIS
& T. DEERING, supra note 89, at 2-12 (suggesting that the only real target of these taxes is
a corporation with large earnings and profits accumulated in prior years).
The personal holding company and foreign personal holding company taxes do not
require a showing of a tax avoidance purpose. They impose a penalty on undistributed
personal holding company income from passive investments and personal services of a
closely held corporation owned by five or fewer shareholders. See I.R.C. §§ 541-547 (West
1988 & Supp. 1989)(personal holding company) and §§ 551-558 (West 1988 & Supp.
1989)(foreign personal holding company). For a discussion of the need for the provisions in
a post-1986 Tax Act world, see Wolfman, supra at 674. The Treasury study will also
comment on these taxes.
102. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 7, at 392-95 (demonstrating
that the extra burden of the corporate tax is progressive if distribution-to-retained earnings
ratios were high, but as the distribution ratios decline, the extra burden ratio turns negative
for high income taxpayers and the burden distribution becomes negative). See McLure,
The Case for Integrating the Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 257, 260 (1975)(Overtaxa-
tion of distributed corporate-source income considerably outweighs the undertaxation of
retained income, resulting in debt financing being favored relative to equity finance, and
investment in the corporate sector being discouraged relative to that in the noncorporate
sector. The end result is capital shortages in the.corporate sector and unnecessarily low
national output.).
103. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 145 (5th ed. 1987)(attributing growth to
many factors such as the advantages offered by the corporate form, the lesser non-tax
sophistication of the passthrough entities, general economic prosperity, and efficient use of
capital by corporations). The growth might also be explained on the grounds that the effec-
tive tax rate of corporations was lower than the effective tax rate of individuals and
noncorporate businesses. Agency cost economics also supports the value of the public firm
despite higher levels of taxation. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 330-43 (1976).
104. An alternative "tax irrelevance" view, the basic premise of which is disputed,
see supra note 63, is based on the Miller and Scholes contention that investors can avoid
all personal taxes on interest, dividends, and partnership income. This view creates a before
tax equilibrium for firm financing decisions, including the choice between debt and equity
finance, the payment of dividends, and the funding of pensions based on the irrelevancy of
the tax effects on dividends. See Hamada & Scholes, Taxes and Corporate Financial Man-
agement, in RECENT ADVANCES IN CORPORATE FINANCE 187, 197-201, 203, 205, 208 (E.
Altman & M. Subrahmanyam eds. 1985).
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taken to explain why public firms continued to pay dividends in
the face of the double tax.'05 There is evidence that dividends and
retentions were valued equally by investors in large public firms
due to the presence of many tax-exempt and tax-preferred inves-
tors,106 which provides support for a "tax capitalization" view of
105. For an overview of the basic theories, see J. ANG, Do DIVIDENDS MATTER? A
REVIEW OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND THEORIES AND EVIDENCE (Salomon Brothers Center
for the Study of Financial Institutions Monograph Series No. 1987-2, 1987). The various
explanations include: different tax clientele for different firms, see S. Ross & R. WESTER-
FIELD, CORPORATE FINANCE 418-19 (1988); an irrational preference for dividends, see
Black, The Dividend Puzzle, 2 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 5 (1976); a signalling function con-
cerning the future profitability of the firm, see Bhattacharya, Imperfect Information, Divi-
dend Policy and "the Bird in the Hand" Fallacy, 10 BELL J. ECON. 259 (1979); Miller &
Rock, Dividend Policy Under Asymmetric Information, 40 J. FIN. 1031 (1985); Asquith &
Mullins, The Impact of Initiating Dividend Payments on Shareholders' Wealth, 56 J. Bus.
77 (1983); the reduction of agency costs by the payment of dividends restricting the actions
of management, see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 103, at 312; Rozeff, How Companies
Set Their Dividend Payout Ratios in THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE FINANCE 320 (J.
Stern & D. Chew eds. 1986); if the distribution tax on retained earnings is capitalized by
the market, payment of dividends merely reflects the market's prior expectation of pay-
ment, see supra note 69; conflicting preferences of shareholders in different tax brackets
and their desire for portfolio diversification causes firms to pay dividends, see Feldstein &
Green, Why Do Companies Pay Dividends?, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 17 (1983), reprinted in
M. FELDSTEIN, CAPITAL TAXATION 69 (1983); growth of the firm makes it riskier and
reduces the market value of the shares and therefore the firm will pay dividends to avoid
growing faster than the economy's natural rate, see Feldstein, Green & Sheshinski, Corpo-
rate Financial Policy and Taxation in a Growing Economy, 93 Q. J. ECON. 411 (1979),
reprinted in M. FELDSTEIN, CAPITAL TAXATION 427 (1983); behavioral/cognitive elements
contributing to decisions to issue dividends, see Miller, Behavioral Rationality in Finance:
The Case of Dividends, 59 J. Bus. S451, S467 (1986)(the cash preference allusions of
Shefrin & Statman, Explaining Investor Preference for Cash Dividends, 13 J. FIN. ECON.
253 (1984), may "loom larger for individual investors who hold modest amounts of stock
directly and who, unlike institutional and other large investors, do not rely heavily on pro-
fessional portfolio advisers"); tax clienteles that prefer dividends to capital gains, see infra
note 106; the positive reaction that a dividend announcement may provide, see Eades, Hess
& Kim, Market Rationality and Dividend Announcements, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 581 (1985);
the use of dividends to fund consumption in a more preferable manner than capital gains
transactions through lower transaction costs or lower risk than violating legal structures
against the spending of capital, see Gordon & Malkiel, supra note 62, at 131, 152-53, 175;
and an overlapping generation of investors model to predict the undervaluation of firms and
dividends as a means to realize value, see Auerbach, Share Valuation and Corporate Eq-
uity Policy, II J. PUB. ECON. 291 (1979)(corporations distribute dividends despite their
disadvantageous tax treatment because corporate capital may be undervalued in the mar-
ket place and dividends represent the best means to allow shareholders to recognize value
in their investment).
For the legal commentary, compare Brudney, Dividends, Discretion and Disclosure,
66 VA. L. REV. 85, 95-96 (1980)(shareholders view dividend policy as important), with
Fischel, The Law and Economics of Dividend Policy, 67 VA. L. REV. 699, 702-03
(1981)(shareholders are indifferent to dividend policy).
106. This valuation can be calculated through use of the capital asset pricing model.
See Gordon & Bradford, Taxation and the Stock Market Valuation of Capital Gains and
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dividend taxes under both the traditional view of the effect of
shareholder level taxes and the view that only shareholder taxes
are capitalized. °7 Dividend taxes do not affect firm value under
either view if debt and retained earnings financing, rather than
new equity, dominate capital financing choices.'" 8 However, for
many investors, deferral of distributions' 019 coupled with share re-
purchase strategies" created value which may not have been cap-
italized by returning cash to stockholders subject to lower tax
rates than were dividends."' Indeed, it is surprising that such
strategies were not more heavily used" 2 prior to 1984, when debt
Dividends, 14 J. PUB. ECON. 109, 110 (1980)(demonstrating that "asset market equilib-
rium will generate a single rate of exchange between dividends and capital gains" due to
the presence of individual investors for whom capital gains are an advantage and institu-
tional investors with no tax on dividends or a reduced tax on dividends but with that rela-
tive value fluctuating). The data is interpreted as consistent with the view of the firm as
maximizing share value and making decisions about dividend policy, real investment and
financial structure, with an implication that the increase in value from a dividend and
capital gain are estimates of the value in the market of incremental real investment. Id. at
134. It also reflects the fact that there are tax clienteles for both dividends and capital
gains. See Gordon & Malkiel, supra note 62, at 152-53. This fact coupled with the repeal
of the capital gains preference should change the capitalization mix.
107. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 66. Debt and retained earnings finance dominate corporate capi-
tal structure, as illustrated by the allocations of 34% by debt, 62% by retained earnings,
and 5% by new equity. See D. FULLERTON & J. MACKIE, supra note 98, at 8-9 & n.7
(noting also that the noncorporate sector is financed one-third by debt and two-thirds by
equity). Under the capitalization view the cost of capital is higher in 1989 than in 1980 but
under the traditional view it is lower. See id. at 11.
109. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 43.
111. See Gordon, The Savings Investment in Valuation of Corporations, 45 REv.
ECON. & STAT. 37 (1962). A future second tax at the same rate as the initial corporate tax
with the second tax not offset by a return of basis (in situations where there are earnings
and profits) is equivalent to the result of an immediate distribution of earnings. See War-
ren, Timing, supra note 102, at 501; Bryan, supra note 44, at 1054-55, 1057-58. A future
distribution at a lower rate is not and creates value for the shareholder.
112. See Auerbach, The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Cost of Capital, J. EcON.
PERSP., Summer 1987, at 73, 75-76 (When dividends were less attractive than share repur-
chases under prior law a significant amount of money was distributed as dividends. This
unexplained phenomenon leads to the conclusion that "[u]ntil economists have an adequate
theory of what determines firms' financial structure, we cannot be sure either of the effect
of the new tax law on financial structure, or more importantly, on investment."). Accord
CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 58 (current understanding of corpo-
rate distribution policy leaves uncertain "the total impact of policies designed to reduce the
bias between debt and equity"). On the value of repurchases versus dividends and the
effects of the personal income tax structure relevant to the valuation of the corporation, see
Brennan, Taxes, Market Valuation and Corporate Financial Policy, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 417,
425-26 (1970).
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replacing equity led to negative equity financing."' Nonetheless,
deferral strategies and the firm level lower cost of capital through
retained earnings arguably led to an inefficient allocation of re-
sources.114 Firm managers preferred retained earnings financing
over debt and new equity financing, 1 5 both of which require more
extensive disclosure of information about firm uses of funds. Re-
tained earning financing without a required dividend payout is ar-
gued to have maximized corporate wealth rather than profits, led
to the funding of inferior projects," 6 and created a negative im-
113. See supra note 43.
114. Merritt Fox argues and demonstrates by empirical evidence that firm efficiency
as measured by production efficiency, output choice efficiency, and dynamic efficiency (the
search for new goods to produce and new production techniques) is limited where firms rely
on retained earnings finance where managers are not subject to the discipline of expressly
interested capital providers and under the check of explicit financial constraints in capital
structure through required interest payments or required to disclose information about
projects and where projects are generated internally rather than externally. See M. Fox,
supra note 36, at 337-39. This argument is at the core of the belief that increased debt
finance results in greater efficiency. Internal cash flow after payment of dividends has in
recent years been sufficient to fund an average of close to 90% of the real investment of
the largest 100 United States industrial corporations. Id. at 337. There is growing evidence
of the inefficiency of retained earnings financing. See id. at 201-09 (discussing "internal"
financing and adoption of a "low payout ratio" and advocating a mandatory dividend pay-
out); Baumol, Heim, Malkiel & Quandt, Earnings Retention, New Capital and the Growth
of the Firm, 52 REV. ECON. & STAT. 345 (1970); see also Brumbaugh & Gravelle, The
Corporate Income Tax and the U.S. Economy, 25 TAX NOTES 576 (1984); Heaton, On the
Bias of the Corporate Tax Against High-Risk Projects, 22 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS
365 (1987) (corporate tax leads to misallocation of resources because firms are reluctant to
undertake high-risk ventures). But see Racette, Earnings Retention, New Capital and the
Growth of the Firm: A Comment, 55 REV. ECON. & STAT. 127 (1973)(suggesting that
Baumol, Heim, Malkiel & Quandt used an unsatisfactory assumption about the impor-
tance of transaction costs and that their conclusion is therefore suspect).
115. Historically, from 1953-1983, 48% of corporate growth has been financed with
retained earnings. 1987 Senate MLP Hearing, supra note 30, at 159 (statement of John E.
Chapoton, based on Federal Reserve Board flow of funds data). Other evidence suggests
62% of growth has been financed by retained earnings. See D. FULLERTON & J. MACKIE,
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN RECENT TAX RETURN HISTORY: POLICY REVERSALS OR CONSIS-
TENT IMPROVEMENTS? 8-9 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.
2593, 1988).
116. See M. Fox, supra note 36, at 247-331 (demonstrating theory by application to
the semiconductor industry). See also Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences,
J. EcON. PERSP., Winter 1988, at 21, 28 & n.6 [hereinafter Jensen, Takeovers](discussing
the importance of agency costs associated with conflicts between managers and sharehold-
ers over dividends). See also Sheppard, supra note 8, at 646 ("[T]he combination of the
double taxation of dividends and the capital gains exclusion . . . has resulted in entrenched
management acting as investment bankers for their shareholders .... "). This observation
is not new. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND REPORT, supra note 14, at 169 (retained
earnings results in two kinds of misapplication of funds: the firm invests without consulting
the individual stockholders who might spend the dividend instead of investing it, and the
firm is likely to reinvest the funds in the firm's business while the shareholders might invest
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pact on saving. The reverse is argued to be true for highly lever-
aged corporate structures."'
2. The Impact of the 1986 Act
Proceeds from the corporate tax declined from 21.6% of fed-
eral tax receipts in 1959 to 6.2% in 1985.11 a The explanation for
this decline is twofold. First, legislative changes reduced the cor-
porate tax base;" 9 and second, economic conditions reduced cor-
porate profitability.' 20 The 1986 Tax Act reversed the decline by
looking toward the business sector as a whole, and particularly
corporations, for increased taxes. 2'
The 1986 Act eliminated most of the tax advantages of the
classical corporate tax system. While nominally lowering the tax
rate, the 1986 Act broadened the corporate tax base. 22 In reduc-
it elsewhere); G. LENT, supra note 91, at 181 (same). The first argument may be somewhat
specious since a shareholder who has a liquid ownership interest can sell the interest on the
exchange and exercise his or her own consumption preference.
Forced dividend payouts could mitigate these problems. A preferable solution, how-
ever, might be the use of a taxable stock dividend in place of the distribution of corporate
assets. See M. Fox, supra note 36, at 399-402.
117. See also infra note 173 and accompanying text.
118. See Auerbach & Poterba, Why Have Corporate Tax Revenues Declined?, in I
TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1, 3 (L. Summers ed. 1988)(based on the authors' calcu-
lations); Evans & Kenward, Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Reform in the United States,
35 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 141, 149-50 (1988)(shifting the tax to corpora-
tions decreased the amount of total savings by increasing the effective tax rate on income
from capital); accord Poterba, Tax Policy and Corporate Saving, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 455 (1987).
119. See CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, CORPORATE INCOME TAXES IN THE REAGAN
YEARS: A STUDY OF THREE YEARS OF LEGALIZED CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE 1-11
(1984).
120. Some argue that this is the most important cause of declining corporate taxes.
See Auerbach & Poterba, supra note 118, at 2 (legislative changes may account for less
than half of the change since the mid-1960s). For a view that tax policy prior to 1986 arose
from a corporate policy of desperation and greed, see Fisher, Corporate Tax Incentives:
The American Version of Industrial Policy, 19 J. ECON. ISSUES 1, 18 (1985).
121. The $120 billion in estimated revenue from corporations for 1987-1991, see
COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986: CONFERENCE REPORT TO AC-
COMPANY H.R. 3838, H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 884 (1986), has
not been met. See Rosenbaum, Big Shortfall in Corporate Taxes Thwarts Key Goal of
1986 Law, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
122. It (1) repealed General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200
(1935)(thereby taxing corporate gain on liquidating distributions, see I.R.C. § 336(a)
(West 1988 & Supp. 1989)); (2) enacted a stronger minimum tax (I.R.C. § 55 (West 1988
& Supp. 1989)); (3) limited the use of net operating losses (I.R.C. § 382 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1989)); (4) increased the effective tax rate by eliminating many corporate prefer-
ences, such as ACRS accelerated depreciation and the investment tax credit (see Bosworth,
Taxes and the Investment Recovery, I BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY I
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ing the maximum effective individual rate to 28 % 123 and setting
the corporate rate at 34 %.,124 the 1986 Act inverted the long-
standing relationship between the individual and corporate rates
which had existed under the classical corporate tax system. 5 The
1986 Act also eliminated the preferential capital gains rate. Al-
though the bases are somewhat different, the minimum tax rates
for individuals and corporations 126 are almost at parity. The as-
(1985)(review of preferences operating after 1981)); (5) changed certain accounting meth-
ods (see, e.g., changes from the prior favorable treatment of long-term contracts, I.R.C. §
460 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989), and the required capitalization of construction and devel-
opment costs, I.R.C. § 263A (West 1988 & Supp. 1989)); see also Auerbach & Poterba,
supra note 118, at 18-19 (accounting changes were responsible for over half of the pro-
jected tax-rate increases for 1986-1989); and (6) revoked the capital gains preference
(I.R.C. § 1202 (repealed 1986)). For a view of the effect of tax reform on investment, see
Fazzari, Tax Reform and Investment. Blessing or Curse?, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.
Louis, June-July 1987, at 23, 30.
123. See I.R.C. § 1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989). The top marginal rate is 33% for a
significant range of taxpaying individuals.
124. I.R.C. § 11 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989)(phase-out of graduated rates); I.R.C. §
11 (b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989)(phase-out of graduated rates at $335,000 by additional
5% tax on income greater than $100,000 for a marginal rate of 39%).
125. Clark, Morphogenesis, supra note 95, at 96-135. The rate relationships resulted
in a historical relationship in which the highest corporate marginal rate was lower than the
highest individual marginalrate. Data by Feldstein and Jun suggests that viewed an effec-
tive tax rates that relationship did not hold until 1958 for data from 1953 to 1984. See
supra note 100.
In tracing the relationship between the corporate tax rate and the individual normal
tax, Professor Shoup identified four stages. The first stage occurred between 1913 and
1918. During this timeframe the normal individual tax rate was the same as the corporate
tax rate except in 1917, when the corporate rate was 6% and the individual rate was 4%
"and dividends were exempt from the individual normal tax." Shoup, The Dividend Exclu-
sion and Credit in the Revenue Code of 1954, 8 NAT'L TAX J. 136, 136 (1955). Another
attribute of this period was that "the corporate tax was regarded as a sort of advance
payment of the individual normal tax on distributed profits." Id. The second stage ran from
1919 to 1935. There, "the corporation tax rate was somewhat above the individual normal
tax rate." Id. (footnote omitted). "[T]he spread between the rates developed . . . because
• . . Congress was repealing. . . other taxes on corporations, notably the excess profits tax
and the capital stock tax, and for this reason felt justified in slowing down the rate reduc-
tion of the corporate income tax." Id. (footnote omitted). The third period covers 1936-53
and is marked by "the repeal of all exemptions of dividends from the individual income
tax." Id. at 136-37. The "corporation income was purposely subjected to double taxation,
or more accurately, to extra taxation at least insofar as it was distributed to shareholders.
Congress . . . [was] more concerned with the escape of undistributed profits from full tax-
ation than it was over extra taxation of distributed profits [and] the extra taxation was
almost a by-product of the confusion that arose over the issue of taxing undistributed prof-
its." Id. at 137 (footnote omitted). The fourth era began in 1954 when the "attention [was
placed] on distributed profits . . . with a view to reducing the extra taxation [and] keeping
the problem of undertaxation or extra taxation of undistributed profits well out of sight, if
not out of mind." Id.
126. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
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sumption of capitalization of firm level taxes argues that the rate
changes produced a tax-related gain in old corporate equity by
causing an increase in the value of corporate shares.' 27 However,
the 1986 Act left the classical corporate tax regime intact and
therefore perpetuated the tax bias against new corporate equity.
As a result of these changes, the 1986 legislation exacerbated
two prominent distortions' 28 of the old classical corporate tax re-
127. See Downs & Hendershott, Tax Policy and Stock Prices, 40 NAT'L TAX J. 183
(1987)(predicting a 10-13% rise in the stock market resulting from the changes in the
1986 Tax Reform Act). Theoretical models also predict a capitalization of the risk of fu-
ture taxes and tax reform. See R. FLOOD, ASSET PRICES AND TIME-VARYING RISK 17-19
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2780, 1988). See also
Kopcke, Tax Reform and Stock Prices, NEw ENG. ECON. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 3
(modeling changes in stock prices under various scenarios of income tax reform, strategies
of portfolio management, and actual firm investment). Empirical data also exists on the
existance of a windfall gain through tax law changes affecting firm level taxes. See, e.g.,
Poterba & Summers, supra note 66. Even assuming capitalization of the firm level tax, the
windfall gain effects of a corporate tax rate cut are debated under a partial equilibrium
analysis as set forth by Gordon and Malkiel:
One would expect a reduction in the corporation tax to cause capital gains
on equity, but if the amount of equity outstanding is initially in equilibrium, this
may not be the case. In the new equilibrium, equity holders will still value the
returns (after the corporation tax) from a dollar of marginal real investment at a
dollar. The price of equity may rise immediately, but firms will expand the sup-
ply of equity capital, cutting back the supply of bonds, until the price falls to-
ward its original level. Anticipation of this eventual drop may restrain the initial
rise. Even though in equilibrium the new marginal holder of equity values the
return from a dollar of real investment at a dollar, the increased inframarginal
holdings of equity will be valued at more than a dollar, so consumer surplus will
have increased. Although price may not change significantly, there will be wind-
fall gains in utility. Since those in the higher tax brackets have relatively
stronger preferences for equity rather than for bonds [due in part to the tax
benefits for equity income rather than interest and the risk aversion of upper
income investors], this group would capture most of these windfall gains in util-
ity. And existing bondholders, having a lower probability of bankruptcy, would
also receive windfalls.
Gordon & Malkiel, supra note 62, at 179.
128. The impact of these two distortions was moderated by a third distortion, the
retained earnings versus distributed earnings bias. The new tax law, however, has now
largely eliminated this third distortion, thereby unmistakably tipping the scales in favor of
passthrough taxation. The retained earnings bias, or reward for a deferred future share-
holder tax, was the basis of the 1984 ALI view of the classification issue that presumed the
equivalence between the corporate and passthrough regimes:
There is ample evidence that a broad section of the tax community views
these two systems of taxation [the corporation tax regime and the passthrough
regime], at least when applied to entities economically similar to limited part-
nerships, as tradeoffs. For entities that are economically similar to partnerships,
a direct tax on the owners of the entity is considered an adequate substitute for
the combined corporate and shareholder level tax applied to corporations.
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gime - the bias in favor of unincorporated firms 129 and the pref-
erence for debt financing.1 a0 Tax planning since the 1986 Tax Act
has tried to ensure the "disincorporation of America" ' in three
ways. The first, or "nonincorporation" prong of disincorpora-
tion, a2 encourages firms to earn" business income in the first in-
For the most profitable entities, the 50 percent tax paid immediately by a
partner produces revenue that compares favorably with the amount realized
from the lower corporate tax rate and a deferred tax at the shareholder level.
However, even for less profitable enterprises, this type of tradeoff also exists. Of
course, for particular businesses the decision to operate as a partnership or a
corporation can have important tax consequences. Nevertheless, there is ample
evidence that Congress has been willing to accept pass-through taxation for lim-
ited partnerships and the entities most similar to them.
Am. LAW INST. FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, TAXATION OF PARTNERS: SUBCHAPTER K
378 (1984)[hereinafter ALl SUBCHAPTER K STUDY](footnote omitted and emphasis
added).
The American Law Institute's view of the actual effective taxation of profitable enter-
prises was presumably colored by the reduction in effective corporate tax rates created
through the enactment of the accelerated cost recovery system and the investment tax
credit as well as through self-help of closely held corporations. Accord Fredrich, The
Unincorporation of America?, 12 J. CORP. TAX'N 3, 12 (1987). Moreover, it assumed that
the issue was the treatment of limited partnerships only. Its impression of the tradeoff
between the two taxing regimes appears to adequately reflect economic reality. For an
overview of the posture of the present corporate tax system, see LeDuc & Gordon, Two
Visions of Subchapter C: Understanding the 1986 Tax Reform Act and the 1987 Revenue
Act and Predicting the Near Future, 42 INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 13.01, at 37-1
(1988)(describing orthodox and radical views of the classical corporate tax system in the
context of specific legislation).
129. See infra notes 139-57 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 158-74 and accompanying text.
131. No definition of disincorporation has been offered to date but the term was first
coined in a 1983 article. See Mack, Disincorporating America, FORBES, Aug. 1, 1983, at
76. Use of the term continued in subsequent years. See, e.g., Saunders, America Dis-
incorporated?, FORBES, June 16, 1986, at 74; Saunders, Tax Reform's Tax Dodge,
FORBES, Oct. 20, 1986, at 103.
132. Empirical evidence of the erosion of the corporate tax base by the nonincorpora-
tion and freezing strategies is difficult to obtain. The best evidence on nonincorporation to
date is the great increase in S corporation elections following the 1986 Tax Act, and the
increasing number of S returns. In 1986, 811,987 Forms 1120S were filed, 892,376 were
filed in 1987, and 917,800 were projected to be filed in 1988. 7 STATISTICS OF INCOME
BULL. 3 WINTER 1987-88, at 100 (Table 20). This increase was substantial, although less
than the increase in the reported number of S elections made after the 1986 Tax Act.
Reports of S elections were 220,000 for 1986 (although some may have only been effective
for 1987). See Brooks, A Proposal to Avert the Revenue Loss from "Disincorporation," 36
TAX NOTES 425 n.1 (1987). S elections totalled 329,000 for January 1, 1987 through May
1987. See 1987 Senate MLP Hearing, supra note 30, at 63 (statement of J. Roger Mentz).
The incentives to adopt passthrough taxation have been increased by the lack of economic
size limitations imposed upon S corporations.
The problem of avoidance of the corporate tax through unincorporated entities is not
confined to the United States. See White Paper, supra note 12, at 195 (prior to adoption of
an imputation system in 1987, Australia feared "de facto abolition of the company tax
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stance in a passthrough entity. The second, or "freezing" prong of
disincorporation, 13 s encourages firms to restructure themselves as
partnerships"3 or as S corporations entitled to passthrough taxa-
tion, 135 so that asset appreciation and future income from assets
presently in entities subject to the classical corporate tax regime
will be earned by the present owners outside of the corporate en-
tity and thus be subject to single level taxation. The third, or
"debt finance" prong of disincorporation,136 encourages firms to
increase leverage and substitute debt for equity in leveraged
buyouts or leveraged recapitalizations.3 7 These strategies have
system" through the "[u]nchecked growth of public unit trusts and private businesses and
trading trusts").
133. See Freeman, Some Early Strategies for the Methodical Disincorporation of
America After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: Grafting Partnerships onto C Corporations,
Running Amok with the Master Limited Partnership Concept, and Generally Endeavoring
to Defeat the Intention of the Draftsmen of the Repeal of General Utilities, 64 TAXES 962,
967-74, 982-89 (1986)(discussing a variety of "freezing" strategies). Freezing is much
more difficult to accomplish under the estate and gift tax than under the income tax. See
I.R.C. § 2036(c) (West 1989)(placing severe curtailment on freezing). The Service has
announced that it will now rule on partnership freezes involving family partnerships that on
formation have a 'special allocation for the purpose of fixing or freezing the value of a
partner's partnership interest. See Rev. Proc. 88-3, 1988-1 I.R.B. 29, as modified by Rev.
Proc. 88-51, 1988-43 I.R.B. 14. The current rules are in Rev. Proc. 89-3, 1989-1 I.R.B. 29.
134. Liebtag, Capital Formation by Small Business, J. ACCT., June, 1987, at 82, 86
(citing study of 400 small business owners where 25% of the owners of firms structured as
corporations are giving serious thought to changing to an alternate business form).
135. See Lemons & Child, Using a Partnership Freeze to Shift Future Appreciation
in Corporate Assets, 69 J. TAX'N 84 (1988).
136. After 1986, debt finance replaces retained earnings finance as the tax preferred
form of capital structure. For a comprehensive vibw of the value of deferral, redemptions,
and retained earnings, debt finance, and debt replacing equity strategies in 1988, see Zolt,
supra note 27, at 858-68 (finding that 100% dividend payout strategy is the preferred
dividend strategy and that debt finance initially or by replacing equity with debt provide
the highest after-tax future value of the financing alternatives). Accord CORPORATE Fi-
NANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 38-54, 82-84 (debt structure increases returns on
equity and distributions favored over retention). Leverage increases the after-tax return to
equity if interest is deductible. See infra note 230 and accompanying text. Debt-finance
preference is caused by the tax advantage to the firm relative to recipient tax rates and the
double taxation of corporate equity. See Senate LBO Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 16, at
195-96 (prepared statement of Lawrence Summers). Debt finance with interest deductibil-
ity also allows tax arbitrage by "increasing the transfer of low effective tax rate assets to
high bracket taxpayers" through leveraged purchases of assets and shifting income inclu-
sions to low bracket taxpayers. See CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at
78-79. All prongs, however, increase the transaction costs.
137. Corporate spin-offs followed by S elections were a favored technique. See Simon
& Simmons, The Future of Section 355, 40 TAX NOTES 291, 295-96 (1988). Corporations
that decide to use a spin off toi elect subchapter S will not qualify for the federal tax
savings available under I.R.C. § 355 because the reorganization will lack the required valid
business purpose. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(3) (1989). Certain plans to use partner-
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been attacked but not eliminated, and no solution to the revenue
loss through interest payments to tax exempt recipients has been
accepted. 3
Private ordering in partnerships, limited partnerships, and
trusts can accomplish many of* the same results as incorpora-
tion,13 although there are differences. In the case of a limited
partnership, equity participants sacrifice some management rights.
However, the significance of these rights under earlier versions of
the limited partnership acts, and especially the more liberal recent
140versions, is debatable. To achieve limited partnership status and
ships to circumvent the repeal of General Utilities will be attacked under I.R.C. § 337(d)
(1986). See I.R.S. Notice 89-37, 1989-13 I.R.B. 7 (corporate-level gain recognized to the
extent corporate contributing partner receives a partnership distribution of its stock or
stock of an affiliate); see also Sheppard, Curbing General Utilities Abuses; The Scope of
Notice 89-37, 42 TAX NOTES 1433 (1989)(counteracts May Department stores transac-
tion). No consensus has yet been reached on the appropriate treatment of corporate debt
and the interest deduction in restructing transactions or for all taxpayers.
138. See supra notes 47-50 & 56 and accompanying text. The obvious solution is to
treat interest paid by corporations that are entitled to a deduction as unrelated business
income in the hands of tax exempt recipients and as taxable to foreign holders. A limited
provision with respect to foreign holders is contained in I.R.C. § 163(j) as amended by the
OBRA, supra note 49, § 7210, which denies the interest deduction for earnings stripping
transactions where debt has replaced equity in a leveraged buyout resulting in a higher
debt-equity ratio than 1.5 to I and the payment is made to a related party.
139. See Anthoine, Federal Tax Legislation of 1958: The Corporate Election and
Collapsible Amendment, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1146, 1175 (1958)("[L]imited partnership is
well suited to most of the ventures that subchapter S seems designed to serve. . .. [There-
fore,] subchapter S is bound to be a 'gimmick' section."). For considerations in organiza-
tional choice, see infra note 279. The state law characteristics of limited partnerships have
also undergone significant change. See infra note 140.
140. The Uniform Limited Partnership Act was drafted in 1916. UNIF. LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AcT, 6 U.L.A. 561-619 (1969)[hereinafter ULPA]. Creation of the ULPA
was intended to resolve the liability issues and to encourage the wider use of limited part-
nerships. See id. at 562-65 (official comment). The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act was promulgated in 1976. REv. UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 220-385
(pocket part 1989)[hereinafter RULPA]. Its purpose was to "modernize the prior uniform
law while retaining the special character of the limited partnerships .... " See id. at 221
(prefatory note). The limited partner's right to information was increased. Id., § 105, at
265; id. § 305, at 314. The ability to have a limited input into basic policy was clarified
with the imposition of several corporate law concepts. Id., §§ 301-05, at 298-316.
The limited partnerships formed under RULPA temporarily raised questions as to
whether they would be treated as partnerships or associations for tax purposes. See Com-
ment, An Analysis of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 399, 400
(1980). However, the Treasury eventually ruled that limited partnerships formed under
RULPA would be treated the same as ULPA partnerships. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
2(a)(5)(1983). Forty-two jurisdictions have now adopted RULPA. Id. at 220-21 (table of
jurisdictions). The 1985 amendments to RULPA streamlined the procedural requirements
for creating and operating limited partnerships and modified the test for liability to third
parties. The 1985 amendments also further clarified safe-harbor activities for a limited
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for tax and market signalling purposes, 14 1 some public corpora-
tions liquidated entirely or transferred significant business divi-
sions 141 into publicly traded limited partnerships while continuing
their businesses and substituting limited-partnership equity for
corporate equity or debt.'43 These corporations were generally but
not always in industries with a history of limited partnership use
and with returns mirroring high yield debt returns.'" It had been
partner. See id. at 221-23 (prefatory note).
The theory that a limited partner is not entitled to participate in management while
retaining limited liability derives from the fact that the limited partner is allowed to be
treated as a partner rather than a debt holder. She does have, however, debt-like character-
istics. This was recognized from the adoption of ULPA and is grounded in creditor reliance
upon the activities of a limited partner in determining status as a general or a limited
partner. See infra notes 286-94 (discussion of limited partners' debt-like and equity-like
characteristics and the difficulty in distinguishing debt from equity). RULPA imposes lia-
bility when third parties have actual knowledge of the limited partner's participation in
control. See Note, Limited Partnership Controk A Reexamination of Creditor Reliance,
60 IND. L.J. 515, 524 (1985). Notwithstanding the control restrictions inherent in the lim-
ited partnership model, publicly traded partnerships had been substituted for corporations.
See, e.g., SERVICEMASTER INDUSTRIES, PROXY STATEMENT/PROSPECTUs (Nov. 28, 1986).
Other quirks of partnership law may make private ordering Iless flexible than one
would otherwise believe. For instance, there are restrictions limiting the right of a general
partner to have a return of capital before the limited partner. But see Lanier v. Bowdoin,
282 N.Y. 32, 38, 24 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1939)("In the absence of prohibitory provisions of
. . . statutes or . . . rules of common law..., the partners . . . may include . . . any
agreement they wish .... "); Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 548,
223 N.E.2d 876, 880, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 392 (1966)(self-dealing can be validated by part-
nership agreement - "if the asserted self-dealing was actually contemplated and author-
ized, it would not, ipso facto, be impermissible").
141. These transfers created wealth for the corporation upon conversion to limited
partnership status, rollouts of assets and distributions to shareholders, reductions in free
cash flow, information signalling, reductions of information asymmetries, and improved as-
set management. See Moore, Christensen & Roenfeldt, Equity Valuation Effects of Form-
ing Master Limited Partnerships, 24 J. FIN. EcON. 107 (1989).
142. See, e.g., exhibit III of Turlington & Beeson, supra note 51, at 309-12 (listing
twelve liquidation MLPs and 23 drop down MLPs).
143. See 1987 Senate MLP Hearing, supra note 30, at 145-46, 163-68, (statements
of John E. Chapoton and Barry R. Miller). These transactions are illuminating. For exam-
ple, Bordon Chemical rolled out its developed basic chemical and polyvinyl chloride resin
business and assets into a publicly traded limited partnership under the grandfathering
provisions of the 1987 legislation, retaining a 25% interest. Capital expansion was not
contemplated and the return generally mirrored a high-yield return (12% on $10.50 unit)
with a put or call right prior to conversion to a corporation at $10 per unit or 125% of the
actual trading price. See BORDEN CHEMICALS AND PLASTICS LTD. PARTNERSHIP, PROSPEC-
TUS 3-11 (Dec. 10, 1987).
144. Most MLPs operated in the debt-substitute mode because of market percep-
tions as to their use. The few offerings of MLPs that failed to offer the current cash flow or
security that investors think of as essentially a substitute for debt (such as DeLaurentis,
which offered investors long-run appreciation) do not sell well. The market looked for cur-
rent yield rather than General Utilities-type gain and sponsors adapted to that. MLP eq-
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argued that the pressure to disincorporate by forming a publicly
traded limited partnership, would be mitigated by at least four
countervailing forces: (1) the relative expense of establishing and
administering partnerships,145 (2) the tendency of management to
retain rather than distribute earnings,'46 (3) disadvantageous tax
consequences for tax-exempt equity holders14 7 and foreigners, 48
and (4) the relative nontax advantages of the corporate form.149
uity in a rollout is "heaven for the issuer" that is replacing higher-rate junk bonds with
public-partnership equity. See SUBCHAPTER C CONFERENCE, supra note 13, at 170 (state-
ment of Louis Freeman).
A transaction cost view may be used to explain why PTPs held assets of an identifi-
able, generic type and were redeployable. See Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corpo-
rate Governance, 43 J. FIN. 567, 581 (1988). Williamson first notes that the key govern-
ance structural differences between debt and equity are that debt has numerous contractual
restraints, is a preemptive security, and does not intrude into firm governance, whereas
equity has no contractual restraints, bears residual claimant status, and intrudes exten-
sively into management. Id. at 579-81. Williamson then surmises as follows:
[T]he TCE [transaction cost] approach maintains that some projects are
easy to finance by debt and ought to befinanced by debt. These are projects for
which physical asset specificity is low to moderate. As asset specificity becomes
great, however, the preemptive claims of the bondholders against the investment
afford . limited protection-because the assets in question have limited
redeployability. Not only does the cost of debt financing therefore increase, but
the benefits of closer oversight also grow. The upshot is that equity finance,
which affords more intrusive oversight and involvement through the board of
directors (and, in publicly held firms, permits share ownership to be concen-
trated), is the preferred financial instrument for projects where asset specificity
is great.
Id. at 589. Williamson speculates that debt will be substituted for equity for redeployable
assets and that the shift in focus for lenders in leveraged buyouts from a cash-flow analysis
to an asset-based analysis is consistent with his transaction-cost hypothesis. Id. at 581, 585-
87.
145. See McKee, supra note 29, at 23-8; 1987 Senate MLP Hearing, supra note 30,
at 172 (statement of Barry R. Miller).
146. See McKee, supra note 29, at 23-9.
147. Tax-exempt equity holders are subject to tax on unrelated business income
which was not triggered by dividend payments. See McKee, supra note 29, at 23-9, 23-10;
see also I.R.C. §§ 511-514 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
148. Foreigners are taxed on a withholding basis on partnership equity income but
are not taxed on "portfolio interest" or treaty preferred interest. See McKee, supra note
29, at 23-10; see also I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 871(h), 875, 881(c), 882(c), 1446 & 6012 (West
1988 & Supp. 1989). Foreigners receive dividend and interest payments subject to 30%
withholding unless reduced by treaty, but since 1984 a broad category of "portfolio" inter-
est is tax-free to foreigners. See I.R.C. § 871(h) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
149. Examples of non-tax advantages of the corporate form of organization include
perpetual life of the organization, general freedom from liability for the investors and prin-
cipals, and greater control over management by investors through the ability to elect direc-
tors. See 1987 Senate MLP Hearing, supra note 30, at 103 (statement of Lewis Sandier).
A corporate governance preference for corporations over limited partnerships has also
been observed. Writing after the decision in Larson v. Commissioner, Gabinet and Coffey,
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While these four arguments leveled against MLPs as general busi-
ness vehicles failed to persuade Congress, they may be borne out
by subsequent developments. 5 '
Pressures to disincorporate existed before 1986."'1 The in-
crease in S elections from 1981 to 1985152 provided evidence of
the increased desirability of passthrough entities compared to that
of the traditional corporate form. This increase was enhanced by
observe that contract-risk attributes of corporate equity are not the same as limited part-
nership interests because of the limited supervisory prerogatives of limited partners and the
relative illiquidity of their interests relative to publicly traded but not closely held equity.
Even if they had the same contract risks, firms that require substantial equity investment
must tap investors with lower levels of absolute risk aversion who would not enter limited
partnerships as managers because the managers of a limited partnership have unlimited
personal liability for the acts of the firm. They assert that certain production activities may
only be undertaken through the corporate form, if "[b]usiness association's law . . . disal-
low[s], outside the framework of the corporate form, the packaging of total firm risk so as
to construct an equity investment that meets the risk tolerance of [potential investors]."
Gabinet & Coffey, The Implication of the Economic Concept of Income for Corporation-
Shareholder Income Tax Systems, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 895, 907, 909 (1977).
150. The problems of high administrative costs, suitability for investment by pension
funds, IRAs and mutual funds, stability of the ownership base, and limitations on the use
of suspended losses by partners are all reasons that several publicly traded limited partner-
ships with qualifying income have considered reincorporation. See Shearson Lehman Hut-
ton, The "Recorporatizing" of MLPs: Devon Resources and Apache Petroleum Lead the
Way, TAX AND ACCOUNTING ISSUES, vol. 1, issue 33, Dec. 12, 1988, at 1 (Devon Resources
and Apache Petroleum abandon MLP status and convert to the corporate form).
151. For some, disincorporation only began in 1986. See Zolt, supra note 27, at 870.
152. S elections for the years 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986 numbered 147,000,
187,000, 133,000, and 174,000, respectively. 1987 Senate MLP Hearing, supra note 30, at
19 (statement of J. Roger Mentz). The number of S returns increased from 541,489 in
1981, to 564,219 in 1982 (the first effective year for new firms), and to 648,267 in 1983
(the first year effective for all firms). INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Corporation Income
Tax Returns: Selected Balance Sheet, Income Statement, and Tax Items for Selected
Years, 1970-1983, 5 STATISTICS OF INCOME BULL., no. 4, at 108 (Spring 1986)(Table 8);
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Corporation Income Tax Returns: Balance Sheet, Income
Statement, and Tax Items for Selected Income Years, 1970-1985, 7 STATISTICS OF INCOME
BULL. no. 3, at 92 (Winter 1987/1988)(Table 13). The percentage increase was less signifi-
cant than one would otherwise have believed. The 61% increase for 1981-1984 must be
discounted somewhat because there was a corresponding 12% increase in all corporate
returns during that same period. Since 1983, S corporations have continued to increase in
number. In 1984, 701,339 S corporations filed tax returns and in 1985, they increased to
725,021. Id.
There is also an increase from 1982 in the proportion of total S corporation income
over total net income. The value was 0.88% in 1981, 1.97% in 1982, 2.70% in 1983,
2.97% in 1984, and 3.17% in 1985. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, SOURCE BOOK:
CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS (1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985)[hereinafter SOURCE
BooK](compiled from table called "all industries returns with and without net income" by
comparing the following two entries: (I) Total net income (less deficit) and (2) Net income
(less deficit) for firms using form 1120S). However, S corporations generated a very small
percentage of the total net income in the larger asset groups.
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the extremely favorable 1986 legislation enabling certain C corpo-
rations, not limited by economic size, to elect S corporation pass-
through taxation without liquidating or making taxable distribu-
tions. The only restriction was a future tax cost that may in whole
or part be eliminated .1 5  Between 1981 and 1985, the number of
publicly offered limited partnerships, including publicly traded
partnerships, also increased. 54 The best evidence of the increased
153. Under the legislation, firms eligible for the election can elect Subchapter S sta-
tus without a taxable liquidation to the corporation (or to the shareholders who would
recognize a tax on the unrealized appreciation in corporate assets) and can avoid entirely
the corporate tax on appreciated assets if the election was made before 1987, if the firm
liquidated after the election before January 1, 1989 and was eligible for the General Utili-
ties repeal transitional rules, or if the election was made after 1986 and the corporation
retains the appreciated assets more than ten years after the Subchapter S election. For
firms electing S and continuing to operate, the resulting single taxation may be a great
deferral benefit. See Yin, Taxing Corporate Liquidations (and Related Matters) After the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, 42 TAX L. REV. 573, 681-86 & n.459 (1987). The built-in gain
tax can also be eliminated or minimized with careful planning even where the transitional
rules could not be utilized to avoid the tax. See Billings & Ryan, Making the S Election
with Built-in Gain, 14 J. CORP. TAX'N 283, 297-98 (1988)(noting importance of carry-
forward losses offsetting unrealized gain, ten-year holding period, disposal of gain assets at
the same time as losses assets, and timing of losses). See generally Smith, S Corporation
Built-in Gains: An Analysis of Section 1374 After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 39 U.
FLA. L. REV. 1117 (1987). An alternative could have been a toll-charge spread over a
reasonable period. See Yin, supra at 686 n.459 (citing Senate Finance Committee Staff
Report). For an earlier view of the appropriate S toll charge recognizing gain in excess of
shareholder basis, see Ginsburg, Subchapter S and Accumulated E & P: A Different View,
17 TAX NOTES 571 (1982). The extent to which the failure to tax appreciation at the firm
lev 1, the individual shareholder level, or both at the time of the election is subject to
debate. The answer to this question depends largely upon assumptions made regarding the
role of double taxation in the classical regime. See infra notes 298-446 and accompanying
text. The LIFO benefit recapture that triggers upon the making of an S election is one
form of toll charge. I.R.C. § 1363(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989). For a further discussion
of S corporations, see infra notes 1049-60 and accompanying text.
154. In 1985, 28 MLPs were formed (10 roll-up, 7 liquidation, 7 roll-out, and 4
acquisition) as compared with 6 in 1984 (4 roll-up, I roll-out, and I acquisition). In 1986,
38 MLPs were formed, and 40 were formed in 1987, through June 29 of that year. 1987
Senate MLP Hearing, supra note 30, at 77 (table 2)(statement of J. Roger Mentz). While
estimates vary, the Treasury Department placed the number of exchange-trade MLPs in
existence at approximately 126. Id. at 65. The Coalition of Publicly-Traded Partnerships
estimated this number at 100. See Chambers Associates, An Overview of the Origin and
Tax Treatment of Publicly-Traded ("Master") Limited Partnerships 2 (Oct. 1987) re-
printed in Tax Notes Microfiche Database Doc. 87-6812. The 1988 estimate is 140. NEW
YORK STATE BAR ASS'N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON ISSUES CONCERNING THE DEFINITION
OF PUBLICLY TRADED PARTNERSHIPS 14 (June 15, 1988)(found in full text in Tax Notes
Microfiche Database Doc. No. 88-5534).
The gross proceeds from public limited partnership offerings were $16.395 billion in
1985, $23.140 billion in 1986, and $22.963 billion in 1987. S.E.C., Gross Proceeds From
Limited Partnership Offerings, By Industry 1985-1988, S.E.C. MONTHLY STATISTICAL
REV., vol. 47, no. 11, at 19 (Nov. 1988). The value of limited partnership offerings in
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use of passthrough taxation prior to the 1986 Tax Act was the
emergence of net income in the partnership sector in 1985, revers-
ing a four-year loss trend.'55 In reaction to the presumed effects of
the 1986 Act, which drove firms to disincorporate,'156 the 1987 leg-
islation included certain publicly traded partnerships within the
scope of the classical corporate tax system and proposed broad
limitations on debt financing. 57 Debt financing also increased sig-
nificantly prior to 1986, due to the tax advantages of debt, a high
real rate of interest, and development of the high yield debt mar-
ket. 15  Restrictions prohibiting certain financial intermediaries
January - September 1988 was $13.653 billion, as compared to $14.241 billion in 1987. Id.
155. In 1981, partnerships in the aggregate reported a net loss for the first time in
the 25 years that the statistics on partnership returns have been available. The annual
statistics of the partnership then continued to show losses. Nelson, Taxes Paid by High-
Income Taxpayers and the Growth of Partnerships, 5 STATISTICS OF INCOME BULL, no. 2,
at 55-60 (Fall 1985); id. at 86 (table 5). The greatest-net loss for the three years 1981
through 1983 occurred in 1982. The statistics of income for 1985 reversed this trend with
net income in the partnership sector of $8.88 billion. 7 STATISTICS OF INCOME BULL, no. 3,
at 90 (Winter 1987/1988).
156. 1 TREASURY I STUDY, supra note 8, at 18 ("The corporate tax rate should be
no higher than - and, as has been the case historically, perhaps somewhat below - the
top rate applied to income of individuals. If the corporate rate and the top individual rate
differ significantly, there would be an artificial inducement either for or against use of the
corporate form.").
157. See supra notes 29-30 & 46 and accompanying text.
158. The increase in debt finance beginning in 1981 is considered by some to contra-
dict the belief that the change in the rate structure in 1986 was the primary impetus for
higher leverage.
Some believe that, because the top personal tax rate was reduced below the
top corporate tax rate in the 1986 Act and because the share of wealth held by
tax-exempt entities is substantial, the tax advantage of debt at the corporate
level outweighs its disadvantages to investors [who are taxed currently on inter-
est income]. They would argue that changes in tax law have provided the motive
force in the drive toward higher leverage. However, given that the observed
changes in corporate financial behavior began well before 1986, the changes due
to the 1986 Act may have been of relatively little importance in determining
changes in leverage and acquisition behavior. The individual rate reductions in
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, some respond, started the shift toward
more debt in corporate structures and the 1986 Act merely provided another
push in that direction.
CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 57. The importance of the 1981
individual rate changes is also supported by evidence of the increase in S corporations and
partnerships, although the effect of the 1981 Act on depreciation and the investment tax
credit weakens the correlation between the 1981 Act and the increase in debt finance.
Other nontax factors such as the lower risk aversion of managers and the value of leverage
in the marketplace which was syndicated through the growth in the high yield debt market,
which had a record year in 1986 arguably in anticipation of the 1986 Act's changes, are
evidence that debt finance was not purely a 1986 phenomenon.
The theory that the high real rate of interest caused the increase in debt financing in
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from holding equity also contributed to this increase by encourag-
ing these capital providers to hold riskier debt in search of higher
rates of return on their invested capital.
The net new borrowing figures show a dramatic increase in
the amount of corporate debt beginning in 1981, a reduction dur-
ing the recession of 1982-1983, and an increase in 1984.159 Debt-
equity ratios also demonstrate an increase in 1986-1988 relative to
1981-1985,160 although the implications for the risk involved in
such leveraging"' and the relationship between interest deduct-
ibility and investment choices remain unclear." 2 The growth in
corporate debt is correlated with an increase in leveraged buyouts
the 1980s is set forth in Blair, A Surprising Culprit Behind the Rush to Leverage, BROOK-
INGS REV., Winter 1989-90, at 19. For a discussion of the development of the high yield
debt market, see infra note 168. For a discussion of the relationship between restrictions on
equity investment by financial intermediaries and the growth of debt finance, see R.
Kopcke & E. Rosengren, Regulation of Debt and Equity (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Conference Paper, Oct. 1989).
159. CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 8 (Table I-A). Accord
Jensen, supra note 116, at 37-39 (the dramatically increased bias toward corporate debt
finance began in 1981). The increase continues despite the increased cost of debt financing
in 1989, relative to 1985. See Hausman & Poterba, supra note 41, at 110.
160. CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 64-66 (Table IV-B). For
1981-1985, the ratio of debt to equity based on book value averaged 33.1 percent and 62.5
percent based on market value. Id. For 1986-1988, the average was 44.4 percent based on
book value and 65.6 percent based on market value. Id. Other measures of the difference in
the debt-equity ratios show higher debt-equity ratios in the years 1900 to 1958 than in
1985, even though there is a trend in the nonfinancial corporate sector toward increased
debL--equity ratios beginning in 1946. See M. SCHAPIRO, THE STABILIZATION OF THE U.S.
ECONOMY: EVIDENCE FROM THE STOCK MARKET 20 (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search Working Paper No. 2645, 1988).
161. While the average based on book value has exceeded the previous peak in the
1970s, see supra note 160, "book values of equity do not embody expectations about future
profitability, and therefore do not take into account the stock market's evaluation of the
corporate sector's ability to repay debt ... ," and the ratio based on market value was not
significantly higher than the immediate and other past periods, "because the recent in-
crease in the market value of stock has paralleled the increase in corporate debt insurance
* . * [there is] some comfort for those concerned about the increase in corporate debt, but
only to the extent it is believed the stock market is a reliable predictor of future ability to
repay debt." CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 64 & 66 (footnote
omitted). See also infra note 909 and accompanying text.
162. Tax shields such as depreciation and the investment tax credit lower a firm's
need to issue debt since they decrease the value of interest deductibility. See J. MACKIE-
MASON, Do TAXES AFFECT CORPORATE FINANCING DECISIONS? 1-2 (National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 2632, 1988). Empirical data seems to suggest that
the reduction of tax shields as occurred in 1986 will increase the value of other deductions
such as the interest deduction and will cause firms to increase debt-equity ratios. Id. See
also CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 81 ("[R]ising interest deduc-
tions might cause corporations to reduce tax-preferred investments (because there is less
income to shelter from tax).").
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and other acquisitions' 6" and the view of the firm as a cash flow 164
(possibly allocating capital to industries that can be highly lever-
aged and away from start-up firms and more risky investment). 65
It also arguably leads in restructuring transactions to a weakening
of the debt coverage ratios.' 66 The reduction in other tax prefer-
ences in the 1986 Act may also be resulting in increased debt fi-
nance. 6 7 The characteristics of that debt have changed over time
163. See CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 11 (Table I-C)(for
example, while the $4.5 billion in value of LBOs was 6.2 percent of the $73.1 total value of
mergers and acquisitions in 1983, LBOs rose to $18.8 billion in 1984 or 15.4 percent of the
$122.2 billion value of all mergers and acquisitions and the $14.3 billion increase in LBO
transactions in 1984 relative to 1983 was 29 percent of the total $49.1 billion increase in
mergers and acquisitions between 1983 and 1984).
164. See The Savviest Investors Are Going with the Flow, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 7,
1987, at 92: L. LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAINS
AND THE ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 122-52, 140-41 (1988). Cash flow reporting has been
standardized by the Financial Accounting Standards Board beginning with the 1988 an-
nual reports. FASB Statement-95, Statement of Cash Flows (Nov. 1987), reprinted in 8
MILLER COMPREHENSIVE GAAP GUIDE UPDATE SERVICE No. 1, Analysis and Explana-
tion of FASB Statement 95 (1988)(superceding APB-19 and requiring that a statement of
cash flows be included as part of a full set general purpose financial statements of all
business enterprises in place of a statement of changes in financial position). Cash flow
reporting is user-oriented since "many analysts, bankers and investors view cash informa-
tion as the ultimate measure of debt paying ability." See Hammer & Kistler, The State-
ment of Cash Flows, 32 NAT'L PUB. ACCT. 19, 21 (1987).
165. Most of the leveraged buyout and acquisition candidates are firms with cash
flows - "cash cows" - argued to support the leveraged structure. See CORPORATE FI-
NANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 62. This may impact other firms:
"The development of highly leveraged firms may shift the allocation of cap-
ital toward firms which can be more cheaply leveraged. It is often assumed that
desirable leveraged buyout candidates are stable firms with a reliable cash flow
available to meet the required interest payments. As funds shift toward these
firms, capital may be allocated away from riskier investments. Indeed, if debt is
truly tax advantaged, then the cost of funds may be reduced for industries which
can support high leverage. Less stable industries then would face a relatively
higher cost of capital."
Id.
166. Interest coverage ratios - the ratio of interest payments to cash flow - are
used to evaluate the risk of bankruptcy since a high interest coverage ratio suggests a
decreased ability of the firm to meet interest payments with current cash flow. Interest
coverage ratios are rising regardless of whether they are measured as a ratio of net interest
to cash flow or the ratio of net interest to capital income plus economic depreciation. See
M. SCHOLES & M. WOLFSON CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 66-67
(Table IV-C). "Both measures indicate that current levels of interest coverage are higher
than in the past, especially for a period of economic expansion with relatively low rates of
interest. This may explain why, unlike in other expansions, bankruptcies and defaults are
increasing." Id. at 66.
167. See supra note 162. The 1986 Act may also increase debt finance by increasing
the attractiveness of acquisitions by foreign investors. See M. SCHOLES & M. WOLFSON
THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN TAX LAWS ON CORPORATE REORGANIZATION ACTIVITY
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with less-than-investment-grade debt, much of which is argued to
be a disguised form of equity finance, increasing from 14.9 per-
cent of corporate debt issued in 1983 to 23.9 percent in 1988.168
These high yield issues range in form from conventional high yield
bonds to the deferred coupon structures used in leveraged buyouts
which increase the options for the firm to realize cash from asset
sales before paying back the subordinated debt holders . 6  These
issues also provide a current interest deduction for the payment of
interest or for the accrual of interest on discount obligations, al-
though legislation has now limited the interest deduction and has
reclassified a portion of certain interest as preferred stock. The
risks relative to the returns from using either default ratios or
mortality ratios are monitored10° and are argued to present posi-
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3095, 1989).
168. CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 69 (Table IV-E). For the
view that junk bond financing is not the reason for takeovers and merely reflects forces
generally increasing competition in capital markets, see Taggart, The Growth of the
"Junk" Bond Market and Its Role in Financing Takeovers, in MERGERS AND ACQUISI-
TIONS 5 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988).
169. L. Goodman, High Yield Default Rates: Is There Cause for Concern? 12
(Goldman Sachs Fixed Income Research Apr. 1989). For a description of these bonds, see
infra note 817. For the basis of the interest deduction, see infra note 183 and accompany-
ing text.
170. The Altman-Namacher zeta index which evaluates junk bond defaults has long
suggested that the risks of junk bonds are overcompensated relative to the default rate. See
E. ALTMAN & S. NAMACHER. INVESTING IN JUNK BONDS: INSIDE THE HIGH YIELD DEBT
M.RKET 148-49 (1987). Using the entire population of junk bonds outstanding as the de-
nominator, but excluding the 1987 Texaco default, the 1988 default rate has increased
from 1.34 percent to 2.48 percent and the weighted default loss increased from 0.89 per-
cent to 1.54 percent. Both the weighted default loss and the default rate is lower in 1988
than in both 1986 and 1987 if the Texaco default is included. The 1989 data shows a 4.035
percent default rate which does not include the defaults of the Allied and Federated stores.
Data from calculations by Edward Altman on file with the Case Western Reserve Law
Review. The zeta index predicts that the risks are overcompensated and that the risks,
while higher than investment grade bonds, can be offset if the holders of the bonds invest in
them the way they would with traditional loans by setting up reserves against default based
on individual issue mortality rates. See Altman, Should We Regulate Junk Bonds?, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 8, 9.
Focusing on individual issue mortality rates, however, increases the "default rate."
Altman's bond mortality rate study finds higher rates of default ranging from 31.17% to
36.4%. See Altman, Measuring Corporate Bond Mortality and Performance, 44 J. FIN.
909 (1989)[hereinafter Altman, Mortality]. Other studies based on mortality figures find
similarly high rates of mortality. Asquith, Mullins & Wolff, Original Issue High Yield
Bonds: Aging Analysis of Defaults, Exchanges, and Calls, 44 J. FIN. 923 (1989)(also not-
ing high rate of exchanges and low rate of payoff through sinking funds or at maturity).
While there was controversy over the zeta approach and the mortality approach to measur-
ing risk, see Winkler, Junk Bonds Are Taking Their Lumps: Harvard Study Notes De-
faults, Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1989, at Cl, col. 3, the difference reflects the difference be-
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tive returns for investors, especially those who can invest on a
portfolio basis, but the changing market creates additional
risks.' 7' There is also a growing presence of tax-exempt investors
in these leveraging transactions.172
While leveraged structures are argued to induce firm manag-
ers to become more efficient, 73 especially when coupled with the
tween the default approach measured by the total population of all junk bonds outstanding
and not the single year's issuance that has defaulted. See Forseyth, Junk Defaults: Noth-
ing New, BARRON's, Apr. 17, 1989, at 52, 53 (recounting figures from earlier draft of
Asquith, Mullins & Wolff mortality study). The Altman and Asquith, Mullins and Wolff
mortality studies also differ in that the latter study does not extend the mortality analysis
to compare the bond performance to the returns relative to the risk. See House LBO Hear-
ings II, supra note 16, prepared statement of Edward I. Altman, at 1-2 (Tax Notes Micro-
fiche Database Doc. No. 89-3900).
171. The financial predictions in 1989 for the risk-return ratio have become increas-
ingly cautious based on default and mortality data:
What are the lessons of this for the future? The market is so different from
a decade ago that it is hard to draw firm conclusions. The issuers have changed,
the issue size has changed, the capital structures of the issuers have changed,
and the bond structures have changed. Thus, while returns have more than com-
pensated for the risks in the past, there is obviously no guarantee they will con-
tinue to be attractive in the future. Money managers must continue to evaluate
each investment opportunity on its merits, while considering the effects of diver-
sification. They should bear in mind that a high yield portfolio can sustain a
fairly high proportion of defaulting bonds, given the high initial issue spreads
and normal recovery rates.
L. Goodman, supra note 169, at 13. The turmoil in the high yield debt market in 1989 and
the increasing default rate, see supra note 170, highlight these issues. See Wallace, Riding
the "Junk" Whirlwind, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1990, § 3, at 12, col. 3; Bartlett, Life in the
Executive Suite After Drexel, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1990, § 3, at 1, col. 6 (detailing the
changing market).
172. See CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 76. Proposals di-
rected at these investors and the erosion of the tax base are repeatedly made. See supra
note 49 and infra notes 825 & 1023.
173. There are many theories that include efficiency gains as a result of restructur-
ings. Under the "free cash flow" hypothesis, target firms are those that have positive cash
flows in excess of their net present value investment projects. Since a manager's compensa-
tion is often based on the size of the firm, managers will use this cash flow to invest in zero
or negative net value projects rather than distribute funds to shareholders. See Jensen,
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
323 (1986). Other efficiency gain theories focus on lowering transaction costs, better use of
tax shields and leverage, wealth transfers, defenses against takeovers, lowering agency costs
and monitoring by concentrating ownership in fewer hands, bonding managers through
compensation tied more clearly to the firm's performance, and risky arbitrage through re-
structuring the firm's assets-project composition in a more efficient manner. See
Kieschnick, Management Buyouts of Public Corporations: An Analysis of Prior Charac-
teristics, in LEVERAGED MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 35, 36-41,
59-60 (Y. Amihud ed. 1989)(detailing these hypotheses, rejecting the free cash flow hy-
pothesis on data, and accepting the risky arbitrage view). Other studies find efficiency gains
based on a combination of debt and managerial incentives. See Kaplan, Efficiency, supra
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restructuring of financial incentives for managers supervised by
interested residual shareholders, there currently is no consensus on
this view and there is a concern over the macroeconomic and firm-
specific risks of leverage."7 4 Increased leveraging in public firms
through the use of subordinated issues has reduced the
creditworthiness of these firms and has caused a decline in the
value of their senior debt. This loss in value has been the subject
of litigation by senior bondholders against the management of
these firms and has led to changes in covenants in the bond inden-
tures of current senior issues.17 5
note 44; C. Muscarella & M. Vetsuypens, Efficiency and Organizational Structure: A
Study of Reverse LBOs (Southern Methodist University Working Paper, July 1989). For a
summary of the efficiency claims and debt risks, see KKR Hearing, supra note 16 (Securi-
ties Industry Association Position Paper on Leveraged Buyouts attached to the prepared
statement of Hardwick Simmons). Efficiency arguments for leveraged structures include:
(1) aligning interest of managers and shareholders more closely, (2) increasing the man-
agement supervision by shareholders, (3) a reduction in the ability to managers to squan-
der cash flow on pet projects, (4) sales of under performing divisions to those who can
make a better use of the assets, as contrasted with the view of the sales as a fire sale to
support the transaction, and (5) and a sum of the parts is greater than the whole effect for
broken up firms. CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 60-61. The mana-
gerial efficiency strategy of structuring management compensation to more clearly reflect
the profitability of the firm, concentrating equity ownership in a few active investors, and
bonding managers through debt creation and servicing has recently been characterized as a
higher level of firm.than the public corporation and a management-investment structure
that will eclipse public ownership. See Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV.
Bus. REv., Sept. - Oct. 1989, at 61 [hereinafter Jensen, Eclipse]. Evidence on efficiency is
mi .ed. Compare S. Kaplan, Efficiency, supra note 44 (finding efficiency gains in LBOs for
both selling and buying shareholders) with D. RAVENSCRAFT & F.M. SCHERER, MERGERS,
SELL-OFFS, AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 1-19, 192-215 (1987)(no increase in profitability
for acquired businesses but LBOs not included since study was based on older data).
174. The debate over the efficiency gains moved to the congressional stage in the
leveraged buyout hearings. Compare House LBO Hearings I, supra note 16, at 225 (pre-
pared statement of Benjamin M. Friedman)(noting the increased risk of financial distress
relative to efficiency gains since "the principal basis for the optimism about corporations'
debt burdens in relation to likely future earnings that was often expressed just a brief time
ago has now disappeared") with id. at 408-14 (prepared statement of Michael C. Jen-
sen)(new organizational management gains from leveraged buyouts and leveraged struc-
tures mirror Japanese groups of companies and the risks of bankruptcy have been priva-
tized). See Hearing on Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. Leveraged Buyouts Before the
House Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, supra note 16 (examining the conflicting views of efficiency gains in re-
sponse to a KKR study claiming efficiency). See also CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES,
supra note 4, at 63 ("However, increased corporate indebtedness and even increased risk
are not necessarily adverse developments, and there is by no means consensus among ex-
perts about the significance of increased debt. Some consider it to be just one more aspect
of financial innovation; yet others consider it as ultimately improving economic
efficiency.").
175. The senior bondholders of RJR Nabisco have engaged in litigation which has so
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The financial claims of the firm's capital suppliers are denom-
inated debt and equity. Equity is what remains after the claims of
all of the firm's claimants are paid. It includes the right to the
profits of the firm only after the claims of the creditors of the firm
are paid. Ultimately, equity "connotes an unlimited claim to the
residual benefits of ownership and an equally unlimited subjection
to the burdens thereof."'1 76 For voting issues, equity carries the
control rights over the management of the firm. Debt, on the other
hand, is traditionally viewed as a fixed claim to the repayment of
principal and the payment of interest on that principal, with inter-
est reflecting the return for the use of the principal based on the
time value of its use. In other words, debt is an "unqualified obli-
gation to pay a sum certain at a reasonably close fixed maturity
date along with a fixed percentage in interest payable regardless
of the debtor's income or lack thereof."'1 7 Although the debtor
gives up the right to control the management of the firm, she exer-
cises control over the management of the firm through the terms
of the indenture. These terms encompass numerous covenants and
representations by the firm including the establishment of priori-
ties of creditors and sinking funds for repayment of senior debt,
the use of borrowed proceeds, and the important right to declare
the bankruptcy of the firm if those promises are not kept.
far been unsuccessful. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 88-8266
(S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1989)(granting motion to dismiss claims based on implied agreement
not to restructure and leaving claims based on bond covenants). There is growth in the use
of new forms of bond indentures with contractual provisions - "poison puts" - which
shift event risk to the issuer by creating a right to compel a bond's redemption if a signifi-
cant increase in debt lowers the issuer's credit rating. See Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA),
Apr. 14, 1989, at 551. The ultimate issues in this area are the basis of the claim against
management, whether creditor protection statutes are necessary in a free market, and
whether bondholders have a duty to protect themselves through prior negotiations. See
Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989
DUKE L. J. 92 [hereinafter Bratton, Restructuring].
176. B. BITTKER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 4.02, at 4-7 (5th ed. 1987). See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, supra note 40,
at 230-38; CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 35 ("[A] pure equity
interest is generally understood as an investment which places the funds contributed by the
investor at the risk of the enterprise, provides for a share of any future profits, and carries
with it rights to control or manage the enterprise.").
177. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1957). See W. KLEIN & J.
COFFEE, supra note 40, at 216-30. The tax law has adopted this view of pure debt from
which gradations in risk and return are tested. See CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES,
supra note 4, at 35 ("It is generally understood that a pure debt instrument is ordinarily
represented by a written, unconditional promise to pay a principal sum certain, on demand
or before a fixed maturity date not unreasonably far in the future, with interest payable in
all events and not later than maturity.").
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The factors used to classify debt and equity claims are drawn
from case law which generally involves closely held corpora-
tions.' ' These classification factors were reflected in section 385
of the Internal Revenue Code which authorized the Treasury to
prescribe regulations, according to a number of enumerated fac-
tors, to determine whether a debtor-creditor or a corporation-
shareholder relationship exists. 1' 9 The Treasury withdrew the sec-
tion 385 regulations because of the ease with which the factors
were manipulated involving the all or nothing classification of hy-
brid instruments - instruments with both debt and equity char-
acteristics.18 In 1989, the Treasury was granted explicit authority
to split the characterization, although this authority previously
may have been implicit. 81 New financial instruments created to
achieve optimal capital structures and to accommodate investor
demand for a variety of financial instruments 8 2 are (like more
178. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 176, M1 4.02-.04, at 4-6 to 4-27; see
also CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 35-36 (listing judicially formu-
lated factors to distingush debt from equity which were codified in part in I.R.C. § 385);
Comment, The Intractable Debt/Equity Problem: A New Structure for Analyzing Share-
holder Advances, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 452 (1987)(applying these factors in a closely held
context). For early consideration of debt and equity distinctions, see Commissioner v.
O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1935) (creditor is to be paid "independently
of the risk of success" whereas the stockholder "takes the risks and profits from success").
179. The factors include the existence of "a written unconditional promise to pay on
demand or on a specified date a sum certain in money in return for an adequate considera-
tion in money or money's worth, and to pay a fixed rate of interest," the subordination of
preference of the promise over any indebtedness, the ratio of debt and equity in the corpo-
ration, any conversion feature of the instrument into stock, and the proportionality of the
stock holdings to the ownership of the interest in question. See I.R.C. § 385(b) (West
1988). See also B. BITTKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 176, % 4.02, at 4-11 to 4-12 (detail-
ing the failure to implement regulations under I.R.C. § 385 which codifies the judicially
formulated categories for distinguishing debt from equity); CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUC-
TURES, supra note 4, at 35-37. Under H.R. 3299, supra note 49, the Treasury would be
permitted to treat a hybrid instrument as part debt and part stock. For a view of the
classification problem as a subset of the problems of tax avoidance and income measure-
ment, see Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REv. 365,
437-39, 462, 474-84 (1988).
180. For a discussion of the ruling on adjustable rate convertible notes, see infra note
205 and accompanying text.
181. The Senate Report accompanying § 7208 of the OBRA, supra note 49, states
that it is not intended to reflect that the Treasury did not have implicit prior authority to
split the characterization of an instrument under both I.R.C. § 385 and several case law
precedents.
182. New financial products strain both the classification tests and the appropriate
view of the accrual of interest on discount obligations. See, e.g., Canellos, New Financial
Products, 63 TAXES 970 (1985)(discussing instruments including subsidiary tracking stock
or debt, convertible stock, debt with interest rate caps, payment in kind debentures with
mini-bonds, and S & P index subordinated notes (SPINs)); PRACTISING LAW INST., NEW
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traditional instruments) tested under the facts and circumstances
test of current law. This test requires an inquiry into the capitali-
zation of the firm (the "thin incorporation" problem), the subordi-
nation of the claim to creditors, and the reference point for the
right to payments.
When dealing with highly subordinated issues, the dividing
line between preferred stock and debt is murky at best. Preferred
stock is defined as stock with a term for mandatory redemption at
a specific price and a fixed return if earned. It is traditionally is-
sued without voting rights. A deduction for interest is allowed if
the interest is "paid or accrued," allowing firms to issue dis-
counted debt obligations which accrue interest under the original
issue discount rules and are either not paid until maturity or are
paid on a sliding scale.18 3 Discounted debt provides the ongoing
reinvestment in the firm of the foregone interest payment. This
suggests that the interest deduction should not be allowed until
actual payment. Discounted debt, carrying a high interest rate
that reflects its subordination in the firm's capital structure and its
increased default risk for which the coupon premium is compensa-
tion, is closer to an instrument with a cumulative right to fixed
payments out of retained earnings (like preferred stock) than it is
to an instrument with the right to payment regardless of the in-
come of'the firm.184 In highly leveraged structures where there is
FINANCIAL PRODUCTS (1988)(discussing portfolio income notes, auction rates, and
remarketed preferred stock); Hariton, The Taxation of Complex Financial Instruments,
43 TAX L. REv. 731 (1988)(advocating accrual of interest on the revised issue price of any
financial instrument that provides for variable payments at the stated rate or the applicable
federal rate (whichever is greater) including the accrual of interest on zero coupon convert-
ible debt contrary to the holding in Scott Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 137 (1980)).
183. I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989) provides for an interest deduction if
interest is paid or accrued. Accrual of interest income and interest deductions on discount
obligations are mandated under the original issue discount rules. See I.R.C. §§ 1272-1275
(West 1988 & Supp. 1989). Proposed regulations help differentiate between promised pay-
ments meeting the "all events" test of accrual accounting and rights to contingent pay-
ments that do not. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275 (Apr. 8, 1986). Accrual deductions
strain the traditional view of interest as the denominated right to payment. Cf Old Colony
Railroad v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 561 (1932)(interest is the amount of the payment
in the coupon and not the amount with reference to the issue price when issued at a pre-
mium). Payment-in-kind debt for which a separate "baby bond" is issued has a variety of
possible tax treatments under the original issue discount rules, but the general consensus is
that the bond should not be treated as payment and that the value of the baby bond should
be included in the stated redemption price upon maturity of the parent bond upon which
original issue discount is computed. See Levin & Gallagher, Proposed Code Section 386
Treating OlD and PIK Debentures as Preferred Stock, 45 TAx NOTES 87, 88 (1989).
184. Stated differently, if the instrument meets the capitalization tests for debt clas-
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an increasingly high premium paid over the riskless rate of inter-
est to reflect firm specific default risks, subordinated debt holders
apparently take on the increased risks of equity holders. The fixed
claims of these subordinated debt holders to current or deferred
interest payments and the ultimate return of their principal are
highly exposed to the risks of the business. The question is
whether the manner in which the holder's risk is compensated by
the market turns it into an equity risk that is taxed as a debt
risk.185
Classification of debt and equity.is important in determining
the appropriate taxable income of the firm since distributions on
equity are nondeductible and distributions on debt are deductible
as a cost of producing income. The foregoing characteristics have
led to the current debate over whether the interest deduction for
deep discount bonds and certain hybrid instruments should be de-
ferred until the time of payment or whether these instruments
should be recharacterized as equity. Current law bifurcates the
treatment of these instruments and creates a deferred interest de-
duction for certain discount obligations until the payment of cash
and a nondeductible dividend for interest in excess of six percent
over the applicable federal rate.186 For those viewing these instru-
ments as equity risks based on the rate of return indicating an
equity premium, deferring the interest deduction until the time of
payment would create a further form of integration of the corpo-
rate-shareholder tax.
sification, then under current law the right to payment, even if interest is not currently
paid, is a right to interest which gives rise to a firm level deduction when paid. This view
assumes the correctness of the current classification test which focuses on debt-equity ratios
and the reference point of the right to payment.
185. Outside of tax policy considerations, the repackaging of equity risks as debt has
been labeled a deceptive alchemy. See House Protection Hearings, supra note 16, prepared
statement of Louis Lowenstein, at 13-18 (reporting preliminary data from study of high
yield portfolios of median coverage ratios of 1.04:1 and other features of the funds invest-
ing in high yield securities that arguably understate the equity risk).
186. The current provisions of I.R.C. § 163(e)(5) & (i) defer the deduction on cer-
tain high yield OlDs and PIKs and disallow the interest deduction entirely for OlD and
PIK features in excess of the applicable federal rate plus six percent. See Levin & Gal-
lagher, New Code Section 163(e)(5) Limiting Deductibility of Interest on OlD and PIK
Debentures, 46 TAX NOTEs 555 (1990). This should be contrasted with the House provision
which, using a five percent benchmark, treated the entire payment as a nondeductible divid-
end, see H.R. 3299, § 11202, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), and the Senate provision which
provided for deferral of the deduction until payment and no recharacterization of any por-
tion of the yield on the instrument as a dividend, see H.R. 3299, § 6202, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989)(as passed by the Senate).
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For the foreseeable future, the double tax on new and ex-
isting corporate investment is subject to deferral only through the
use of tax-exempt entities (mainly pension funds) for ownership of
corporate equities or through the elimination of the second tax by
holding equity securities until death or otherwise timing the reali-
zation of capital gains and losses to take into account favorable
rates. Both of these strategies may be significant from the inves-
tor's perspective when compared with other investment choices.
Nonetheless, the deferral strategy under the classical corporate
tax regime, unless coupled with repurchase strategies, no longer
presents the same tax advantages as single-level taxation when
viewed from both the taxable shareholder's and the firm's perspec-
tive. 1 7 Debt is tax preferable for raising firm capital, although for
a variety of reasons some firms do not resort to debt financing.' 88
Assuming taxes on dividends and interest are an important consid-
eration, tax clienteles with a demand for new financial instru-
ments, the value of deferral for outstanding equity, and the exis-
tence of higher rates of return on investment counter to some
degree the bias against equity in public firms.'89 The erosion of
187. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37 & 105-1I. Compare Bogdanski, Us-
ing Corporations for Tax Savings - A Reappraisal, 14 J. CORP. TAX'N 160 (1987)(re-
view of the features of the 1986 Act that eliminate the value of a traditional corporation
for closely-held businesses) with Glickman, Choosing a Corporate Tax Structure, A.B.A.
J., Sept. 1988, at 74, 76 (demonstrating that C status is still valuable for some closely held
corporations).
For both public and private corporations a retained-earnings strategy cannot be justi-
fied by the present rate structure. For firms not subject to the graduated corporate rates,
the Warren formula indicates that the firm should distribute all earnings. Warren, Timing,
supra note 97, at 501; Ben Horim, Hochman & Palmon, The Impact of the 1986 Tax
Reform Act on Corporate Financial Policy, 16 FIN. MGMT. 29, 35 (1987)(predicting in-
creased dividend payout ratios and a shift to debt financing using analysis of tax changes
on corporations and their security holders).
188. See, e.g., Long & Malitz, Investment Patterns and Financial Leverage, in COR-
PORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURES IN THE UNITED STATES 325 (B. Friedman ed. 1985)(detail-
ing agency cost and other limitations that limit firm debt financing and testing the hypoth-
esis against data in different industries). The Long and Malitz data validates the "pecking
order" view of corporate finance - firms prefer internal funds, adjust dividend payouts for
investment requirements, and if external finance is required, firms choose the safest secur-
ity first. Long and Malitz support the conclusion that the greater the availability of inter-
nal funds, the less the use of leverage. They also support the "static trade-off" view of
financial structure choice since they find that firms with investment in intangibles have a
lower market imposed debt capacity than firms investing in tangible assets. Id. at 345. For
a critique of the Long and Malitz model, see id. at 348-51 (comments of Stewart Myers).
Other industry data is consistent with the view that leverage is not uniform. See Taggart,
Secular Patterns in the Financing of U.S. Corporations, in CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUC-
TURES IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (B. Friedman ed. 1985).
189. Preferred stock has always been used to exploit the clientele effect based on the
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the high yield debt market through well publicized defaults and
the bankruptcy of its main market maker may mean that predic-
tions of "deleveraging" will dominate financing in the 1990s. 19 °
For new investment the choice is clearly biased against the corpo-
rate form. A consensus of tax planners after the 1986 Tax Act is
that "noncorporate forms of business organization may come to
dominate corporate forms."191 And if a corporate form is chosen
dividends received deduction for corporations. See I.R.C. § 243 (West 1988 & Supp.
1989). The corporate dividends received deduction does create a financing vehicle through
the use of nondeductible dividends on preferred stock and partial exclusion for the recipi-
ent, see CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 16-17, but the value of the
deduction for portfolio investment is lessening. See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1006(c)(5)-(8), 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (102 Stat.) 3342, 3394-95 (amending I.R.C. § 1059(e))(defining "qualified pre-
ferred dividends"). Preferred stock which has the characteristics of debt continues to push
the line between debt and equity. For a recent provision to limit the ability of corporations
to exploit the dividends received deduction for self-liquidating stock, see OBRA, supra note
49, at § 7206 (adding I.R.C. § 1059(0).
A continued preference for equity and its after tax return may be the result of the
systemic factors which lower the effective rate on equity below the effective rate on debt.
See CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 55-57. A tax clientele for capi-
tal gains persists after 1986 when such gains are taxed as ordinary income because of the
deferral of tax on unrealized gains and the ability to time realization for maximum advan-
tage. See Ferris & Reichenstein, A Note on the Tax-Induced Clientele Effect and Tax
Reform, 41 NAT'L TAX J. 131 (1987); see also Constantinides, Capital Market Equilib-
rium with Personal Tax, 51 ECONOMETRICA 611 (1983). The effect of this continuing tax
clientele is to lead to the demand that "high yield securities should offer higher before-tax
returns for a given level of risk than low yield securities." Ferris & Reichenstein, supra, at
136. Recent studies also find that the tax changes have influenced the trading of securities.
See P. BOLSTER, L. LINDSEY & A. MITRUSI, TAX INDUCED TRADING: THE EFFECT OF THE
1986 TAX REFORM ACT ON STOCK MARKET ACTIVITY 25 (National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 2659, 1988).
190. Firms will "deleverage" by replacing debt with equity at a lower cost of capital
since investors will demand a share of the upside in the firm and make debt too expensive,
but the speculative nature of some firms will make capital difficult to obtain for middle tier
and weaker companies. See Lowenstein, Firms Expected to Rely Much More on Stock
Sales, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1990, at A6, col. 3. This development makes the correct taxa-
tion of equity even more important for weaker firms.
191. McLure & Zodrow, supra note 8, at 53-54 ("[t]he long run economic conse-
quences of this change in organizational form are not obvious")(specifically referring to
master limited partnerships). Investment in certain noncorporate forms was discouraged by
the 1986 Tax Act. For example the passive-loss rules of I.R.C. § 469 have contributed to
the steep decline in publicly offered limited partnerships investing in real estate. See Berg,
Market Place: Revising Realty Partnership Plans, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1988, at D6, col. 3
($7.5 billion in 1986, $6.5 billion in 1987, $5.0 billion in 1988). The continued advice of
consultants for the use of partnerships (and S corporations) as acquisition vehicles reflects
the trend towards noncorporate forms. See 1 PRACTISING LAW INST., TAX STRATEGIES FOR
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS AND OTHER CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, RESTRUCTURINGS, AND
FINANCINGS 603-875 (1989). The bias against the corporate form is viewed as a benefit by
those who see the corporate tax as undesirable. This argument was unsuccessful when
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or maintained, high leverage is tax preferred even if the market
demands a higher rate of return.
Whether a change in business forms in response to tax incen-
tives should be viewed as beneficial depends to a large degree
upon the normative basis for a double tax that allows an interest
return to the firm that is taxed only once and that subjects the
remainder of the firm's profit to double taxation. While debt fi-
nance creates this form of a profits tax, it may have other conse-
quences such as increased monitoring and agency costs as well as
macroeconomic disadvantages. Private ordering outside of the
capital markets as S corporations and partnerships in order to ob-
tain passthrough status also distorts financing incentives if these
alternate business forms are chosen for tax consequences alone.
B. Income Tax Theory
1. The Taxable Unit
The Haig-Simons definition of income includes in income a
taxable unit's increase in net wealth (property rights) from the
beginning to the end of the period in question, plus all rights
which might be exercised in consumption. 192 The income tax sys-
tem requires a current payment from a taxable unit based on abil-
ity to pay tax in the year in which income is earned. 193 The cur-
made in favor of MLPs. See 1987 Senate MLP Hearing, supra note 30, at 141 (statement
of John E. Chapoton).
192. H. SIMONS, supra note 101, at 49-50 (1938); Haig, The Concept of Income -
Economic and Legal Aspects, in FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (R. Haig ed. 1921). For a
review of other views of personal income and the ideal tax base, see Koppelman, Personal
Deductions Under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX L. REV. 679, 687-705 (1988).
193. Popkin, Tax Ideals in the Real World: A Comment on Professor Strnad's Ap-
proach to Tax Fairness, 62 IND. L.J. 63, 64 (1986).
[A consumption tax] analysis assumes that a tax obligation is fairly discharged
if it is accrued as a charge against wealth. An income tax, by contrast, requires
that the tax be paid currently, out of wealth. The dispute between the income
tax and the consumption tax can therefore be recast as an argument about
whether a tax obligation is fairly discharged by accrual or payment.
Id. See also Strnad, Taxation of Income From Capital: A Theoretical Reappraisal, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1023 (1985); Kaplow & Warren, An Income Tax by Any Other Name - A
Reply to Professor Strnad, 38 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1986); Warren, Fairness of a Consump-
tion-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975); Gunn, The
Case for an Income Tax, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 370 (1979). Deviation from the idea of
current payment occurs only because of the realization requirement. Congress increasingly
recognizes that deferral of a current payment obligation ought to give rise to interest paya-
ble to the government on deferred taxes. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 453 (West 1988 & Supp.
1989); Blum, New Role For the Treasury: Charging Interest on Tax Deferral Loans, 25
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 95 (1988)(deferred tax-payment interest should be expanded beyond
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rent version of the income tax functions like a consumption tax'94
since savings are not taxed until they are realized.1 95 However,
neither the Haig-Simons definition of income nor the current in-
come tax system adequately addresses the selection of the appro-
priate taxable unit. 96 In the case of business firms, the selection
present statutory scope for installment sales); Cain, Installment Sales by Retailers: A Case
for Repeal of Section 453(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 1; Note,
Fairness and Tax Avoidance in the Taxation of Installment Sales, 100 HARV. L. REV. 403
(1986).
194. See Aaron, Galper & Pechman, Introduction, in UNEASY COMPROMISE:
PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 1-13 (H. Aaron, H. Galper & J.
Pechman eds. 1988); D. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 16-19 (1986); An-
drews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113,
1128 (1974).
195. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). The realization requirement is re-
laxed in circumstances in which a taxpayer could either take riskless income, I.R.C. § 1272
(West 1988), or could choose to realize it, I.R.C. §§ 1092, 1256 (West 1988 & Supp.
1989), or is given a choice either to realize income or leave appreciation as unrealized,
I.R.C. § 305(b)(1) (West 1988)(choice between stock dividend and cash dividend); cf.
I.R.C. § 305(b)(3) (West 1988). On a continuum of opportunities to save or consume, the
existence of an opportunity to choose becomes a taxable event. The lack of a realization to
continuing shareholders on the implicit increase in wealth upon redemption of other share-
holders which currently falls outside of this continuum is an example of tensions in the
realization concept. Even in the absence of choice, a clearly received right that is nonfor-
feitable and noncontingent, even though not immediately exercisable, is income. Cf.
Drescher v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950)(employer purchased annuity
which could not be borrowed against directly in the plan, had a spend-thrift provision, but
was nonforfeitable was included in income).
The failure to tax unrealized appreciation has led some to prefer a true expenditure
tax. See Andrews, The Achilles' Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax, in NEW DIREC-
TIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980s 278, 280-85 (C. Walker & M. Bloomfield
eds. 1983); BLUEPRINTS, supra note 10. But see Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Con-
sumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1577 (1979); Warren, Would a Consumption Tax
Be Fairer than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1118-19 (1980).
196. See Warren, Interest, supra note 1, at 1590-93. But cf. 2 A. KRAGEN & J.
McNULTY. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 897-98 (3d. ed. 1981)(noting that Simons did
have a view for eliminating the corporate tax by taxing accrued capital gains under an
incomplete integration system). The search for that unit is part of the tax policy debate
and struggle. Nacev, A Bibliography of the Literature on Tax Policy, 30 TAX NOTES
1019, 1023 (1986). In the comprehensive income-tax debate, Professor Bittker has demon-
strated that a comprehensive tax base need not apply equally to all business and financial
entities. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80
HARV. L. REv. 925, 979-80 (1967); Bittker, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Response,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1032, 1038 (1968).
The tax system has difficulty identifying the appropriate taxable unit when a unit
other than an individual is involved. Non-human taxable entities present unique problems.
There is a question, for instance, about when a firm ceases to exist. See I.R.C. §§
362(a)(1), 708 (West 1988). Another issue is the permissible splitting of income between
related taxable units. "Business purpose" tests derive from two different legal bases: (1)
direct statutory requirements, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 355 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989)(divisive
reorganizations); and (2) implied statutory requirements, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 368(a) (West
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of the appropriate taxable unit is complicated because incidence
and distributional analysis of taxes indicates that they fall upon
individuals rather than entities. 197 Thus, one may argue that enti-
ties should only be taxed as withholding or surrogate agents for
the ultimate owners.' 98 Nonetheless, while some legal entities have
been given transparent status for tax purposes, corporations, "as-
sociations," cooperatives distributing earnings to non-members,
and trusts not distributing income are treated by the income tax
system as separate taxable units.'99
2. Single-Taxed Income
The income tax system has identified certain returns that will
generally be taxed only once - namely, returns that are funneled
to outsiders in exchange for their labor or capital before the firm's
taxable income is calculated. This treatment is consistent with the
single-tax character of income that is the direct product of labor
or capital.200 Elaborate statutory steps2 01 are sometimes taken to
1988 & Supp. 1989); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(c)(1980)(acquisitive reorganizations). There is
arguably no generalized business purpose requirement other than arm's length pricing and
valuation. Cf. I.R.C. § 482 (West 1988); Foglesong v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 848 (7th
Cir. 1982), which reversed and remanded 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976), nonacq. Rev.
Rul. 88-38, 1988-21 I.R.B. 11 (two trades or businesses holding not followed when control-
ling shareholder works exclusively as an employee for controlled corporation). This is true
for transactions that shift income between taxable units by express election. See I.R.C. §§
1361, 1374 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989)(S elections) (shifts income on assets to single-level
taxation in S corporation).
197. See generally Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
13 (1972)[hereinafter Klein, Legal Entities]; Nacev, supra note 196, at 1023:
[B]ecause the legal concepts that give substance to these disparate tax entities
predate our modern tax laws, our tax laws have not been able to develop a nor-
mative response, partly due to a lack of- coherent theory, as in corporate tax
integration . . . and partly because of a lack of empirical support, as in the
corporate tax incidence dilemma ... [providing] by default . . . [a]
reif[ication] [of] such legal entities in the federal tax jurisprudence and confine
responses to tinkering at the margins ..
Id.
198. This is a major thrust of the integration debate, at least in the past. See supra
notes 8-10.
199. See supra note 6. Distributions of earnings in the first three situations are taxed
again under the classical corporate tax system. Id.
200. Income as a product also dictates that the tax system should not tax in a man-
ner that would distort the production of wealth by society. See Warren, Interest, supra
note 1, at 1596-97. Theory demonstrates that income that is the direct product of one's
labor or capital, including salary, rents, interest, royalties, or income from financial in-
termediaries, should be taxed as income from single-tax items. While distortions such as
unreasonable salary or debt-depreciation mismatches may exist, income tax theory pro-
ceeds from the assumption that direct income from capital or labor is a single-tax item.
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protect the single-taxed character of these returns when they are
This view of income as product underlies the personal income tax base. See Warren, supra
note 194, at 1085-90.
Specialized forms of creating income as a product and defining financial in-
termediaries include employee stock ownership plans ("ESOPs"). An ESOP allows a com-
pany to give employees ownership through repurchases of existing stock, benefitting the
employee trust, or purchases of treasury stock, allowing the firm additional investment cap-
ital. In addition, if the ESOP leverages by borrowing at the favorable rates provided by the
tax law, which exempts 50% of the interest income of the lender, the firm which funds the
payments receives a deduction for both interest and principal. See I.R.C. §§ 133, 409,
4975d(3), e(7)(West 1988 & Supp. 1989). Other than the rate of interest, the use of an
ESOP for the purchase of existing equity does not create a benefit for the firm that would
be absent if compensation deductible at the firm level was paid directly to the employees
and the employees purchased the equity from a third party equity holder. The use of an
ESOP to finance purchases of outstanding stock does not, however, accomplish a leveraging
effect for the firm other than increasing the tax deferral options for the ESOP equity bene-
ficiaries. On the other hand, where the equity contributed by the ESOP is used by the firm
to purchase business assets, the ESOP creates a pure financing effect analogous to debt
financing with deductible principal payments. However, since the increased value of the
firm inures to the ESOP which must invest primarily in employer common or convertible
preferred stock, the ability of the other firm shareholders to appropriate the benefit is
somewhat tempered. See M. SCHOLES & M. WOLFSON, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP
PLANS AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: MYTHS AND REALITIES 17-24 (National Bureau
of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3094, 1989). For the use of the ESOP as a
financing technique in leveraged buyouts and stock or asset acquisitions, see CORPORATE
FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 50-52. The OBRA, supra note 49, contains pro-
visions (§§ 7301-7303) which would limit the partial exclusion for interest received with
respect to a securities acquisition loan used to acquire employer securities for an ESOP and
the dividend deduction with respect to employer securities held by an ESOP, repeal the
estate tax, and impose a three year holding period requirement on rollover sales.
The evidence as to an ESOP's success in increasing employee ownership is mixed. The
GAO Study finds no significant resulting increase in employee ownership. GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS: LITTLE EVIDENCE OF EFFECTS
ON CORPORATE PERFORMANCE, GAO/PEMD-88-1, (Dec. 14, 1987)(While ESOPs have
broadened the base of stock ownership somewhat, they do so at a relatively high cost in
foregone tax revenue. The 1986 tax legislation on ESOPs may undercut this observation
but it is still too early to tell.).
201. Canada has taken such steps in its tax law. It provides a very elaborate imputa-
tion system for private corporations designed to preserve single taxation of investment in-
come (capital gains, dividends, interest, and rents). Its fully integrated system achieves
current taxation of these items through a withholding system whose safeguards prevent
deferral advantages for shareholders. See Boadway, Bruce & Mintz, Corporate Taxation
in Canada: Toward an Efficient System, in TAX POLICY OPTIONS IN THE 1980s, at 171,
178 (W. Thirsk & J. Whalley eds. 1982). Canadian controlled private corporations receive
a refund of the tax on income from certain specified investment businesses. The principal
purpose of such a business must be to gain income from property (interest, dividends, rents,
or royalties) unless it employs more than 5 full-time employees or uses an affiliated corpo-
ration to provide the services that these employees would otherwise provide. See Income
Tax Act §§ 125(7)(b), 125(7)(e) & 129, reprinted in 9 Can. Tax Rep. (CCH) §§
125(7)(b), 125(7)(e) & 129 (1988). For a discussion of these statutory provisions, see 4
Can. Tax Rep. (CCH) U 19,559a, d, e & 19,562 (1989).
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funneled through firms and financial intermediaries.20 2 Debt and
equity are labels on the financial claims to a firm's assets. Tradi-
tionally, in a corporation, equity is the common stock with the
lowest residual claim, i.e. a contingent return of unlimited dura-
tion; and senior debt is the highest financial claim with a denomi-
nated return of fixed duration.203 The changing nature of financial
structures including high yield subordinated debt paid on a cash
or an accrual basis in leveraged buyouts," 4 adjustable rate con-
vertible "debt,""" and various forms of participating and variable
rate debt206 continues to raise questions about the significance of
the labels attached to these financial claims. Legislation aimed at
the hybrid character of debt and bifurcated treatment thereof re-
alistically addresses these financial structures.0 7
The Modigliani-Miller capital structure irrelevance principle
separates the production decisions and financial decisions of the
firm by demonstrating that in perfect capital markets and in a no
tax world "the market value of any firm is independent of its capi-
tal structure and is given by capitalizing its expected return at the
202. Examples of such financial intermediaries are regulated investment companies
(mutual funds) and REITs. See infra note 225. Passthrough taxation is especially appro-
priate for some financial intermediaries. Clark, The Federal Income Taxation of Financial
Intermediaries, 84 YALE L.J. 1603, 1608, 1620-21 (1975).
203. See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, supra note 40, at 216-38.
204. See supra note 169 and infra note 817 and accompanying text.
205. Debt that has a return adjusted to the earnings of the firm was classified as
stock under the proposed § 385 regulations, see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5, 47 Fed. Reg.
164 (1982)(withdrawn by T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69), if on the date of issue the fair
market value of the straight debt payments was less than 50% of the fair market value of
the instrument. Adjustable rate convertible notes ("ARCNs") were classified as equity
when the notes had the right to be converted into common equity in a transaction that was
structured to cause investors to exercise the conversion privileges. See Rev. Rul. 83-98,
1983-2 C.B. 40. The ruling on ARCNs has been criticized for failing to address the main
issue of whether the fact that the notes are convertible, the fact that the instrument is
traded in line with the firm's stock, or the fact that the notes guarantee a specific return
which operates like a stop-loss provision was the key factor. See Hariton, supra note 182,
at 778-80; accord Madison, The Deductibility of "Interest" on Hybrid Securities, 39 TAx
LAW. 465, 492-94 (1986)(criticizing the all or nothing approach to debt classification, ar-
guing for bifurcation, and applying contingent claims analysis to value the option and debt
components of ARCNs).
206. Participating forms of debt that provide equity returns ought not be classified as
debt if they are subject to a risk of loss of capital similar to that facing equity participants.
But see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d)(3), 47 Fed. Reg. 164 (1982)(withdrawn by T.D.
7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69)(pro rata participating debt may be treated as debt if 20% held by
third parties). Variable rate debt raises the issue of whether payment should float with
interest rates or other factors. See Hariton, supra note 182, at 753-58.
207. See supra note 49.
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rate . . . appropriate to its class [of risk]."2"8 Similarly, the aver-
age cost of capital of the firm does not change since shareholders
have the opportunity to undo any leveraging decision of the firm
by putting leverage into or out of their own personal accounts. 0 9
Leverage does increase the expected return on the equity of the
firm in proportion to the debt-equity ratio expressed in market
values, with the rate of increase depending upon the spread be-
tween the expected rate of return on the portfolio of all of the
firm's securities and the expected return on the debt.2 10 In the real
taxable and financial worlds, the form of capital structure can
make a difference because with interest deductibility at the firm
level, leverage creates value up to the point that it increases the
risk of bankruptcy and other costs of financial distress (the exis-
tence, definition, and magnitude of which is debated) beyond the
discounted present value of the tax savings.211 A later model by
Miller posits that there is no optimal capital structure for the firm
but only an optimal capital structure for all corporations, and that
under existing law and existing tax clienteles, the tax benefits of
equity finance due to low taxation of unrealized appreciation for
individuals offset the higher taxation of interest payments.212
208. Modigliani & Miller I, supra note 60 (Proposition I).
209. Id. at 269-70.
210. Id. at 271 (Proposition II). With leverage, the total value of the firm remains
still the value of its discounted cash flows but the gains of leverage which will accrue to the
shareholders if the project financed are successful are matched by an enhanced risk of a
decline in operating income; thus, while the issuance of debt increases the expected returns
to shareholders, it is exactly offset by the rate at which the earnings are capitalized. M.
BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 62, at 390-93.
211. Under the Modigliani-Miller approach, the costs of bankruptcy are insignifi-
cant, see Modigliani & Miller II, supra note 60 at 433, 435-39 (value enhancement is
discounted present value of tax savings), but that approach is not universally followed. See,
e.g., Litzenberger, Some Observations on Capital Structure and the Impact of Recent Re-
capitalizations on Share Prices, 21 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 59, 66 (1986)(estimated costs
of bankruptcy and financial distress need to be considered); DeAngelo & Masulis, Optimal
Capital Structure Under Corporate and Personal Taxation, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 3
(1980)(same); S. Ross & R. WESrERFIELD, supra note 105, at 363, 373-75. See infra notes
904-21 and accompanying text.
212. Miller, supra note 61. Nonetheless, finance theory does search for the optimal
capital structure for the firm. See, e.g., Titman & Wessels, The Determinants of Capital
Structure Choice, 48 J. FIN. I (1988)(testing theory of capital structure choice based on
collateral value of assets, non-debt tax shields, growth, uniqueness, industry classification,
size, volatility and profitability and finding a positive correlation for uniqueness explained
under the view that firms that can impose costs on suppliers and customers in bankruptcy
have a lower debt ratio and importance of transaction costs); Choi, Fabbozzi & Yaari,
Optimum Corporate Leverage with Risky Debt: A Demand Approach, 12 J. FIN. RES. 129
(1989)(investigating the Modigliani-Miller theorem on optimal capital structure in an im-
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Challenges have been made to Miller's view that there is not
an optimal capital structure for the firm. The challengers posit
that for a given firm there is a credit rationing effect beyond the
risk/return rationale. They contend that, in a world where bank-
ruptcy is possible and in which there is asymmetric information,
(1) debt and equity differ in the amount of monitoring required,
(2) the concentration of debt holders and the dispersion of equity
holders have effects on the firm, and (3) debt and equity provide
different incentives for managerial risk taking.21 In addition, in a
world of less than perfect markets, individual borrowing may be
credit constrained, and therefore homemade leverage is not a per-
fect substitute for firm level leverage, which may also be credit
constrained by limitations such as the 1989 legislation restricting
savings and loan portfolios to investment grade debt.214 The recent
trend in higher firm leverage through internal firm leverage rather
than external personal leverage is "just MM leverage arbitrage,
but channeled through the raider's corporate, rather than per-
sonal, investment account."2 15 In these restructurings, the tax ar-
bitrage value of debt brings with it additional agency costs which
are offset by aligning the interest of the debtholders with the
residual equity claim.216 The theory that both debt and equity se-
curities may provide a more stable financial structure and forestall
bankruptcy raises questions as to the appropriate classification of
perfect capital market and finding that bankruptcy risk has an ambiguous effect on the
value of the firm and its optimal leverage). Finance theory also finds capital structure deci-
sions to be based on both agency theory and a signaling and asymmetric information ap-
proach to indicate value to the firm of different capital structure choices. See S. Ross & R.
WESTERFIELD, supra note 105, at 377-79.
213. Stiglitz, Why Financial Structure Matters, 2 J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1988, at
121, 122-24. See, e.g., Stiglitz & Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect In-
formation, 71 AM. EcON. REV. 393 (1981).
214. Stiglitz, supra note 213, at 123. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, § 222, 101st Cong., Ist
Sess. (1989) (adding § 28(d) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to prohibit savings and
loans from investing in corporate debt securities not of an investment grade).
215. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions after Thirty Years, 2 J. ECON.
PERSP., Fall 1988, at 99, 108.
216. Id. at 114 ("The debtor/creditor incentive and agency problems that might be
expected under such high leverage ratios have been kept manageable partly by immediate
asset sales, but over the longer term by "strip financing" - trendy investment-banker argot
for the old device of giving the control, and most of the ownership of the equity (except for
the management incentive shares) to those providing the risky debt (or to the investment
bankers they have designated as monitors). The same hold-both-securities approach
...has long been the standard one in Japan .... ").
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these intertwined financial structures.217
As recently pointed out, debt and equity exist in three modes
in the corporation: a legal mode where debt supplies capital to
equity owners, an investment mode where debt and equity depend
on managers for their returns from the firm, and an agency/finan-
cial economics mode where debt and equity are traded securities
with different risk variances.218 As financial claims, the value of
both debt and equity is based in part on their relative risks and
variances and on the probability that they will bear returns in ex-
cess of the risk-free rate of return measured by the rate of interest
on Treasury bills.2 9 As a residual claim, the "equity" risk has a
217. Proportionately held debt is a classic problem for the tax classification of debt
and equity in closely held firms. See B. BITTKER & J. EusTiCE, supra note 176, 4.04, at
4-22 to 4-23; Comment, supra note 178; see also Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-2 & -6, 47
Fed. Reg. 164 (1982)(withdrawn by T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69)(testing hybrid and
straight debt instruments based on proportionality of holding, debt-equity ratio, and the
existence of holdings by independent creditors for hybrid instruments, and asserting the
inapplicability of the proportionality rules if both the corporation's stock and debt is widely
held and the instruments are separately traded and readily marketable). In LBOs, equity
may be held through a partnership and the debt held separately. Furthermore, investors
may invest on a portfolio basis which further complicates the question of the appropriate
view of a firm's proportionate holdings of debt and equity.
218. Under a legal mode, debt suppliers are contractual suppliers of capital not tied
to the firm and the equity holders are the owner-managers facing the highest en-
trepreneurial risk and reward and retain control. Under an investment concept, the debt
holders like equity are dependent upon the performance of managers for the return on and
a "refund" of their investment, with both lacking the power of managers within the firm.
Under an agency-financial economics approach applicable so firms with traded securities,
debt like equity is a traded security with debt-equity relationships in the firm determined
through the relationship of underinvestment costs (the requirement of the equity holders to
invest in high return high variance projects to increase the return to equity higher than the
cost of the project and the face amount of the debt), asset substitution costs (equities re-
present options to buy and sell the firm's assets with an incentive to increase the value of
the firm by increasing the volatility of the firm's earnings), and out-of-pocket bankruptcy
costs. Bratton, Restructuring, supra note 175, at 101-33.
219. The riskless rate of return is not the real interest rate equating the supply of
and demand for capital, see I. FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST (1930), but also includes
the inflationary component of interest. The default premium for bonds over the riskless rate
of return is correlated with the market risk of the firm in a recession which includes the
debt-equity ratio of the firm, the variability of the firm's income, the size of the issue, and
the duration of the bonds and thus is calculated with reference to the firm relative to the
entire market. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 62, at 562-66. The value of the
bond can also be derived under option pricing theory. Id. at 564-65. Equity premia are
related to the market risk of the firm, which is measured by beta under the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM), which includes the factors of debt-equity ratio and flow of income
relative to the market portfolio. Id. at 136-44. In both cases, the risk of the firm relative to
the market sets the debt and equity premia over the riskless rate of return.
The ultimate market is the market for all investments, which is the problem with the
empirical proof of the CAPM. Viewing equity as a risk-return investment for securities
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greater variance and can command a greater return than "debt."
The increased return to equity is a mixture of the riskless rate of
return and of the profit of the firm that is demanded by risk ad-
verse capital suppliers as to particular firms in a particular risk
class. Financial theory does not make a case for a principled defi-
nition of debt or equity because the capital structure of the firm is
irrelevant in perfect capital markets in a no tax world; it only be-
comes relevant in a world in which taxes are imposed at the firm
level and the existence of tax clienteles at the investor level pro-
duces a demand for and gives value to different financial claims.220
While financial theory generally lends great support to the theory
of single taxed income, or analogous treatment of debt and equity
in all firms including corporations, and supports the economic con-
cept of an interest return to all capital supplied to the firm,22' it
fails to make out a case for the double taxation of returns from
financial claims on firms. Financial theory does support a view
that risk variances between "debt" and "equity" claims can be
used to measure the cost of production from a profit and to differ-
entiate an equity cost of capital from a debt cost, so that the tax
system by allowing interest as a deductible cost does not subsidize
the creation of debt to replace equity returns.222
traded in a market and priced under the CAPM, arbitrage pricing theory, or option pricing
theory, see infra notes 538-43, also has application to viewing the claims in all firms - sole
proprietorships, partnerships, limited partnerships, cooperatives and the like.
220. This neutrality view of finance theory was also made in Comment, Hybrid In-
struments and the Debt-Equity Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 118,
140 (1985)(proposing debt classification only for straight debt). The Comment does not
deal with the further question as to how finance theory and the recognition that variance of
returns is also a basis for determining when debt is effectively equity.
221. For a recent exposition of this view in a cost-of-capital aliowance system, see
Kleinbard, Beyond Good and Evil Debt (and Debt Hedges): A Cost of Capital Allowance
System, 67 TAxEs 943 (1989).
222. Variance between the movement of the instrument and the systemic risk of the
market under the capital asset pricing model differentiates and values different instruments
issued by a particular firm. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 62, at 136-40, 173-85.
Contingent claims analysis derived from the option pricing model also prices contingent
instruments based on relative variance. See Mason & Merton, The Role of Contingent
Claims Analysis in Corporate Finance, in RECENT ADVANCES IN CORPORATE FINANCE 7,
16-17, 25-32 (E. Altman & M. Subrahmanyam eds. 1985). Financial theory also demon-
strates that differences in the rates of return of firms cause differences in the market value
of the firm's equity and debt, and that the variance between debt and equity is lowered by
a decline in the debt-equity ratio. See Galai & Masulis, The Option Pricing Model and the
Risk Factor of Stock, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 53, 62-66 (1976). This suggests particularized debt
and equity risks for each firm. This is a similar argument to the rationale for the passage of
I.R.C. § 279 (West 1988) in 1969 which denied interest deductibility for certain subordi-
nated debt convertible into equity in leveraged corporate structures. See H.R. 91-413 (Part
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It has been maintained that, under the income tax, the in-
come of a corporation or firm other than a sole proprietorship in-
cludes profits used to pay all financial claims of the firm, and
therefore a deduction for interest is not required since it is not a
special category of "expense."22 It is a stronger argument when
applied to firms that are clearly separate economic entities made
up of managers and financial investors.224 While the income tax
has generally denominated claims to firm level profits by debt cap-
ital, labor, and product suppliers as costs of doing business, it has
been demonstrated that there is no theoretical requirement to so
denominate such claims. There is a rationale for the single taxa-
tion of individual income and for the pooling of financial resources
1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2027,
2169-76 (1969); see also Eustice, Corporations and Corporate Investors, 25 TAX L. REv.
509, 516-23 (1970).
223. See CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 79-80. This position
was maintained in Warren Interest, supra note 1, at 1594-98, drawing from accounting
concepts of income and a view of income as product as elaborated by Seligman, see E.
SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 12-13, 19, 685 (2d ed. 1914); E. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXA-
TION 246 (9th ed. 1921). Seligman's view of the nondeductibility of interest on corporate
debt comes from the belief that the corporation has an ability to pay tax on that debt "is in
reality an integral and constituent part of the capital." E. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION
106-07, 272-73 (8th ed. 1913)("Taxation of income on corporate debt is not double taxa-
tion, because the coupons, like the dividends, are integral parts of the income; because both
bonds and stock together form what is really the working capital from which the income is
derived."). See supra note 200.
224. Warren, Interest, supra note 1, at 1588. For recognition of this view of corpo-
rate capital structure and the ambiguous result from its application, see CORPORATE Fi-
NANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 79-80:
Under one view, the corporation earns income not for the benefit of its own
consumption, but for the benefit of its owners. In such a case, it is not clear what
the appropriate calculation of income is for the separate corporate entity or how
interest should enter into it. Indeed, much of modern corporate financial analysis
is based on the premise that debt and equity both represent ownership claims on
the future earnings and assets of the corporation. Within this framework it may
be more plausible to treat corporate debt just like equity and permit no deduc-
tion at the corporate level for interest. Yet such treatment would create addi-
tional distortions between corporate and noncorporate forms of business and
among various investment activities that may be viewed as more undesirable
than the problems caused by debt finance.
The same type of analysis, however, leads one to question the justification
for a separate, unintegrated tax on corporate income; the corporation could be
viewed as a partnership between all debt and equity holders. Some believe, how-
ever, that the large corporate enterprise often possesses significant economic re-
sources and acts to some degree, for its own benefit and not necessarily for the
benefit of its creditors or shareholders. They would argue, therefore, that a sepa-
rate corporate level tax is appropriate. (Emphasis in original).
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for passive investment.2 5 For a firm generating business income
225. The income tax statute has extended the view of conduit taxation for firms that
represent aggregations of capital for the production of income which is the direct product
capital beyond interest and dividends received through financial intermediaries such as mu-
tual funds (RICs) and real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs) but to passive
forms of real estate investment. The tax treatment of real estate investment trusts (REITs)
is an example of this distinction. The legislative history indicates that an amalgamation of
capital deriving "passive income from real estate investments" through rental receipts and
sales of real property qualifies for conduit treatment whereas real estate development would
not. See Kahn, Taxation of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 48 VA. L. REv. 10 11, 1012-14
(1962)(The legislation recognized that pooling of small investor funds was useful because it
would stimulate the flow of investment capital. Special tax treatment for REITs was fur-
ther justified due to its similarity to the treatment afforded group ownership of stocks and
securities through regulated investment companies.). Real estate activities, for this reason
and others, thus blur the distinctions between business and investment activities. See Rev.
Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261 (provision of customary tenant services not a business activ-
ity and therefore the owners will be taxed as co-owners and not as partners). The income
from real estate similarly blurs the distinction between business and investment income.
See Suburban Realty Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1980)(The sale of prop-
erty arose from the realty company's ordinary operation of its business. The proceeds were
therefore ordinary income rather than investment capital gains.).
The recent legislation on publicly traded partnerships went well beyond a view of in-
come as product and made a rough distinction between business and investment, although
it did not use those terms, by creating a category of "qualifying income" considered to be
of a "passive-type." The "passive-type" term is included in the legislative history to charac-
terize the activities named in the statute. 1987 House Report, supra note 46, at 1067-69;
House CONFERENCE COMM. RPT., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 946-47
(1987)[hereinafter 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT]. I.R.C. § 7704(c), (d) (West Supp. 1989).
Qualifying income includes interest, dividends, real property rents, gains from the sale of
real property including inventory, income and gains from exploration, development, mining
or production, processing, refining, transportation or the marketing of any mineral or natu-
ral resource, any gain from the disposition of a capital asset held for the production of the
above income, and certain gains from commodities and futures contracts. I.R.C. §
7704(d)(1) (West Supp. 1989). While it includes income from rental real estate, real es-
tate with varied services, like hotels, is not treated as producing income as product. See
I.R.C. § 7704(c) (West Supp. 1989). As a political compromise and explicitly couched in
neutrality principles, it included a broad category of natural resources extraction and
production.
[C]ertain types of natural resources and rental real estate activities have com-
monly or typically been conducted in partnership form, and the committee con-
siders that disruption of present practices in such activities is currently inadvisa-
ble due to the general economic conditions in these industries. [It] does not
intend to treat tax benefits from such activities more favorably than under pre-
sent law, but at the same time considers it inappropriate to subject net income
from such activities to the two-level corporate tax regime to the extent the activ-
ities are conducted in forms that permit a single level of tax under present law.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 46, at 1066-67. The House, however, viewed income as product
as being limited only to interest, a return that the investors could earn directly, and divi-
dends, a return already subject to the two-tier tax. Id.
The Congressional treatment of PTPs was also an example of a congressional applica-
tion of what I term "transactional formalism" under the statute since it soundly rejected
the view that these entities were "debt substitutes" since they often replaced corporate
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within a structure that provides for multiple suppliers of labor and
capital, however, the single-taxed income rationale breaks down
since within the firm all are at a multiple risk of loss. If neither
income-as-product nor accounting income rationales compel a tax
distinction between debt and equity capital providers and if finan-
cial claims in the form of both debt and equity can be double
taxed, any failure of the income tax to distinguish debt from eq-
uity is irrelevant. On the other hand, Henry Simons and others
have argued that a generalized principle of single taxation of all
income is mandated by the theory of an income tax. 26 Income tax
theory could thus be viewed, without appeal to other considera-
tions, 27 as supporting on the one hand the double taxation of the
returns to all firm capital suppliers and, on the other, the single
leverage by substituting a public-equity buyout or repaid existing corporate debt through a
public-equity buyout. Support for this proposition is gathered from the offering prospec-
tuses, the returns offered by the transactions, and the use of the proceeds raised from the
public. See CHAMBERS ASSOCIATES INC., AN OVERVIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND TAX TREAT-
MENT OF PUBLICLY TRADED ("MASTER") LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 1-17 (Oct. 1987), re-
printed in Tax Notes Microfiche Database Doc. No. 87-6812; Kraakman, supra note 44, at
916-17 n.89. Cf. 1987 Senate MLP Hearing, supra note 30, at 67-70 (statement of J.
Roger Mentz)(absent tax considerations, a subsidiary corporation would be as effective).
The debt-substitute argument was enlarged to note that corporate expansion could be un-
dertaken in a single tax form through the use of investments financed by debt, by retained
earnings, or by an MLP. See 1987 Senate MLP Hearing, supra note 30, at 142, 145-60
(statement of John E. Chapoton); id. at 179 (statement of Richard G. Cohen)(If MLPs are
debt substitutes, then the question whether MLP equity should be single-taxed should be
considered in conjunction with the question of whether interest on corporate debt should be
deductible.). The debt-substitute argument was made frequently by industry representa-
tives. See 1987 Senate MLP Hearing, supra note 30, at 102, 133, 167 (statements of Lewis
H. Sandier, John P. Neafsey, Barry R. Miller). The fact that MLPs themselves contained
debt financing was not lost on the Treasury. See 1987 Senate MLP Hearing, supra note
30, at 52 (statement of J. Roger Mentz)(noting capitalization of MLPs with debt and the
use of debt in MLPs to raise capital from tax exempt and foreign investors). This was
disputed by industry representatives. See Id. at 162, 165-66 (statement of Barry R.
Miller). The effect of debt on MLP yield was also noted. Id. at 197 (statement of Barry R.
Miller)(MLPs are market-driven by the yield requirement not to have significant amounts
of debt and they do not use debt in any way comparable to the historic use of debt by
corporations). One can imagine many reasons, including administrative ones, why transac-
tional parity for the taxpayer should not have been maintained since arguably PTPs, which
trade on the "junk bond" return and offer a contingent return, provide a riskier return than
ought to be allowed under the classification of debt. Congress failed to articulate a ration-
ale for not pursuing that line of reasoning.
226. H. SIMONS, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 22-25 (1950); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
REPORT, supra note 14, at 155-87, 397-400. This argument would also be applicable to a
view of income as product in the personal tax base, see supra note 200, to the extent that
double taxation reduces social product. This fact suggests that the tax must be structured
as a profits tax.
227. See infra notes 364-77 and accompanying text.
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taxation of the returns to all firm capital.2 28
Depending upon assumptions as to the form of financing by
the firm and setting aside considerations of tax incidence, any firm
level tax capitalized by the market is a flat tax in the sense that
when it occurs it lowers the rate of return to the residual equity
holder.2 29 Since finance theory demonstrates that the value of firm
leverage in a world with an income tax inures to the benefit of the
residual equity claimants, 30 a corollary tax policy, holding that at
228. One explanation for the failure of the 1986 general inquiry on the tax treatment
of passthrough entities and an inquiry on pending legislation dealing with RICs and REITs
to generate momentum is that they asked the wrong question. The Staff of the Joint Com-
mittee in framing the issues for the hearings was correct to review the structures of each of
the entity's and then examine the factors that lead both to taxation of the entity as a
separate entity and also the taxation of that entity's earnings twice. STAFF OF THE JT.
COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 30, at 1. It focused on the arguments for separate taxation
when the entity is not the alter ego of the owner as both a reason for separate taxpayer
status in conjunction with factors of the firm such as centralized management, limited
liability, and free transferability of interest, the administrative case for entity level taxa-
tion, and the neutrality issue of taxation of like firms alike, but then devoted little space to
the two key issues - the rationale for the treatment of income generated through financial
intermediaries and passive income funneled through firms as single taxed income regardless
of how collected and the question of "whether income should be taxed both at the entity
level when earned and at the owner level when distributed." Id. at 13-19. Review of the
structure of and classification tests for the passthrough regimes is useful, but as a norma-
tive point of view, the normative value of passthrough taxation cannot be addressed without
making the question of who should pay the corporate or a firm level tax the first level
inquiry. The 1986 inquiry mixed the question of the positive and normative structure of
passthrough taxation with the normative issue of when passthrough taxation is correct.
229. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
230. Leverage is the mechanism by which the yield on an investment including an
equity investment in a corporation is increased. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note
62, at 390-93. Just as a leveraged purchase increases the yield on an out of pocket invest-
ment in an asset, leverage in the classical corporate tax system up to the point that leverage
is too expensive as a cost of capital increases the yield on invested equity relative to the
risk. See id. at 393-401. If interest on firm debt is deductible, a leveraged financial struc-
ture increases the return on the equity. See R. HAMILTON, CORPORATION FINANCE 484-525
(2d ed. 1989). For a demonstration of this result consider the example used in CORPORATE
FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 53-54:
Assume i corporation in the 34 percent tax bracket with after tax earnings of
$990,000 on income of $1.5 million. It has 99,000 shares outstanding, earnings
per share of $10, and trades on the market at 8 times earnings, or $80 a share
for a market value of $7,920,000. A repurchase of the 91,667 shares at 12 times
earnings can be made for $11 million. If the firm finances this totally with debt
borrowed at 12 percent interest, it will have an interest cost of $1.32 million,
which if deductible will leave before tax earnings at $180,000 and after tax
earnings of $118,000 ($180,000 minus taxes of $61,200). Earnings per the re-
maining 7,333 shares are now $16.20. For the remaining shares, while the
amount of after-tax income of the corporation has decreased, the earnings per
share have increased on account of leverage, which is the normal phenomenon of
leverage in capital structure, so that even if the firm still sells for 8 times earn-
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the individual level income from capital representing merely the
time value of its use and the return from one's labor should be
subject to only one level of tax, supports the view of the firm level
tax as a profits tax - a tax after the return to capital suppliers of
the time value of their money. 3' This would mean a profits tax
computed by determining the tax base from the income of the
firm less a deduction at the risk-free rate of interest on the value
ings, the stock value for the remaining shareholders will increase from $80 per
share to $129.60.
Id. "More generally, the return on equity rises with increasing debt capitalization so long
as the interest rate is less than the pre-tax rate of return on corporate assets. This suggests
that the Code creates an incentive to raise the debt-equity ratio to the point where the
corporate income tax (or outstanding equity) is eliminated." Id. Modigliani and Miller
point out that the increase in the debt-equity ratio will result in a lower capitalization of
earnings but that the overall value of the firm in a world with taxes will remain the same.
In a world with taxes, the value of the firm increases by the discounted present value of the
tax savings from the interest deductions and the value of the equity is correspondingly
increased. A dramatic example of these two propositions is the recent trend toward corpo-
rate restructurings noted in REPORTER'S STUDY DRAFT, supra note 53, at 18-31. The cost
of financial distress increases the cost of debt to the firm and therefore a perfectly lever-
aged structure is not possible. CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 54-55
(other costs of financial distress associated with high debt equity ratios include credit con-
straints, constraints on expenditures and operating decisions relative to the terms of the
debt, and the direct costs of bankruptcy). For a dynamic view of the value of leverage to
the residual equity holders, see Arditti & Pinkerton, The Valuation and Cost of Capital
with a Leveraged Firm with Growth, 33 J. FIN. 54 (1978).
231. The existing corporate tax mismatches the taxation of the return for the time
value of money. In the argument for inclusion of the interest on corporate debt in the
corporate income tax base, it was noted that:
Even assuming that the relevant increment in value accrues to the corporate
enterprise generally, and not solely to shareholder equity, there is a final argu-
ment that some interest should be excluded from the ideal corporate income tax
base . . . . The cost of capital can be conceptualized as the sum of (1) the cost
of using assets in a riskless enterprise, i.e., what it is worth to have something
now instead of in the future, plus (2) a premium for the risk entailed . ...
Since even a riskless enterprise would necessarily incur the time preference com-
ponent of the cost of capital in order to effect production, it might be concluded
that payments for the time preference reduce increment as much as payment for
real, as opposed to financial, assets or services. That argument is, of course, in-
apposite with regard to the existing corporate income tax since the cost of equity
capital also includes a payment for the riskless use of capital, but no deduction is
permitted for any part of dividends paid. Moreover, interest on debt cannot be
regarded as the rough equivalent of the cost of using assets in a riskless enter-
prise nor dividends on equity as a rough equivalent of a risk premium since
equity instruments can be purchased independently of debt instruments. Thus,
the return on equity instruments must include a pure time component as well as
a risk premium.
Warren Interest, supra note 1, at 1593-94 n.34. The efficiency response is that to the ex-
tent that there is double taxation of an interest return, the interest rate either increases if
in an open economy or the cost of capital generally increases in the closed economy model.
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of all financial claims. It does not say anything about the risk ele-
ment of that return, but suggests that the normative view of the
rate is that of a risk-free rate of return.23 2 The obvious benchmark
for this riskless rate is the applicable federal rate for issues of
comparable term.2 3 It is on this premise of the income tax that
the argument is made in Part III of this Article to rewrite the
corporate tax as a profits tax on firms with liquid equity,23 4 leav-
ing to the agenda for inquiry consideration of the appropriate in-
terest rate and the limitation of interest deductions on debt capital
232. Finance theory generally defines risk which commands a risk premium as
against a return merely for the passage of time by reference to the returns on the risk free
portfolio of Treasury bills. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 62, at 126-27. A further
refinement on risk and the risk premium is made by portfolio theory which assumes that
the unique risk of a particular investment can be avoided by diversification such that the
market will not reward that risk with a risk premium and that the only remaining risk
which is rewarded with a risk premium is the systematic risk, the risk of the market. Id. at
128-65. The importance of determining the appropriate risk measure for debt instruments
(which any return above a Treasury instrument of comparable term reflects risk) and eq-
uity is, as set forth in the Staff discussion of the theory of the disallowance of a portion of
the interest on debt, a question of finding the appropriate rate in an attempt to define
economic income:
[T]o the extent the rate selected reflects a measurement of "risk", this ap-
proach also might be described as an attempt to properly measure economic
income. If one accepts the premise that all interest on debt is properly deductible
without regard to whether the debt supports an asset that produces taxable in-
come, and the further premise that the most fundamental basis for distinguish-
ing debt from equity is the degree of investor risk, this approach seeks to deny a
deduction for the "risk" element of stated interest on the theory it more nearly
resembles a dividend distribution, while continuing to permit the nonrisk portion
to be fully deductible.
A primary issue with respect to this type of approach is the selection of the
permitted deductible interest rate. To the extent that rate is selected in an at-
tempt to identify excessive risk, the questions may be raised regarding the accu-
racy of a risk analysis based solely on interest rate. On the other hand, to the
extent the proposal is viewed as one of administrative convenience, designed to
address revenue concerns and avoid the need to distinguish between debt and
equity, the accuracy of any risk analysis may be considered less important.
CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 4, at 104-05 (noting that nontax factors
such as the ability of start up firms to use interest deductions with variation on permitted
rates raising neutrality concerns). The limitation of certain debt replacing equity transac-
tions is also defined as an attempt to define risk. Id. at 108-09.
Other assessments of risk demonstrate that while the market does not reward unsys-
tematic risk which can be diversified away with a risk premium, other factors, including
inflation and earnings estimates are effective in setting the returns to firms and that the
levels of risks associated with a firm is also related to the returns. Brainard, Shoven &
Weiss, The Financial Valuation of the Return to Capital, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON Eco-
NOMIC ACTIVITY 453, 501-02 (1980).
233. See I.R.C. § 1274(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
234. See infra notes 447-59 and accompanying text.
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to appropriately compute the firm's profit.
C. The Resemblance Test
Since 1909, corporations and associations have been subject
to an entity-level tax on income235 while unincorporated busi-
nesses, with the exception of those publicly traded partnerships
covered by the 1987 Act, have not." 6 From its inception, the tax
was viewed as a tax on the legal personality of the corporation,
and not as a tax on the production of business income . 37 The de-
cision to impose a corporate tax on "associations" and the lack of
a statutory definition 238 led to administrative definitions of "asso-
ciation." A 1916 regulation included all limited partnerships as
taxable associations based on the limited liability afforded their
owners, 239 a position that was reversed in 1918 in a definition that
relied in part on a weighing of resemblance factors to the charac-
teristics of a corporation2 40 and was an early formulation of a re-
semblance test.
While the regulations gave the- test its administrative scope,
Morrissey v. Commissioner2 1 gave it the judicial imprimatur to
find "resemblance and not identity." 242 According to the courts,
the test was designed to include a common law association, de-
235. The revenue acts of 1913 (Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166-81),
and 1916 (Revenue Act, 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 765) specifically excluded "partnerships"
from the "associations" and "corporations" that were subject to the corporate tax, again
without definition, and "partners" were held individually liable for tax. See Sexton & Os-
teen, Classification as a Partnership or an Association Taxable as a Corporation, 24 TUL
TAX IN sT. 95, 99 (1975). The reason for the statutory exclusion was thought to be a desire
to preserve harmony between federal tax law and general principles of state law. See
United States v. Coulby, 251 F. 982, 984 (N.D. Ohio 1918), aff'd, 258 F. 27 (6th Cir.
1919)(noting that the reason Congress and consequently "the law" ignored the partnership
for taxing purposes was that "[u]nlike a corporation, a partnership has no legal existence
aside from the members who compose it").
236. See infra notes 640-71 and accompanying text.
237. The definition of a "corporation," which survives in I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (West
1988), was incorporated into the tax law in 1918. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1, 40
Stat. 1057 (1919). Personal service corporations were excluded from the corporate tax
from 1918-1921. Sexton & Osteen, supra note 235, at 100.
238. Sexton & Osteen, supra note 235, at 108-09.
239. Id. at 106-07.
240. For a review of the resemblance test from the revenue acts of 1894 to 1975, see
Sexton & Osteen, supra note 235. For additional history, see Scallen, Federal Income Tax-
ation of Professional Associations and Corporations, 49 MINN. L. REv. 603, 611-14
(1965).
241. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
242. Id. at 357.
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fined as "a body of persons united without a charter 'but upon the
methods and forms used by incorporated bodies for the prosecu-
tion of some common enterprise.' "243 For fifty years the tax sys-
tem has gone back and forth with less than coherent formalistic
rules based on the resemblance test.244 The present regulatory re-
semblance test is based on four elements: limited liability for cor-
porate debts, centralized management, continuity of life, and free
transferability of ownership interests. The Kintner regulations2 45
243. Id. at 358 (citing Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 157 (1924)). After Morris-
sey, the bundle-of-rights "resemblance" test would tip the balance to association status, the
predictability of which, even by regulation, was unclear. See Sneed, More About Associa-
tions in the Oil and Gas Industry, 33 TEX. L. REV. 168, 185-90 (1954). The constitutional-
ity of distinguishing between unincorporated and incorporated firms was based on a bene-
fits recognition of the corporate form. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 111,
151-52 (191 l)(benefit of corporate form is different). Until 1987, the core of the current
system tested unincorporated firms solely for resemblance to that form. Although Congress
did reconsider the classical corporate double tax-single tax line when it enacted Subchapter
S in 1958, as well as when it expanded it in subsequent years, the basic rationale which
drew firms into the double-tax world was never fully articulated.
244. See Scallen, supra note 240, at 605-07 n.6 (listing a comprehensive biography);
Sexton & Osteen, supra note 235 (discussing the evolution of the resemblance test). Con-
sideration of the resemblance test occurred before Morrissey. See, e.g., Pierson, The Cor-
porate Tax Decision, 20 YALE L.J. 636 (1911); Pond, The Taxation of Corporations, 24
YALE L.J. 381 (1915); Warren, The Progress of the Law: Corporations, 34 HARV. L. REV.
282 (1921); Robinson, Taxability of Unincorporated Organizations as Corporations for
Federal Income Tax Purposes, 15 A.B.A. J. 159 (1929). It continued after the Morrissey
decision as well. See, e.g., Flagg, Associations Taxable as Corporations, 13 TAXES 589
(1935); Smith, Associations Classified As Corporations Under the Internal Revenue Code,
34 CALIF. L. REV. 461 (1946); Brabson, What Constitutes an Association Taxable as a
Corporation, 7 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1282 (1949). For a detailed critique of "association
status," see Sneed, supra note 243. For a discussion of the Kintner regulations, see Lyons,
Comments on the New Regulations on Associations, 16 TAX L. REV. 441 (1961); Scallen,
supra note 240. The proposed 1977 draft regulations are found at 42 Fed. Reg. 1038 (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301)(proposed Jan. 5, 1977), and were withdrawn in 42 Fed. Reg.
1489 (withdrawn Jan. 7, 1977). They would have applied more functional considerations
and taxed large limited partnerships as corporations, with the application of the functional
analysis also bringing large general partnerships in the service industries close to the line.
See Note, Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships, 90 HARV. L. REv. 745 (1977);
Note, Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships: The IRS Bombards the Tax Shelters,
52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 408 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Shelters]. Some offer the well-worn view
that the Kintner regulations allowed tax shelters to exist. See, e.g., R. DOERNBERG, H.
ABRAMS, B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
PARTNERSHIPS 44-45 (1987).
245. With the adoption of the Kintner regulations (Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2
(1960)), the resemblance test became a mechanical test that treated any firm which had
more than two of the above factors as an association. The elements of "associates" and
"objective to carry on business for profit," however, are considered essential and an associa-
tion will not be classified as such if either of these elements is absent. See W. McKEE, W.
NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS § 3.06
[2], at 3-41 (1987). These authors argue that the regulations are:
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convert the test into a stylized formula under which only three of
the elements need to be present before association status exists.
The regulations list "other factors" which, if applied, should cause
publicly traded limited partnerships to be taxed as associations,
but since these are not incorporated into the main test the courts
have disregarded them.246
1. Legal Personality and the Resemblance Test
The resemblance test looks for a resemblance between the
characteristics of the entity tested and the legal characteristics of
corporations and stems from a fictional legal personality of the
corporation that existed at the turn of the century. According to
this fiction, the corporate form has certain unique attributes,24 1
including limited liability which was heralded by Nicholas Mur-
ray Butler as "the greatest single discovery of modern times. 2 48
composed of a series of sentences which, though not directly contradictory, are
not entirely consistent. This tendency probably resulted in most cases from an
effort to resolve most questions against the [corporation] classification and to
insure that every general partnership subject to the Uniform Partnership Act,
and most limited partnerships subject to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
will not be classified as [corporations], while paying lip service to the theoretical
considerations.
Id. at 3-42.
246. Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq. 1979-1 C.B. I (reaffirms
adherence to the four factor balancing test). But see Outlaw v. United States, 494 F.2d
1376, 1385 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974)("other factors" such as the use of
a securities offering to achieve financing are "significant"). Treasury then issued proposed
regulations on limited liability companies that required personal liability for at least one
member in the firm as a pre-condition to application of the four factor balancing test. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701(a)(2) - (a)(4) & (g), 45 Fed. Reg. 75709 (1980). These proposed
regulations were later withdrawn in order for the Service to "undertake a study of the rules
for classification of entities for federal tax purposes with special focus on the significance of
the characteristic of limited liability . . ., with the possible application of the minimum
capitalization requirement of Revenue Procedure 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735, to all entities
seeking classification of partnerships for federal tax purposes." I.R.S. News Release IR-82-
145 (Dec. 17, 1982)(discussing whether Revenue Procedure 72-13 must remain an advance
ruling position or instead be elevated to a rule of substantive law). At the same time, the
acquiescence to Larson was withdrawn to the extent that it was inconsistent with the mini-
mum capitalization requirement. Id. The Larson approach was followed for foreign entities
where there was beneficial joint ownership by "separate and distinct economic interests."
See MCA, Inc. v. United States, 685 F.2d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 1982).
247. See Cleary, The Corporate Entity in Tax Cases, 1 TAX L. REV. 3 (1945)(This
theory presumes that corporations have separate identities, much like individual personali-
ties, regardless of the number of stockholders. This "identity" is what is generally consid-
ered for tax purposes and it cannot be ignored by the courts, except in unusual
circumstances.).
248. 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 21, at
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Historical research has yielded conflicting views as to both the
uniqueness 249 and importance 250 of limited liability as a corporate
attribute. While noting that limited liability economizes on trans-
action costs and the cost of internalizing externalities,25' commen-
tators debate its importance to the firm as a whole. 52 Nontax law
43 (1917) (statement of Nicholas Murray Butler, former President of Columbia University,
at the Address to the 143rd Annual Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of
New York, Nov. 16, 1911).
249. Limited liability in a corporation was not considered a unique attribute 150
years ago although 300 years ago monopoly probably would have been thought unique. H.
Dougan, The History of the Taxation of Associations, at 17-18 (1962)(unpublished manu-
script on file at Columbia Law Library).
250. While the importance of limited liability is debatable, the majority of writers
consider it a "landmark institution." But see Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, Piercing the
Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 357 (1979)(since the number of incorpo-
rations in Massachusetts did not increase after introduction of limited liability, limited
liability did not promote incorporation).
251. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 370-72 (3d. ed. 1986). For
another economic approach, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corpo-
ration, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985). For a review of the literature concerning why limited
liability is attractive in terms of transaction costs, see Forbes, Limited Liability and the
Development of the Business Corporation, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORGAN. 163, 165 n.6 (1986).
252. Limited liability has no allocative effects even if significant transaction costs are
present. This is true due to the downside that limited liability brings. Although limited
liability may make it cheaper to raise equity capital, this is offset by a higher cost of debt
capital. See Forbes, supra note 251, at 164 n.1 (citing Ekelund & Tollison, Mercantilist
Origins of the Corporation, II BELL J. ECON. 715, 719 (1980)). Under this view, limited
liability for nonconsensual claims on firm assets, by tort or otherwise, serves as a substitute
for insurance coverage for those third-party claims that exceed firm assets. Limited liability
merely reduces the cost of this insurance. Forbes, supra note 251, at 165 & n.5. Insurers
are risk averse when they face uncertainty and unpredictable probability of loss, rather
than with risk and predictable probabilities. See F. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND
PROFIT 197-263 (1921 & reprint 1971). The argument that the cost of insurance is identi-
cal to the cost of limited liability by statute breaks down. The two present different moni-
toring costs. Further, limited liability avoids the costs associated with diversifying the risk
through pooling. These factors suggest that limited liability is advantageous. See Abraham,
Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 942, 945-49
(1988).
Limited liability impacts the monitoring activities within the firm. Several reasons sug-
gest why transaction costs make limited liability attractive for consensual parties. First, it
permits efficient risk-sharing between shareholders and bondholders, since the value that
shareholders place on the reduced exposure to risk will be positively related to the claims of
creditors relative to the size of the firm's assets. "In this sense limited liability is a substi-
tute for an insurance policy that covers the claims of creditors in excess of the firm's as-
sets." See Forbes, supra note 251, at 165. Second, unlimited liability is a costly arrange-
ment since shareholders attempt to escape their liability for firm debts, thus increasing
collection costs. This problem can be remedied in part by limited liability because share-
holders have no personal liability for firm debts. Id. at 166. Third, only limited liability can
permit free transferability of shares, since unlimited liability argues for restrictions on
transferability of shares. Id. at 166, citing S. Woodward, On The Economics of Limited
Liability (U.C.L.A. Dept. of Econ. Working Paper, 1985).
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has generally reduced legal personality and the resemblance test
to rhetoric;2 53 however, tax law continues to follow the personality
cult. 54
Ever-changing state laws make the resemblance test even
more suspect as a guardian of federal tax policy. This was demon-
strated by the 1976 and 1985 revisions to the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act255 as well as by state changes in the management
The existence of limited liability favors new firms and those firms that require that the
savings of a large number of individuals be pooled. Limited liability is not essential for
established firms because they may be able to internally finance their investment. In addi-
tion, their reputation for honesty and managerial acumen might be sufficient to overcome
investor uncertainty. Id. at 174-75.
Limited liability may distort firm behavior, reducing social responsibility. See Kraak-
man, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Control, 93 YALE L.J. 857,
858 (1984)(considering when liability rules should hold accountable leading corporate par-
ticipants for corporate wrongdoing, rather than the firm itself.). Firms may be willing to
sacrifice the ability to manage in order to benefit from limited liability laws. See infra note
289 and accompanying text.
253. Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law,
54 U. Cm. L. REV. 1441, 1442, 1478-83 (1987)(discussing the evolution of corporate per-
sonality and explaining that all that remains of a corporation as a legal person is rhetoric).
For the view that the decision to tax "corporations" was compounded by some basic errors
in the fiction of the corporate personality. See H. Dougan, supra note 249, at 17-18 (Per-
haps the only thing unique about a corporation is that the law has recognized its entity
characteristics as conferred by an act of the legislative or executive branches of government
rather than by case.law or common experience.). For a discussion of contextual views of
the firm within society, see R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 1-4, 675-703 (1986).
254. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue declared in 1960 that "[t]he separate-
ne, of the corporate personality or the corporate entity is one of the cornerstones of our
present income tax law." See Caplin, Income Tax Pressures on the Form of Business
Organization: Is It Time for a "Doing Business" Tax?, 47 VA. L. REV. 249, 252-53
(1961)(considering the complexities and inconsistencies in current tax legislation and sug-
gesting a single doing business tax on the taxable income of any enterprise, regardless of its
classification under state law). For an example of the strength of this proposition, see
Gabinet & Coffey, supra note 149. There, the authors argue that a plan for full imputation
of corporate income to shareholders in other than closely held firms would be "a major
upheaval in the constitutional meaning of income, a rejection of the narrow holding of
Macomber, and the abandonment of the dominion and control doctrine, which is simply not
likely to happen." Id. at 935. Other forms of integration do not have that defect. Id. at
935-41. Gabinet and Coffey hypothesize that the lack of a constitutional challenge to Sub-
part F is explainable on the grounds that the corporations in question are foreign. Id. at
928-29. Compare Powell, The Stock-Dividend Decision and the Corporate Nonentity, 5
BULL NAT'L TAX ASS'N 201 (1920)(passthrough taxation of all corporations could be up-
held despite Macomber), with Ballantine, Corporate Personality in Income Taxation, 34
HARV. L. REV. 573, 586 (1921)(passthrough taxation would not be upheld "at least in the
case of large and active business corporations employing large capital since corporations
are separate legal personalities").
255. The 1976 proposed revisions to the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
were delayed until a "favorable" determination could be made by the Internal Revenue
Service. See generally T.D. 7889, 1983-1 C.B. 362 (containing regulations relating to the
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rights of limited partners . 56 New trends in state laws, like the
Georgia Limited Partnership Act2 57 which depends on application
of the Kintner test for tax classification, highlight the uncertainty
arising from reliance on state law.25s
2. Economic Personality and the Resemblance Test
Since the keys to the resemblance test are characteristics of
legal personality, economic aspects such as whether a firm oper-
ates in a public or private market and whether its economic role is
based on the size of the organization occupy a distinctly secondary
status. The resemblance test was developed in the infancy of cor-
porate finance. The large publicly traded firm operating in an effi-
ciently organized and regulated equity market did not come into
existence until after the Stock Market Crash of 1929.259 In 1932,
Berle and Means advanced their revolutionary view of the firm as
an economic agent rather than as a legal personality.260 Notwith-
standing the Berle and Means insights, the resemblance test ar-
rived at in the Morrissey decision and based on statutory interpre-
tation and longstanding Treasury regulations pointing to formal
classification of limited partnerships in light of recent state-law changes allowing the re-
moval of a general partner by the limited partners and for limitation of the liability of a
general partner to partnership creditors).
256. See infra note 676.
257. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-9A-1 to 130 (Supp. 1988).
258. Federal Tax consequences under the resemblance test may be altered by
changes in state law. See Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation, 65
WASH. U.L.Q. 357 (1987)(proposing statutory provisions limiting a general partner's power
to effect a partnership dissolution); Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation:
A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L.
REV. 1, 3, 50-59 (1977)(since a closely held corporation is similar to a partnership, a mi-
nority shareholder should have a statutory right to have the closely held corporation buy
out all his stock and equity). The creation of these state law rights can alter the federal tax
treatment accorded the firm. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 88-76, supra note 33 (determining the
status of an unincorporated limited liability firm for tax purposes under the resemblance
analysis depends solely on existence of more than two of the corporate factors of continuity
of life, centralization of management, limited liability, and free transferability of interests
under state law).
259. See generally A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1968); L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 164, at 21-30 (discussing
changes in corporations after 1929 and how these changes brought about corporations with
large numbers of stockholders).
260. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 259. See also id. at 119-40 (the corporation
is itself an economic agent in a financial market). Berle and Means noted the transition of
the corporation from a legal entity in which owners controlled their property according to
terms in a charter closely supervised by the state, to an arrangement in which many deliver
capital into the centralized control of a separate entity. Id. at 127.
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characteristics of the entity such as continuity of existence and
centralized management, 6' continued to rely heavily on the fic-
tion of legal personality. The struggle to determine the true nature
of a corporate entity occupied much of the nontax,162 but not the
tax,263 considerations in the 1940s and 1950s. While the nontax
view of the corporation was becoming more functional, the resem-
blance test, although not completely mechanical, was only applied
by the courts to firms that were not incorporated entities. While
resemblance characteristics in a firm also pointed to economic dif-
ferences, any attention paid to an economic concept of corporate
production in determining the appropriate entity to tax was sub-
sumed in the discussion of the resemblance characteristics.264
3. The Counter-Productiveness of Resemblance Thinking
Unfortunately, the resemblance conception colored the
261. Subsequent regulations continued adherence to the formal characteristics under
state law. See Sexton & Osteen, supra note 235, at 117-20. The Morrissey articulation of
resemblence rather than identity did cause the Treasury in 1939 to reverse its earlier posi-
tion that New York limited partnerships modeled on the ULPA would not be tested for
resemblance since they were so like ordinary partnerships "as to render impracticable any
differential in their treatment for tax purposes," and to require testing of ULPA limited
partnership for resemblance. See Vernon, When Are Partnerships Likely to be Taxed as
Associations?, 4 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 489, 499 (1946).
262. See, e.g., Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), which had
its greatest influence later. For a review of the theoretical developments, see Williamson,
Th, Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1537,
1537-43 (1981). These conceptions of the theory of the firm as a economic actor, beginning
with Coase, had other antecedents ignored by the tax law. See Bratton, The New Economic
Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives fro m History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473
(1989) [hereinafter Bratton, Theory] (arguing that theories of the firm as an economic
actor presently represented in both the Jensen and Meckling neoclassical and Oliver Wil-
liamson institutional nexus of contracts views of the firm "have followed from and re-
sponded to economic practice; they have not dominated and determined it"). For a recent
set of views on the theory of the firm and contractual arrangements in corporate govern-
ance theory, see Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395
(1989) (Symposium).
263. See, e.g., Sneed, supra note 243 at 193 (corporate taxes should be applied to
business entities depending on limited liability of the owners and centralization of legal
title rather than through application of the other classification factors).
264. See, e.g., Glensder Textile Co. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 176, 187 (1946)
(holding a New York limited partnership not taxable as an "association" because "it does
not bear such a resemblance to an association or operate effectively as such so as to justify
our inclusion of it in that category for tax purposes") (emphasis added); Bert v. Commis-
sioner, 92 F.2d 491, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (holding a stock trading trust an association
after weighing the resemblance factors to find the "method, mode, and form of procedure
in the conduct of its business")(citing Commissioner v. Brouillard, 70 F.2d 154, 158 (10th
Cir. 1934)) (emphasis added).
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double-tax debate in a number of ways, foreclosing the develop-
ment of a reasoned economic rationale for the business tax classi-
fications that exist even today. First, Congress never articulated
its reasons for taxing corporations differently from partnerships;265
consequently, the issues were decided on the basis of entity classi-
fication and statutory construction. The policy critiques of the
classification issue have generally been interwoven with an analy-
sis of the availability of perceived tax benefits or an analysis of
attributes associated with the status of the entity.2 6 Second, the
resemblance test obscured the legal, if not the economic, debate
over the taxation of business entities. Even if the resemblance test
made distinctions among co-ownership, corporation, limited part-
nership, and trust, it failed as a meaningful legal test of the role of
entities within the context of the income tax. 67
The vagueness of the resemblance test and its relationship to
the other structural provisions of the income tax left the Treasury
open to criticism that its regulations did not establish a policy def-
inition of corporations .2 6  The failure of the resemblance test also
265. Some commentators have bemoaned the fact that the classification regulations
cannot "be tested against the congressional purpose [because] Congress has never articu-
lated its reasons for taxing corporations differently from partnerships." Note, Shelters,
supra note 244, at 420.
266. When partnerships were used as tax shelters, commentators asked the Treasury
and the courts to refrain from judging the classification issue on the ultimate tax conse-
quences, i.e., the passthrough of losses. Instead, they urged that classification under state
law should control. See Hyman & Hoffman, Partnerships and "Associations". A Policy
Critique of the Morrissey Regulations, 3 J. REAL EsT. TAX'N 377 (1976)(advocating the
wholesale adoption of state-law classification as controlling federal tax consequences absent
a countervailing federal tax policy). Similarly, commentators urged the Treasury and
courts to use state law principles when professional partnerships sought association status
to achieve pension and other deferred-compensation benefits available only to corporations
and associations. See, e.g., Scallen, supra note 240, at 715 (preferable course was to allow
normal federal tax consequences to follow from the local-law form of these professional
organizations).
267. See Klein, Legal Entities, supra note 196 (analyzing taxation based on legal
status and suggesting a gradual replacement of tax on entities with a more direct tax on
"people"); see also Lee, Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded Partner-
ships, Personal Service Corporations, and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 VA. TAX REv.
57, 83-93, 102-09 (1988) ("deep structure" analysis to determine appropriateness of entity
taxation with participation of owners as sine qua non of entity-level taxation, and under
separate analysis, the classical corporate tax); Brooks, supra note 132, at 459 ("Entities
should be subject to separate-entity taxation only when the administrative reasons for im-
posing the separate tax are thought to outweigh the economic and equity costs of doing so,
irrespective of the legal form of the entity."). A resemblance test is necessary to draw lines,
other than the single-tax/double-tax line, whenever these relationships have a meaning in
the tax-collection system for firms and individuals.
268. See, e.g., Hyman & Hoffman, supra note 266.
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resulted in the inclusion of clear financial intermediaries within
the scope of the double tax.269 The resemblance test does not ex-
clude from association status closely held corporations, defined as
those firms without a public market for their shares and which
may be controlled by their owners, even if such an unincorporated
entity would not be an "association" when tested under the crite-
ria.270 Nonetheless, legal commentators, including the ALI, have
proposed standards based on resemblance criteria 71 without ask-
ing the federal tax-policy questions alluded to in Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co. - what is the classical corporate tax, who should pay
it, and implicitly, why? The ALI's position on the resemblance
test - that the Kintner regulations continue and that only pub-
licly traded limited partnerships be taxed as associations - re-
solves none of these problems.2 72
269. See 2 R. MONTGOMERY, C. TAYLOR, & M. RICHARDSON, MONTGOMERY'S FED-
ERAL TAXES - CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS 1951-1952 23-31 (1952).
270. Note, Close Corporations and the Federal Income Tax Laws -Should the
State Label Control?, 59 IOWA L. REV. 553, 573-75 (1974)("[T]he close corporation...
cannot meet the resemblance test of the 1960 regulations."); see also 1987 House MLP
Hearings, supra note 30, at 344 (statement of John W. Lee)("[M]ost close C corporations
exhibit some of Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)'s four corporate characteristics."); Kessler, With
Limited Liability for All: Why Not a Partnership Corporation?, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 235,
255-58 (1967)("[A]ny statute designed to benefit close corporations would permit them to
mold their mode of .operatidn more or less as they chose, thus making them even more
permissive than the ordinary corporation statute.").
271. Limited liability seems to be the most popular factor because of its uniqueness
to ;ae corporate form and its importance in choosing a corporation as a business entity.
See, e.g., Postlewaite, Dutton & Magette, A Critique of the ALI's Federal Income Tax
Project -Subchapter K: Proposals on the Taxation of Partners, 75 GEO. L.J. 423, 459-60
(1987)(given the deficiencies of other parts of the resemblance test, classification regula-
tions should be changed to focus on limited liability, the only truly distinguishing factor);
Leonard, A Pragmatic View of Corporate Integration, 35 TAX NOTES 889, 897 (1987)(al-
though classification lines are always somewhat arbitrary, limited liability is an important
factor); Keyser, Publicly-Traded Limited Partnerships: The Treasury Fights The Wrong
War, 36 INST. ON OIL & GAS LAW & TAX'N 10-1, 10-17 to 10-19 (1985)(a general partner
with enough assets to pay all the debts of the partnership is required, and the liability in
the partnership must be in the form of recourse obligations for a limited "partnership to
enjoy partnership status, since only then will there be unlimited liability"); Note, Tax
Classification of Limited Partnerships, 90 HARV. L. REV. 745, 757 (1977)(personal liabil-
ity is the cleanest distinction between a corporation and a partnership).
Whether the owner's interests are publicly traded or offered has been also suggested as
the determinative factor under a resemblance criteria. See, e.g., ALI SUBCHAPTER K
STUDY, supra note 128, at 392 (public trading); Outlaw v. United States, 494 F.2d 1376,
1385 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974)(public offering as another factor that
should be considered and generally would be determinative). The public offering standard
was also proposed in 1975 as part of anti-tax shelter legislation and was not acted upon.
See Lee, supra note 267, at 85 n.l 14.
272. ALl SUBCHAPTER K STUDY, supra note 128, at 383-84. Noting that if a busi-
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Other countries have dealt directly with these questions with-
out resemblance criteria and in spite of different corporate and
individual rate strucfures.27a Although the resemblance test does
little to identify which firms should pay a corporate tax, the
United States persists in applying resemblance analysis. The 1986
Treasury proposal on a public-trading standard that led to the
1987 legislative change of heart reflects this persistence.
The proposal we make today is not based on the view that pub-
licly traded limited partnerships are different in kind from all
other partnerships, but on the view that public trading in the
interests of a limited partnership is indicative of the existence of
the other, more relevant, classification factors . . . that may, to
a lesser extent, be present in many other partnerships.174
Thus, the change of heart was based on the resemblance criteria
and not on a position that public trading or liquidity in and of
itself justified an entity-level tax. The debate over publicly traded
limited partnerships was so intertwined with resemblance concerns
that it failed to articulate the meaningful differences between pri-
vate and public firms and the capital markets in which they exist.
The difficulty of using resemblance criteria has not been lost
on economists. 5 Their inquiries have generally focused on the al-
ness entity acts like a corporation, presenting the same administrative and audit problems
as a corporation, it should be taxed as a corporation the ALl proposed an addition to the
resemblance test based on public trading. The "public-trading test is principally intended
to exclude from partnership treatment the type of entity that carries on an active business
and which, if interests in it were publicly traded, would resemble the publicly-held corpora-
tions that carry on most of this country's important industrial enterprises." Id. at 384. That
view is known as the duck theory. See, e.g., Partnerships: Ways & Means Chairman Ros-
tenkowski Says Nature of MLP Deals Will Determine Tax Treatment, BNA DAILY TAX
REPORT No. 181 at G-6 (Sept. 21, 1987)("To the extent that the deals [the investment
community puts] together look more and more like ordinary businesses, the Congress is
going to be inclined to tax you as such. In other words, if it looks like a duck, walks like a
duck, and sounds like a duck, it ought to be taxed like a duck."). The duck theory is much
cited as an explanation of the 1987 legislation. See, e.g., McKee, supra note 29, at 23-11 to
23-13.
273. See, e.g., H. GUMPEL, WORLD TAX SERIES: TAXATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUB-
LIC OF GERMANY 451-67 (1969)(civil law classification of firms governs tax provisions).
Nonetheless, a resemblance test is required for classifying foreign entities. See 2 BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY § 32.03 [2] [b], at 32-66 (B. Rilster ed. 1987).
274. 1986 House Passthrough Hearings, supra note 30, at 31 (statement of J. Roger
Mentz). The concern changed in 1987 to a fear of a start-up MLP. See infra text accom-
panying note 659.
275. This economists' point of view is encapsulated in Brooks, supra note 76, at 460
("Of what importance is it in a tax system designed to measure economic power that a
person's liability for an investment in an income source is limited, or that the investment
has potentially an unlimited life, or that it is freely transferable?").
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locative inefficiency of the classical corporate tax, the distortions it
creates in the corporate and the noncorporate sectors and in fi-
nancing decisions, and increasingly, the need to define corporate
production. The imposition of a firm-level tax on corporate pro-
duction has some justification, particularly when there is evidence
that a form of business organization produces excess returns that
ought to be taxed. Thus, the resemblance test should be directed
at the form of production rather than an organization's resem-
blance to a corporate entity. 76 For example, the ability of residual
claims to manage or affect the management structure may not be
as highly valued as was once thought, 7 and firm organizational
choices reflect control of agency risks, diversification and con-
sumption choices, and production forms.27 8 This would belie the
276. See A. Nekam, The Personality Conception of the Legal Entity, in III
HARVARD STUDIES IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 110-15 (1934). "It would be easy to recall
all those formations which are not recognized as corporations yet, nonetheless, have either
because of legislative enactment or because of the decision of the courts rights patently
acknowledged to them, and which therefore all contradict the theory." Id. at 114.
277. Control is generally valued in the pricing of securities. In addition to the study
of market acceptance of dual class common structures, see infra note 683, the value of
control has attracted further study. In the study by Lease, McConnell & Mikkelson, The
Market Value of Control in Publicly-Traded Corporations, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 439, 441,
466-68 (1983), superior voting rights for identical securities of 26 firms resulted in higher
valuation, but superior voting rights in common stock for four firms with voting preferred
stock traded at a significant discount. They thus reject in part the Manne, Jensen, and
Meckling hypothesis that the source of value is the additional compensation and perquisites
the. the controlling security holders can obtain. They conclude that there is a consistent
relationship between security value and corporate control and that the value of control is
related to the "incremental positive payoffs" relative to control. Similarly, Swiss studies
show there is a value to the vote for public firms. Since capital markets do not reward
diversifiable risk, the majority shareholders hold the high-voting-rights stock. Homer, The
Value of the Corporate Voting Right: Evidence from Switzerland, 12 J. BANKING & FIN.
69 (1988). Lower valuation for high voting right shares relative to other shares can also be
related to the other restrictions of the securities. The Lease, McConnell, and Mikkelson
conclusion that control has its costs and benefits is applicable to the argument that the
limited partnership form might not replace the corporate form, but that the ability to tailor
the agreement to replace the costs of loss of control with other protection will give a posi-
tive valuation regardless of the control element. Since limited partners do not work for the
firm, the agency explanation is not as compelling. Control is also related to factors involv-
ing managers. Cf. R. MORCK, A. SHLEIFER & R. VISHNY, ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 2 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.
2532, 1988)("Where the board fails, external control devices come to play a role.").
278. See infra notes 364-77 and accompanying text. Firm-structure choice is much
studied, as is firm-capital structure. For example, Jensen and Meckling posit that firms are
legal fictions for contractual relations among individuals. This has led to research into con-
tracts and bargains that are struck to minimize risk and agency costs. See Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 103, at 310-11; Fellingham & Wolfson, Taxes and Risk Sharing, 60
AccT. REV. 10 (1985)(evaluating efficient risk sharing and incentives in joint ownership of
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assumption that limited partnerships can never completely replace
corporations, and it demonstrates that in many respects the lim-
ited partnership is a different organizational form. 7 9 As will be
argued shortly,2 80  there are great difficulties with such a
an income-producing project when part of the income is unavailable for personal consump-
tion); Shevlin, Taxes and Off-Balance-Sheet Financing: Research and Development Lim-
ited Partnerships, 62 Acct. REV. 480, 480-81 (1987)(finding tax and off-balance sheet
motivations providing support for agency-model predictions); Harris & Raviv, Optimal In-
centive Contracts with Imperfect Information, 20 J. ECON. THEORY 231, 233 (1979)(not-
ing that there are potential gains to monitoring individuals when the agent is risk-averse).
Drawing on earlier work of Coase (Coase, supra note 262), Oliver Williamson finds that
the model is transaction-cost minimizing. Williamson, supra note 144, at 572 (noting that
the distinctive orientation of Coase's theory is transaction costs). Theoretical models sug-
gest that there are identifiable rationales for choosing a general partnership, limited part-
nership or a corporate form. Fama and Jensen provide a theoretical explanation for the
existence of various organizational froms such as corporations, professional partnerships,
financial mutuals, and non-profit organizations. Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and
Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 327 (1983). They conjecture that the larger and more
complex the decisionmaking hierarchy in a firm, the greater the need to separate the deci-
sion management from the risk-bearing claimants. The more complex the organization, the
larger is the number of decisionmakers employed and the more specialized is each of the
decisionmaking roles. This complexity rules out the possibility that all decisionmakers may
become involved in all relevant decisions. Fama and Jensen explain that this may result in
a separation of risk-bearing from decisionmaking, which creates an agency problem. They
hypothesize that the separation of the manager's "decision management rights" and execu-
tive "decision control rights," as in a corporation, will resolve some of these agency
problems by limiting the ability of the individual decisionmakers to force too much risk on
the risk-bearing claimants. For smaller and less complex organizations, such as a small
partnership, concentrated decisionmaking is efficient and agency costs are low. Thus, there
is no need for separation between decisionmakers and risk-bearing claimants. In a further
study, Fama and Jensen demonstrate that closed firms trade the loss of optimal portfolio
diversification for gains in controlling agency costs, which leads to an undervaluation of
their residual equity claims relative to the value of the residual claims of an open firm
traded in perfect capital markets. See Fama & Jensen, Organizational Forms and Invest-
ment Decisions, 14 J. FIN. EcoN. 101, 102, 106-09, 117-19 (1985) [hereinafter Fama &
Jensen, Organization]. For a view of other corporate stakeholders, see Cornell & Shapiro,
Corporate Stakeholder and Corporate Finance, FIN. MGMT., Spring 1987, at 5 (claiming
that the inclusion of stakeholders other than investors and managers play an important role
in financial policy and leads to new interpretations of classical problems in finance). See
also Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. EcON & ORGAN. 267 (1988)(surveying the
reasons for the "dominance of investor-owned firms in market economics").
279. See supra notes 141-50 and accompanying text. One commentator argues that
the limited partnership form is chosen for agency savings and an ability to effect manage-
ment entrenchment, but sometimes an agency cost results when the tax treatment of a
corporation causes the form of the transaction to be distorted in favor of a limited partner-
ship. See Ribstein, An Applied Theory of Limited Partnership, 37 EMORY L.J. 835 (1988).
I do not agree with his assertions (1) that there is no principled reason for distinguishing
between publicly traded and nonpublicly traded firms, see id. at 874-76, and (2) that the
"resemblance" distinctions he makes ought to be tax significant under a "resemblance"
test.
280. See infra notes 409-18 and accompanying text.
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definition.
4. The De Facto Public Trading Test for the Double Tax:
Revenue Ruling 88-76
On September 6, 1988, the Service dropped two bombshells.
First, it announced that it would no longer apply the net-worth
requirements of Revenue Procedure 72-13 to entities seeking part-
nership classification.28 Second, the Service issued Revenue Rul-
ing 88-76282 in which it classified a firm formed under the Wyo-
ming Limited Liability Company - Act 283  as a partnership,
notwithstanding the fact that all of the participants had limited
liability and there was centralized management. The Service sub-
stantially altered the normal focus of the resemblance test by bas-
ing its ruling on the partnership's lack of free transferability of
management rights and absence of continuity of life. 84 The Ser-
vice's position was extraordinary, given its previous reading of its
own regulations and given prior predictions of a legislative move
to include large limited partnerships within the double-tax
285regime.
Limited liability within a firm has two functions.288 First, it
281. Net worth requirements of Rev. Proc. 72-13 are no longer applicable to all
entities seeking partnership classification but went on to state that it would prepare a new
consolidated revenue procedure that would review net worth requirements. See infra note
297 and accompanying text. The announcement was somewhat cryptic as to whether it
would continue to apply to sole corporate general partners. Announcement 88-118, 1988-38
I.R.B. 26. In a subsequent private letter ruling, Private Letter Rul. 8916003 (Dec. 19,
1988), the Service applied only the requirement in the regulations for substantial net worth
to a limited partnership with a sole corporate general partner. The announcement closes
the study initiated in 1982 of rules for classifying entities which presumably was focusing
in large part on the significance of limited liability for federal tax purposes. Id. See gener-
ally I.R.S. News Release IR-82-145 (Dec. 1982), reprinted in 17 TAX NOTES 998
(1982)(further explanation of the then forthcoming study).
282. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-38 I.R.B. 1"4; see -supra note 33 and accompanying text.
283. WYo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to 17-15-136 (1977).
284, According to Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1), continuity of life is not present if
death, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member causes dissolution.
Rev. Rul. 88-76, supra note 33. In the event of death or withdrawal of any member, §
301.7701-2(b)(2) provides for continuity of life if all remaining members consent to con-
tinue the business by agreement in the articles of incorporation, unless, under state law,
death or withdrawal causes dissolution. Rev. Rul. 88-76, supra note 33. Here, the remain-
ing members did not consent to continue the business, so the corporate characteristic of
continuity of life did not exist. Id.
285. M. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 594 (2d ed. 1988) (the dominant mo-
tive after the 1986 Tax Act to form large limited partnerships will be avoidance of the
double corporate tax.)
286. Limited liability as a Kintner resemblance factor looks to whether at least one
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allows the managers of the firm to engage in decisions or acts that
have the potential of bankrupting the firm. Second, it ensures that
owners are not liable for the debts of the firm. While limited lia-
bility has therefore been argued to lead to excessive risk taking by
the firm,287 the reason why limited liability was included among
the resemblance test criteria was essentially unclear. Was the rea-
son related to the reward that equity participants received from
the firm engaging in risky behavior, or was the value of the sub-
sidy they received to invest without risk justifiable under the bene-
fits theory? If the latter, the issue was overpayment since under
economic theory the risk of limited liability is shifted to the credi-
tors who will demand higher compensation; in the case of involun-
tary creditors, the firm will have an incentive to purchase insur-
ance at a price that will induce managers and employees to invest
human capital in the firm, especially smaller firms investing in
risky projects where there is no separation of functions between
capital suppliers and decision makers."' 8 Limited liability acts as
an antecedent to a more important function in the firm - the
reduction in costs of trading equity securities under uncertainty of
valuation and the reduction in cost of separating management
member of the organization would have personal liability for the organization's activities.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1)(as amended in 1984). However, an impecunious general
partner does not preclude limited liability so long as he is not the "dummy" of the limited
partners. Presence of a "dummy" may cause general liability for the limiteds under state
law. W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, supra note 245, at 3.06 [4][c]. The court
in Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 741 (Ct. Cl. 1975), paraphrases the regula-
tions, approvingly, as follows:
[P]ersonal liability will exist with respect to a general partners where (1) such
general partner is a corporation having substantial assets which can be reached
by creditors; (2) the general partner contributes only services, but still has sub-
stantial assets; (3) the general partner has substantial assets, although insuffi-
cient to satisfy the obligations of an organization engaged in large-scale financial
transactions; and (4) the general partner has no substantial assets and is not
merely a "dummy" acting as the agent of the limited partners.
Id. The 1977 proposed regulations looked to see if a functional question with respect to
liability was actually present. "If the principal activity ... is acquisition . . . and opera-
tion of property," if ordinary risks are insured or indemnified against, and activity is princi-
pally financed by debt to which none are personally liable - then, there is limited liability
as to loss of assets not invested. Prop. Reg. § 301.7701-2(f)(2), 42 Fed. Reg. 1038, 1042
(1977)(withdrawn 42 Fed. Reg. 1489 (1977))..In 1980 the centralized management prong
was limited. Prop. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4), 45 Fed. Reg. 70,909 (1980). "A substantially
restricted right of the limited partners to remove a general partner . . . will not itself cause
the partnership to possess centralized management." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4)(as
adopted in 1984).
287. See Bratton, Restructuring, supra note 175, at 92, 109-10.
288. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 251.
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from capital.2"9 When limited liability is viewed in such a manner,
transferability becomes the key issue because limited liability is
only its antecedent for which a price is paid by the equity partici-
pants in the firm in the form of insurance and higher payments to
creditors.29 o
In a limited partnership, a limited partner is not liable for the
debts of the firm; limited partners achieve their limited liability
because they are considered lenders to the partnership. 291 Tax
289. This view begins with a simple statement of the role of limited liability, and is
extended by further analysis, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 251, at 94 (adjunct to
separation of management from capital); Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, An Economic
Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117
(1980)(eliminates valuation uncertainty).
290. See infra note 418.
291. The first limited partnership acts precedzd corporate laws by decades. See H.
REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 264, at 434 n.54
(1979)("The first U.S. legislation providing for a limited partnership was adopted in New
York in 1822."). Limited liability in limited partnerships were available, however, only for
truly passive investors who were not in control of the business. See Weidner, The Existence
of State and Tax Partnerships: A Primer, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 26-40 (1983). "Just as
for state law purposes the partnership is seen as a separate entity that owns its own assets
and conducts its own business, it is also treated as a separate entity for many federal in-
come tax purposes." Id. at 26-27. While there is no prohibition on control, the loss of
limited liability through exercising control is a strong deterrent. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG,
PARTNERSHIP § 26, at 147 (1968). Drafters of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act con-
sidered it to be a codification of a majority judicial rule that "[t]he lender who takes a
share of the profits . . . does not by the reason of that fact run the risk of being held as a
partner." Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 719
(1917)(footnote omitted). General partners have a principal-agent relationship with each
other as to activities within the enterprise, but someone who supplies additional capital
"without forming a corporation or other statutory business association," id., can keep the
limited liability of the lender-debtor relationship inherent in the limited partnership and
avoid the principal-agent relationship of a normal partner. See, e.g., Eastman v. Clark, 53
N.H. 276 (1872)(cited with approval in Lewis, supra at 719 n.5). This principle applies so
long as she does not "take. . .part in the control of the business." ULPA, supra note 140,
at § 7, amended by RULPA, supra note 140, at § 303(b). Apparently some courts have
held that a limited partner may act like a shareholder on important issues or an employee
as long as she does not function like a corporate director. Kempkin, The Problem of Con-
trol in Limited Partnership Law: An Analysis and Recommendation, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 443,
453-55 (1985)(citing Siluola v. Rowlett, 129 Colo. 552, 272 P.2d 287 (1954); Grainger v.
Antoyan, 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957); Plasteel Products Corp. v. Helman, 271
F.2d 354 (lst Cir. 1959)). But see Klein, Legal Entities, supra note 197, at 130 ("[T]he
relationship of limited partners to the business in which they invest seems even more re-
mote than that of shareholders, since the latter at least retain the legal power of control
over the management of the business.").
A similar trend has occurred with respect to creditor control. For example, debt hold-
ers can only withhold funds from creditors where they reasonably believe that such action
is necessary to protect the creditor's interest. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust, 757 F.2d
752, 763 (6th Cir. 1985)(decision against the bank); see also Hass, Insights Into Lender
Liability: An Argument for Treating Controlling Creditors as Controlling Shareholders,
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commentators frequently view the dominance of limited partners
in the capital structure of a firm as a fatal combination of quintes-
sential corporate attributes, 92 notwithstanding the fact that lim-
ited partners receive their limited liability for nontax purposes
precisely because they are viewed as creditors rather than inves-
tors. 93 Furthermore, if they dominate the capital structure but
cannot manage the firm, then the organization assumes another
corporate characteristic - representative management.294
Revenue Ruling 88-76 radically reduces the importance of
the resemblance factors of limited liability and centralized man-
agement,29 5 which were long thought by the Service to carry more
weight in the determination of corporate status than the two other
characteristics of the resemblance test - continuity of life and
free transferability of interests. In addition, the partnership agree-
ment at issue in Revenue Ruling 88-76 limited the transfer of
management rights but permitted the transfer of rights to profits.
Thus, the ruling embraced a nonfunctional reading of free trans-
ferability that was specifically contrary to the view of free trans-
ferability taken under the 1977 draft regulations.296 Those pro-
posed regulations found free transferability to exist if one could
transfer the right to profits without consent, notwithstanding the
fact that management rights could only be transferred with
consent.
This de facto publicly traded standard for double taxation re-
mains the rule in the Service's revised advance ruling position. Al-
135 U. PA. L. REV. 1321, 1346-49 (1987)(comparing controlling creditors to controlling
shareholders where creditors have the power to use voting control created in debt instru-
ments and the means to signal the market based on the creditor's superior access to
information).
292. See Postlewaite, Dutton & Magette, supra note 271, at 458-62 (An entity
ought to be treated by the tax law as an "association" if it exhibits any of three important
traits: (1) the general partners are all corporations; (2) the general partners are without
sufficient assets; or (3) a majority of the equity is limited partner equity.).
293. See Lewis, supra note 291, at 719.
294. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4)(as amended in 1983). "[L]imited partnerships
. . . generally do not have centralized management, but centralized management ordina-
rily does exist . . . if substantially all the interests . . . are owned by the limited partners."
Id.
295. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1983)(centralized manage-
ment); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (as amended in 1983)(limited liablity).
296. Under the 1977 proposed regulations, free transferability would exist if a mem-
ber had the power freely to assign her "primary attributes," such as the right to receive
capital and the right to share the profits of capital. Prop. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g), 42 Fed.
Reg. 1038, 1042 (1977)(withdrawn 42 Fed. Reg. 1489)(1977)).
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though not a statement of substantive law, the position permits
independent consideration of each of the ruling factors, omits dis-
cussion of free transferability, and does not require a corporate
general partner to satisfy any particular net worth standard al-
though it does provide a safe harbor.297 The operative test for
double taxation will be the publicly traded standard. There is no
longer a regulatory uncertainty as to the scope of the application
of the resemblance test regulations; they are close to a rubber
stamp for "unincorporated" corporations at the state law level.
II. APPROPRIATE NEUTRAL RATIONALE FOR A DOUBLE TAX
A. Distinguishing the Rationale for a Double Tax from the
Rationale for a Corporate Tax
Many rationales for a separate corporate tax within the gen-
eral context of business taxation have been offered. 9 A separate
297. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22.
298. See, e.g., R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 7, at 387-90 (describing
the absolutist view, ability-to-pay, benefit consideration, and regulatory objectives theories);
J. PECHMAN, supra note 103, at 135-37. (It is fair to tax the corporation because it "owes
its life, rights, and power to the government"); Warren Interest, supra note I, at 1598-
1603 (noting rationales of (I) adjunct to the personal income tax; (2) charge for benefits
granted to corporations; (3) production of revenue; (4) need to control corporate power and
monopoly profits; and (5) economic stabilization). For the distortions it produces, see C.
SHOUP, PUBLIC FINANCE 300-32 (1969). For other early views, see H. GROVES, supra note
76, at 20-25 (discussing T.S. Adams, Gerhard Colm, Paul Studenski, and Edwin Selig-
man). See also Buehler, The Theory of Business Taxation, in TAXATION AND BUSINESS
CONCENTRATION 231, 235-36 (1952)[hereinafter Beuhler, Theory] (citing the discussions
of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and Henry Carter Adams). Business
taxation was originally defined as a tax whose burden rested largely on the owners of the
enterprise but this theory was extended to include the creditors, managers, employees and
others associated in a group venture for obtaining income. See Studenski, Toward a The-
ory of Business Taxation, 48 J. POL. ECON. 621, 623 (1940). This view of business taxation
would extend to all taxes that affect taxpayers in their capacities as producers rather than
consumers, and it would be imposed on income where it is earned rather than where it is
spent. See Adams, Fundamental Problems of Federal Income Taxation, 35 Q.J. EcON. 541
(1921); Buehler, Theory, supra, at 248, 252-53. The flux in the law resulted from the
difficult search for a coherent rationale. See, e.g., Buehler, The Taxation of Business, in
REAPPRAISAL OF BUSINESS TAXATION 33, 36 (1962)[hereinafter Buehler, Taxation]("Each
theory falls down on some score, whether one refers to the numerous variations of ability to
pay, costs, benefits, neutrality, equality, uniformity, or other bases of taxation. We always
arrive at the point where ability, benefits, economic effects, and so on become uncertain
and perhaps immeasurable.").
The 1940's witnessed theoretical debates of this type. There were calls to de-empha-
size irrational forms. See, e.g., H. GROVES, supra note 76, at 20-27. The major tax plans
following World War II reflected this same view by proposing plans for corporate integra-
tion and taxation of new enterprises. These proposals are discussed in Blakey, Evaluation
of Post-War Tax Proposals Made by Various Groups and Individuals, in How SHOULD
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corporate tax may function solely as a collection mechanism for
the fisc 299 or as a back-stop to an inadequate tax payable by the
taxpayer in the future.300 Alternatively, it may be used to control
or restrict the absolute size of firms 0 ' (not necessarily monopo-
lies), 0 2 to tax monopoly profits,303 or to pay for perceived benefits
of the corporate form of business in general 0 4 or benefits received
by corporations as business entities.305 It may be imposed as a
painless sources 6 of pure revenue307 or a revenue and economic
CORPORATIONS BE TAXED? 3, 10-11 (1947). See also S. SURREY & W. WARREN, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 1087-1100 (1953)(discussing the policy debate in the National Tax As-
sociation and listing sources); S. SURREY & W. WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
1254 (1955)(additional sources). For an early view that only retained or undistributed
profits in the hands of the corporation should be taxed, and that distributed profits in the
form of dividends as well as interest should be deducted, see Lent, Bond Interest Deduction
and the Federal Corporation Income Tax, 2 NAT'L TAX J. 131, 131-33, 140-41 (1949).
299. The use of the firm as a collection agent on current income eliminates the need
to trace beneficial ownership of income, particularly when tax liabilities may be adjusted in
an audit long after the event. See 1987 Senate MLP Hearing, supra note 30, at 71-72
(statement of J. Roger Mentz).
300. STAFF OF JT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 1ST SEss., TAX REFORM PRO-
POSALS: CORPORATE TAXATION 17-18 (Comm. Print 1985)[hereinafter 1985 CORPORATE
PROPOSALS](tax on undistributed profits to compensate for deferral).
301. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 7, at 389.
302. Id.
303. A control rationale for the imposition of a firm level tax derives from the idea
that extra profitability ought to be taxed as a means of controlling the "persistent monop-
oly elements in corporate profits." Siltor, The Corporate Income Tax: A Re-Evaluation, 5
NAT'L TAX J. 289, 302 (1952).
304. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 7, at 388-89 (limited liability).
305. See H. GROVES, supra note 76, at 23 (" 'Business,' says Adams, 'ought to be
taxed because it costs money to maintain a market and those costs should in some way be
distributed over all the beneficiaries of that market.' The fallacy lies in the fact that every-
one is a beneficiary of a well-maintained market and the relative benefits are indetermi-
nate.")(footnote omitted).
306. A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 131-32 ("Perhaps most important
in political terms is the belief, held by many taxpayers, that it is borne by corporations
rather than individuals - and is therefore relatively 'painless.' ").
307. The cynical view of corporate taxation is that "[t]he tax is well established ...
and . . . produces large amounts of revenue." R. GOODE, supra note 10, at 26 (citing
Colm, Conflicting Theories of Corporate Income Taxation, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
281, 282 (1940)). This appraisal of the corporate tax is offered by Professors Kragen and
McNulty:
The federal corporation income tax has been highly successful in the most
conspicuous way that a tax can be successful - namely, in raising government
revenue. Like the political party that has been in power through a period of
continuous high-level prosperity, it is unlikely to be quickly turned out of office
by the voters. Nevertheless, it is true that the incidence of the tax is open to
serious quest.ion, and that insofar as the tax is not shifted it fails to fit neatly
with the personal income tax into a logical system of income taxation.
2 A. KRAGEN & J. McNULTY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATIONS,
CORPORATE TAX
stabilization measure in times of inflation and recession."' The
existence of a corporate tax allows for tax incentives and disincen-
tives to be directed at firms.309 For example, if corporate savings
are desired, the tax system can be used to make retentions more
desirable than distributions. 10
Under the corporate double tax system and the theory that
the firm level tax is capitalized, the corporate level tax lowers the
after tax return on profits to the firm. 11 Taking into account the
relevance of shareholder level taxes, equity investors invest in the
firm based on the after tax firm profits available for distribution to
them and the alternative after tax investments in the economy
with similar risk.312 Under this view, the corporate tax is a fiat tax
that impacts upon the firm's decision to incorporate or upon the
shareholders if the firm issues additional equity. 13 The decision to
incorporate and the subsequent financing choices of the firm dic-
tate the presumed initial incidence of the tax.3 14 For the firm, fi-
nance and economic theory holds that given certain assumptions,
including perfect capital markets, the effect of the tax is com-
pletely avoided if existing firms finance all marginal investment
with debt 15 or if shareholders are able to finance their investment
totally with debt.316
The Modigliani-Miller model shows that the choice between
debt and equity does not matter absent taxes.317 Both firm level318
and shareholder level3 19 limitations on debt financing negate these
AND PARTNERSHIPS 1268 (4th ed. 1985).
308. A. KRAGEN & J. McNuLTY, supra note 195, at 899 ("The corporate income
tax acts as an automatic stabilizer that combats inflation (or deflation).").
309. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 7, at 390.
310. Id. A more recent justification for the corporate tax, that drew strength from
the historical relationship between the corporate tax rate and individual passthrough rate,
was that it provided an incentive to economic growth by putting a premium on the reten-
tion of earnings. These earnings were thus withdrawn from consumption, and investment
was encouraged. See 1985 CORPORATE PROPOSALS, supra note 300, at 17-18 (noting that a
low corporate tax rate causes the accumulation of retained earnings). But see supra notes
114-16 and accompanying text for the view of the inefficiency of retained earnings finance.
311. The benefits and burdens of such a tax have been capitalized by the market.
See 1985 CORPORATE PROPOSALS, supra note 300, at 17-18.
312. See supra notes 66 & 106 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 67.
314. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 64.
316. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 60.
318. See supra note 65.
319. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. For margin requirments and margin-
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effects, and the weighted cost of capital in even the most highly
leveraged firms includes an equity component. If financing
through a noncorporate vehicle in a nonpublic market is lim-
ited,320 the actual effect of the tax will either be on entrepreneurs
who must exploit their ideas in the corporate form or on venture
capital and leveraged buyout investors who find the public market
essential for realizing gains from private ownership.3 2' The effect
will also fall on existing shareholders if firm financing is not made
with debt or retained earnings. While the assumptions of firm fi-
nance theory demonstrate the short-term incidence effect of the
tax, none of the foregoing provides a rationale for the double taxa-
tion of distributed profits. The existence of a high-rate excise tax
based on income as a franchise tax on doing business in one form
rather than another 322 is difficult to rationalize, especially if the
overtaxed form is a socially and economically advantageous form
for the activities that are being pursued. 23
able stock, see 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1 - 220.130 (1988) (Reg. T, broker-lenders); 12 C.F.R. §§
221.1 - 222.123 (1988) (Reg. U, bank lenders); 12 C.F.R. §§ 207.1 - 207.112 (1988) (Reg.
G, other lenders); 12 C.F.R. §§ 224.1 - 224.3 (1988) (Reg. X, borrowers). Margin ac-
counts are available under Regulation T for many equity securities listed on national secur-
ities exchanges as well as on the NASD National Market System and other more liquid
over-the-counter securities, with a maximum loan value of 50%. See Fed. Res. Bd., List of
Marginable OTC Stocks, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,256 (Oct. 28, 1988)(3113 stocks
listed). The courts have not yet decided if margin limitations are potential "show stoppers"
in leveraged buyouts. See C. BRUCK, THE PREDATOR'S BALL 211-12 (1988). For recent
views on the role of margin requirements, see 74 FED. RES. BULL. 453 (1988)(statement
before Congress of Wayne D. Angell, member of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System)(arguing for consistency when the margin requirements in cash, futures,
and options markets are set).
320. For an example of non-tax factors that led entrepreneurs to choose a public
rather than a private market, see infra notes 840-42 and accompanying text. For firms that
were not previously subject to the tax, there would be an obvious loss during transition. See
McLure & Thirsk, A Simplified Exposition of Harberger Model I. Tax Incidence, 28
NAT'L TAX J. 1, 12-13 (1975); McLure & Thirsk, The Harberger Model, Reply, 28 NAT'L
TAX J. 467 (1975)("[A] loss in production efficiency must be added to the loss in consum-
ers' surplus to arrive at the overall welfare cost.").
321. See infra notes 1039-40; see also L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 164, at 182-83.
"[T]he advantages of private ownership are largely based on, or at least coupled with, a
heavily leveraged capital structure, extremely generous but short-term compensation ar-
rangements, tax-sheltering devises of equally short duration and an investor group that in
all likelihood will not be content for long with merely paper profits .... " Id. at 183. This
means that the going private firm "is inherently unstable and will soon metamorphose into
something quite different." Id. But see supra note 173 and accompanying text.
322. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911) upheld an early form of such an
excise tax under a benefits theory.
323. It is anomalous to tax an entity on its savings and its addition to savings and
again tax an individual owner of that entity based on the same additions to savings either
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If a comprehensive personal income tax with full accrual of
capital gains existed, there would be no need for a corporate level
tax at all 24 except for the taxation of nonresidents3 25 and for divi-
sion of revenues between source and residence countries.a26 If the
tax system could start anew (or ignore or adequately lessen the
windfall gainsa21 or losses), a single tax on real economic income
would be desirable. 28 The tax system might for instance pass en-
(1) when the firm reinvests its profits, (2) when the firm distributes its profits to the owner
which allows the owner a consumption or a savings choice, or (3) when the owner realizes
such income through a sale of the ownership interest. Under traditional tax policy, this
fundamental discontinuity in the income tax system can only be accepted if there is a
separate benefit, ability-to-pay, or equitable consideration that has been received by the
owners of the firm that is separate and apart from the increase in wealth that is present in
the firm itself. Income tax theory suggests that single level taxation of individuals, partner-
ships, limited partnerships, cooperatives, and financial intermediaries is actually correct.
See, e.g., TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND REPORT, supra note 14, at 150-52; W. VICKREY,
supra note 39, at 456-57. This holds true because all one can expect any tax system to do is
tax income from capital once (or in the Irving Fisher or John Stuart Mill sense, twice). See
Klein, Legal Entities, supra note 197, at 51-52 (fairness considerations account for the
varying treatment of different entities).
324. Without the corporate tax individuals could amass huge amounts of wealth in
corporations that either would never be subject to tax or would be taxed preferentially. See
Pechman, Another View of the Corporate Income Tax, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL
TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980's 177 (C. Walker & M. Bloomfield eds. 1983).
325. See Bird, supra note 13, at 245.
326. See Boadway, Bruce & Mintz, Corporate Taxation in Canada: Toward an Effi-
cient System, in TAX POLICY OPTIONS IN THE 1980s (W. Thirsk & J. Whalley eds. 1982);
Musgrave, Interjurisdictional Coordination of Taxes on Capital Income, in TAX COORDI-
NATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 197, 200-01 (S. Cnossen ed. 1987)("lower-level
jurisdictions within a federal system usually confine their corporate income taxes to the
source principle"). There may be good reasons why a national jurisdiction may want to
base a system of income taxes on both the source and residence entitlement concepts. Some
source countries, for example, France and West Germany, have extended by treaty the
imputation credit to investors from abroad.
327. It has been argued that capitalization of taxes saved through integration would
result in a windfall gain to present shareholders who are concentrated in the upper income
groups. Others suggest that the adverse effects of resource allocation are not dependent
upon whether capitalization has occurred and that even if capitalization does occur the
burden of the tax will be shared by owners of noncorporate capital. In the studies of Euro-
pean integration, the question of windfall gains to existing equity holders was not debated,
whereas the actual mechanics of the tax credit and the refunds to wealthy shareholders
were. See Gourevitch, supra note 13, at 74-77, 107-09 (noting the loss of revenue after
integration in France and Vest Germany, revenue neutrality in the United Kingdom, and
the opposition to a tax credit system in the Netherlands on the basis of revenue loss due to
refunds to nonresident shareholders).
328. Other problems would still arise. Another significant problem with integration
involves treatment of corporate earnings that have not borne corporate tax (tax preference
income). The Treasury Department dealt with this problem by allowing only a 50% divi-
dends paid deduction thus leaving much of the tax preference income within the firm and
not distributed to the shareholders. The proposal rejected a 100% deduction to prevent
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tity income through to owners, as is done now for partnerships329
and S corporations. 3 On the other hand, as I argue, equity and
efficiency goals could also be met through a double tax.33 '
B. Rationales for Double Tax Systems
A double tax system has five possible structural rationales:
to tax income that has not been taxed at the appropriate rate, to
tax income where the first tax has been shifted to other taxpayers,
to tax excess returns from production, to allocate income between
jurisdictions for firms that operate internationally, 3 2 or to tax
power over income. This section considers these rationales and ex-
amines whether they advance horizontal equity and efficiency. It
concludes that only the fifth, the power rationale, is an appropri-
ate neutral rationale from which to design a double tax system
that will advance horizontal equity and efficiency.
1. The Inappropriate Corporate Tax Rate Rationale
One justification for a double tax system is that the first level
tax may not be assessed at the appropriate marginal effective tax
rate. The effective tax rate of corporations began to drop in the
1970s,333 just as the real tax burden on corporations (as well as
excessive revenue loss and to keep the rules simpler since preference income would be pre-
sumed to be paid out last under rules governing the order of payout. 2 TREASURY I STUDY,
supra note 8, at 136. Those rules would come into play less frequently under a 50% deduc-
tion, but would affect many corporations under a 100% deduction. To the extent that
corporate preferences have been limited, that concern is less valid. The dividend deduction
probably confers a short run benefit on any corporation that can adjust its dividend payout
without diminishing its access to capital markets. The question is whether there has been a
sufficiently complete overhaul of the tax law to eliminate tax preferences so as to allow
integration. Sheppard, supra note 8, at 644-45 (quoting Seymour Fiekowsky, Assistant
Director of Business Taxation in Treasury's Office of Tax Analysis: "you have to have a
complete overhaul of the law to get rid of tax preferences to sell integration."). The eco-
nomic effects of the choice of mechanism (dividends paid deduction or shareholder credit)
for the firm as a withholding agent for the shareholders differ. Under the "managers are
reluctant to distribute dividends" view and the question of extending benefits to foreigners,
a credit mechanism is preferred.
329. I.R.C. § 701 (West 1988).
330. I.R.C. § 1361 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
331. See infra notes 385-446 & 829-928 and accompanying text.
332. See Bird, The Interjurisdictional Allocation of Income, 3 AUSTRALIAN TAX
FORUM 333 (1986)(a comprehensive discussion describing how income should be allocated
among firms that compete internationally); Warren, Integration, supra note 1, at 786-87.
333. J. PECHMAN, supra note 103, at 150 (Table 5-3). By 1982 the effective tax rate
for the average large corporation had dropped to 16%. See STAFF OF JT COMM. ON TAXA-
TION, 98TH CONG., IST SESS., STUDY OF 1982 EFFECTIVE TAX RATES OF SELECTED LARGE
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other taxpayers) was increasing because of inflation.3 34 The 1986
Tax Act reversed this trend by raising taxes on the corporate sec-
tor and by broadening the corporate and business tax base,33 5 but
the magnitude of the effective corporate tax rate is still de-
bated.3 36 The ability of firms to avoid taxes is not only suggested
by the unusually small difference between taxable and tax-exempt
bond yields,33 7 but also by the creativity of large accounting
firms.33 8 Recent evidence suggests that the changes in the 1986
Tax Act have been successful in increasing the effective corporate
rate, 3 9 although it is still not as high as the nominal rate. A view
of the corporate tax as a toll charge for the deferral value of the
corporate tax system is a subset of this analysis. 4 ° If firms are
able to use tax preferences to lower their marginal tax rate to a
US. CORPORATIONS 1-2, 11-12 (t. Comm. Print 1983).
334. Bernard & Hayn, Inflation and the Distribution of the Corporate Income Tax
Burden, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 171, 184-85 (1986) (discussing data through 1984).
335. The fuller inclusion of corporate source income in the tax base is largely offset
by a rate reduction. Nevertheless, the reform increases taxes and should, under traditional
incidence analysis, add to the progressivity of the tax system since stock tends to be owned
by higher bracket taxpayers. See Musgrave, Short of Euphoria, J. EcON. PERSP., Summer
1987, at 59, 69.
336. See infra notes 337-39 and accompanying text.
337. See Koppelman, Tax Arbitrage and the Interest Deduction, 61 S. CAL L. REV.
1143, 1177-83 (1988).
338. See Berton, Business as Usual: Under New Tax Law, Corporations Still Find
Ways to Reduce Rates, Wall St. J., June 2, 1988, at 1, col. 6 (noting examples of large
U.S. corporations paying taxes at "microscopic rates" in a study that did not purport to be
an effective tax rate study). For example, firms can achieve a lower effective tax rate by
making deductible contributions to pension plans. Benefits are not taxed until they are
received by the plan beneficiaries. If plan assets are assets of the firm, overfunded pension
plans benefit the firm, creating value and lowering the effective tax rate. See S. Ross & R.
WESTERFIELD, supra note 105, at 719-24. For a description of various funding strategies,
see Francis & Reiter, Determinants of Corporate Pension Funding Strategy, 9 J. AccT. &
ECON. 35, 36-7 (1987). The ability of firms to take advantage of tax preferences varies
with their size and their ability to make investments. See Brooks, supra note 132, at 482-
94 (noting higher cost of capital for small firms and government efforts to intervene in
favor of small business). Exemptions for small producers from value added taxation are
based on this theory. Imposing a double tax system on firms that take advantage of the
existing tax preferences to lower their effective tax rates would reverse such tax
expenditures.
339. R. MCINTYRE, THE CORPORATE TAX COMEBACK: CORPORATE INCOME TAXES
AFTER TAX REFORM (1988)(22% overall effective tax rate in 1987 compared to 15% in
pre-tax reform years); F. MAROVELLI, EFFECTIVE CORPORATE TAX RATES - 1987
(1988)(survey of the top 1,000 United States corporations found that they paid taxes at an
effective tax rate of 25.54 percent in 1986, with much of the one-year rise attributed to the
1986 Act). See also M. STARCHER, THE EFFECT OF TAX REFORM ON EFFECTIVE CORPO-
RATE TAX RATES (1988)(interindustry changes).
340. See supra note 300.
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very low effective tax rate, then the second level tax is necessary
to ensure that income will be taxed at the established effective tax
rate. Thus, a double tax system should single out for special treat-
ment those firms that are able to lower their effective tax rates
through integration of production processes by bypassing other-
wise taxable steps in the production of goods and services or
through accounting and investment decisions. Untaxed perquisites
consumed by managers, owners in owner controlled firms, and em-
ployees which are presently deductible under the income tax
which has a high tolerance for such consumption items, 4" create a
separate ability to pay tax since taxes at the consumer level would
lower the ability of the firm to offer tax free consumption. Taxing
the firm would be a surrogate for taxing the ultimate benefi-
ciary.342 Another example would be the use of pension benefits,
including the existence of overfunded pension plans.343 The use of
tax preferences, including the use of fringe benefits, may be corre-
lated with size.3 44 The effective tax view of the double tax is essen-
tially a tax arbitrage view. Firms that utilize tax arbitrage
through the above means, as well as other arbitrage possibili-
ties, 3415 should arguably be subject to a second level of tax on ei-
ther distributed or undistributed earnings since the investment of
the residual equity owners is at first subject to a very low level of
341. I.R.C. § § 132, 274, 401(k) (West 1988 & Supp..1989).
342. For example, the Bradley and Mikulski Amendment No. 2390 to S. 1511, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S8028 (daily ed. June 16, 1988), proposed a phase-out of
the 80 percent deduction for meals and entertainment expenses by one percentage point for
each $1,000 of adjusted gross income over $360,000 with a complete phase-out at $440,000
for individual entrepreneurs and partners but did not apply to C corporations. The ration-
ale for not applying the provision to C corporations was not as clear as it could have been.
See 134 CONG. REC. S7933, 7962-63 (daily ed. June 16, 1988)(colloquy between Sen.
Bentsen, Sen. Bradley and Sen. Dole).
343. If plan assets are assets of the firm, see S. Ross & R. WESTERFIELD, supra note
105, at 705, 719-24 (in defined benefit plans where the value of the pension assets is not
related to the promised benefits), the excess of pension assets over pension benefits is a
corporate surplus that can be controlled by the shareholders and under this interpretation
shareholders of a firm could have an incentive to overfund the pension plan because of tax
arbitrage. For a view of the funding strategies, see Francis & Reiter, supra note 338.
344. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, 1987 STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 147-50 (1987)(de-
tailing the increasing use of tax preferences for compensation varying with size).
345. See Koppelman, supra note 337; Shakow, Confronting the Problem of Tax Ar-
bitrage, 43 TAX. L. REV. 1 (1987). To the extent that tax arbitrage positions are available
in all firms through long-term contracts, inventory, self-constructed assets, see Koppelman,
supra note 337 (identifies these items), tax depreciation, economic depreciation, interest
deduction and income reporting mismatches, and substituting labor for capital subject to
tax arbitrage limitations, see Shakow, supra, at 47-48, a double tax system becomes a
doing business tax under the effective tax rate view.
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tax.
The use of effective tax rates to judge tax policy objectives
has engendered much debate. 4 6 This rationale for a double tax is
stronger for firms that lower their effective tax rates through inte-
gration of production processes and utilization of unrealized ap-
preciation, and it is weaker for firms that lower their effective
rates through the use of tax preferences. In that sense, the firm
level tax is a tax on supernormal profits that accrue because the
firm takes advantage of favorable structural provisions that are
applicable in computing the income tax. Treating a double tax as
a back stop for the overutilization of tax preferences is more
troublesome since these were adopted for all firms. While these
difficulties proved insurmountable to integration efforts after the
1981 Tax Act, they are more an explanation of inaction than a
reason for taking action in constructing a tax system. The effec-
tive tax rate rationale, like the shifting rationale, suggests that the
second level tax should be collected on an accrual basis.
2. The Shifting or Incidence Rationale
A second rationale for a double tax system is that a double
tax is appropriate when general or partial equilibrium analysis 417
shows that the firm is able to shift the firm level tax away from
the owners who would otherwise bear the incidence of the tax. A
firm engaging in profit maximizing behavior will not shift a tax on
net profits to labor or consumers, because firms will produce to the
point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. However,
firms that fail to profit maximize for a variety of reasons may
shift the tax to labor or consumers. The reasons that some firms
fail to profit maximize include the exercise of economic power in
neither perfectly competitive nor monopolistic markets and the
conscious decision of managers to maximize size rather than prof-
its.34 Under this controversial view of shifting, the burden of new
346. See Bittker, Effective Tax Rates: Fact or Fancy, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 780
(1974)(critiquing the usefulness of effective tax rates as an analytical tool). The effective
corporate rate argument is somewhat undercut by the fact that all firms within a particular
industry enjoy the same effective tax rate due to similar tax preferences. The effective tax
rate argument should, therefore, be made in the context of those firms that are more inte-
grated than others.
347. General equilibrium analysis is a study of the effect of a given policy on all
economic factors. Partial equilibrium analysis is a study of the effect of a given policy on
only a few factors.
348. These rationales are detailed in Klein, Incidence, supra note 2, and Break,
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corporate taxes is passed on to consumers and labor in the form of
higher prices or lower wages s.34  This enables corporations to pre-
serve a constant rate of return, and even if the incidence of the
corporate tax were on shareholders because of financing decisions
of the firm, the corporate level tax would not be capitalized into
share prices in efficient capital markets. Thus, shareholders as in-
vestors and entrepreneurs would be sheltered from taxes unless a
second level tax is applied. Concerns about shifting continue in the
debate on integration of the firm level and shareholder level tax.50
The economic empirical and modeling evidence concerning such
shifting and other views of the corporate tax have followed three
paths in the analysis of a closed economy. For different reasons,
both the classical and neoclassical views suggest that in the short
run the tax is borne by shareholders; the Krzyzaniak-Musgrave
view adopts one aspect of the shifting hypothesis and suggests that
the tax is borne by consumers through higher prices of corporate
products; the Harberger view rejects the shifting rationale but
demonstrates that capital investment is allocated away from the
taxed sector and that the incidence of the tax is borne by owners
of capital in general. a5'
The neoclassical view of the tax as solely a tax on corporate
profits and based on a view of infinite debt finance must be re-
supra note 70, at 141-46. See also supra note 70.
349. Shifting to labor or consumers may be both short-term and long-term. See
Klein, Incidence, supra note 2, at 591-94. Most modeling studies have focused on the short-
term. See J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE: ECONOMICS OF THE PUB-
LIC SECTOR 316-21 (7th ed. 1981). In addition, many of the studies have mixed and incon-
clusive results. Compare Dusansky, The Short-Run Shifting of the Corporation Income
Tax in the United States, 25 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 357, 370 (1972)(100% or greater
shifting), with Oakland, Corporate Earnings and Tax Shifting in U.S. Manufacturing,
1930-1968, 54 REV. ECON. & STAT. 235, 235 (1972)(no shifting). The classic study of
shifting is M. KRZYZANIAK & R. MUSGRAVE, THE SHIFTING OF THE CORPORATION IN-
COME TAX (1963).
350. The issue is whether firm managers will behave differently under the various
forms of integration relief assuming that the tax will be shifted under the two-tiered system
and whether a tax collected at the firm level would be viewed simply as a withholding tax
for the shareholders rather than a classical tax on the firm. See C. McLURE, supra note 9,
at 41-42 & n.60; see also Mieszkowski, Integration of the Corporate and Personal Income
Taxes: The Bogus Issue of Shifting, 19 FINANZARCHIV 285, 290-91 (1972)(arguing that
managers will see that integration has increased the after tax yield on corporate income
and that connecting the firm with the shareholders' direct after tax interests increases the
likelihood of profit maximization).
351. See D. DAVIES, UNITED STATES TAXES AND TAX POLICY 275-84 (1986). See
also Klein, Incidence, supra note 2, at 594-95; A. ANDO, M. BLUME & I. FRIEND, THE
STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF THE U.S. TAX SYSTEM 143-47 (1985); Break, supra note 70,
at 123-54.
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jected as the complete explanation if debt finance is limited. Mod-
els of shifting as the rationale for the tax would have to evaluate
more closely the economic power and behavior of the firm within
its market, and therefore shifting would not provide a generalized
rationale for the imposition of the corporate tax under any form.
The classical view of the corporate tax as a tax on equity financed
corporate capital must be rejected as a complete explanation of
the incidence of the tax if the Harberger model is correct.
Harberger posits that capital migrates based on after tax returns
and that to the extent that capital in noncorporate sectors is bid
up, the incidence of the tax is borne by owners in general depend-
ing upon the ratio of labor and capital input in each sector and
the structure of demand for corporate and noncorporate goods.
These theories are shared by other models that view the corporate
tax as an incentive for present rather than future consumption. 52
In a recent criticism of the Harberger model, economists Jane
Gravelle and Lawrence Kotlikoff posited a mutual production
model that attempts to explain the existence of corporate produc-
352. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, in TAXATION AND
WELFARE 135 (A. Harberger ed. 1974). In a closed economy, the Harberger model of the
incidence of the corporate income tax found that capital in general bears almost the full
burden of the corporate tax and that the burden falls on all investors, not merely corporate
investors. Harberger, supra note 5, at 215, 236. Harberger's analysis divides the economy
into two business sectors - corporate and noncorporate. Harberger concludes that the cor-
porate income tax creates a disequilibrium in the capital markets since the taxed corporate
sector achieves a lower rate of return on capital. Id. at 215-16. As illustrated in an earlier
work, Harberger concludes that the disequilibrium in capital markets ultimately leads to
price differentials between the two sectors that in turn lead to overexpansion of the
noncorporate sector at the expense of the corporate sector. See TAX REVISION COMPEN-
DIUM, supra note 5, at 231-33. For a recent critique of the Harberger model, see infra
notes 353 & 369-72 and accompanying text. For earlier modelling of the deadweight loss
in lower output due to capital flight to noncorporate producers, see Harberger, Efficiency
Effects of Taxes on Income from Capital, in EFFECTS OF CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION
(M. Kryzaniak ed. 1966). The preference for consumption over savings demonstrates an-
other distortion. Compare Shoven, The Incidence and Efficiency Effects of Taxes on In-
come from Capital, 84 J. POL ECON. 1261 (1976) and Fullerton, Shoven & Whalley,
General Equilibrium Analysis of U.S. Taxation Policy, in DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF
TAX ANALYSIS, COMPENDIUM OF TAX RESEARCH 23, 48-55 (1978)(large excess burden and
loss of nationlal income from the tax and preference for present consumption over savings)
with Gordon, Taxation of Corporate Capital Income: Tax Revenues versus Tax Distor-
tions, 50 Q.J. ECON 1, 5-6, 22-23 (1985)(setting forth a model where the variance of the
return to the individual and the excess return over the market portfolio depends on the
level of investment and not on tax rates and includes all sources of risk that the individual
investment decisions embody). Gordon argues that the actual effect of the tax is less even
though individuals ultimately bear all risk even though the government by taxing away a
portion of the return is in effect charging a price for the portion of the risk it bears and
that current taxation shifts the burden to future generations. Id.
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ers with the same production functions as noncorporate producers
producing the same goods. They find an even greater deadweight
loss in overtaxing corporate production which in effect allows less
efficient noncorporate entrepreneurial producers to compete with
respect to the same good. 5 '
If the contours of the Harberger model are accepted as the
correct explanation, then a determination of whether the incidence
is on capital or labor depends upon whether the capital is located
in a substantially closed economy. Traditional analysis has sug-
gested that where the economy is closed (i.e., where neither na-
tional savings nor international capital movements are signifi-
cantly responsive to changes in the domestic rate of return to
capital), the corporate tax incidence is borne by capital.3 54 The
globalization of the world economy, however, calls into question
the traditional assumptions about the closed economy.355 In an
353. Gravelle & Kotlikoff, The Incidence and Efficiency Costs of Corporation Taxa-
tion When Corporate and Noncorporate Firms Produce the Same Good, 97 J. POL. ECON.
749, 777-78 (1989)(Harberger two-sector approach fails to account for cross-sector substi-
tution (non-corporate producers in the corporate market) that causes additional inefficien-
cies). The 1986 Tax Act lowered taxes for industries in the noncorporate sector and pro-
duced efficiency gains for corporations competing in that sector. See J. GRAVELLE & L.
KOTLIKOFF, CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE EFFICIENCY GAINS OF THE 1986 TAX REFORM
ACT 31-34 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3142, 1989).
354. Harberger, The State of the Corporate Income Tax: Who Pays It? Should it be
Repealed?, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980's 161, 164-65 (C.
Walker & M. Bloomfield eds. 1983).
355. Globalization of the world capital markets is a reality. Harberger noted the
impact of globalization of economic investment and production:
These facts of modern life require a re-examination of the incidence question in
the context of an open capital market. . . . [that] dramatically alters the con-
clusion reached for the case of a substantially .closed economy. For if the net rate
of return is given in the international market place, the burden of a tax on the
income from capital in one country will not . . . end up being borne by capital
(which can flee) but by other factors of production (. . . which cannot flee).
[Therefore]. . . wages will be driven down.
Harberger, supra note 354, at 166. Although Harberger thought that the incentive to save
would not be impaired, id., the effect of the tax burden shifting to labor remains unclear.
Compare Lintner, Effects of a Shifted Corporate Income Tax on Real Investment, 8
NAT'L TAX J. 229, 233-35 (1955)(shifting to labor causes increased liquidity and availabil-
ity of capital and leads to increased investment), with Bhatia, Tax Effects, Relative Prices,
and Economic Growth, in PUBLIC FINANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 349, 361-62 (D.
Biehl, K. Roskamp & W. Stolper eds. 1983)(predicting a decline in savings and investment
as a result of increased taxes on corporate income). But cf. Harberger, supra note 354, at
167 (suggesting that all the major trading nations of the world taken together could be
characterized as a closed economy).
For the practical implications of shifting, see Bernheim & Shoven, Taxation and the
Cost of Capital: An International Comparison, in THE CONSUMPTION TAX: A BETTER AL-
TERNATIVE 61, 82-83 (C. Walker & M. Bloomfield eds. 1987)(assuming tax borne half by
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open economy, although general incentives to save are not im-
paired, prices for tradable corporate products will not rise to ab-
sorb the corporate tax, wages will be driven down, and labor must
bear the full burden of the tax.358 Incidence studies that take into
account the globalization of the domestic economy suggest that
the United States should follow the lead of other countries that
have adopted an integrated corporate and individual tax regime.
In an open capital market, the burden of an increase in the
corporate tax would be borne by labor. -A complete evaluation of
the corporate income tax will require an understanding of the rel-
ative effect of corporate tax rates on domestic as well as foreign
firms, and an understanding of the impact of dividend relief provi-
sions under existing tax treaties. For example, the second level of
taxation may be less onerous for foreign investors than for domes-
tic shareholders, and a corporate tax may be more regressive do-
mestically in an open economy.
In summary, there is a general acceptance that some of the
incidence of the tax is borne by shareholders, at least in the short
term, to the extent that corporate tax is not a profits tax as Stig-
litz has suggested,357 although evidence also suggests some short-
term shifting to consumers or labor.3 58 However, the long-term ef-
fects are more problematic 59 and the ultimate results are incon-
clusive.3 0 At the very least, the consumer/labor shifting ration-
ale31' for both the firm level tax and any tax on the investment
capital and half by labor, and concluding that the 1986 Tax Act increased the cost of
capital by .2 percent). The cost of capital in the United States was the second highest in
the world after West Germany, attributable largely to domestic credit conditions and in
part taxation.
356. See Harberger, supra note 354, at 166; see also Pechman, Another View of the
Corporate Income Tax, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980s, at
177 (C. Walker & M. Bloomfield eds. 1983).
357. See supra note 64.
358. See supra note 351.
359. The most recent evidence suggests that short-run shifting of the tax is not
likely, although most specialists would probably agree that long-range shifting to owners of
capital does occur. See McLure, The Elusive Case of the Corporate Income Tax, the State
Case, 9 PUB. FIN. Q. 395, 397 (1981); see also Solow, Interindustry Flows and the Inci-
dence of the Corporate Income Tax, 30 J. PuB. ECON. 359, 367 (1986)(concluding that
omission of consideration of interindustry flows in general equilibrium tax incidence re-
search has been a serious flaw); Rapanos, Variable Returns to Scale and Tax Incidence, 46
J. ECON. (ZEITSCHRIFT FOR NATIONALOKONOMIE) 397 (1986)(concluding that a consider-
ation of variable returns to scale adds a new dimension to tax incidence research).
360. J. PECHMAN, supra note 103, at 141-46.
361. Concern over shifting suggests that firms of sufficient economic size operating in
neither perfectly competitive nor monopolistic markets, or corporations operating in oligo-
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income distributed to shareholders suggests that (1) incidence
analysis does not support the use of the double tax system as a
backstop to a tax on firm profits that has been shifted to consum-
ers or labor if there is evidence that the shareholder level tax can
also be shifted and (2) if investment taxes on shareholders are not
shifted, then the second level tax ought to be collected on an ac-
crual basis rather than upon a distribution of income in order to
prevent the deferral from undermining the impact of the tax to
the extent that the individual rate is higher than the corporate
rate. If the Harberger or mutual production model is followed, the
tax ought to be applied regardless of whether the firm is incorpo-
rated.36 It is clear from the foregoing that the issue of corporate
tax incidence cannot justify the continuance of the classical
double tax system although it points, if not uniformly, to the
adoption of a form of integration.63 Incidence analysis must be
coupled with an analysis of the desirability of the effect and oc-
currence of tax incidence as well as whether the profit being
double taxed is a true "economic profit or rent." Incidence analy-
sis alone does not answer equity or efficiency concerns.
3. The Unique Attributes of Corporate Production Rationale
A double tax system might be justified if it could be demon-
strated that corporate producers have unique attributes that gen-
erate unique, and therefore arguably excess, profits. 364 Success
polistic markets in which only they are subject to the tax (with no significant competition
from producers not subject to the tax), ought to be included within the tax base. This
approach responds to the concern that their economic presence allows them to price and
invest on an after-tax basis and to shift the tax. Commentators presume that shifting does
not occur in either markets of perfect competition or monopoly, see R. MUSGRAVE & P.
MUSGRAVE, supra note 7, at 411-16, nor in oligopolies in which one of the oligopolists is
less efficient and therefore made to bear the entire tax. If this presumption is accurate,
then it follows that some shifting does occur among noncorporate producers. Firm manag-
ers may choose not to profit maximize in order to shift the incidence of shareholder level
taxes to labor or consumers through lower wages and higher prices, thereby generating
more dividends and retained earnings. See supra note 350; see also Mundstock, supra note
70, at 38.
362. Unincorporated firms with market power, such as law firms with merger and
acquisition specialists or accounting firms with valuable software, should be subject to the
tax under this rationale.
363. See Bird, supra note 13, at 227, 242-43 ("[lIt hardly follows that the corpora-
tion taxes now existing in almost every country should be abolished in whole or part (or
integrated with personal income taxes, which amounts to the same thing) for reasons of
intellectual tidiness.").
364. Others have suggested that "there is an offsetting technological advantage [to
corporate economies of scale] and to running an enterprise as a partnership or proprietor-
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with such an argument supports the tax on equitable taxation and
efficiency grounds.36 5 The incidence of these excess profits, just as
with a profits tax on economic rents, suggests that production de-
cisions will not change and the incidence of the tax will be on the
owners of corporate capital. 66 Even the resemblance test attempts
to identify enterprises that, because of their form, have the capac-
ity to produce greater returns. However, the resemblance test
looks only to legal personality. A correct theory would look to cor-
porate management efficiencies, economic size, and access to capi-
tal markets, all of which enable the corporation to produce excess
profits.367 The argument is that the demand for this form of pro-
duction is inelastic, and therefore the imposition of a tax will not
reduce new equity investment. 68
The question is whether economic insights have advanced the
concept of corporate production to the point that a meaningful
test, apart from a doing business tax on large firms, can be de-
vised. Economic inquiry has recently focused on the nature of cor-
porate production. Gravelle and Kotlikoff use this inquiry to de-
termine which capital is subject to the corporate tax, and to
ship and that this advantage involves information and control," but it is also an advantage
that "dissipates with size." See Gravelle & Kotlikoff, supra note 353, at 757. This sugges-
tion is supported by agency theory. See supra note 278.
365. See infra notes 729-32 & 877-94 and accompanying text.
366. See infra notes 729-32 and accompanying text.
367. This is different from the benefits theory of the corporate tax. See infra notes
415 & 417-18 and accompanying text. That theory views the tax as a payment for the
benefits of the corporate form of doing business. See J. PECHMAN, supra note 103, at 135-
36. It is, however, related-to expressions of the benefits theory. According to Goode:
It is not necessary to establish a genuine difference between the corporation and
its stockholders in order to justify a tax on the basis of the benefit theory. A tax
imposed on the net income of the corporation may be warranted even though the
real intention is to tax stockholders in relation to the benefits they enjoy indi-
rectly through corporations.
R. GOODE, supra note 10, at 29-30.
Organizational analysis would limit the management efficiencies to the choice of the
most efficient organizational structure which in some firms would be a partnership or lim-
ited partnership. See supra notes 278 & 364. Thus, a corporate production standard would
ultimately need to pierce the view of the legal personality of the corporation and would
include other forms of organization. It would also need to be sensitive to concepts of in-
come as product.
368. Since many in the economic community have long been opposed to the corpo-
rate tax, there are few expressions in favor of this corporate production standard. Among
others, Joseph Pechman has maintained this view. Cf. J. PECHMAN, supra note 103, at 31-
32. Richard Musgrave in a very early piece expressed its content. See Musgrave, Should
an Absolute Corporation Tax Be Retained?, 1946 PROc. NAT'L TAX ASS'N 11I, 114-17,
119. This theory attempts to isolate particular financing characteristics that produce excess
returns.
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rework assumptions about the lack of competition between corpo-
rate and noncorporate firms that underlie the Harberger model."s 9
They note that the government appears to be looking at both the
size of the enterprise and diversity of ownership. They conclude
that for many producers there are some economies in operating on
a large scale, and that the production unit could be owned by a
number of individual specialists rather than a very large number
of owners.3 70 Furthermore, they conclude that small entrepreneurs
369. See Gravelle & Kotlikoff, supra note 353. The Gravelle and Kotlikoff observa-
tions on the nature of corporate production are significant. First, they review the problems
with even large service firms in which the owners participate, where there may be a less
efficient form of production due to the problems of information and control. Second, they
determine that liquidity and diversification have much to do with the form of corporate
production. Third, they isolate the multiple parts of this view of production: the size of the
enterprise, the diversity of ownership, and the management relationships.
Responding to criticisms that corporate and noncorporate firms may produce substi-
tute rather than identical goods, Gravelle and Kotlikoff have calculated the excess burden
of the corporate tax under a Differentiated Product Model (DPM) for firms that produce
goods with substitute demand under identical production functions. See J. GRAVELLE & L.
KOTLIKOFF, DOES THE HARBERGER MODEL GREATLY UNDERSTATE THE ExcEss BURDEN
OF THE CORPORATE TAX? - ANOTHER MODEL SAYS YES 2, 6,7, 12 & 17-20 (National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2742, 1988)(using 195Trates, Shoven's
data allocating 60% of capital to the noncorporate and 20% to the corporate sectors, and
the substitution of demand hypotheses, they find excess burden of 102% of the tax col-
lected under the DPM rather than the 123% excess burden under the Mutual Production
Model (MPM)). Unlike the MPM, the DPM does not treat the supply of entrepreneurs as
inelastic, does not seek to explain the size distribution of noncorporate firms, and treats the
demands for substitution of corporate and noncorporate goods as highly elastic, which are
all reasons that Gravelle and Kotlikoff prefer the MPM model despite the fact that the
DPM predicts similar excess burdens. Id. at 22 n.8.
370. See Gravelle & Kotlikoff, supra note 353, at 756 ("enterprises that both are
very large and have a large number of owners appear to be fair game"). Other economists
accept the Morrissey view of the resemblance test as indicative of forms of production
within firms that cannot take place outside of corporations. See Petruzzi, Mergers and the
Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 7 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL'Y 97 (1988)(corporate
production involves identifiable Morrissey factors and significant equity financing).
For a discussion of the effects of integration on firm productivity, see Grossman &
Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,
94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 692 (1986)("a firm that purchases its supplier, thereby removing
residual rights of control from the manager of the supplying company, can distort the man-
ager's incentive sufficiently to make common ownership harmful"). Gravelle and Kotlikoff
answer this with the following:
The answer here appears to involve a number of factors: diversification of
risk, the desire to limit liability, information costs of becoming fully informed
about all the activities of a large enterprise, and liquidity. These reasons for
multiple owners are interrelated. For example, it may be very difficult for any
one owner to become fully informed about a large firm's activities, but the lack
of full information may make investing in a large firm riskier. The limits on full
information provide investors with a further interest in reducing their exposure
in a particular firm, including limiting their liability.
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can compete successfully because the enhanced value of informa-
tion and control in a small firm offsets any disadvantages of its
small size.37 ' In other words, even in large service firms produc-
tion may be less efficient due to the" problems of information and
control.37 2 The claimed efficiency gains from undergoing a man-
agement or leveraged buyout support the review of the resulting
organizational relationship in search of a basis upon which to sup-
port the imposition of the tax on forms of production that create
excess profits. 3
In contrast, the Harberger model presumes that corporate
producers and noncorporate producers do not compete. This is an
unwarranted assumption. Economic statistics show that there is
corporate production in noncorporate sectors and noncorporate
production in corporate sectors.374 Two economists, Ebrill and
Gravelle & Kotlikoff, supra note 353, at 757.
371. This is presumably drawn in part from literature on firm size. See, e.g., Calvo
& Wellisz, Supervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimum Size of the Firm, 86 J. POL.
ECON. 943 (1978)(the limitation on firm size depends on the firm's degree of employee
monitoring); Grossman & Hart, supra note 370 (a sale by management resulting in a loss
of residual rights can lower marginal productivity, thus constraining firm size); Williamson,
Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size, 75 J. POL ECON. 123 (1967)(discussing
loss of control features in hierarchical organizations); Prescott & Visscher, Organization
Capital, 88 J. POL ECON. 446, 447 (1980)(noting that "[i]nformation about employee and
task characteristics" decrease with firm size). But see R. NELSON & S. WINTER, AN Evo-
LUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 309-10 (1982)(studies show that "at some
point there is negative correlation between size and the growth rate," and that "the vari-
ance of growth rates declines with firm size.").
372. See Gravelle & Kotlikoff, supra note 353, at 757 ("Entrepreneurs, with a major
stake in their own firm, will have an incentive to stay better informed about their firm's
behavior and to control more fully their firm's behavior than will shareholders in large
companies.").
373. Michael Jensen has posited the efficiency gains resulting from aligning the firm
and its managers in a business form that does not depend on the capital markets, is highly
leveraged with placement of these noninvestment grade securities in the diversified portfo-
lios of institutional investors, provides equity stakes for the managers, and is monitored by
the ultimate residual institutional owners through delegation of authority to partners of
leveraged buyout funds who are themselves motivated by high equity rewards for success.
See Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 173. Others contradict the view that the public market's
risk diversification will be replaced by structures which have questionable efficiency with
regard to the risk of bankruptcy, and also suggest that management may possibly appropri-
ate shareholder returns in going private transactions. See Letters to the Editor, HARV. Bus.
REV., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 182; see also Kitching, Early Returns on LBOs, HARV. Bus.
REV., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 74.
374. See Ebrill & Hartman, The Corporate Income Tax, Entrepreneurship, and the
Noncorporate Sector, 11 PuB. FIN. Q. 419, 423 (1983)(even if it is empirically possible to
maintain a distinction between the sectors, the mere possibility of crossover is sufficient to
negate the Harberger modeling hypothesis); see also Gravelle, Effects of the 1981 Depreci-
ation Revisions on the Taxation of Income from Capital, 35 NAT'L TAX J. 1 (1982)(asso-
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Hartman, suggested that the effect of a corporate tax will be to
delay incorporation until the benefits of incorporation, particularly
access to capital, outweigh the costs.37 5 Viewing the firm's decision
as a cost of capital choice, they concluded that the corporate tax is
merely a tax on size. Other studies argue that large incorporated
firms arise because ex ante contracting costs are too great,378 and
that firms strive to achieve overall efficiency by gravitating to the
form of organization that best serves their financial and govern-
ance needs.17
7
Although these theories provide interesting insights into the
nature of a firm, it is clear that they do not consistently isolate the
uniqueness of corporate production or a view of organizational ef-
ficiency as a rationale for a double tax system satisfying equitable
taxation or efficiency criteria. At most, these theories would sup-
port a doing business tax, or a tax based solely on economic size.
ciating the "measurement of waste from non-neutral taxation of capital" with Harberger).
375. Ebrill & Hartman, supra note 374, at 426-27 ("The market for corporate capi-
tal is, therefore, viewed here as an institution that processes and disseminates information
in an efficient manner."). Ebrill and Hartman conclude that these considerations lead them
to modify their analysis in two ways: "First, the technology employed by a firm depends on
the firm's inventiveness and may well be related to size . . . . Second, the gross cost of
raising capital will in general differ between sectors due to differences in the cost of trans-
mitting information to - and thereby influencing - the investors." Id. at 428.
This view of corporate production would encompass a publicly traded limited partner-
ship. It would not encompass a publicly offered limited partnership absent sufficient forms
of liquidity. The Ebrill and Hartman analysis placed no particular value on pure liquidity,
and viewed the effect of the tax on the mix of goods produced in the economy as uncertain.
However, they presumed that noncorporate firms could exist in competition with corporate
firms in the same good because of technological innovation. This presumption is supported
by empirical data on the coexistence of competitors of very different size. Id. at 428 (citing
Stigler).
376. For a discussion of the relationship of ex ante costs to the theory of the firm, see
Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, in KNIGHTS,
RAIDERS AND TARGETS 77, 85-92 (J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Ackerman eds.
1988). Explorations of the nature of the firm focus on the firm: (1) as originating to substi-
tute for market exchanges to lower transaction costs, see Coase, The Nature of the Firm:
Origin, Meaning, Influence, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORGAN. 3, 19, 33 (1988), (2) as countering
agency theory issues, see Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J.L.
ECON. & ORGAN. 119 (1988), and (3) as a unit within the broader political and social
institutions that regulate economic activity, see Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L.
EcON. & ORGAN. 181 (1988). See generally, R.H. Coase Lectures, Conference Papers to
Celebrate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the "Nature of the Firm," and Related Papers, 4 J.
L. ECON. & ORGAN. 1 (1988).
377. See, e.g., Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in POLICY
ISSUFS AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 64 (V. Fuchs
ed. 1972).
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4. The Allocation of Income Rationale
A fourth rationale for a double tax system is that it will facil-
itate the allocation and taxation of income to source countries
given a less than harmonized international tax system. 78 The
unintegrated corporate tax avoids issues of discrimination between
the allowance of distribution or credit relief for distributions to
domestic investors and the disallowance of such relief for foreign
direct or portfolio investors.3 7 9 Furthermore, it has been argued
that capital importing countries can extend dividend relief to for-
eign corporations or tax credits to foreign shareholders of domes-
tic companies without an imputation system.38 0 The existence of
378. The considerations in determining whether to model the corporate tax system as
a classical integrated or imputation system are discussed in Musgrave, supra note 326. For
a discussion of the general lack of coordination in international taxation, see Palmer, To-
ward Unilateral Coherence in Determining Jurisdiction to Tax Income, 30 HARV. INT'L
LJ. 1 (1989)
379. For that reason, major studies of corporate taxation in the past have recom-
mended the adoption of the unintegrated corporate tax. See M. NORR, supra note 12, at
158-60 (noting that Van den Tempel, Sato and Bird, and Cardyn all prefer the classical
system on neutrality and simplicity grounds). For capital importing countries, the existence
of the classical tax results in significant revenue from foreign investors. See White Paper,
supra note 12, at 195. Thus, the preferred choice for integration of the corporate and
shareholder level taxes is: (1) an imputation system (as distinguished from full integration
systems); and (2) denial of credits on dividends paid to non-residents and imposition of a
withholding tax on foreign direct investors. Id. at 196-99. These considerations in adopting
imputation systems apply also in capital exporting countries. See, e.g., Lovisolo, Italy: The
New Imputation System, INTERTAX, 1979/I, at 10; Reitsma, Italy: Fundamental Changes
in the Imputation System, EUROPEAN TAXATION, Feb. 1985, at 40, 46 (discussions of ex-
tending dividend relief to -nonresident shareholders). For a discussion of the interrelation-
ship between domestic relief from double taxation and international tax credit relief, see
Chown, Imputation Systems: An Overview, 4 J. STRATEGY IN INT'L TAX'N 1 (1988). On
the other hand, the Treasury Study proposed extending dividend relief to distributions to
foreign shareholders and not imposing a compensating withholding tax to offset the corpo-
rate deduction for tax treaty reasons. See 2 TREASURY I STUDY, supra note 8, at 139-40 &
142-43 (the denial of a credit refund in credit imputation systems technically does not
violate tax treaties); see also Ault, Germany: The New Corporation Tax System, IN-
TERTAX, 1976/8, at 262, 273-74 (double taxation to be resolved through treaty negotia-
tion). For views from developing countries, see Lent, Corporation Income Tax Structure in
Developing Countries, 24 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 722 (1977).
380. Foreign direct investment may depend on exploitation of economic rents. There-
fore deferral advantages for direct investors and creditability of foreign taxes in the home
jurisdiction are sufficient incentives to continued investment. See Bird, Imputation and the
Foreign Tax Credit: Some Critical Notes from an International Perspective, 4 AUSTRA-
LIAN TAX FORUM 1, 7 n.15, 8-11 & 32-34 (1987)(focus should also be on the politics of
taxation and not merely economic models). For a discussion of foreign direct investment in
the context of international company taxation, see J. ALWORTH, supra note 7, at 16-66,
153-82. For discussions of the taxation of direct investors, see S. FROMMEL, TAXATION OF
BRANCHES AND SUBSIDIARIES IN WESTERN EUROPE, CANADA AND THE USA (2d ed. 1978).
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the foreign tax credit in the foreign capital supplier's home coun-
try shifts the loss of revenue to that treasury. The classical system
may also have an impact on investment and savings by influencing
returns to capital in the taxing jurisdiction relative to worldwide
rates of return.38' The open economy model suggests that the
classical corporate tax increases the rate of interest worldwide,
whereas a profits tax may not.a82 Successful interjurisdictional al-
location also depends on the creditability of the tax in the home
country. 8 '
In an open economy, the classical corporate tax raises effi-
ciency concerns even if it is effective in the allocation of income in
favor of the host country.3 84 Therefore, the allocation of income
rationale has merit, but is not costless. It also does not address by
381. It is beyond the scope of this article to incorporate the extensive economic liter-
ature on the effects of capital taxation for large and small countries, capital importing and
exporting countries, and the effect of that taxation in an open economy of international
capital flows. For a discussion of the literature within the context of an open economy
model, see Slemrod, Effect of Taxation with International Capital Mobility, in UNEASY
COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 115 (H. Aaron, H.
Galper & J. Pechmran eds. 1988). Imposition of a capital tax by a large capital importing
country reduces the price of capital as the world rate of return declines. Id. at 133. This
suggests that taxing returns that are both interest and equity returns will cause a revenue
increase to the extent that rates of return in the importing country remain higher than the
worldwide level. Id. at 124-28. The classical corporate tax is argued not to be this type of
tax since its incidence is argued to fall on labor. See supra note 357. If this argument is
correct then the classical corporate tax is like a wage tax and its effect will be to decrease
the availability of the labor supply and also to decrease capital stock. Id. at 144 (discussing
Roger Gordon model). The Slemrod model, like others, is not without its critics. Id. at 148-
55 (comments by Lawrence Summers)(focus should be on the relationship between taxes
that tax savings and investment). This is also not to suggest that there is no rationale for
the scope of two-tier taxation of corporations and shareholders in the case of income de-
rived by corporations from foreign sources or the claims of the United States as a capital
importing nation to tax U.S. source corporate income distributed to foreign shareholders.
See Roin, The Grand Illusion: A Neutral System for the Taxation of International Trans-
actions, 75 Va. L. Rev. 919, 941-42, 959-60 (1989).
382. See Phelps, supra note 94, at 686-91. Where capital is owned by foreigners, the
profits tax produces "a 'sitting duck' for the national treasury." Id. at 686. There is no
increase even if the economy is open, provided that certain assumptions apply.
383. If the rate of return is higher on a specific foreign investment because of, for
example, lower labor costs, that higher rate of return will be preserved to the investor if the
effective foreign tax rate does not exceed the effective domestic tax rate and if the foreign
tax is fully credited against the domestic tax. See Slemrod, supra note 381, at 130-31; id.
at 150-51 (comments by Lawrence Summers)(A tax that is "creditable by another coun-
try's treasury . . . is desirable [and] will have no distortionary effect at all and is therefore
an ideal tax from the point of view of the home country. It is, however, a bad tax from the
world's point of view.").
384. See generally Bird, supra note 13 (noting the effectiveness of a firm-level tax in
sourcing income but making no claim for the efficiency of the classical corporate tax).
1988-891 CORPORATE TAX 1081
itself the equity or efficiency of a double tax domestically.
5. The Power Rationale
a. The Power Rationale Defined
The income tax is a tax on power.38" "The power to dispose of
income is the equivalent of ownership of it." ' To the extent that
385. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940)(donor of interest coupons taxed on
payments made to donee since donor created the right to receive the income); Taft v. Bow-
ers, 278 U.S. 470 (1929)(assignor of right to receive future income taxable on that in-
come). Provisions that tax persons who have power over income have been incorporated
into the tax law under assignment of income principles. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 704(e) (West
1988)(family partnerships); see also Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949)(the
Court recognized the partnership, rejecting the Commissioner's position that all the income
should have been taxable to one high-rate taxpayer). In interpreting these provisions the
question arises whether the courts, in prior definitions and challenges to power, appropri-
ately drew the line according to the congressional conception of the power doctrine.
Early versions of the power rationale sought to tax improper accumulations of profits
in closely held corporations directly to shareholders notwithstanding the legal personality of
the firm. Even now power over income has tax consequences in a variety of situations. See,
e.g., Rev. Rul. 88-37, 1988-21 I.R.B. 9 ("The owner of a working interest under an oil and
gas lease is not entitled to a charitable deduction . . . for the contribution of an overriding
royalty interest or a net profit interest."); Rev. Rul 81-282, 1981-2 C.B. 78 (no charitable
contribution where owner of stock retains voting rights); Rev. Rul. 76-331, 1976-2 C.B. 52
(no contribution where owner retains mineral rights to donated tract of land).
An analogy can.be made between the power rationale and the double taxation of gifts
(i.e., gifts taxed both to the donor and the donee even though there is only one level of
consumption). See H. SIMONS, supra note 101, at 56-58, 134-35; Dodge, Beyond Estate
anu Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177,
1184-88 (1978)(finding that both the consumption tax and Haig-Simons model of an in-
come tax require the inclusion of gifts in the income of the recipient and taxation of the
donor on any appreciation with no deduction on the transfer). Several arguments support
this double tax of gifts. First, the tax system does not require that all income items have
offsetting deductions. See Utz, Taxpayer May Not Always Have Income When Fine or
Penalty Paid By Another, 69 J. TAX'N 112 (1988)(discussing situations in which fines paid
on behalf of another will not constitute income to the one benefitted by the payment).
Second, treatment of a gift as nontaxable corpus has its roots in incorrect views of trust law
as applied in several state cases. See J. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX 98 (1989). The better
view is that receipts of corpus can in fact be taxable events. See Kwall, The Income Tax
Consequences of Sales of Present Interests and Future Interests: Distinguishing Time
from Space, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1988). Third, mechanical views of ability to pay do not
adequately distinguish between separate taxpayers. Dodge, supra, at 1187-88 (ability to
pay of donor and donee should be measured separately). Taxation of both the donor and
the donee can be explained by viewing the taxed item as shared consumption. (Calvin
Johnson illustrates this point with an outrageous necktie that has appreciated in value after
it was given to him by a relative). Identification of the correct taxpayer for distributed
income in a trust in the well-known series of cases on life estates and remainders proceeds
from the same rationale. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 60-65 (5th ed.
1988)(positing alternatives).
386. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118 (1940).
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the income tax taxes those persons with power over income,38 7 the
choice of a taxable unit is simple - determine who has the ulti-
mate power over any item of income or asset and tax any gains or
losses to that person. 88 A corollary to income taxation based on
power is the fact that the right to income implies the right to con-
sume or save - that income carries with it the dual ability to be a
liquidator of an investment by consumption or to be a saver by
deferring consumption until the future.389 When firm managers
exercise decision-making power separate from that of the residual
owners, control over income is present39 0 and the firm is arguably
the appropriate taxpayer in the first instance.
The assertion that this tax should be accompanied by a sec-
ond tax rests on a separate foundation - the ability of the owner,
independent of the firm, to exercise potential consumption-savings
choices directly, or where shares are held through a financial in-
termediary, the ability to exercise savings-consumption decisions
with respect to it. 39' Owners can liquidate their investments with-
387. The classic case is Horst, which stands for the proposition that present power
over future income makes the income taxable to the donor. See also Iber v. United States,
409 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1969)(owner of real estate can be taxed on the rental proceeds
even though those payments were assigned to a trustee and paid to the trustee's benefi-
ciary); Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 580 (1940)(trust payments assigned by benefi-
ciary to her children taxable to beneficiary)(citing, inter alia, Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111
(1930)).
388. That view was the rationale for separate income tax returns for married persons
based on the separate power that each had over separate assets and the joint power that
both had over community assets in a community property state. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282
U.S. 101 (1930). It was also the rationale for viewing dual working spouses as two con-
sumption units. See Felton v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 278 (1982), aff'd, 723
F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1983); Hantzis v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1169 (1979), rev'd,
638 F.2d 248 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981). But see Popkin, Deduction of
Traveling Expenses by the Two-Worker Family - An Inquiry into the Role of the Courts
in Interpreting the Federal Tax Law, 55 Tax. L. REV. 645 (1977)(family is the appropriate
consumption unit).
389. See W. POPKIN, INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 6.04[A]
(1987).
390. The Fisher separation theorem of financial economics supports the principle of
segregating decision-making power from ownership. The theorem states that the potential
consumption decision is separate from the firm's decision to invest rather than distribute
retained earnings. See Chang, Optimal Taxation of Business and Individual Incomes, 35
J. PUB. ECON. 251, 262-63 (1988) (economic model supporting integration of business and
personal taxes based on the firm as the initial taxpayer). Roberta Romano has applied this
insight to firm-shareholder relations. See Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Re-
form, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 952-56 (1984).
391. The separation theorem has been used to identify firms that exhibit a separation
of ownership from control and it provides the tax rationale for the owner level tax. Fama
and Jensen have elaborated on this theorem. Assuming that perfect substitute securities for
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out regard to the desires of the majority. 392 It is this ability to
liquidate that supports an increased ability to pay at the owner
level. 93 A double tax system is justified where there is both the
relinquishment of power over income and the retention of power
over income. Power is relinquished by becoming an equity holder
in a firm in which one is not a controlling shareholder or a man-
ager. Power is retained by having liquidity; that is, by being able
to realize a return through a sale of an interest and obtain the
underlying value in firm assets.
common stock exist that are correctly priced and tradable without transaction costs in a
perfect capital market, "the consumption streams that an investor can realize in future
periods are constrained only by current wealth, that is, the market value of current and
future resources. When the stream of payoffs implied by the wealth or value maximizing
investment decisions of an open corporation does not correspond to an investor's optimal
consumption stream, the capital market can be used to exchange residual claims in the
corporation for other claims with the same market value but with a stream of payoffs that
better matches the investor's desired consumption stream." Fama & Jensen, Organization,
supra note 278, at 102.
392. A shareholder must be viewed as both an owner and a risk taker who has a
residual claim to the firm. The firm managers are directed to supply her a fair return on
her capital; hence the firm should be treated as a unit, separate from the shareholders, with
power over income. N. WOLFSON, THE MODERN CORPORATION 40-41 (1984)(citing Fama,
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL ECON. 288 (1980)). Public firm
shareholders also have the perspective, for better or for worse, of investors. See L. LOWEN-
STEIN, supra note 16.4, at 89-118. This has been validated by informal survey evidence. See
Soderquist & Vecchio, Reconciling Shareholders' Rights and Corporate Responsibility:
New Guidelines for Management, 1978 DUKE L.J. 819, 835-40.
393. A Berle and Means residual equity claimant who has no management role owns
an interest in invested capital that, although not subject to a risk of total loss to the same
extent as a gambler, is entirely outside of her direct control. Such residual claimants take
their indirect control rights (i.e., voting rights) lightly. Although proposals for corporate
and shareholder integration may be advanced on efficiency grounds, the classic formulation
of the income tax regards the residual claimant as a risk-taking gambler rather than as an
owner.
The teaching embodied in Taft, Lucas, and Horst is that income is taxed only once
and only to one person. However, the notion of a "person" can be split, as in the case of the
theoretically correct taxation of a remainderman. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 385, at
60-65. Just as the single tax system is based on power over income, the double tax system
is based on two rightful claims over income. Cf. North American Oil Consol. v. Burnet,
286 U.S. 417 (1932)(profits earned by property in receivership taxed to receiver because
corporate owner of property had no claim of right to the profits until the receivership was
dissolved). Nevertheless, tax liability can be triggered even in the absence of a claim of
right over income. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (196 1)(Embezzled funds are
income taxable to the embezzler, although the funds were obtained illegally and the em-
bezzler may be required to repay them.). When assessing the risk associated with an in-
vestment the ultimate question is how likely is the investor to get her money back with a
return for the time it has been used. The essence of equity participation is residual risk
with respect to the ability to recoup capital and to share in profits. See supra note 176 and
accompanying text.
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It may be argued that a firm must have more than mere con-
trol over income to justify taxing it separately. This argument
raises the question of whether a firm has its own ability to pay.
The answer to this question depends on the way in which ability
to pay is defined. 94 Under a theory of ability to pay requiring
sacrifice39 5 and the elimination of consumption wants, firms do not
have an ability to pay since firms do not consume (apart from
perquisites consumed by their managers and employees)396 Thus,
an income tax simply cannot be justified on an ability-to-pay
rationale.3 97
However, under equitable taxation principles, a firm possesses
a separate taxpaying ability, even if it is not justified under the
traditional ability-to-pay398 principle, simply because it is per-
ceived as separate from its underlying owners.399 This observation
394. See Colm, The Ideal Tax System, 1 Soc. REs. 319, 326-28 (1934)(a tax based
on one's ability to pay is most clearly manifested in a progressive tax system).
395. W. VICKREY, supra note 39, at 372-73 (discussing "traditional sacrifice
criteria").
396. Under an income tax, entities do not have the choice between present and fu-
ture consumption. Cf. Kaplow & Warren, supra note 192, at 409 n.42 (1986)(income re-
flects the present value of future cash flows, and the income tax taxes presently, regardless
of when consumption takes place). Haig's definition, while not emphasizing the separation
of income into the components of consumption and change in wealth, offers the same per-
spective as Simons: "Income is the money value of the net accretion to one s economic
power between two points of time." Haig, supra note 190, at 1, 7 (emphasis in original).
Simons arrives at his concept of income via an "estimate of (a) the amount by which the
value of a person's store of property rights would have increased, as between the beginning
and the end of the period, if he had consumed (destroyed) nothing, or (b) the value of
rights which he might have exercised in consumption without altering the value of his store
of rights." H. SIMONS, supra note 101, at 49. This implies that income, while not equalling
consumption, is viewed as being part of the ability to consume. The Haig definition empha-
sizes the power concept without asking whether power includes the power to consume
rather than merely the power to save. The result is a defect in the ability to pay rationale
for a tax: since firms do not consume, they are inappropriate separate taxpaying entities
unless they are a proxy for accrual taxation of their owners on undistributed firm profits.
397. See J. BALLENTINE, EQUITY, EFFICIENCY, AND THE U. S. CORPORATION INCOME
TAX 5 (1980)(even though corporations are legal persons, they do not have income since
the profits of the firm are owned by the stockholders).
Ability to pay can also be viewed by gauging the social usefulness of corporate profits.
R. GOODE, supra note 10, at 37 ("a large part of corporate profits and dividends has a
lower order of social usefulness than the income that would be taken by likely alternative
taxes"). For a critique of this approach and the assumptions upon which it is based, see id.
at 32-37.
398. For a review of the historical literature on ability-to-pay, see Musgrave & Pea-
cock, Introduction, in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE ix-xviii (1967).
399. See A. KRAGEN & J. MCNULTY, supra note 308, at 791-92. Other commenta-
tors agree:
[t]he earnings of General Motors are plainly not the earnings of its shareholders
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raises the much asked question, "whether it is appropriate to view
the corporation as a separate, taxable entity, distinct from its
shareholders or, alternatively, as simply a conduit through which
all earnings and taxes eventually pass to the owners of the
firm."'400 The argument against the conduit view lies in the dis-
tinction between the corporation and the shareholder which "in-
clude[s] the fact that functions of management and ownership are
typically separated, and firm executives may act more in their own
interests than those of their shareholders. ' 40 1 The agency costs
i
for many other purposes: unless General Motors declares a dividend the share-
holders may not even be enriched by them, for gloomy future prospects may
depress the value pf General Motors' stock even as the corporation earns income;
and the people w o eventually get the money that General Motors earns this
year will include any who are not now General Motors shareholders. For these
and many other r~asons, the underlying premise that a corporation is a mere
fiction cannot be taken seriously today. Once we discard "sacrifice" notions of
ability to pay and recognize that it is the earners of income, not those who "ben-
efit" from income, who pay income tax, taxing corporations seems no more ab-
surd and no more unjust than taxing anyone else.
Gunn, supra note 193, at 395 n.77 (conceding that the separatists' case is weakened for
closely held corporations and that in contrast with corporations that have no shareholders
such as universities, shareholders in public corporations are somewhere between closely
held firms and firms without owners). But see 2 TREASURY I STUDY, supra note 8, at 128.
The progressive rate structure for individuals is premised on the ability-to-pay
concept, which in turn reflects an assumption that additional amounts of income
are increasingly available for discretionary, nonessential consumption. These
concepts have no relevance to corporate income, all of which is either distributed
or used to produce additional income.
Id.
400. Auerbach, "New View", supra note 71, at 21. See C. MCLURE, supra note 9, at
20 n.2 ("[t]he conduit view is most often used to justify full integration, but can be used to
argue for dividend relief"). The difference goes beyond the fact that small firms are more-
like partnerships. It has long been recognized that close corporations are the functional
equivalents of partnerships and are inappropriate for entity level taxation. See Weiner,
Legislative Recognition of the Close Corporation, 27 MICH. L. REV. 273, 283 (1929)(not-
ing early Treasury proposal to class small corporations with partnerships for income tax
purposes).
401. Auerbach, "New View," supra note 71, at 21 ("corporate taxes may be viewed
as affecting the power of managers as well as the wealth of investors").
The argument begins with the recognition of the separate entity relationships of the
corporation and its stockholders under state law for financial accounting purposes. See
Bryan, Cancellation of Indebtedness by Issuing Stock in Exchange: Challenging the Con-
gressional Solution to Debt-Equity Swaps, 63 TEX. L. REV. 89, 114-20 (1984)(the classical
corporate tax base has its roots in financial accounting principles that were traditionally
applied to corporations as an entity to distinguish accounts of the entity from the accounts
of the owners and creditors). Whether a firm has a separate ability to pay tax under equi-
table tax policies is a different matter. See, e.g., R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra
note 7, at 232-46 (ability to pay is not dispositive). Also a different consideration is
whether the income of a large corporation constitutionally can be taxed directly to its own-
ers. See Gabinet & Coffey, supra note 149 (realization requirement is a constitutional
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theory is also at the heart of this view of the firm. 02
limitation to pure integration or allocation of public corporation's income to its sharehold-
ers). But see Cohen, supra note 98, at 147-49 n.19 (realization requirement no bar).
402. Agency risk describes the situation where managers who are not substantial
owners are able to expropriate the firm's assets through perquisites. Agency theory has
been elegantly described by Williams:
Stripped to its barest elements, Jensen and Meckling's provocative argu-
ment runs roughly as follows. Insiders in firms financed with external debt opti-
mally invest in excessively risky projects, whereas insiders in firms financed with
external equity optimally consume excessive perquisites. Because outside inves-
tors anticipate these problems when purchasing corporate securities, insiders
bear all agency costs in equilibrium. If insiders serve their personal interests,
then they select a capital structure that compromises between the corporate
agency class of external debt and equity.
Williams, Perquisites, Risk, and Capital Structure, 42 J. FIN. 29 (1987). "In short, a
theory of optimal corporate securities logically precedes a theory of optimal capital struc-
ture." Id. at 43. For a detailed application of agency theory, see A. BARNEA, R. HAUGEN &
L. SENBET, AGENCY PROBLEMS AND FINANCIAL CONTRACTING (1985)(distinguishing be-
tween the economic theory of agency which concerns itself with principal-agent problems in
a single-period world and the financial theory of agency that brings financial markets into
explicit consideration and tends to lengthen the horizon to multi-period issues and examin-
ing the implications of agency to show how it impacts the costs of security pricing, invest-
ment banking, accounting, disclosure, and risk incentives.).
John Coffee finds that managerial underdiversification encourages management goals
other than shareholder wealth maximization. See Coffee, supra note 376, at 110-12. On
the other hand, the inclination of managers to consume excessive perquisites or to be risk
adverse may well be offset by management compensation packages that are tied to firm
performance.
These agency costs have been documented as differences in behavior or performance of
manager-controlled and owner-controlled firms. Whether firms perform differently when
management has a substantial equity stake is a subject of academic and marketplace con-
cern. See Gibb-Clark, Managers' Share of Firm Can Be a Valuable Asset, Toronto Globe
and Mail, Aug. 13, 1988, at BI, col. 1 ("[a] manager has all of his 'human capital' tied up
in the company he works for and his talents will be worth less on the outside market if he is
not seen to be doing a good job").
Manager-controlled firms are more likely to maximize sales and profits, engage in
activities to smooth income and engage in conglomerate-type mergers - all of which have
the potential of shifting wealth from the owners to management. See Nyman & Sylverston,
The Ownership and Control of Industry, 31 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 74 (1978)("owner-
controlled companies have a higher rate of profit than management-controlled compa-
nies"); Smith, The Effect of the Separation of Ownership From Control on Accounting
Policy Decisions, 51 ACCT. REV. 707 (1976)("policy decisions made by manager firms
smoothed income significantly more often than the policy decisions made by owner firms");
Amihud & Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12
BELL J. ECON. 605, 615 (1981)("manager-controlled firms were found to engage in more
conglomerate acquisitions than owner-controlled firms.").
Studies use the percentage of ownership of the dominant shareholder as a criterion for
classifying firms as manager-controlled or owner-controlled. The greater concentration of
ownership implies more control or at least potential control and fewer agency problems.
Manager-controlled firms might be expected to have higher returns as a reward for bearing
agency risks, however, the data does not bear this out. See Palmer, The Profit-Performance
Effects of the Separation of Ownership from Control in Large U.S. Industrial Corpora-
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The power view of the income tax is at the core of the separa-
tion argument. While the power rationale 03 was being developed
during the formative years of the income tax, tax theorists did not
apply it to the corporate tax, perhaps due to an inherent distaste
of double taxation and the dominance of the nontax ideal of a
legal personality. °40 Kragen and McNulty identify a fundamental
issue in the integration debate:
The "uneasy case for separate taxation" seems to rest on a nag-
ging feeling that corporations, especially large publicly-held cor-
porations, are aggregates of capital, legal entities, and groups of
managers (often quite separate from owners) that have a capac-
ity to pay, or that should be regulated, or that derive some bene-
fits in return for which income taxes should be paid. That feel-
ing doesn't seem to go away, even among keen analysts who
follow fully the reasoning of the integrationist argu-
ments . 405
The ability to control the firm's decisions has been used to
identify corporations entitled to passthrough taxation. 0 6 The view
of the public corporation as a separate entity apart from its
residual equity owners has been expressed in various ways. Ac-
cording to Van den Tempel, historical developments demonstrate
that the corporation should be viewed as a separate entity:
These developments mean an abandonment of the idea that the
share comp4ny and its shareholders can be considered as being
identical. Modern industrial development has meant that nota-
bly the public share company, of which the shares are quoted on
the stock exchange, when seen from an economic and social
point of view has an existence of its own, independent of that of
its shareholders. This impersonal entity aims at its own mainte-
nance and growth, with a view to the object to be achieved by it.
Its interests are to be found in the sphere of production and are
not the same as the interest of the shareholders. The idea that
tions, 4 BELL J. ECON. 293 (1973)(concluding that the average profit rate of management-
controlled firms was significantly lower than the profit rate of owner-controlled firms). But
see Lloyd, Jahera & Goldstein, The Relation Between Returns, Ownership Structure, and
Market Value, 9 J. FIN. RES. 171, 172-73, 176-77 (1986)(finding no significant relationship
between ownership and returns).
403. The power rationale is discussed infra notes 412-46 and accompanying text.
404. See, e.g., S. REAMONN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CORPORATE TAX 35-37
(1970)(describing decisions of English courts under an early version of the income tax).
405. 2 A. KRAGEN & J. MCNULTY, supra note 195, at 960; A. KRAGEN & J. MC-
NULTY, supra note 307, at 1256.
406. See, e.g., 1985 CORPORATE PROPOSALS, supra note 300, at 17 ("corporations
directly controlled by shareholders are permitted" passthrough treatment).
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the share company is a form of contractual cooperation, by
means of which the joint shareholders ran an enterprise, is obso-
lete. It is the share company which has the status of entrepre-
neur and which competes both with its congeners and with the
enterprises of natural persons. Its income cannot exclusively be
seen, as would be convenient in the absence of a real corporation
tax, as partly already and partly not yet distributed dividend. 0 7
Kragen and McNulty's difficulty with the conduit concept is based
on their recognition of the power that firm managers have over
firm income:
From the equity point of view, the most troublesome fea-
ture of the partnership approach to integration is the taxation of
stockholders on income over the use of which they have little or
no control. Most owners of large public corporations exert no
influence over the disposition of retained profits, and inclusion of
these in their taxable incomes implicitly assumes that, had they
received them as dividends, they would immediately have rein-
vested them in the corporation. Needless to say, this is an as-
sumption of rather monumental proportions. If the proper mean-
ing of income is gain which, if not actually realized by the
taxpayer, is at least clearly realizable by him, profits retained by
public corporations should not be included in the taxable in-
comes of their stockholders. 0 8
The liquidity of shares in publicly traded companies enables their
owners to realize gains. In addition, public trading "involves a de-
gree of lack of identity of the investor with the entity that particu-
larly justifies separate taxation of the entity, rather than partner-
ship conduit treatment."40 9 Furthermore, stockholders do not
necessarily take rational account of the actions taken by the firms
in which they hold shares. Their connection may be characterized
under a managerialist or investment based view of the relationship
between the firm and equity capital suppliers or under an agency
costs view of the firm with the contract with equity viewed as
merely another bargain made under constraints.4 10 The essence of
the relationship between the firm and its residual owners, the eq-
407. A. VAN DEN TEMPEL, supra note 3, at 8 (commenting on the adoption of the
classical regime in the U.K. and Belgium).
408. 2 A. KRAGEN & J. McNULTY, supra note 307, at 897.
409. 1987 HousE REPORT, supra note 46, at 1067.
410. For discussion of these views of the firm, see Bratton, Theory, supra note 262,
at 1482-17. "The fact of restructuring does not matter and restructuring takeovers do not
threaten the hierarchy; they only replace one set of managers with another."
Id. at 1525.
1088 [Vol. 39:965
1988-89] CORPORATE TAX 1089
uity suppliers as financial investors, is a market transaction in
which the equity holders can liquidate their investment and em-
bark on a savings or consumption decision regardless of the deci-
sions of the firm managers." 1 The extreme financial view of the
powerlessness of the equity holders is that the bondholders own
the firm assets and the residual equity holders have an option or a
series of options on firm assets exercised by satisfying the claims
or series of claims of the bondholders through interest and princi-
pal payments.412
It is this view that I term the power view and rationale for
the corporate tax. The power theory of the corporate income tax
can be summarized as being based on "a collective taxable capac-
ity that parallels [a company's] economic autonomy."41 It is a
theory in the equitable taxation tradition. While the Canadian
Carter Commission could find "no grounds in principle for taxing
corporations, 414 there is a ground for taxing power over income.
Therefore, the power theory supports the separate taxation of cor-
porations. This separatist power view of corporate taxation de-
pends, in turn, on both benefits415 and ability-to-pay analysis.41 6
411. See infra notes 532-52 and accompanying text.
412. These relationships were first discussed in Black & Scholes, The Pricing of Op-
tions and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. EcoN. 637, 649-52 (1973), which forms the
basis for option pricing theory and contingent claims analysis for the pricing of equity and
debt. Equity is conceptualized as a European call option - an option that can be exer-
cised only on one day upon its termination - on the value of the firm's assets, with the
exercise price equal to the debt's promised principal and interest payments and with an
expiration date equal to the maturity date of the debt. See Mason & Merton, supra note
222, at 16-17. Debt can be viewed as made up of the riskless rate of return plus a premium
for writing a put option with a specific expiration point and exercise price on the firm's
assets only since the shareholders have limited liability. See Courtadon & Merrick, The
Option Pricing Model and Valuation of Corporate Securities. in THE REVOLUTION IN
CORPORATE FINANCE 197, 202-03 (J. Stern & D. Chew eds. 1986). For a presentation of
option pricing in determining the value of debt and equity, see J. Cox & M. RUBENsTEIN,
OPTIONS MARKETS 359-426 (1985).
413. M. NORR, supra note 10, at 32. "These arguments may not apply with full
force to a closely held (generally small) corporation" where ownership and management
are in the same hands. Id. at 32 n.23. Norr argues that an extension of that independent
taxable capacity argument is a different power argument: the power and position of certain
business enterprises, generally conducted as corporations, justify a tax on firm profits as
such "to provide adequate recognition under the tax system of the economic importance of
corporations as prime income recipients in a high-level economy." Id. at 33 (footnote omit-
ted). This points to a corporate production standard and is different from the power con-
cept based on liquidity.
414. 4 CARTER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 4.
415. The benefits theory of taxation was dominant in the tax literature until the time
of John Stuart Mill. See H. GROVES, TAX PHILOSOPHERS 29 (1974). For an overview of the
benefits theory, see R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 7, at 388-89; see also R.
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The benefits theory of taxation supports a publicly traded line for
MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 61-89 (1959)(historical development and
criticism).
The theory has several facets. "'[B]enefit' as used by Mill ... can be given either an
objective or a subjective meaning, the former being related to some factor in the individ-
ual's welfare, objectively observed (such as greater security), the latter to a preference by
him for a given course of public action at a specified price (taxes)." H. GROVES, supra, at
30. A progressive tax may be justified by the greater value that the rich place on a benefit
as evidenced by their willingness to pay more for it. Id.
Another variant of the theory views government as "an external agent supplying ser-
vices [to business] and entitled to payment therefrom for the costs of such services." Stu-
denski, supra note 298, at 630. Still another variant views government as a partner in every
business. Id.
Closely related to benefits theory is the social-cost theory. It holds that taxation isjustified to cover certain social costs that are properly assignable to business, such as re-
moval of pollution. See R. GOODE, supra note 10, at 30-31 (distinguishing two kinds of
social costs: public services, such as education, and evils that need correcting, such as pollu-
tion); Studenski, supra note 298, at 631 (social costs are the "damages caused [by busi-
ness] in an incidental way to the physical and human resources of society .. "). Benefits
theory also focuses on the "privilege" of limited liability and other privileges peculiar to the
corporate form. See Comm. on Federal Taxation of Corporations, Final Report, 1939
PROC. NAT'L TAX ASS'N 534, 580. This approach reduces the tax to an impersonal fee
assessed for doing business in the corporate form that mirrors to a degree the inquiry under
the Morrissey version of the association test.
The benefits of the corporate form include: "limited liability of stockholders, perpetual
life, easy transfer of ownership, multiple sources of financing, and the possibility of inter-
corporate affiliations. These characteristics make it easy for corporations to grow in size
and power and to tap new sources of finance and wider markets." R. GOODE, supra note
10, at 28. According to this theory, classical corporate taxation can be viewed as a payment
for the benefits that the firm receives through the tax system generally, including protec-
tion of property rights and special privileges conferred by incorporation such as limited
liability. Id. at 27-30. "The value of the corporate-charter privilege [that is the bundle of
rights that enables the corporation (and indeed a limited partnership) to act on a nation-
wide scale as a legal personality with divisible share capital, permanent existence, and lim-
ited liability] may be measured either by the size of the corporation's income or by the size
of its assets. The relative merits of these two measures is a subject of debate." Studenski,
supra note 298, at 643.
The benefits theory has been used to support the extension of the tax to limited part-
nerships on the theory that limited liability is the greatest attribute of the corporate form.
See supra notes 248-52 and accompanying text. But see Harberger supra note 354, at 162
(corporation income tax that has prevailed since the 1930s is too large to be justified sim-
ply as payment for limited liability).
Benefits analysis would extend business taxation, even indirect taxation, to all forms of
business. See, e.g., Hunter, Shall We Tax Corporations or Business? 26 AM: ECON. REV.
84, 85 (1936)(net income tax on business generally); Studenski, supra note 298, at 630
(state-partnership variant of general benefit theory requires net income tax on business
enterprises while cost-of-service variant requires taxation of business enterprises "on the
basis of their capital assets, gross earnings, or 'net-value output,' . . . at proportional
rates"); Colm, supra note 394, at 328-30 (theory of the state as partner in production
justifies two types, of businesses taxes: a value added tax and a special tax on business
favored by particular government services).
Not surprisingly, the benefits theory has had a mixed reception as a rationale for the
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the tax since it is precisely those publicly traded firms that derive
benefits from the financial infrastructure; therefore those firms
should pay a portion of their profits to support the cost of regulat-
ing the efficient United States markets."'
classical corporate tax. See Warren, Interest, supra note 1, at 1600 n.72 (noting difficulty
of isolating precise benefits to corporations and questioning imposition of tax on net income
instead of gross receipts). Arguments against the theory are: (1) special benefits are an
incidental aspect of incorporation conferred by the state because it serves the public good;
(2) it is impossible to measure these benefits and thus no reliable mechanism can discern
the correct extent of taxation; and (3) since incorporation is open to all, it does not have a
special value.
416. Under the separatist view, ability to pay means collective ability and not per-
sonal ability. Studenski, supra note 298, at 633; Buehler, The Taxation of Business Enter-
prise - Its Theory and Practice, 183 ANNALS 96, 97 (1936). It is economic expansion,
unaided by the legal personality of the firm, that, in the separatist view, creates a separate
taxpaying entity. See R. GOODE, supra note 10, at 35 (ability to pay analysis is concerned
with "[t]he nature of the income rather than the general economic and social status of its
recipients"); Adams, Fundamental Problems of Federal Income Taxation, 35 Q.J. ECON.
527, 543 (1921)("dual structure of the income tax . . . is a . . . recognition of the fact
that . . . the business entity has an individuality and a capacity to pay of its own").
Based on the theory of the firm literature beginning with Coase, see supra notes 262
& 376-77, an alternative view of ability to pay was born. It emphasizes the economies of
scale and decreased monitoring risks resulting from integration of activities within a firm.
In determining which firms ought to pay a separate tax under this view, there is a correla-
tion between the participation of owners, the lack of separation, and the decreasing margi-
nal utility of certain forms of integration. While it is easy to see the value of integration
and economies of scale in large service firms, there are differences between such firms and
manufacturers. To the extent that owners do not participate, the web of contracts view of
the firm presumes contractual arrangements within the firm that limit moral hazard risk
and exact a rate of return that would not have been possible outside of the firm.
For some firms, proponents argue that the contractual web is an unsatisfactory model.
See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 258 (difficulty of voluntarily dissolving closely held
corporations makes ownership illiquid and creates risk of exploitation of minority share-
holders that ex ante contracting cannot prevent). But see Easterbrook & Fischel, Close
Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986)(no reason to treat closely
held and publicly traded companies differently). The classic argument is made in F.
O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed.
1985). This view of ability-to-pay justifies in part an exemption from a firm level tax for
firms in which individuals materially participate, at least for income that can be directly
traced to the value of their individual participation. See infra text at notes 673-90.
417. The United States market operates within a regulated environment of required
disclosure of information to which liability provisions attach. See 1 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION 26-28, 171-84, 218-29 (3d ed. 1989); E. BLOCH, INSIDE INVEST-
MENT BANKING 299-313 (2d ed. 1989). This in in contrast with the less extensive and often
nonexistent disclosure systems in other countries. See STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMM.. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 74-245 (July 27,
1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS] detailing the di-
rectives for disclosure in the E.E.C. generally followed by the Netherlands, systems similar
to the United States in Japan, Canada, and France, the less than developed disclosure
systems in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia, and no government required
disclosure in Switzerland). It is argued that regulatory oversight is necessary to promote
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The argument I make here refers not only to the cost of the
benefit under the benefits theory, but also to the value of that ben-
efit.418 The core of the power view is the conception, derived from
Berle and Means, that firms with highly liquid ownership interests
and a separation of ownership from control have a separate ability
to pay and possess unique benefits. The value of the profit that is
earned on equity must be viewed from the standpoint of the
the efficiency of the market by providing information to all participants, to prevent unfair
advantage by those with private information, and to ensure the efficient operation of the
market. I L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra, at 184-93; see also J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF WALL STREET 561-68 (1982). While proponents of the efficient market
hypothesis, portfolio theory, and agency cost economics argue that disclosure requirements
are unnecessary because it is in management's interest to disclose, see L. Loss & J. SELIG-
MAN, supra, at 184-91 & nn.41-42, required disclosure may be mandated by the efficient
market hypothesis since it rests on the need for information. For the contrasting views of
disclosure, see Gellis, Mandatory Disclosure for Municipal Securities: A Reevaluation, 36
BUFFALO L. REV. 15, 21 & nn.19-20, 40-44 & nn.93-113 (1988). Furthermore, portfolio
theory does not rebut a need for disclosure to make rational choices in a diversified portfo-
lio of investments, and the agency theory explanation for management's interest in disclos-
ure has not been empirically tested and may be unrealistic. L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra,
at 184-92. For examples of this reasoning, see Flannery, Asymmetric Information and
Risky Debt Maturity Choice, 41 J. FIN. 19 (1986)(maturity of risky debt is a signal to the
market, if there are positive transaction costs, of the true quality of the firm to counterbal-
ance the market's view that insiders will issue securities that the market will overvalue);
Mikkelson & Partch, Valuation Effects of Security Offerings and the Issuance Process, 15
J. FIN. ECON. 31 (1986). If one accepts the argument that disclosure and monitoring are
necessary to promote efficient markets, this framework of public information lowers the
cost of capital to firms trading within this market, see infra notes 460-531 and accompany-
ing text, as well as the cost of the regulatory effort and allows the government to be a
partner in that investment, see infra note 791 and accompanying text.
418. See Kornhauser, supra note 78, at 492-97 (the benefit theory of taxation should
be understood as referring to the amount of the benefit received rather than the cost); see
also R. GOODE, supra note 10, at 29 ("[i]f the benefit theory is accepted, it may be as-
sumed that benefits received are closely associated with profits earned, and hence a tax on
net income is justified"). I also distinguish my analysis from the previous attempts to link
the corporate tax to a benefits theory based on the benefit of limited liability. It is both the
cost and the value of limited liability that makes it an unclear focus for the corporate tax
as a benefits theory. The benefits conferred by the corporate form vary according to the
size of the firm. For example, limited liability is of greater value to small firms than to
large firms. Hence, the tax should fall on small rather than large firms. This is especially
true since limited liability allows for capital formation in the first instance and then, by
enhancing free transferability of shares, allows capital to be maintained. M. KING. PUBLIC
POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 112-13 (1977). Larger firms do not need limited liability
to raise capital since they can generally act as self-insurers, whereas smaller ones do. The
cost of limited liability in social terms through the fostering of negligence may not be
proportional or related to the size of the firm and may be higher for riskier enterprises. See
supra note 252. I also recognize that limited liability may sometimes be essential for cer-
tain large firms with high risk projects, and whenever this is the case the benefits theory
applies. The value or cost of that benefit cannot be limited to the actual jurisdiction (state
of incorporation) that provides the legal grant.
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residual owners who are the ultimate beneficiaries. The incentive
society wants to give to risky investment must also be considered.
The view of liquid assets as less risky, carrying a lower return
premium over the risk-free rate of return because of liquidity (as
will be set forth in Part III), leads to some justification under a
benefits analysis for the theory that the firm's ability to earn a
profit on a liquid investment entitles the government to be a part-
ner in that investment.
b. Berle and Means Revisited - The Economic Personality of
the Firm
The separatist view of the corporate tax stems from the Berle
and Means economic personality view of the firm.4 19 The separa-
tist theory justifies a corporate income tax because the tax is not a
tax on stockholders but a tax on a separate entity. 2 For Berle
and Means, separation depended largely upon the operation of
capital markets and the ability of the shareholders to liquidate
their investments independently of the firm's investment deci-
sions.42 Berle and Means noted that mere incorporation does not
necessarily result in this separation, since some corporations are
merely the alter egos of their owners. 22 Rather, Berle and Means
articulated a more expansive view of the "corporate system"
which includes not only separation of ownership from contro4 23
but also the market place relationship between the firm and its
equity owners:
419. For a discussion of the separatist view, see R. GOODE, supra note 10, at 15-20.
420. Id. at 9-23. But see J. BALLENTINE, supra note 397, at 5-6 ("The profits of a
corporation are owned by the stockholders and are thus the income of shareholders .
As a result the tax on corporate profits is a tax on the income of shareholders.").
421. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 259, at 286-87; see also R. GOODE, supra
note 10, at 20-21 ("The individual stockholder no longer has power of disposal over the
capital used by the enterprise. As Berle and Means put it, the stockholder has 'exchanged
control for liquidity.' ").
422. Berle and Means insisted that neither the form of the enterprise nor its legal
status was the essence of corporate production or the legal personality of corporatism: "If
the corporate form had done nothing more than this, we should have only an interesting
custom according to which business would be carried out by individuals adopting for that
purpose certain legal clothing. It would involve no radical shift in property tenure or in the
organization of economic activity; it would inaugurate no 'system' comparable to the insti-
tution of feudalism." A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 259, at 5.
423. Separation of ownership from control, as used here, refers to the ability of firm
managers, whether or not they are owners or share the profits of the firm, to pursue profit
maximizing or other objectives separate from the wishes of a significant portion of the
residual owners.
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The corporate system appears only when this type of pri-
vate or "close" corporation has given way to an essentially dif-
ferent form, the quasi-public corporation: a corporation in which
a large measure of separation of ownership and control has
taken place through the multiplication of owners.
Growing out of this separation are two characteristics, al-
most as typical of the quasi-public corporation as the separation
itself - mere size and the public market for its securities. It is
precisely this separation of control from ownership which makes
possible tremendous aggregations of property .
Though the American law makes no distinction between the
private corporation and the quasi-public, the economics of the
two are essentially different. The separation of ownership from
control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of
ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and where many
of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power
disappear. Size alone tends to give these giant corporations a
social significance not attached to the smaller units of private
enterprise. By the use of the open market for securities, each of
these corporations assumes obligations towards the investing
public which transform it from a legal method clothing the rule
of a few individuals into an institution at least nominally serving
investors who have embarked their funds in its enterprise. New
responsibilities towards the owners, the workers, the consumers,
and the State thus rest upon the shoulders of those in control. In
creating these new relationships, the quasi-public corporation
may fairly be said to work a revolution. It has destroyed the
unity that we commonly call property - has divided ownership
into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined to it.
Thereby the corporation has changed the nature of profit-seek-
ing enterprise.424
Therefore, the Berle and Means view supports a separatist
view of the corporate tax neither because the corporation is public
or large nor because it is characterized by a separation of owner-
ship from control, but rather because the corporation's separation
of ownership from control is accompanied by a liquid capital mar-
ket. "Taxing both the profits of the public corporation and the
dividends received by its stockholders does not seem to be so much
double taxation of the same income as separate taxation of the
424. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 259, at 5-7.
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incomes of two related economic entities."42
This view of the public firm can be contrasted with the many
definitions proposed for the closely held firm.426 Disagreement ex-
ists as to whether the essence of the close corporation is the lack
of a public market for its shares alone,427 a combination of no
market and close family or friendly shareholders,42 a small num-
425. R. GOODE, supra note 10, at 25.
426. See 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.07, at
1-24 to 1-31 & § 1.02, at 1-2 to 1-9 (3d ed. 1987)(nbting common characteristics of closely
held firms). See also Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in the
Close Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 456, 508 (1985)(the "close corporation is a
hybrid of a publicly-held corporation and a partnership"); Soderquist, Reconciling Share-
holders' Rights and Corporate Responsibility: Close and Small Public Corporations, 33
VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1388-95 (1980)(noting the need for a "categorization [of firms] that
approximates reality").
Several factors are normally associated with closely held firms: no shares held by the
general public and shares are difficult to obtain, no ready market for shares, no reliable
method of valuing shares, control in relatively few hands, identity of shareholders, and
operating executives whose principal source of income is salary from the firm. Martin,
Factors Used In Evaluation of Closely-Held Stock, 20 NAT'L PUB. ACCT. 12, 12-13
(1975); cf. A. HOFFMAN, ISRAELS ON CORPORATE PRACTICE § 4.01, at 68-70 (4th ed.
1983)(some corporations with a large number of shareholders can nevertheless be classified
as closely held because of a significant identity of shareholders and managers); C. ROHR-
LICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 2A.02 (5th ed.
1975)("The term 'close corporation' has been defined in such various ways that an all-
purpose definition is difficult. It is commonly described either in terms of size, simply as a
corporation with relatively few shareholders, or in terms of its method of marketing securi-
ties, as a corporation whose shares are not generally traded in the securities market.").
427. 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 426, § 1.02, at 1-4 to 1-5 (A defini-
tion that looks to a lack of trading in the securities markets is "most nearly in accord with
the linguistic usages of the legal profession" and it was adopted by the authors.); accord
Latty, The Close Corporation and the New Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L.
REv. 432, 439 (1956); Pavenstedt, The Second Circuit Reaffirms the Efficacy of Restric-
tive Stock Agreements to Control Estate Tax Valuation, 51 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 n.1
(1952); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1982)(rules against structuring shareholder
relationships like partnerships relaxed if corporation is not publicly traded); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 620(c) (MeKinney's 1986)(rules against restrictions on freedom of board of
directors relaxed if corporation is one in which "no shares are listed on a national securities
exchange or regularly quoted on an over-the-counter market by one or more members of a
national or affiliated securities association").
428. C. ROHRLICH, supra note 426, at 2A.03 ("[T]he essential peculiarity of the
'close corporation' is . . . the identity between stock ownership and active management.");
R. CLARK, supra note 253 § 18.3 (1986)(close corporations primarily identified by share-
holder management); Tennery, The Potential of the Close Corporation: A Question of
Economic Validity, 14 How. L.J. 241, 247 (1968)("a close corporation is a group of asso-
ciates who band together to conduct a business in the corporate form"); Comment, Corpo-
rations - Definition of the Close Corporation, 16 VAND. L. REV. 1267, 1271-72
(1963)("The integration of management and ownership. . . may be the most useful single
all-inclusive definition."); A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 161 (1976); see
also A. HOFFMAN, supra note 426, § 4.01, at 69. But see R. HAMILTON, CORPORATION
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ber of shareholders, 29 or a combination of all three. 30 Market
advocates focus on the lack of an active market for shares. 3
Closely held firms with relatively large numbers of shareholders,
strong ties to the community, and nonpublicly traded shares are
not uncommon. 32 Restructuring transactions through leveraged
and management buyouts may align the interests of firm manag-
ers more closely with those of equity holders, but when a reverse
leveraged buyout occurs the close corporation ceases to exist. The
corporate governance debate433 and the statutory developments 434
FINANCE 131 (2d ed. 1989)(when shares of a firm are widely held in an infrequently traded
"thin" public market, the firm is public for some purposes and closely held for others).
429. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-203(A)(3) (1977)(limits close corporation to 10 or
fewer shareholders); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 102(5) (1981)(not more than 20
shareholders).
430. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511
(1975)(small number of shareholders, no ready market for the corporate stock, and a sub-
stantial majority of stockholders participating in management); see also H. HENN, LAWS
OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 257, at 694 (3d ed. 1983)(deter-
mination based on all factors).
431. Easterbrook and Fischel identify four ways in which the lack of an active mar-
ket for shares injures investors in closely held firms. The absence of an active secondary
market (1) "makes valuation of residual claims highly uncertain," (2) "creates conflicts
over dividend policy and other distributions," (3) "precludes reliance on the stock market
as a monitoring device," and (4) "deprives uninformed investors of the protection of
purchasing at a market price." Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 416, at 275-76.
432. For example, Glenshaw Glass, a long-time producer of bottles for local compa-
nies, has 135 shareholders, most of whom are descendants of the company's founders. See
Barcousky, Takeover Bid Made For Glenshaw Glass, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Aug. 20,
1988, at 23, col. 3.
433. See Symposium on Corporate Governance, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 657-839
(1987); AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1986). For a review of the ALI project, see Lipton, Cor-
porate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 47-59
(1987).
434. The Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement allows new firms unlimited
access to its form of governance. New corporations wishing to elect close corporation status
have no shareholder number limitation and a public offering does not invalidate the elec-
tion. MODEL STAT. CLOSE CORP. SuPP. § 3(a) & Official Comment at § 3 (1984). The
Supplement limits a close corporation election by an existing corporation to firms with 50
or fewer shareholders and bars share transfer except to the extent allowed by the company'
articles of incorporation. Id. at §§ 3(b), 11 (a). The Official Comment to § 3 indicates that
the number limitation was imposed because of "[t]he danger that a large corporation with
numerous shareholders might attempt to elect close corporation status in order to operate
without a board of directors", and that growth beyond the 50 shareholder limit causes no
problem. Id. at § 3, Official Comment.
States take a variety of positions on close corporation status. There are a surprising
number of restrictions in Delaware. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 342(a) (1983)(Delaware
does not allow a public offering and limits the number of shareholders to 30). Other states
have broadly permissive provisions. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-33-1(c) (West 1989) (al-
lows corporation with 50 or fewer shareholders to dispense with a board of directors); N.Y.
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that have taken place in the last twenty years demonstrate the not
surprising proposition that public and large public435 firms, includ-
ing those not necessarily publicly traded,4 36 are different from
closely held, private4 37 firms.
Publicly traded firms and private firms are also distinct. "By
and large the legal-historical developments and the economic
functions of these two systems are quite different, and meaningful
legal or economic analysis must begin by recognizing this fact.
438
Henry Manne finds that public corporations exist in three mar-
kets: the market for investment capital exemplified by the pro-
moter's search for new funds, the liquidity market for the buying
and selling of existing securities exemplified by the organized se-
curities exchanges, and the market for corporate control.4 39 John
Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(c)(McKinney 1986)(no concept of "close corporation" but direct
shareholder management allowed if shares not regularly traded); CALIF. CORP. CODE §
158(a) (West Supp. 1989)(close corporation limited to 35 shareholders, no limitations on
trading); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 3.01-3.06 & 12.01-12.54 (Vernon 1988 & Supp.
1989)(no limitations on the number of shareholders or the issuance of shares by a public
offering). For a comparison of recent state approaches, see Siedel, Close Corporation Law:
Michigan, Delaware and the Model Act, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 383 (1986).
435. See Am. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, §§ 1.03, 1.16, 1.23, 3.01, 3.02, 3.03 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984)(Three
tiers of corporations are defined: "large publicly held corporation[s]" with 2,000 equity
holders and SIOO million of total assets; "publicly held corporation Is]" with 500 sharehold-
ers and $3 million of total assets; and other corporations treated as "business organiza-
tions." The first and second tier of corporations face stricter requirements than does the
third tier.)
436. Federal securities laws require disclosure for large firms regardless of whether
they are publicly traded. Securities Exchange Act § 12(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)
(1986). The statutory requirement has been liberalized by regulatory rule and it now re-
quires disclosure only if there are 500 or more shareholders and total assets of more than
$5 million. Rule 12g-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (as amended by Adoption of Amendments
to Reporting by Small Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-23,406, [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 84,012 (Aug. 15, 1986)). Large firms, which are de-
fined as "public" and "large public" under the corporate governance provisions, see supra
note 435, are generally publicly traded. Large non-traded firms do exist. See Minard, In
Privacy They Thrive, FORBES, Nov. 1, 1976, at 38 (listing the largest nonpublic firms). The
growing number of leveraged and management buyouts add to their ranks. On a corporate
governance level, they may function like publicly traded firms but avoid the discipline of
the market for corporate control.
437. For governance purposes, closely held firms are viewed as "incorporated part-
nerships." That view has given rise to expansive close corporation statutes in most states.
The Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement permits great latitude in the govern-
ance structure of closely held firms. See supra note 434.
438. See Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L.
REV. 259, 259 (1967).
439. Id. at 265. Nonpublic corporations and their markets are, of course, markedly
different.
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Coffee finds the duties of the majority to the minority in private
firms different from the duties of corporate managers to the public
in public firms.440 This difference is explained in part by the fact
that participants in closely held firms do not have the securities
market as an "escape mechanism" and thus are more exposed to
"potential exploitation."44 While the perspectives of managers
and equity holders within the closely held firm are changed
through management and leveraged buyouts, the fact remains
that the escape mechanism of the public market is not present.
c. The Power Rationale in a Flat Tax World
In a flat tax world, double taxation of equity is appropriate
where the equity ownership interest is publicly traded and highly
liquid, because of the fundamental risk differences that exist be-
tween residual owners of public firms and owners of private firms.
Liquidity enables investors to be risk neutral and to exercise their
consumption and savings preferences through a sale of the
residual ownership interest. Liquidity also enables investors to in-
sulate themselves from the risk preferences of managers of public
firms who are generally risk averse and underdiversified.442
Finally, liquidity allows owners to indicate to managers their
440. Coffee, No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and
the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 919 (1988)[hereinafter Coffee, No
Exit]. The courts have not always acted consistent with the Coffee view. Compare Dona-
hue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975)(selective repurchases
in closely held firm violated fiduciary duty of majority shareholder to minority) and Topper
v. Park Sheraton Pharmacy, 107 Misc.2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1980)(involun-
tary dissolution allowed whenever minority shareholder's reasonable expectations frus-
trated) with Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964)(permitting selective
repurchases).
441. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 440, at 940-41 (the closely held corporation may
require closer judicial monitoring to place limits on the ability of the closely held firm to
opt out of the rules of standard corporate governance).
442. This view derives from the concept of manager-shareholder relations so elo-
quently expressed by Professor Coffee. Coffee, supra note 376, at 80. The Coffee view
synthesizes three perspectives of the firm: The first is the neoclassical view. See, e.g., Jen-
sen & Meckling, supra note 103; Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88
J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980). The second is the managerialist view. See, e.g., H. SIMON, MOD-
ELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL (1957). The third is the transaction cost view. See,
e.g., 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 273-325 (1985). All of
these perspectives view managers as individuals who pursue goals other than the maximiza-
tion of shareholder wealth. Regardless of the view adopted, a market for liquid residual




displeasure with management strategies.443 The paradigm of sepa-
rate risk analysis for the firm and the owners holds, even though
evidence suggests that the most sophisticated investors are not di-
versified,444 that individuals with a high savings rate can satisfy
consumption wants by borrowing, 445 and that ownership of equi-
ties is through pension and other forced savings plans.44 The
power rationale supports the separate taxation of the firm and its
owners under an equitable taxation tradition. Whether it supports
the double tax on efficiency grounds depends upon how the power
view of the double tax is defined. It is the latter consideration that
is modeled in Part III below. That model is then tested against
both horizontal and vertical equity criteria and the efficiency and
neutrality paradigms in Part VII.
III. PROPOSAL FOR A PROFITS TAX ON PUBLICLY TRADED
FIRMS WITH LIQUID EQUITY
Taxing the firm level profits of firms with liquid equity under
a double tax system is justified on ability-to-pay and horizontal
equitable taxation grounds. The difference between liquid and il-
liquid equity ownership, generally framed as the difference be-
tween publicly traded and nonpublicly traded firms, has instinctive
appeal. Therefore, it may be appropriate to tax each separately.44 7
443. See Manne, supra note 438, at 264-65 (shareholders control managers by exer-
cising their "freedom to dissociate").
444. See Blume & Friend, The Asset Structure of Individual Portfolios and Some
Implications for Utility Functions, 30 J. FIN. 585 (1975).
445. There are, however, limits placed on shareholder borrowing. See supra note 319
for a discussion of margin requirements.
446. The savings choices of many individuals are altered by the favorable retirement
benefits available. These incentives persuade individuals to defer consumption. In the "age
of the savings planner," the decisions of individual savers are being made by group repre-
sentatives. Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management
Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REv. 561, 565-66 (1981)("the decision to save is only indirectly
controlled by many of the workers who are to benefit from these plans (which can no
longer accurately be described as 'fringe' benefits), just as the decision to invest in particu-
lar financial claims is only rarely controlled by public suppliers of capital to financial
intermediaries").
447. It is the liquidity of the owners, representing their separate and independent
power over income, that allows firm managers to operate without regard to the individual
savings and consumption preferences of the equity owners (the Fisher Separation Theo-
rem). See Romano, supra note 390, at 952-55. Of course, the firm owner cannot purchase
assets to adjust for all consumption preferences if the market is less than complete. When
faced with this circumstance, the holder will want the firm to conform to her own con-
sumption preferences. The result is that profit maximization for public firms may not be
(or indeed should not be) the most desired goal. See Grossman & Stiglitz, On Value Max-
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The unique characteristics of public companies such as the exis-
tence of a market for ownership, the shareholder's typical lack of
control, and the often indirect correlation between the risks and
benefits accruing to the underlying productive assets and those ac-
cruing to the stock representing ownership of those assets support,
at least indirectly, the classical corporate tax regime.448
Early tax reform proposals generated only limited discussion
of the characteristics of the market in which a public firm exists
and how that market should be defined.44 9 The stock market is a
more-or-less closed system of property holding that is essentially
independent of actual productive processes and gives rise to a sep-
arate form of valuation of those underlying processes. 450 Early in-
imization and Alternative Objectives of the Firm, 32 J. FIN. 389 (1977).
448. Davies, however, "does not question the basic assumption that a separate corpo-
rate income tax is a useful tax which ought to be retained, regardless of who ultimately
bears the burden of that tax." Davies, Public Stock, Private Stock: A Model for the Cor-
porate Income Tax, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 299, 303 (1975)(footnotes omitted)(since the in-
come is earned at the corporate level it ought to be taxed there).
449. This struggle to define the market came up in two different contexts. The first
arose when commentators questioned whether Subchapter C ought to treat public and pri-
vate firms differently for basic realization and recognition events. The second context in-
volves the implementation of an accrual tax system.
When analyzing whether Subchapter C ought to treat public and private firms differ-
ently, Davies concluded that the stock exchanges were public markets. Davies, supra note
448, at 311. He was less sure about the over-the-counter market. Id. This issue is discussed
fully at infra note 451.
The accrual issue was addressed by Slawson and others. Slawson proposed to tax, on
an accrual basis, the annual appreciation in publicly held stock. Slawson, Taxing as Ordi-
nary Income The Appreciation of Publicly-Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623, 648 (1967). His
proposal was limited to publicly held stock because published market quotations make its
value readily determinable without actual disposition and a five hundred shareholder mini-
mum and gross assets of $1 million to match Congress' proxy and reporting requirements
as specified in the Securities Act Amendments of 1964. Id. at 651. Other accrual proposals
for the collection of the shareholder level tax also focus on the marketability of and valua-
tion in the public market. See Thuronyi, The Taxation of Corporate Income - A Propo-
sal for Reform, 2 J. AM. TAX POL'Y 109, 121 & n.45 (1983)(in a proposal to replace the
corporate tax computation entirely with shareholder level accrual, the proposal confined to
publicly held corporations for which there is a ready market); Shakow, Taxation Without
Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1111, 1133-36, 1167
(1986)(incentives for public trading in an accrual system if the corporate tax were elimi-
nated for publicly traded but not nonpublicly traded corporations are analyzed and an
accrual system that would exclude hard-to-value securities such as those trading in a thin
market is proposed); see also id. (discussion of the Twentieth Century Fund and David and
Miller proposals for valuation of untraded securities). But see Note, Realizing Apprecia-
tion Without Sale: Accrual Taxation of Capital Gains on Marketable Securities, 34 STAN.
L. REv. 857, 872-73 (1982)(Publicly held status always attaches if the then S.E.C. 500
shareholders and $1 million in gross assets requirements are met regardless of market.).
450. This proposition was advanced by Professor Harbrecht. See Berle, The Impact
of the Corporation on Classical Economic Theory, 79 Q.J. EcON. 25, 38-39 (1965).
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tuitions of the differences between firms in the public and private
market fueled proposals to treat public firms differently from pri-
vate firms.""' These differences have been heightened by the cur-
rent financial attributes of the market including evidence that the
efficient market hypothesis may not hold when confronted with
the alleged irrationality of the October 1987 market break, gains
by noise traders and discounts for shares,4 52 market participant
451. These included five proposals. One proposal was to tax the unrealized apprecia-
tion in publicly traded shares currently as ordinary income while maintaining the entity
level tax. See Slawson, supra note 449, at 644-47 (corporate tax also retained); Note,
supra note 410, at 872-73; Cohen, Taxing Stock Dividends and Economic Theory, 1974
Wis. L. REV. 142, 147 n.19 (1974)(the increase in value in publicly traded shares ought to
be taxed in the year of accrual similar to the treatment of interest on a savings account).
The second proposal was to treat redemptions as a taxable event for the continuing share-
holders or to apply the redemption provisions only to closely held businesses and not pub-
licly held cbrporations. See Chirelstein, Optional Redemptions and Optional Dividends:
Tax and the Re-Purchase of Common Shares, 78 YALE L.J. 739, 750-54 (1969)(noting
increase in value of continuing shareholder stock on capital gain redemptions and the vol-
untary nature of the choice to tender and arguing that an occasional major shift of owner-
ship interests among shareholders should not apply to publicly held corporations in essen-
tially liquidation transactions). But see Bacon, Share Redemptions by Publicly Held
Companies: A New Look at Dividend Equivalents, 26 TAX L. REV. 283, 304 (1971)(There
is no real evidence that Congress intended to limit § 302(b)(1) to prearranged exchanges in
closely held companies.). The third proposal was to treat distributions from private firms
differently from distributions made from public firms. See Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau & War-
ren, A Technical Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Corporate Distribu-
tions to Shareholders, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 53 n.100 (1952)(different treatment justified
because transactions in closely held corporations are usually driven by the tax consequences
alone). The fourth proposal was to treat reorganizations as taxable events. See Hellerstein,
Mergers, Taxes, and Realism, 71 HARV. L. REV. 254, 281-85 (1957)(proposal limited to
publicly traded stock primarily for practical reasons); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4025, 4064-66 (suggesting a
public/private statutory distinction for reorganizations is justified because the actions of
privately held firms are more likely to be motivated by the tax avoidance plans of their
shareholders). The fifth proposal involved a model whose rules distinguished recognition,
distribution, and liquidation events based on the thesis that public stock is separate prop-
erty and private stock is not. See Davies, supra note 351, at 301.
Davies' is the most ambitious proposal to date: to divide Subchapter C into provisions
that deal differently with public and private stock on a transactional basis. Furthermore, it
follows that exchanges of private stock for other private stock would not be a recognition
event. This would allow unlimited deferral so long as the taxpayer remains in a private
market. Not surprisingly, contributions of property to a public corporation in exchange for
its stock would always be taxed under the Davies rationale and the control test of I.R.C. §
351 would be irrelevant. Contributions to private corporations, on the other hand, would
receive treatment similar to I.R.C. § 721 partnership treatment.
452. See J. DELONG, A. SHLEIFER, L. SUMMERS & R. WALDMANN, THE SIZE AND
INCIDENCE OF THE LOSSES FROM NOISE TRADING I (National Bureau of Economics Re-
search Working Paper No. 2538, 1988)(modeling losses of rational traders from the irra-
tional demands of noise traders). For an explanation of discounts in public shares, see L.
LOWENSTEIN, supra note 164, at 88-93.
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behavior,453 market behavior relative to fundamental firm val-
ues,454 market purchases of baskets of securities,4 5  arbitrage be-
tween asset and stock markets, 456 and the lack of valuation effi-
ciency in the market.457 In particular, proposals for taxing
continuing shareholders on the value created by the redemption of
the shares of other shareholders was limited to public firms which
used redemptions as a financial strategy; the proposals did not
seek to include private firms. 458 These proposals were supported by
the fact that liquidity provides an equity holder with an exit
453. Two types of participants are present in today's market. One is the investor who
brings a long term outlook to the market and the other operates with a short term
perspective.
No more than 5% of the money invested in stocks is managed by long-term investors
measuring the value of the business under the fundamental valuation principle. L. LoWEN-
STEIN, supra note 164, at 35 (designating these investors as "Graham-and-Dodders").
Louis Lowenstein has focused attention on the remaining investors who comprise over 90%
of the market and concentrate on short-term stock price behavior or use diversified portfo-
lio techniques. Citing studies showing that many large institutional investors exhibit this
speculative behavior, see L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 164, at 76, he notes that mutual fund
managers, for instance, rarely "compare the price of the stock to either current or future
earnings ... ," id, and, care little about "the amount of debt on the balance sheet," id.
454. For example, in testing the arbitrage pricing theory, it has been argued that the
shares of stock traded in the market place are actually portfolios of the individual units of
production in the economy. These portfolios were created through the adoption of multiple
capital budgeting projects by the individual firms. Thus, the returns on specific individual
units of production within a firm are not reflected when portfolios of stock are traded in the
market place. Instead, what is observed in the market place is merely the portfolio of the
capital budgeting decisions represented by the stock and not really the underlying produc-
tive units. See R. HAUGEN, MODERN INVESTMENT THEORY 217-23 (1986).
455. For example, the increased use of stock index futures provides institutions and
individuals a strategy for hedging their transactions. If they choose, these market baskets
can be leveraged by margin purchases requiring in cash only a small portion of the value of
the contracts. See Japanese Begin Trading in Stock Index Futures, The N.Y. Times, Sept.
5, 1988, at 28, col. 4.
456. The existence of a different market for the stock and the underlying assets is
argued by some to allow for arbitrage between the two markets. For some it is highlighted
by the premiums paid in hostile takeovers and management buyouts and it raises issues
concerning the social responsibility of this conduct. L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 164, at 154
(citing comments of Martin Shubik noting that the ability to arbitrage across markets
means that there is efficiency for one form of market in day-to-day trading that is not
matched in another).
457. Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U. CAL.
DAVIs L. REV. 341, 376, 401-02 (1986). See also Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Mar-
kets. Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985). Tests
of the efficient market hypothesis for information processing do not lead inextricably to
valuation effeciency if decisions based on information are not correct. See L. LOWENSTEIN,
supra note 164, at 52. For further evidence on the lack of fundamental valuation efficiency,
see D. CUTLER, J. POTERBA & L. SUMMERS, WHAT MOVES STOCK PRICES? 14-17 (National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2538, 1988)(returns to noise traders).
458. See supra note 449.
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choice if the firm does not pursue the holder's goals. Liquidity also
provides the firm with a lower cost of capital and thereby in-
creases profits. Regardless of whether the test requires solely mar-
ket liquidity or includes a hybrid form of liquidity by private con-
tract, the ultimate concern is the extent of the value of liquidity to
the firm and its owners. It is the latter result of liquidity that a
liquidity based test must satisfy. However, a liquid ownership test
faces many of the same definitional problems as did the publicly
traded test under the 1987 legislation." 9
A. The Value of Liquidity
1. Liquidity and the Cost of Firm Capital
Equity ownership entails three components: interest in as-
sets, interest in cash flows, and control. For non-controlling own-
ers, it is generally preferable to have liquidity of ownership and
the ability to realize the value of the underlying assets by selling
the interest in an established market."' The liquidity preferences
of even the largest non-institutional investors lead them to pub-
licly traded stock."61 At the end of 1986, institutional investors
owned from forty-two to forty-five percent of the three trillion dol-
lars of corporate equity.4" 2 For 1988, trading in the New York
459. See infra notes 640-71 and accompanying text.
460. F. WESTON, THE CORPORATE FINANCE FUNCTION 149 (4th ed. 1977). For ex-
ample, a minority interest in a closely held company is less liquid, absent agreements, than
a minority interest in a public company. Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 416,
at 274-77 (the absence of a liquid market for shares in closely held corporations does not
pose a risk of exploitation of minority shareholders, who cannot easily sell their shares, by
majority shareholders, but does make valuation of residual claims uncertain, creates con-
flicts over dividend and distribution policy, precludes reliance on market monitoring, and
deprives uninformed investors of the option to purchase at a market price), with Hethering-
ton & Dooley, supra note 258, at 63 (the greatest opportunity for exploitation exists when
the power to control rests with one faction mandating legislative solution). Finance theory
provides an approach to the valuation of minority shares by demonstrating that the risk of
diversion of value from minority owners to controlling owners can be reduced or elimi-
nated. See J. Osteryoung, D. Nast & W. Wells, Pricing Minority Discounts in Closely
Held Corporations (Florida State University Working Paper, Apr. 1989)(abstract).
461. Meyer, How Magnates Pick Partners, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1988 (Magazine),
at 26, 34.
462. See C. Brancato & P. Gaughan, The Growth of Institutional Investors in U.S.
Capital Markets 12-14 (Columbia University School of Law Institutional Investor Project
Working Paper, Nov. 1988)(42.7 percent); L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 164, at 58 (45
percent). The overall average institutional stockholding for all industries reported as of
June 30, 1986 was 40.2%; it was 39.1% as of December 31, 1985, and 35.9% one year
earlier. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION. THE EFFECTS OF POISON PILLS ON THE WEALTH OF TARGET SHAREHOLDERS 37 (Oct.
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Stock Exchange was probably eighty percent institutional, 460 with
a somewhat smaller percentage of institutional trading in the
American Stock Exchange and the OTC Market.46 4 These institu-
tional holdings are in the largest public companies.465 The data
through the third quarter of 1989 indicates that institutional in-
vestment continues to play an important role in the public
markets. 466
Since institutional investors use many market-based trading
strategies, the value of liquidity in maintaining diversification and
trading value is significant to them. Institutional portfolios exhibit
a high turnover rate.467 Since these investors make up a large per-
23, 1986)[hereinafter POISON PILLS]. Institutional investors include insurance companies,
pension funds, and bank managed trust accounts. These investors "concentrate their invest-
ments in the larger capitalization companies that offer better liquidity." L. LOWENSTEIN,
supra note 164, at 58. Use of the poison pill affects such large institutional shareholders.
The College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) objected to International Paper Com-
pany's poison pill strategy because so many firms have poison pills that CREF could not
register disapproval by selling its stock and investing elsewhere. L. LOWENSTEIN, supra
note 164, at 197. Institutional investors with over $100 million of equity under their man-
agement have increased their holdings of over-the-counter stocks from 5.5% in 1979 to
8.4% in 1985, with no change in Amex holdings and a decline in NYSE holdings from
93.2% to 90.3%. See M. Blume & I. Friend, Recent and Prospective Trends in Institu-
tional Ownership and Trading of Exchange and OTC Stocks 1-2 (Rodney L. White Center
for Financial Research of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania Working
Paper, 1986)(using data from Form 13F filings and Telstat quarterly daily pricing files,
with Telstat database limited to a total of 4,881 companies which were all the NYSE and
Amex firms and only larger over-the-counter companies excluding those with very limited
trading or small market values).
463. In 1988, eighty percent of the trading on the New York Stock Exchange was
done by institutions and members of the NYSE, while only eighteen percent was done by
individuals. SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, INVESTOR ACTIVITY REPORT 6-7 (Feb.
17, 1989) (extrapolating from data). Most acknowledge that exchange trading is becoming
"increasingly institutional." L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 164, at 57-63.
464. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASS'N, INVESTOR ACTIVITY REPORT, Summary
Sheet 7 (Feb. 17, 1989) (data reveals institutional over-the-counter share activity of 21.4%
in May-Dec. 1985, 19.3% in 1986, 19.2% in 1987, and 19.7% in 1988).
465. Liquidity concerns were the most common reason for not investing in firms with
a capitalization of less than $50 million (cited by 85% of the largest institutions and 100%
of the smaller institutions surveyed). M. Blume & I. Friend, supra note 462, at 7. Valua-
tion and ERISA concerns were also cited. Id. A high proportion of respondents cited risk-
reward payoffs for all exchange and NASDAQ markets, with a higher percentage finding
changes in growth significant. Id. at 9-10. Liquidity concerns were the dominant reason for
market preferences, id. at 10-11, and the smaller institutions with under $100 million in
common stock cited pricing and valuation second.
466. See Bartlett, Big Funds Pressing for Voice in Management of Companies, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 23, 1990, Al, col. 1.
467. The turnover rate of institutional portfolios, the annual rate at which the portfo-
lios are changed, was estimated at 76% in 1981, 103% in 1983, and 150% in 1985. See
House Protection Hearing, supra note 16, prepared statement of A. Somer, Jr., at 5. The
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centage of investment capital, there is a liquidity premium in pric-
ing transactions that are placed in a public market. Institutional
investors also may have legal and clientele imposed liquidity re-
quirements. Some of the liquid holdings percentages can be ex-
plained by the funding obligations of pension funds,46 8 the opera-
tive prudent person rule,469 or by the financial contracts in mutual
fund and investment advisory accounts that specify limitations on
the amount of illiquid assets.4 70
Under a variety of trading strategies, investors seek to par-
ticipate in both speculation and earnings,47' to identify underval-
ued firms using fundamental analysis, to satisfy preferences for
liquidity relative to yield, and to engage in financial arbitrage
strategies. 472 To the extent that liquidity plays a role in determin-
ownership turnover rate for exchange-traded companies was 80% in 1988, and turnover of
exchange-traded and NASDAQ companies was 100 % in 1988. See id., prepared statement
of Louis Lowenstein, at 5.
468. See Pension Fund Hearing, supra note 16, prepared statement of David P.
Feldman. For a discussion of the proper mix between equity and debt, compare Ambacht-
sheer, Pension Fund Asset Allocation: In Defense of a 60/40 Equity/Debt Asset Mix, FIN.
ANALYST J., Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 14 (minimizing risk over the long-term calls for 40% to
70% investment in equities) with Leibowitz, The Dedicated Bond Portfolio in Pension
Funds - Part I: Motivations and Basics, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 68 (dedi-
cated bond portfolios allow corporate pension fund to take advantage of favorable fixed
income markets) and Leibowitz, The Dedicated Bond Portfolio in Pension Funds - Part
II: Immunization, Horizon Matching and Contingent Procedures, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.-
Apr. 1986, at 47. Consistent with the going concern mix is the fact that in pension funds
had total assets of $1,004.5 billion, with equity holdings of $432.5 billion and bond hold-
ings of $210.7 billion. See Koppelman, supra note 337, at 1183 n.154.
469. The ERISA standards, for instance, are expressed not as a strict percentage but
rather as a fiduciary responsibility and prudent investment requirement. See 29 U.S.C.A. §
1104(a)(1985). For discussion of the ERISA prudent person rule, see Pension Fund Hear-
ing, supra note 16, prepared statement of David P. Feldman, at 5-6 (stating "[t]his is a
higher standard than other corporate/security laws, which only require that there be no
negligence or gross negligence"). For a view that the prudent person rules should be rewrit-
ten with a "portfolio standard" to allow longer-term investment horizons for pension funds,
see Pension Fund Hearing, supra note 16, at 17-19 (prepared statement of Ira M.
Milstein).
470. The liquidity premium will change if investment funds are able to change their
contractual covenants. Private investment advisory accounts contain their own restrictions
on illiquid investments. Presumably, changes in these contractual terms are motivated by
the liquidity concerns of the capital providers. Public funds, however, are restricted by
statute. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-12 (West 1981 & Supp.
1989)(illiquid investments may not exceed 10%).
471. For an application of this dichotomy, see Gabaldon, Disclosure of Preliminary
Merger Negotiations as an Imperfect Paradigm of Rule lob-5 Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1218, 1235-38 (1987).
472. Numerous trading strategies are available. They include: (1) using price expec-
tations based on historical patterns; (2) using the efficient market hypothesis so that ran-
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ing yield, the liquid versus illiquid investment (generally public
versus private)473 increases the value to the firm since firms are
presumed to use the least costly financing option. The cost of capi-
tal is determined, in part, by the risk factors that attach to capi-
tal. Moreover, it is likely that only a portion of the tax benefit in
equities is capitalized, since equities are held by taxpayers in all
brackets and since "no fully taxable or fully tax exempt alterna-
tive to stock ...provides similar investment opportunities. 47 4
The stock market "act of magic" - transforming short term sav-
ings into long term social investment - creates value through
liquidity.4 75
dom-walk model best explains and predicts price behavior; (3) using single or multiple
index models to rid the portfolio of diversifiable risk; (4) using the capital asset pricing/
security market line model so that security selection is made on the basis of required re-
turns which, in turn, are determined by the security's beta together with risk premiums
available in the market generally; (5) using the arbitrage pricing theory and its theorems
from linear algebra to analyze the common, plus idiosyncratic, factors, so that the latter
can be diversified away and the impact of the common factors can be estimated; (6) using
parity models so that price behavior can be analyzed in terms of variation in premiums
over conversion or exercise; (7) using options or contingent claims models; (8) using the
Time-State-Preference Approach, and its ability to analyze investors' desire for present
consumption of their money in light of possible future returns; (9) using financial futures
pricing and its focus on the spread between spot and future prices; and (10) using funda-
mental value analysis and its focus on the worth of the business enterprise. For a descrip-
tion of these various approaches, see F. RENWICK, THE SEARCH FOR BUSINESS CAPITAL
VALUE: A SUMMARY OF FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY ANALYSIS 1-4 (Salomon Brothers Center
for the Study of Financial Institutions Working Paper No. 466, May 1988).
, 473. For the view that illiquidity provides both a higher cost of capital to the firm
and an additional risk to the investor, see Hicks, The Concept of Transaction as a Re-
straint on Resale Limitations, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 417, 420-21 & nn.21-28 (1988).
474. Koppelman, supra note 337, at 1183.
475. The stock market transforms the short-term loan perspective of an individual
saver into a long-term commitment when liquidity is present. It has been noted by Profes-
sor Baumol who writes:
[T]he market performs an act of magic, for it permits long-term investments to
be financed with funds provided by individuals, many of whom wish to make
them available for only a very limited period, or who wish to be able to withdraw
them at will. Thus it imparts a measure of liquidity to long-term investments
that permits their instruments to be sold at a price that yields a lower rate of
return than would otherwise be required.
W. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 3 (1965); see also F.
MACHLUP, THE STOCK MARKET, CREDIT AND CAPITAL FORMATION 225 (1940)(When
desires of short-term investors are made through the stock exchange, there are special ad-
vantages, "for in this case the transformation of what are short-term credits from the pri-
vate viewpoint into long-term savings from the social viewpoint can take place to the fullest
extent."). The stock market as an instrument for fund raising by companies, is being recog-
nized even in socialist economies where the view has espoused is that "publicly held" com-
panies are simply another form of socialist public ownership. See Kristof, Stock Markets'
Role Grows in Chinese Economy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1989, § D10, col. 3. As stated by
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Since liquidity has value, investors are willing to accept a
lower return for more liquid shares. As a result, the firm's cost of
capital is lowered but at the price of the going public decision.478
The combination of liquidity and an open market for corporate
ownership allows shareholders to have an investment timetable in-
dependent of the investment decisions of firm managers. However,
this shareholder autonomy has other negative consequences.
Modern corporations depend on the commitment of capital to
such long-lived investments as plant, equipment, and oil explora-
tion .... [The stock market] enables investors to rely on the
trading market for the liquidity they need, even while the man-
agers invest and reinvest capital and earnings according to the
quite different timetable of the business. The terrible dilemma of
takeovers, at least at the abundant rate we have been witnessing,
is that they give to shareholders - the equity investors whose
dollars were thought to have been the most firmly committed at
the business level - a license to disinvest collectively as well as
individually.4"
The extreme benefit of liquidity, Lawrence Summers and Victoria
Summers argue, produces short term private gain arguably at the
cost of long term efficiency.47 8
Louis Lowenstein:
A share of stock is nothing more than a share in a business, the equity
capital that has been committed to the venture more or less permanently. The
shareholders have liquidity so that any of them, but not all of them collectively,
might sell off their shares in the stock market. Collectively their capital has been
turned into bricks arrd mortar.
L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 164, at 155.
Whether she is a Lowenstein "strong box" investor holding stocks for the long term,
the manager of a fully diversified portfolio or market index fund, or a Coffee underdiversi-
fled firm manager, liquidity has value to her in part because she is probably not diversified
efficiently. See id. at 65 (manager should own Ford or GM but not both); M. KING & J.
LEAPE, WEALTH AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION: THEORY AND EyIDENCE (National Bureau
of Economic Research Working Paper No. 1468, 1985); Cox, Reflections on Ex Ante
Compensation and Diversification of Risk and Fairness Justifications for Limiting Fiduci-
ary Obligations of Corporate Officers, Directors, and Controlling Shareholders, 60 TEM-
PLE L.Q. 47, 64 & n.65 (1987).
476. Note, however, that the firm bears some costs when it offers liquidity. See infra
note 503; see also Groth & Dubosfsky, The Liquidity Factor, in THE NASDAQ HAND-
BOOK 361 (1987)(the price of liquidity translates into a higher cost of capital for security-
issuing firms).
477. L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 164, at 220 (emphasis in original).
478. Lawrence Summers and Victoria Summers have transformed the fact of ex-
treme liquidity into an argument that the existing market is an inefficient allocator of fi-
nancial resources. See L. Summers & V. Summers, supra note 75. Liquidity may not make
better markets if it causes buyers to think in terms of short-term appreciation and trading
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Market microstructure finance research has come of age4 "9
and has branched from models of market-making4 80 to those of
understanding liquidity and its measurement by focusing on the
sale of liquidity in pricing returns.48' The market segmentation
concept of liquidity is different from the liquidity preference the-
ory for term bond structure.4 82 Liquidity preferences other than
instead of continued and substantial earnings. This would make the market into a barome-
ter of investment opportunities instead of a barometer of underlying worth. Id. See also H.
HILL, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES FOR THE AUTONOMOUS CORPORATE ENTITY 35 (1988)(the
liquidity created by the formal stock exchanges has been a significant factor in turning
share ownership from participation to speculation).
479. See Discussion, 43 J. FIN. 634, 634 (1988)(statement of David K. Whit-
comb)(stating that Miller & Grossman, Liquidity and Market Structure, infra note 481,
"represents a coming of age for market microstructure").
480. There are three general models of market-making. They examine: (I) the pric-
ing and inventory behavior of risk-adverse dealers, see, e.g., Stoll, The Supply of Dealer
Services in Securities Markets, 33 J. FIN. 1133, 1133 (1978); (2) risk-neutral dealers
charging traders for losses whenever traders possess superior information and their activi-
ties are camouflaged by "noise traders," see, e.g., Bagehot, The Only Game in Town, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 1971, at 12, 13; and (3) the price of liquidity services as a natural
property of markets, see, e.g., Cohen, Maier, Schwartz & Whitcomb, Transaction Costs,
Order Placement Strategy, and Existence of the Bid-Ask Spread, 89 J. POL. ECON. 287
(1981). Other studies are cited in Discussion, supra note 375, at 634, 636-37.
481. See generally Miller & Grossman, Liquidity and Market Structure, 43 J. FIN.
617 (1988)(presenting a simple model of market structure that conveys the essence of mar-
ket liquidity); Discussion, supra note 479, at 636 (statement of David K. Whitcomb)("It is
time the big guns of finance were brought to bear on the question of liquidity and on the
implications of the demand for liquidity on the relevance of the way we conventionally
measure returns.").
482. Liquidity preference theory (liquidity premium theory) explains the existence of
liquidity premiums for bonds that are in fact riskless. See R. HAUGEN, supra note 454, at
295-98; E. ELTON & M. GRUBER, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND INVESTMENT ANALY-
sis 462-64 (3d ed. 1987). Liquidity preference theory proceeds on the assumption that the
market does not regard a long-term bond as a perfect substitute for a short-term bond. For
simplicity, consider bonds with no risk of default, such as Treasury bonds. The rate of
return on a short-term bond is relatively certain, but a risk premium attaches to a longer
term bond, since interest rates will generally fluctuate more over the life of the longer term
bond. There is a greater risk of a capital loss if the long-term bond is sold before maturity
than if the short-term bond is. Liquidity preference theory postulates that investors will
demand an additional return, a liquidity premium to bear that risk. The yield curve on
interest rates, either upward sloping over time or downward sloping, are influenced by
other factors such as market expectations, but the final yield curve will result from an
interaction between expectations and liquidity preference. See E. ELTON & M. GRUBER,
supra note 482, at 463-64. Thus, other factors may invert the yield curve, with shorter
maturities having a higher interest rate as recently occurred. Term structure of interest
could also be used in the measurement of economic income. See Bankman & Klein, Accu-
rate Taxation of Long-Term Debt: Taking into Account the Term Structure of Interest,
44 TAX L. REV. 335 (1989).
Nonetheless, there appears to be little empirical evidence of additional liquidity premi-
ums after eight to ten months where the expected rates of return reach a peak. See gener-
1988-89] CORPORATE TAX 1109
the preference for term bond structure may influence the yield of
high yield debt securities in the current market as initial high
yield prices reflect both the equity characteristics of these securi-
ties and the illiquidity of the market and prices are highly respon-
sive to a lack of market liquidity.4 " The absolute value of liquid-
ity, in the view of the economists, is not just a preference for
money but a preference for liquid assets.4 84 There is presently no
liquid asset that has the same return characteristics as common
stock. Financial economists Amihud and Mendelson reviewed the
ally Fama, Term Premiums and Bond Returns, 13 J. FIN. EcON. 529 (1984)(examining
expected returns on U.S. Treasury bills and U.S. government bond portfolios). This is ex-
plained by the fact that, while liquidity premiums that increase in size with the term to
maturity are generally presumed, the presence in the market place of different investors
and different instruments offering different time periods allows liquidity premiums to be
effectively negated. Therefore, all investors need not have short-term horizons. See R. HAU-
GEN, supra note 454, at 298. Investment vehicles, such as asset-backed securities, allow
these preferences to be satisfied. See Asset Finance Group First Boston Corp., Overview of
Assets and Structures, in THE AssET SECURITIZATION HANDBOOK 21, 21-59 (P. Zweig ed.
1989). Whether long-term bonds have a higher variance, and whether investors regard this
as desirable or undesirable, is also open to question.
In contrast to liquidity preference theory, market segmentation theory presumes that
all players within the market seek to divide the market into submarkets on the basis of
maturity, that investors in each market are unwilling to venture into other markets, and
that liquidity preference has nothing to do with term structure. See R. HAUGEN, supra note
454, at 299-301; see also E. ELTON & M. GRUBER, supra, at 459-60 (market segmentation
theory is popular with practitioners).
483. High yield bonds present a mixture of debt and equity financial characteristics.
See infra notes 1007-08. The continued positive return spreads in excess of the default
losses, whether measured as default or mortality losses, have several explanations including
one pointing at market inefficiency in pricing high yield debt. See Altman, Mortality,
supra note 170, at 920-21. Another explanation is that if liquidity risk is important in price
determination and if it increases with lower bond rating, id., illiquidity for high yield bonds
may more closely mirror illiquidity effects for equity. Even the investment grade bond mar-
ket has an illiquidity premium which reflects their lack of marketability compared to Trea-
sury bonds of similar duration, and the increased interest rate has been explained on the
basis of liquidity. See Fisher, Determinants of Risk Premiums on Corporate Bonds, 67 J.
POL ECON. 212 (1959). The illiquidity of the high yield market was always there, but with
the demise of Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. the promised liquidity of high yield debt
relative to investment grade debt has declined substantially from parity on January 1, 1989
until just 90 percent of high grade bonds as of February 14, 1990. See The End of Drexel,
Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1990, at A6, col. 3. Lower grade high yield debt experienced even
greater declines. See Wallace, supra note 171 (C-rated high yield debt in January 1990
was at 82 percent of the January 1989 value). This may also reflect the highly publicized
defaults of Integrated Resources Inc. and Campeau Corporation. The high yield market
was based on a promise of liquidity, which some observers now characterize as "illusory."
See Lowenstein, supra note 190, at A6, col. 3.
484. Chang, Hamberg & Hirata, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward Risk Is
a Demand for Short-Term Securities - Not Money, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 420, 421
(1983)(liquidity preference includes demand for short-term money market instruments).
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benefits and costs of increased liquidity noting that increased trad-
ing costs decrease the value of securities. Using this insight, they
predicted that "the greater the liquidity of an asset, the greater its
value. 485 Firm size is also a factor, since the benefits of increased
liquidity are proportional to the initial value of the firm.4 86
Illiquidity in the public market is generally measured by the
bid-ask spread.487 Amihud and Mendelson have provided the only
study to date that tests the relationship of risk and illiquidity to
actual returns using a methodology that controls for systematic
485. Amihud & Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN. ECON.
223, 224 (1986) [hereinafter Amihud & Mendelson, Bid-Ask]. Because "[i]nvestors require
a higher expected return from an asset with lower liquidity to compensate for its higher
trading costs[,] firms have an incentive to carry out policies which increase the liquidity of
the financial claims they issue, since this may lower the required return on these claims and
increase their value." Amihud & Mendelson, Liquidity and Asset Prices: Financial Man-
agement Implications, FIN. MGMT., Spring 1988, at 5, 6 [hereinafter Amihud & Mendel-
son, Liquidity]. They also argue that a change in liquidity has a greater effect on the cost
of capital when liquidity is high rather than when it is low, because the initial expectation
of investors in less liquid assets is for long-term appreciation, which places little value on
liquidity. The Amihud and Mendelson approach is secondary market based rather than
fundamental valuation based. Liquidity is of value, although not directly perceived as valu-
able by fundamental value investors. Firms that trade in a market will have an increased
cost of capital because of liquidity risk. This view of the relative value of liquidity has
implications for a liquidity based test if the residual claimants in leveraged buyouts view
liquidity as an unnecessary component for portfolio diversification. See supra note 173 and
infra .note 520.
486. Amihud & Mendelson, Liquidity, supra note 484, at 7.
487. The bid-ask spread is simply the difference between the price bid and the price
asked. Y. AMIHUD, T. Ho & R. SCHWARTZ, MARKET MAKING AND THE CHANGING
STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 53 (1985). Amihud & Mendelson, Bid-Ask,
supra note 484, at 223-24 (illiquidity is measured by the cost of immediate execution, the
spread between the selling concession, the lower bid price, and the buying premium, the
higher ask price). The bid-ask spread has been approached in terms of a transaction cost to
the trader for immediacy, see Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33, 35-37
(1968), including dealer inventory costs, see, e.g., Ho & Stoll, On Dealer Markets Under
Competition, 35 J. FIN. 259 (1980), and as a tradeoff between expected losses to informed
traders and expected gains to uninformed traders. See, e.g., Bagehot, supra note 480, at
13-14, 22. Another measure of liquidity is the change in the bid price over time. S. GROSS-
MAN & M. MILLER, LIQUIDITY AND MARKET STRUCTURE 21-22 (National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research Working Paper No. 2641, 1988).
Keynes once observed that while most of us could surely agree that Queen
Victoria was a happier woman, but a less successful monarch than Queen Eliza-
beth I, we would be hard put to restate that notion in precise mathematical
terms. Keynes' observation could apply with equal force to the notion of market
liquidity. The T-bond Futures pit at the Chicago Board of Trade is surely more
liquid than the local market for residential housing. But how much more? What
is the decisive difference between them? Is the colorful open-outcry format of
the T-bond Futures market the source of its great liquidity? Or does the causa-
tion run the other way?
Id. at 2.
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risk in order to isolate the role of liquidity. They tested a model
against empirical data and demonstrated that the greater the risk
and the illiquidity, the greater the return; with the risk-return ra-
tio varying over time. 8 8 The Amihud and Mendelson model dem-
onstrates that firms with a low liquidity risk have a lower cost of
capital than firms with a higher liquidity risk. Other models find a
relationship between a perceived fundamental risk and the exis-
tence of a liquidity premium for assets, with decreases in funda-
mental risk decreasing the demand for liquidity. 89 Financial econ-
omists are also concerned with the reasons for illiquidity and its
financial costs.4 90
Other evidence exists as to the value of liquid as compared to
illiquid assets. Venture capital returns from seed, start-up, first-
stage, second-stage, and mezzanine financings prior to a successful
initial public offering reveal an ever increasing return to the ear-
lier capital providers. 9' A body of literature has used a variety of
488. Amihud & Mendelson, Bid-Ask, supra note 484. The model suggests and the
data confirms that the average portfolio risk-adjusted returns increase with the bid-ask
spread and there is a clientele effect where investors with longer holding periods select
assets with higher spreads, but with a concave relationship whereby the returns on the
higher spread stocks are less spread sensitive. Id. at 224-25.
489. See Corcoran, The Anatomy of Buyout Fever, INVESTMENT MGMT. REV., Jan.
1989, at 7. Corcoran postulates that the increase in perceptions of fundamental risk will
increase the demand for indirect ownership of assets through which the assets are securi-
tized and thus have liquidity. Id. at 7-8. He tests that proposition against the demand for
securitized asset ownership in the form of REITs and then correlates the empirical testing
of his model with the securitized assets to the general trend in mergers and acquisitions.
He concludes that mergers and venture capital allocations are also correlated to fundamen-
tal risk perceptions and will increase when risk (and the transaction costs of such invest-
ments) declines. Id. at 12-14. Cf. Copeland & Galai, Information Effects on the Bid-Ask
Spread, 38 J. FIN. 1457, 1468 (1983)(bid-ask spread has a positive correlation with the
security's price level, price volitility, and residual risk).
490. See, e.g., Gloston & Harris, Estimating the Components of the Bid/Ask
Spread, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 123 (1988)(model of the bid/ask spread based on the following
components: information assymetry, inventory cost, monopoly power of specialists, and
clearing costs).
491. See E. BLOCH, supra note 417, at 208-10. Investor-oriented approaches to in-
vestment in private companies also show an increasing concern for the illiquidity premium.
See A. LIPPER, VENTURE'S FINANCING AND INVESTING IN PRIVATE COMPANIES 144-49
(rev. ed. 1988)("The only point to be certain of is that the returns anticipated from the
illiquid investment must far exceed those available from marketable securities.").
There is anecdotal evidence that an investor would require a projected investment re-
turn of the private company of three to five times higher before considering the private
company a suitable substitute investment for the lack of liquidity of the investment. See A.
LIPPER, supra, at 3, 7 (survey of professionals who caution that "sacrifice of liquidity is a
serious consideration"). This anecdotal evidence may be incorrect since the returns to ven-
ture capital investors now do not approach this target return, see infra note 499, and the
1112 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:965
methods to examine the effect of lack of marketability on stock
valuation, including comparing the prices of restricted stock ("let-
ter stock") to a public company's freely tradable stock, comparing
the returns to investors in private transactions prior to public of-
ferings, and by reviewing court decisions attempting to value
closely held interests for wealth transfer and income tax pur-
poses.4 92 The study of discounts of letter stock began with the
1971 Securities and Exchange Commission Institutional Investor
Study Report49 3 which led to the requirement that institutional
investors report their restricted securities and created a body of
data for further study.494 While the earlier studies found a higher
discount, especially for letter stock of over-the-counter companies,
the average and median discount reported in most studies was ap-
proximately thirty-five percent.495 Generally, lower average dis-
counts were found for the letter stock of NYSE and Amex compa-
evaluation of the investment as a single investment may be inappropriate given the portfo-
lio nature of venture capital investment.
492. These studies are collected and summarized in S. PRATT, VALUING A BUSINESS:
THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 238-62 (2d ed. 1989).
While the value of traded stock is taken into consideration for estate tax valuation, Rev.
Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, discounts for lack of marketability are common. See Koffler
v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 159 (1978)(value of stock transferred by gift dis-
counted, partly because stock not publicly traded); Miller v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M.
(CCH) 39 (1977)(future market value of stock in closely held corporation discounted due
to lack of marketability and dividends of minority interests); Gallum v. Commissioner, 33
T.C.M. (CCH) 284 (1974)(proper discount applied to net asset value determined, in part,
on lack of marketability).
493. Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Comm'n,
H.R. Doc. 92-64, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., pt 5, at 2323, 2444-56 (1971)[hereinafter Institu-
tional Investor Study Report).
494. S. PRATT, supra note 492, at 241-43.
495. Id. at 246-47 (Standard Research Consultants' studies reveal a median discount
of 45 percent and the study of the author's company, Willamette Management Associates,
Inc., found a 31.2 percent median discount for 33 letter stock transactions compared to
freely traded stock). See also Institutional Investor Study Report, supra note 493, at 2444-
56 (in the over-the-counter market, the average discount depending upon purchaser group
(banks, investment advisors, life insurance companies, venture capital companies, and other
institutions) ranged from 16.1 percent to 39.4 percent for reporting companies and 22.4
percent to 45.7 percent for non-reporting companies); Gelman, An Economist-Financial
Analyst's Approach to Valuing Stock of a Closely-Held Company, 36 J. TAX'N 353, 354
(1972)(found average and median discounts of 33 percent); Trout, Estimation of the Dis-
count Associated with the Transfer of Restricted Securities, 55 TAXES 381, 383
(1977)(found average discount of 33.45 percent); Moroney, Most Courts Overvalue
Closely Held Stock, 51 TAXES 144, 154 (1973)(found median discount of 35 percent);
Maher, Discounts for Lack of Marketability for Closely Held Business Interests, 54
TAXES 562, 564 (1976)(results indicate that discount should be around 35 percent). For a
summary of the above studies, see S. PRATT, supra note 492, at 241-48.
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nies depending upon the purchaser.496 Between 1985 and 1986,
data on private transactions taken within five months prior to pub-
lic offerings shows an average and a median discount of forty-
three percent with a range of discounts from three to eighty-five
percent. One study of data from initial public offering prospec-
tuses found a median discount of sixty percent adjusted for
change in industry stock price indexes and a median discount of
41.7 percent based on industry price-earnings ratios.497 Arguably
these studies do not control for risk in determining the source of
the discount in order to distinguish risk from liquidity, although
the comparison generally was to the value of the company's com-
parable liquid stock and the discounts may reflect incentives to
undervalue stock in certain transactions.49 As the venture capital
industry has expanded, the amount of discounts for private com-
panies relative to public market prices has been decreasing.4 99
Nonetheless, there is both theoretical and empirical support for
the relationship of liquidity to returns, the firmls cost of capital,
496. Institutional Investor Study Report, supra note 493, at 2455-56 (Table XIV-
52). For example, for the NYSE, the report finds a discount of 18.7 percent for bank
purchases, 21.6 percent for investment advisor purchases, 19.9 percent for life insurance
company purchases, 32.5 percent for venture capital purchases, and 9.2 percent for other
institutions. Id. at 2456 (Table XIV). Discounts on the Amex were 22.5 percent for bank
purchases, 25.4 percent for investment advisor purchases, 23.7 percent for life insurance
company purchases, 36.3 percent for venture capital purchases, and 13 percent for other
purchases. Id.
497. S. PRATT, supra note 492, at 250-57 (citing Willamette Management Study).
498. See supra note 496.
499. Observations from the venture capital industry support an annual rate of return
to bridge capital providers in the last tranche of venture capital financing for high technol-
ogy companies from 15 percent to 30 percent. Telephone interview with Timothy Spicer,
Chief Financial Officer, Hambrecht & Quist Co. (May 26, 1989). This correlates with
statistics showing lower returns to venture capital generally. See Chiampou & Kallet,
Risk/Return Profile of Venture Capital, 4 J. Bus. VENTURING 1, 2 (1989). Statistics not
isolated to technology firms and other start-up industries might be lower since they may
include savings and loan conversions. Telephone interview with Timothy Spicer, supra.
There may be an "illiquidity premium" in the current market for several reasons. First, the
public companies on a price-earnings ratio are undervalued relative to their business due in
part to the large amount of venture capital funding of technology firms in 1982 and 1983.
Id. Second, increased participation by investment banking firms in the venture capital in-
dustry, particularly mezzanine financing, has raised the values for private firms based on
increased information on the industry and increased competition to provide capital to suc-
cessful and potentially successful firms. Id. For the relationship of these developments to
the issue of the inelasticity of demand for liquidity, see infra notes 754-76 and accompany-
ing text. Other factors presumably could lead to an illiquidity premium. There are less
established accounting standards for the valuation of venture capital portfolios, which may
lead to agency costs if management compensation is based on the value of the portfolio.
Portfolios may demonstrate a pricing effect that reflects a reluctance to lower values.
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and the benefit of the public market.
The fact that investors can reduce their risk in any particular
asset by holding a diversified portfolio at a given individual level
of risk preference 500 does not mean investors can avoid the costs of
illiquidity, since those costs are borne on the purchase or sale of
the security. The only remedy is to alleviate the costs of illiquidity
through the financial policies of the firm.501 Liquidity-enhancing
policies that increase the value of the firm by reducing its costs of
capital include many costs of their own - the initial costs of the
public offering and recurring costs such as agency costs and share-
holder servicing costs50 2 - all of which will be undertaken only if
the costs of increasing liquidity are less than the gains. 503
Portfolio theory suggests that diversification with highly illi-
quid assets is possible, although necessarily more costly. Nonethe-
less, as James Tobin demonstrates,0 4 continuously maintaining a
500. See supra note 484 and accompanying text (Amihud and Mendelson methodol-
ogy). Risk preferences determine the mix of the risk level of assets that will be held by an
investor under her particular utility function. See E. ELTON & M. GRUBER, supra note 482,
at 179-21.
501. Amihud & Mendelson, Liquidity, supra note 484, at 7. Liquidity enhancing
factors include: public offerings, organizational form, limited liability, corporate borrowing,
disclosure of inside information, and certification of a new issue. Securitization of assets
allows relatively illiquid portfolios of assets to gain liquidity, lowers interest costs for bor-
rowers, and diversifies credit risks and neutralizes interest rate risks for lenders, while al-
lowing investors to increase the volume and variety of investment options. Bryan, Introduc-
tion, in THE ASSET SECURITIZATION HANDBOOK 3-20 (P. Zweig ed. 1989); Asset Finance
Group First Boston Corporation, Overview of Assets and Structures, in THE ASSET
SECURITIZATION HANDBOOK 21, 25-26, 32-33 (P. Zweig ed. 1989).
502. See DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Rice, Going Private" Minority Freeze-outs and
Stockholder Wealth, 27 J.L. & ECON. 367, 372 (1984)(citing examples of actual costs to
companies that have gone public).
503. Id. at 371-74; see also Ritter, The Cost of Going Public, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 269
(1987)(presenting evidence of direct and underwriting expenses as cost of going public).
The value of public trading is comprised of: (1) access to capital without interest payments
and without complying with bank liquidity rules; (2) name recognition; (3) exit perogatives
for a controlling shareholder who wants to cash out and retire; (4) availability of stock
options and incentives which can be used to attract highly qualified personnel; and (5)
dilution of the ownership of the founders while giving them majority interest and control.
See Nelson, Are You Ready to Take Your Company Public?, ENTREPRENEUR, Feb. 1988,
at 63, 63-64. Realities, however, do not measure up to expectations in all cases. The disad-
vantages include: (1) increased reporting and filing requirements; (2) liability of manage-
ment for conduct, decisions, and failure to disclose certain information; and (3) lessening of
flexibility to manage the business, especially in actions that require shareholder approval.
Id.
504. The theory of a changing portfolio and the implicit importance of liquidity in
maintaining this changing portfolio is set out in Tobin, The Theory of Portfolio Selection,
in THE THEORY OF INTEREST RATES 3 (F. Hahn & F. Breachling eds. 1965). See also
Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk, 25 REv. ECON. STUD. 65 (1958)
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diversified portfolio generally requires not only liquidity but also
monitoring." 5 Evidence of the demand for liquid financial assets
with high returns506 and the value of those assets,50 7 suggests that
there is a demand for such assets that is price inelastic to the ac-
tual return of those assets.50 8 If so, taxing liquid equity under a
double tax system is good tax policy. 509
In October of 1988, the Securities Exchange Commission
proposed adding Rule 144A to the Securities Act of 1933.510 The
rationale for the proposed rule is based upon both the internation-
alization of the world's securities markets and the growth in the
private placement market. 511 If adopted, this rule would allow im-
[hereinafter Tobin, Liquidity].
505. Tobin, Liquidity, supra note 504.
506. See infra note 762.
507. See infra note 770.
508. See infra notes 765-70.
509. See infra notes 752-75.
510. Resale of Restricted Securities: Changes to Method of Determining Holding
Period of Restricted Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 6806,
53 Fed. Reg. 33,147, reprinted in [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
84,335 (1988).
511. According to S.E.C. Chairman David S. Ruder, these dual events necessitate
Rule 144A:
Development of Rule 144A has been compelled not only by international-
ization of the securities markets, but also by the tremendous growth of the pri-
vate placement market. In 1981, $18 billion worth of securities were privately
placed in the United States. In 1987, such placements totalled approximately
$139 billion. In 1988, approximately $202 billion were raised in this private
placement market, representing approximately 43 percent of total corporate fi-
nancing in the United States that year.
Rule 144A is intended to provided a framework in which qualifying institu-
tional resales can be freely undertaken. This rule, as well as the resale safe har-
bor provisions of proposed Regulation S, should provide increased liquidity in the
secondary market for privately placed securities. The potential increase in liquid-
ity could significantly lower the discount commonly associated with private
placements, which could in turn attract an increasing number of issuers, includ-
ing foreign issuers, into the private placement market.
Foreign issuers that previously may have been concerned about compliance
costs and liability exposure associated with registered public offerings in the
United States or that may have been concerned about the financing costs inher-
ent in placing restricted securities may find U.S. private placements more finan-
cially attractive under Rule 144A. Direct participation by foreign issuers in the
U.S. capital markets would reduce the costs born by U.S. institutional investors
by enabling them to invest in a diversified worldwide portfolio without leaving
the U.S. securities markets.
Hearing before the Senate Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (June 15, 1989)(prepared statement of
David S. Ruder, at 24-26 (footnotes omitted)). At the same time, Chairman Ruder ex-
plained that the Commission is continuing to examine questions as to the application of
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mediate resale 12 of securities issued in private placements to insti-
tutional investors, creating instant trading liquidity in the private
placement market.513 Testimony on proposed Rule 144A suggests
that institutional investors would not invest in private placements
of equity securities even if Rule 144A were adopted, unless there
was a price discount reflecting the absence of the liquidity found
in a public market.5 1 4 In addition, the Commission asked for com-
ments on the value of liquidity in lowering the cost of both debt
and equity. It received only the most general statements that Rule
United States registration requirements to overseas securities offerings in connection with
Proposed Regulation S, Securities Act Release No. 6779, 53 Fed. Reg. 22661 (1988)(offers
and sales in the U.S. should be subject to United States securities laws registration require-
ment even if purchasers are foreign, but sales and offers outside of the United States do not
affect the United States securities markets and therefore should not be subject to registra-
tion). Id. at 23-24.
512. For limitations on resale, see Hicks, supra note 473, at 432-33; Analysis of
Regulation D, New SEC Rulings, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
83,631, at 86,886-91 (May 1984)(reporting that Regulation D, which exempts certain pri-
vate and limited offerings from registration requirements, has not replaced private place-
ments to large institutional investors).
513. Securities Act Release No. 6806, supra note 510, at 89, 539-40. The private
placement market has largely consisted of debt securities. This changed in 1987. In that
year, equity securities, mostly preferred stock, totalled $17 billion or 12% of total new
private placements in the U.S. Id. at 89,528. Not surprisingly, the current private place-
ment market is dominated by insurance companies. Other institutional investors only ac-
count for 10% to 20% of the total private placements. This disparity is related to the
contractual and legal requirements of these other institutions. Id. at 89,530. The secondary
market involves almost exclusively debt securities. Id. at 89,532. The proposed adoption of
a rule permitting resales among institutional investors prompted the Commission to request
comment on whether an active, liquid private market would develop alongside the public
market for the same class of securities. Comment also was requested on the consequences
to the liquidity and efficiency of the public market if this dual market should develop,
including arbitrage opportunities between the two markets. Id. at 89,533-34.
The courts have generally taken the view that institutional investors are at least prima
facie sophisticated, see Fletcher, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1154 n.417, but the S.E.C. and some institutional investors
view smaller institutions as being less sophisticated for purposes of Rule 144A. See Com-
ments at S.E.C. Business Roundtable on Rule 144A, cited in Winkler, S.E.C. May Shift
Plan to Boost Private Issues, Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1989, at Cl, col. 3 & at C15, cols. 1-2.
The sophistication of institutional investors even of large size was also questioned. Accord
Letter of the N.Y. Bar Ass'n Securities Regulation Comm. to the S.E.C., dated Mar. 24,
1989, reported in 21 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 455, 456 (Mar. 24, 1989).
514. Compare S.E.C., Roundtable on Proposed Rule 144A (Mar. 14, 1989)(herein-
after "Rule 144A Roundtable")(statement of Curtis Welling, Managing Director of Capi-
tal Markets, First Boston Corp.)(citing lack of liquidity and unattractiveness of private
placements "if publicly-traded stock is available") with (statement of Joseph Grundfest,
Commissioner, S.E.C.)(discounts also lead to cost advantages for side-by-side public and
Rule 144A markets for equity for lesser known companies), reported in 21 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 413, 414 (Mar. 17, 1989).
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144A would increase liquidity and lower the cost of capital.5 15
In July of 1989, the Commission re-proposed Rule 144A, re-
stricting its scope to a single class of institutional investors. The
class is based on a revision of tier one, the "qualified institutional
buyer" tier, of the original proposal. 16 The Commission modified
the definition of a qualified institutional buyer, rejecting a "total
assets" test in favor of an amount "invested in securities" test as a
method of establishing an institution's per se sophistication in the
resale market for privately placed securities."
Additionally, re-proposed Rule 144A excludes the equity and
debt securities 518 of a class that is publicly traded in the United
States on an exchange or an automated inter-dealer quotation sys-
515. Interview with Elisse Walter, Deputy Director, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, Division of Market Regulation (Mar. 15, 1989). The author's perception of the
roundtable discussion of Rule 144A at the S.E.C. on March 15, 1989 which she attended is
that it did not provide any empirical data on the value of liquidity and focused more on the
proposed rule as it would affect debt placements rather than equity. The Comment letters
also did not include a discussion of the empirical value of liquidity. See S.E.C., Summary
of Commentators' Remarks, Proposed Rule 144A, Proposed Amendments to Rules 144 and
145 (May 3, 1989).
516. Resale of Restricted Securities, Securities Act Release No. 6839, 54 Fed. Reg.
30076 (1989), reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,427, at 80,221 & 80,224-27
(July 11, 1989). The comment period ended September 12, 1989.
517. Id. at 80;224-25. The revised proposal defines "qualified institutional buyer" as
an institution that has at least $100 million invested in securities at the close of its most
recent fiscal year. Id. at 80,224. The change in focus from total assets to amount invested
in securities was driven by the commissions' desire to limit the number of troubled banks
and thrifts eligible to participate. See Levin & Maher, SEC's Modified Private Placement
Rule Aimed at Thrifts, Banks, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, July 17, 1989, at 5. The
Commission is still debating whether to lower that threshold in adopting Rule 144A, or
whether to adopt the rule as re-proposed and lower the threshold with an early amendment.
Establishing the threshold for Rule 144A eligibility has been the Commissions's main ob-
stacle in adopting the rule. Id.
518. Prop. Rule 144A(d)(3)(i), (5) (July I1, 1989). A debt limitation on Rule 144A
would heighten the issue of debt-equity classification for securities offerings. Rule 144A
Roundtable, supra note 513, at 414 (statement of Edward Benjamin, Chair, American Bar
Ass'n Federal Regulation of Securities Subcommittee on the 1933 Act - General). For
foreign securities not currently puclicly traded in the United States, to prevent leakage of
unregistered securities into the public markets, the proposed rule provides that if the secur-
ities are securities traded on a foreign exchange or designated organized foreign securities
market and have been quoted within the U.S. inter-dealer quotation system within a twelve
month period, reasonable steps must be taken to prevent the purchaser from reselling the
securities without registration. Reasonable steps are the execution of a written agreement
evidencing a commitment to prevent transfer in conjunction with a procedure administered
by the issuer or a third party that is reasonably designed to prevent the transference of
securities without registration to other than a qualified institutional buyer. See Prop. Rule
144A(d)(5) (July 1, 1989).
1118 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:965
tem. 519 This exclusion would apply to NASDAQ, but would not
encompass the present pink sheet market.520 The Commission lim-
ited the Rule's applicability despite believing that side-by-side
markets for equity securities would not develop for securities that
were already publicly traded, since those equity securities "pre-
sumably would still trade at a discount to the same securities in
the public market," '521 were generally offered in "transactions in-
volving debt securities with an equity component, a leveraged
buyout, a joint venture, or a restructuring . . . , [and] would be
likely to flow into the public market when the holding period re-
quirement of Rule 144 was satisfied." 522 The Commission's exclu-
sion of fungible securities was likely in response to the sharp pock-
etbook reaction of the exchanges and other commentators who
stand to lose business when Rule 144A is adopted. 3  In addition,
519. Prop. Rule 144A(d)(3)(i)-(ii) (July 11, 1989)(excluding securities convertible
within three years into publicly traded securities and securities of an open-end investment
company, unit investment trust, or face-amount certificate company registered under sec-
tion eight of the Investment Company Act); Securities Act Release No. 6839, supra note
516, at 80,233 & n.13.
520. Securities Act Release No. 6839, supra note 516, at 80,233 n.13 & 80,227
n.31.
521. Id. at 80,233.
522. Id. at 80,223 n.12 (quoting Securities Act Release No. 6806). While the
changes in management structure from leveraged buyouts may result in residual claimants
becoming long term investors without liquidity, confirmed in part by a low rate of reverse
leveraged buyouts, Rule 144A will provide liquidity in the third market for the institutional
investors who fund the transactions. This argument was made generally in Jensen, Eclipse,
supra note 173. Jensen argued that institutional investors will seek diversified portfolios of
illiquid "private positions" in firms and will abandon the trading strategy that has long
dominated institutional money management. Id. at 62-63. Jensen's position must assume
that there is no legal restriction on holding illiquid securities, because he was apparently
unaware of proposed Rule 144A. The preference for the privatization of equity is supported
in part by the low number of reverse leveraged buyouts reported in C. Muscarella & M.
Vetsuypens, Efficiency and Organizational Structure: A Study of Reverse LBOs (Southern
Methodist University Working Paper, Apr. 1989)(reporting that only five percent of 1,300
LBOs between 1981 and 1986 have gone public again).
523. See, e.g., Levin, NYSE Still Has Misgivings About SEC Plan for Private
Placements, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, Oct. 2, 1989, at 8, 43. Whether a dual equity
market for identical equity securities, rather than for debt securities, which are by their
nature and by expressed covenants generally not fungible, will decrease the liquidity of the
public equity market and efficiency through going private transactions to avoid the 1934
Act reporting requirements were expressed concerns. See Letter of the New York Stock
Exchange to the S.E.C., dated Feb. 3, 1989, and Letter of Edward O'Brien, President of
the Securities Industry Ass'n to the S.E.C., dated Feb. 16, 1989, reported in 21 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 381, 382 (Mar. 10, 1989). Others expressed concern that the side-by-side
Rule 144A market would result in the further institutionalization of the securities markets
and perceptions of removing small investors from the markets. Rule 144A Roundtable,
supra note 513, at 414 (statements of Edward I. O'Brien, President, Securities Industry
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the Commission indicated that it would consider whether the se-
curities acquired within the Rule 144A exemption should be con-
sidered illiquid for purposes of the investment advisory account
limitations on holdings of illiquid securities.524 In effect, the move
toward privatization of equity will create a significant category of
corporations subject to the corporate tax under theory proposed in
this Article - institutional investors will replace the general pub-
lic entirely and will enjoy liquidity through the Rule 144A
market.
If Rule 144A is adopted for equity as well as debt issues,
there will be a golden opportunity to empirically test liquidity
preferences by comparing the returns for private placements
before and after the adoption of the rule. The value of any result-
ing liquidity premium for equities (as contrasted with the risk pre-
mium for equity over debt525 and the ambiguous liquidity pre-
mium for high yield debt)526 which has been exacerbated by
current market conditions can then be quantified. 27 For example,
Association, and Richard Grasso, President, New York Stock Exchange).
524. Securities Act Release No. 6839, supra note 516, at 80,226-27.
525. Risk premia on equity have varied widely since 1960 and are estimated at. 6.2%
for 1985 while the risk premia on bonds have steadily increased during the same time
period to an estimated 2.75% for 1985. See B. FRIEDMAN & K. KUTNER, TIME-VARYING
RISK PERCEPTIONS AND THE PRICING OF RISKY ASSETS (National Bureau of Economics
Research Working Paper No. 2694, 1988)(Figures 5 & 6)(adjustment reflects risk relative
to the real interest rate and does not include the inflationary component). Equity risk is
cui.ently estimated at 8%. See Senate\LBO Hearings, supra note 16, at 201 (prepared
statement of Lawrence Summers). For 1926-1986, the average equity return was 8.4% to
8.6% above the Treasury bill rate. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 62, at 125-27
(noting that in individual years the returns were higher but that the average gives a long
term perspective); see also S. Ross & R. WESTERFIELD, supra note 105, at 127-28 (average
excess return was 8.6% above the Treasury bill rate). One source reported a guide on the
street for pricing of seven- to eight-year senior\bank debt at prime plus 1.5%. Where the
prime rate is 10.5%, the cost capital is 12%. For subordinated publicly issued high yield
debt securities (junk bonds) with a ten-year or more maturity, the pricing is based on the
long term federal bond rate, of say 9%, plus 300 to 500 basis points, for a cost of capital of
12% to 14%. The same placement of unsecured debt in a private placement is estimated to
require a yield of between 18% and 23% to the investors. It is usually accomplished by a
private placement of debt with equity warrants attached, producing approximately a 5 % to
10% liquidity premium. For the use of equity as a sweetener for debt that is otherwise less
attractive, see Piper & Arnold, Warrants and Convertible Debt as Financing Vehicles in
the Private Placement Market, 4 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. RES. 277 (1977).
526. See supra notes 482-86 and accompanying text.
527. As a debt market, the junk bond market is not particularly liquid. See Wallace,
Time for the Jitters in Junk Bonds, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2 (noting
liquidity problems due to relatively small size of market and number of dealers pricing
bonds that are infrequently traded). The illiquidity of the high yield debt market was high-
lighted by the October 13, 1989 "baby crash" when institutional investors tried to sell high
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one current measure of the ex post risk and liquidity premia is the
return to the venture capital industry as compared to small stocks
and the Standard and Poor's 500, which can be conceptualized in
part as the percentage decrease in cost of equity capital in the
private rather than the public market for equity. 2s
yield holdings of all quality ranges and received discounts of four to nine points for every
$1,000 of bonds if there was a market maker willing to deal. See Wallace, End for "'Junk
Bond" Takeovers?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1989, at 17, col. 3. The high yield market has
changed into a tiered market with lower rated issues shunned by investors, see Investment
Insight, Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1989, at Cl, col. 1, and with a higher rate of defaults and
illiquidity, see Winkler, Junk Bond Turmoil May Be Here to Stay, Wall St. J., Oct 24,
1989, at Cl, col. 3. The use of equity sweeteners is established in the high yield market,
especially when the market is soft. See Wallace, $475 Million "Junk" Issue Sold at
Sweetened Price, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1989, at 43, col. 5 (noting the issue of 14.75 per-
cent Chicago and Northwestern Acquisition Corp. bonds sweetened with ten percent of the
equity of the company in a transaction to refinance prior bridge loans). See generally
Mitchell, Investors Junk Stock of Firms with Heavy Debt. . .But Bond Buyers Lured by
Equity Stakes, Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1989, at Cl, col. 5. This trend will also lead to pres-
sures to utilize convertible preferred stock and convertible debt financing of leveraged
buyouts. See Wallace, Leveraged Buyout Leader Shifts Attention, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3,
1989, at 29, col. 3 (reporting the formation of a Forstmann, Little & Company buyout
fund that will invest in publicly traded companies without borrowing, with management's
consent, and with seats on the companies' boards to secure positions not unlike those of
Warren Buffett with the Coca-Cola Company and Salomon Brothers Inc.). The illiquidity
in the junk bond market has continued as the market maker Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc.
has become increasingly weakened. Eichenwald, A Financial Crisis May Force Drexel to
Seek a Merger, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1990, at Al, col. 6; Henriques, Controlling the
Damage, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
Privately placed bonds yielded, on average, 50 basis points more during 1961-1977
than publicly issued bonds of similar quality, duration and tax treatment. See Zwick,
Yields on Privately Placed Corporate Bonds, 35 J. FIN. 23 (1980). For large publicly
traded companies issuing investment grade debt, "the spread between interest costs in the
public and private markets is collapsing because of the pent-up demand for private deals.
Instead of a typical financing premium of 0.125 to 0.25 of a percentage point, some recent
private-market deals almost matched what the public market would charge." White, Pri-
vate Placement Market Attracts More Business Than It Can Handle, Wall St. J., Feb. 10,
1989, at Cl, col. 4. (referring to debt placements).
For equity returns, market segmentation is more difficult and a presumed liquidity
preference supplies a guideline to investor expectations. Bond market segmentation allows
purchasers to choose between slow pay and fast pay features in investment conduits such as
REMICs. Amihud and Mendelson argue that, unlike privately held bonds held by the ini-
tial purchaser until maturity, "residual claims - which usually do not have finite maturity
- are more likely to be traded, hence their trading cost is of greater importance and so is
the impact of illiquidity on their required returns." Amihud & Mendelson, Liquidity,
supra note 484, at 9. This insight is supported by valuation discounts for private firms
based on lack of marketability. See supra notes 492-98 and accompanying text.
528. Mature venture capital firms with investments over six years encountered an-
nual average returns of 24.4 percent. See Chiampou & Kallett, supra note 499, at 6-7. For
1978-1987 for the comparison between the premiums for venture capital, the 1.9 percent
ex ante return over the small stock return for venture capital over the same period was in
actuality a 4 percent premium. Id. The venture capital return over the S & P 500 was
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Access to public capital markets for small business also de-
pends on the relative costs of obtaining liquidity and the mainte-
nance of the integrity of the financial disclosure market.529 Studies
by the Small Business Administration 30 on the feasibility of ex-
panding the capital markets for small business securities require
an evaluation of the value of the liquidity obtained therein. Like
Rule 144A, capital market developments are highly relevant to
the liquidity standard. 3'
2. Monitoring
Liquidity has value as a monitoring device for both equity
holders and firms because it provides a mechanism for evaluating
firm performance through market valuation of the firm's securi-
ties. Increased awareness of agency costs suggests that firms may
not be profit maximizers. The agency problems that may result in
expected at 5.6 percent and was actually 8.5 percent. Id. The returns to the venture capital
industry are decreasing as additional funds are placed in the industry. Id. at 2.
The ex ante cost of capital over the Treasury bill rate for venture capital was 13.9
percent and was 12 percent for small stocks. Assuming that the venture funds in the
Chiampou and Kallett sample were fully diversified so that the risk of the individual invest-
ments was fully hedged, their required or expected ex ante return over the market for small
stocks was 1.9 percent. Since the liquidity-risk premium for corporate bonds over the trea-
sury bill rate was 1.8 percent, the equity cost of capital (the equity premium above the long
term bond rate) for these small stocks was roughly 10.2 percent. The equity cost of capital
for venture capital above the long term corporate bond rate was roughly 12.1 percent. The
equity cost of capital for small stocks was therefore approximately 85 percent of the equity
cost of capital for venture capital. Venture capital required an equity return approximately
18.5 percent higher than the ex ante equity return for small stocks in order to invest. Based
on ex post returns, venture capital returns were 15.2 percent above the Treasury bill rate
and small stock returns were 11.2 percent. The actual ex post return to venture capital
over the ex post return to long term bonds of 1.6 percent above the Treasury bill rate was
13.6 percent; the small stock return was 9.6 percent. The actual premia was 4 percent. The
small stock cost of capital was 70.1 percent of the venture capital return and the actual
premium for venture capital over small stocks was 40.1 percent. Viewed as an actual pre-
mium over the expected return from small stock over the expected long term bond rate, the
venture capital premium was approximately 30 percent.
These very rough estimates of a liquidity premium should include a risk premium
since the systematic risk of the venture capital portfolios and small stocks were not con-
trolled. They suggest, however, that if an interest return is allowed on capital a tax policy
that taxes a portion or all of the liquidity based return of liquid equity will equalize the
cost of capital.
529. See supra notes 417 & 520.
530. The SBA has a grant proposal currently studying the feasibility of establishing
a capital market for small business securities and reviewing the transaction costs and other
features of the London Unlisted Securities Market and the Vancouver Market. See Propo-
sal of Ulice Payne announced in Commerce Business Journal (Sept. 15 1988).
531. See supra notes 510-28.
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lower profits can be controlled to a great degree by the existence
of a public market for ownership interests in the firm.5"2 The
shareholders' collective ability to affect the market price of the
firm's stock by selling their shares in the open market has been
viewed by commentators as the shareholders' major influence over
the firm.5 33 To the extent industry information readily exists,
shareholder behavior may give owners a yardstick for measuring
manager performance. However, firms with nontransferable
shares have reduced access to external information. This lack of
external information reduces the ability to monitor the perform-
ance of the managers and reduces the incentives to monitor.
Nontransferable ownership interests create problems in port-
folio diversification as well as problems in monitoring. 34 Since
claims cannot be bought or sold, the decision to diversify is re-
stricted and owners are required to bear risks that diversification
would reduce. Furthermore, because claims cannot be concen-
trated, costly actions designed to increase the net cash flow of the
firm are less likely to be undertaken. 535 The existence of a publicly
532. Fama and Jensen provide a strong statement on this point:
The unrestricted transferability of common stock residual claims allows for
a market that will control the agency problems that result in below-market re-
turns on the shares. The stock market offers clear signals on the implications of
internal agent decisions on net cash flows. Holders of the rights to residual
claims are free to dispose of their shares and, in the process, signal the decision
agents about their perceived performance. Additionally, specialists can extend a
tender offer or engage in a proxy fight to alter the behavior of the decision
agents and capitalize the gains from improving the efficiency of the corporation.
Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECoN. 301, 312-13
(1983). Others note the severe agent-principal problems in cooperatives due to the lack of
transferability of ownership interests. See Porter & Scully, Economic Efficiency in Cooper-
atives, 30 J.L. & ECON. 489, 493 (1987). "Since the members' shares cannot exchange in
the market, and since the net cash flow cannot be capitalized and sold, there is no external
information available to the principals through which the performance of the agent (man-
ager) can be evaluated.").
533. See Clark, supra note 446, at 570; G. PINCHES, EssENTIALS OF FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT 511-30 (1984).
534. Jensen & Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to La-
bor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. Bus. 469, 485-88 (1979). See, e.g.,
Karpoff & Rice, Organizational Form, Share Transferability and Firm Performance, 24 J.
FIN. ECON. 69, 98-100 (1989)(detailing losses of Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
corporation due to restrictions on share transferability and lack of financial market moni-
toring); see also supra note 278.
535. In contrast to a proprietary firm where the owner can capture the entire income
stream of the entrepreneurial function, in "jointly controlled firms with nontransferable
claims, only a portion of additional income can be captured by the innovator if he is al-
ready a participant and none if he is an outsider, [and] [t]hus, fewer resources are dedi-
cated to the entrepreneurial functions of innovation and organization, and fewer resources
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traded market helps management determine the projects in which
to invest,513 while it simultaneously provides the owners with a
means to evaluate those projects in which management does
invest." 7
3. Diversification and Portfolio Changes
Modern portfolio theory is based explicitly on the capital as-
set pricing model (CAPM)5 a8 and implicitly on the efficient mar-
ket hypothesis." 9 The CAPM prices assets by the way in which
they deviate from a beta of 1.0 - the risk of the market. The
efficient market hypothesis posits that prices immediately reflect
available public, and perhaps private, information, and that secur-
are expended in monitoring and enforcing contract,." Porter & Scully, supra note 532, at
497.
Efficiency and the level of transferability of ownership interests has also been linked to
the transferability of private ownership and government-owned (political) firms as an ex-
planation of the lack of efficiency in the latter. See DeAlessi, Property Rights, Transac-
tions Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic Theory, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 64, 68
(1983). But see Leibenstein, Property Rights and X-Efficiency: Comment, 73 AM. ECON.
REv. 831 (1983).
536. The market evaluates the firm's activities. The firm could receive feedback
before embarking on a project by monitoring changes in market-based capitalized values.
Indeed, a signal given by the capital-asset pricing model could be used in order to evaluate
a project, see DeAlessi, supra note 535, at 68 and is explicitly used in "q" evaluations of
projects, see supra note 68. This approach is risky if the stock is traded in a market with
high transaction and information costs because the possibility of insolvency and/or bank-
ruptcy is significant. This counsels greater reliance on the total variability to the market
when the firm decides whether to invest in a risky asset. Id. The believed superiority of
market measures of investment decisions lie behind recommendations that they be used for
private firms in assessing investment decisions. See Collins & Barry, Beta-Adjusted Hurdle
Rates for Proprietary Firms, 40 J. ECON. Bus. 139 (1988)(constructing a beta for private
firms).
537. For a discussion of "q", see supra note 68.
538. S. Ross & R. WESTERFIELD, supra note 105, at 192-95; R. BREALEY & S. MY-
ERS, supra note 62, at 173-203. The capital asset pricing model values the equity interest of
a firm. The model assumes: (1) "capital markets are highly efficient where investors are
well informed," (2) "transaction costs are zero," (3) "there are negligible restrictions on
investment and no taxes," (4) "no investor is large enough to affect the market price of the
stock," and (5) "investors are in general agreement about the likely performance and risk
of individual securities and that their expectations are based on a common holding period."
J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 62 (8th ed. 1989).
539. The efficient market hypothesis has been defined as having three levels of mar-
ket efficiency: (1) the weak form, in which prices reflect all the information contained in
the record of past prices, (2) the semi-strong form, in which prices reflect not only past
prices but all other published information, and (3) the strong form, in which prices reflect
not just public information but all the information that can be applied by painstaking fun-
damental analysis of the company and the economy. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN,
supra note 60, at 121, 123-30.
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ity prices follow a random walk so that one cannot "beat" the
market.540 In order to determine what risk premium - the return
over and above that obtained from a riskless asset - the portfolio
will command, it is no longer necessary to determine the risk in-
herent in a particular security. For those who accept and invest
under this theory, it is only necessary to determine the systematic
risk inherent in a total portfolio of securities.541
Arbitrage pricing theory is an alternative view of asset pric-
ing, likewise used to determine the appropriate risk-adjusted dis-
count rate to use in valuing equity securities. It determines a risk
premium relative to the market based on a weighted analysis of
systematic factors affecting a stock. However, under arbitrage
pricing theory the market measure of systematic risk is not beta
but is measured through the sensitivity of the stock to selected
economic factors. 542 Alternatively, option pricing theory values the
equity in the firm as a European call option on the residual value
540. MacQueen, Beta Is Dead! Long Live Beta!, in THE REVOLUTION IN CORPO-
RATE FINANCE 52, 55 (J. Stern & D. Chew eds. 1986). The most accurate beta is derived
from the fundamental valuation components of the firm and the projects in which it is
engaged. Rosenberg & Rudd, The Corporate Uses of Beta, in THE REVOLUTION IN COR-
PORATE FINANCE 58, 64-65 (J. Stern & D. Chew eds. 1986); Malkiel, Risk and Return: A
New Look, in THE CHANGING ROLES OF DEBT AND EQUITY IN FINANCING U.S. CAPITAL
FORMATION 27 (B. Friedman ed. 1982)(another discussion of beta). Other measures than
beta such as the risk of the economy, inflation risk, interest rate risk, and dispersion of
analysts forecasts could be used as a measure of a stock's systematic risk. See Malkiel,
supra at 27, 43 (suggesting that the dispersion of analysts forecasts is a better measure of
systematic risk).
541. While CAPM has provoked controversy, a useful insight from CAPM is that
only the risk that investors cannot diversify away (systematic risk) should be compensated
by a risk premium. S. Ross & R. WESTERFIELD, supra note 105, at 161-73.
542. R. HAUGEN, supra note 454, at 207-25. Arbitrage pricing theory (as distin-
guished from an arbitrage opportunity) is the result of several assumptions.
We assume that the covariences that exist between security returns can be at-
tributed to the fact that the securities respond, to one degree or another, to the
pull of one or more factors. We don't specify exactly what these factors are, but
we do assume that the relationship between the security returns and the factors
is linear.
Id. at 207-208. The arbitrage pricing theory is argued to have two advantages over the
capital asset pricing model: less restrictive assumptions regarding investor's preferences to-
wards risk and return and greater testability. See R. HAUGEN, supra note 454, at 155-61,
203-04, 214-15. The point of difference is that arbitrage pricing theory acknowledges that
investors choose between alternative investments by examining both the expected return
and other factors. Whether one accepts the capital asset pricing model, the arbitrage pric-
ing theory, the market model, fundamental analysis, or the efficient market hypothesis as
the correct view of the pricing of securities in a market, investor assumptions with respect
to risk and return, and investor desires to maximize their utility functions are always the
same. See R. HAUGEN, supra note 454, at 207-25.
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of the assets granted the shareholders by the bondholders.,4, Re-
gardless of the theory one applies, in present value terms the price
of an asset relative to the total market reaches an equilibrium
based on the relative risk assessment that the market (absent any
tax considerations) places on that asset.544 The value of a stock
will be based on the systematic risk associated with its expected
cash flow. The greater the systematic risk, the greater the risk
premium relative to the market portfolio and the return required;
and from the firm's point of view, the greater the cost of equity
capital. Thus, an investor will invest on the basis of desired return
and systematic risk, and will diversify away all unsystematic risk.
The choice of a consumption or an investment decision can change
the overall systematic risk of the portfolio and foist an undiversi-
fled unsystematic risk on it. Thus, liquidity (i.e. the speed with
which a diversified portfolio can be readjusted) has great value. 545
The individual portfolio choices of investors (utilizing either a
portfolio theory investment strategy 46 or fundamental valuation)
are enhanced in a public market where the investor preference for
liquidity relative to risk and return can be exercised.5 47 They are
also enhanced where, as "[f]irms announce their policies (or pro-
duction plans), [shareholders can] exchange shares . ..to maxi-
mize their expected utility of consumption. '' 548 A public trading
market allows the investor to maintain a diversified portfolio at all
times, to choose rapidly between levels of risk, or to choose indi-
vidual securities based on perceived unique properties. Liquidity
confers upon equity holders the ability to capture an excess return
in the market and maintain a portfolio that diversifies away unsys-
tematic risk, while simultaneously maintaining or increasing the
same risk-return ratio that was initially desired. It is the liquidity
543. See supra note 412; see also A. BARNEA, R. HAUGEN & L. SENBET, supra note
402, at 63-64; J. VAN HORNE, supra note 538, at 93-113.
544. "Because stocks do not have intrinsic values, finding the market clearing price is
a task which must be performed by the market's trading system." Y. AMIHUD, T. Ho & R.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 486, at 22.
545. But see Fouse, Risk and Liquidity: The Keys to Stock Price Behavior, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., May-June 1976, at 35, 42-43 (investment in relatively illiquid securities pro-
vides an opportunity for portfolio gains).
546. Portfolio theory suggests that the rational investor should maximize the amount
of return per unit of risk on the risky portfolio by diversification. See Malkiel, supra note
540, at 28-30. Furthermore, "international diversification can reduce risk." Id. at 31.
547. See Tobin, Liquidity, supra note 504 (setting forth a theory of liquidity prefer-
ence derived from the Keynesian economic model).
548. M. KING, supra note 418, at 131.
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of the chosen investments that determines whether an investor's
ideal portfolio can be maintained as circumstances change. 49
The portfolio perspective departs from the conventional
Harberger analysis. Under the conventional view, capital is allo-
cated among alternative uses in a way that equalizes the after tax
rate of return on all uses of all capital. Portfolio theory recognizes
that net rates of return on different uses of capital are not gener-
ally equal, but instead reflect the risk-return preferences of inves-
tors. In data collected by Martin Feldstein, the portfolio approach
explains why different types of taxpayers (from high tax rate indi-
viduals to untaxed pension funds) hold mixed portfolios despite
the differences in relative net rates of return on different types of
assets.550 The Feldstein data also indicates that investors are sensi-
tive to after tax returns based on the level of personal income tax-
ation.551 Nonetheless, liquidity diminishes specific risk and permits
549. The exit right for fundamental value investors is much the same except it runs
over a longer horizon.
550. See Feldstein, Personal Taxation and Portfolio Composition: An Econometric
Analysis, 44 ECONOMETRICA 631 (1976), reprinted in M. FELDSTEIN, CAPITAL TAXATION
194 (1983)(study using household survey data to explain the effect of taxes on the composi-
tion of assets held by different income classes). If risk considerations were irrelevant to
these investors, each type of investor would specialize in a particular type of investment
that had the highest net yield for that investors particular tax situation. The lack of spe-
cialization is significant because it implies that different groups of portfolio investors re-
spond differently to tax-induced changes in the net rates of return, whereas the conven-
tional analysis assumes that there are no differences in investor response, but that all
capital owners respond within "infinite" asset adjustment to any divergences of net rates of
return. See Litzenberger & Ramaswamy, The Effect of Personal Taxes and Dividends on
Capital Asset Prices: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 163 (1979)(an af-
ter-tax version of the capital asset pricing model); Malkiel & Cragg, Expectations and the
Structure of Share Prices, 60 AI. ECON. REV. 601 (1970)(presenting empirical study
designed to measure the risk or quality of return stream to arrive at price/earning ratios).
Theoretical models also predict that the existence of tradeable assets will positively impact
the value of nontraded assets. See L. SVENSSON, PORTFOLIO CHOICE AND ASSET PRICING
WITH NONTRADED ASSETS 5 & 26 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Pa-
per No. 2774, 1988).
551. For example, part of the portfolio can consist of venture fund investments
which, while having an arguably determinable beta, cannot be liquidated easily. Financial
portfolio composition modeled by Feldstein shows a yield sensitivity with higher bracket
individuals showing a very positive correlation for holding common stock in their portfolios
relative to other financial assets which Feldstein attributes to the favorable taxation of
capital gains as increasing the after-tax yield relative to risk. See Feldstein, supra note
550, at 637-39, 648. This data does not contradict the value of liquidity since portfolios of
financial assets that are measured all have marked liquidity (made up of bonds, money,
preferred and common stocks). Relative to capital gains taxation increasing the after tax
return, the preference for common stock with a known liquidity factor suggests that it is
yield sensitive to risk (relative to return) which supports the view of the value of liquidity
in common stock even to the wealthiest investors. Feldstein and Slemrod further show that,
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a wider range of portfolio positions.
In summary, liquidity produces benefits for both firms and
owners because it provides the ability to monitor firm performance
and the ability to maintain a diversified or changing portfolio. 52
For highly sophisticated and institutional investors pursuing active
portfolio management strategies, these aspects of liquidity, along
with liquidity enhancing products such as options and index fu-
tures, are key to portfolio management. For others, liquidity pro-
vides a timely exit. These liquidity benefits are what is taxed when
profits are taxed at the firm level and again when distributed to
the owners. For firms that decide to provide liquidity in raising or
maintaining equity capital, there is no credit for taxation at the
firm level and again at the owner level because the value of liquid-
ity to the equity capital providers lowers the firm's cost of capital.
Once this proposition is accepted, the question becomes, how is a
liquid equity ownership standard constructed and to what extent
should private contracts creating markets for ownership interests
be judged equivalent to a public market?
B. Definition of Liquidity
Double taxation of entities whose ownership interests are
publicly traded is appropriate because those interests are highly
liquid. Liquidity is the underlying basis for finding the firm dis-
tinct from the owner and determining that the income of the firm
assuming that there is a lower corporate rate than the individual personal tax rate, there
will be an effect on portfolio allocations between corporate and noncorporate investment
which favors corporate production even if corporate taxes exist due to the less favorable
individual income tax on noncorporate income. See Feldstein & Slemrod, Personal Taxa-
tion, Portfolio Choice, and the Effect of the Corporation Income Tax, 88 J. POL. ECON.
854 (1980).
552. This is true regardless of whether fundamental valuation or market based strat-
egies are used. Where information is poor or where liquidity is limited, the ability to use a
speculative investment strategy is limited. Gabaldon, supra note 471, at 1236 (speculation
may also lead to market liquidity). While speculation increases the choices for an individ-
ual investor, not all commentators view speculation as desirable. See L. LowENSTEIN,
supra note 164, at 202-17 (Speculation serves a useful social purpose because it allows
investors to specialize in different degrees of risk. It is not costless, however, and a 100%
tax on all profits from stocks sold within a year of purchase should be applied to direct real
investment to more socially productive uses.). But see Bandow, Blaming the Investor, Wall
St. J., June 9, 1988, at 28, col. 5 (Lowenstein's negative view of speculation is erroneous
for three reasons: (1) it ignores the economic benefits of takeovers; (2) it disregards the
fact that the purposes of the financial markets are to create incentives for management and
distribute investment risk; and (3) it assumes that preventing people from trading their
stocks would make others better off.).
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is not the product of the owner. The role of the market in defining
liquidity depends on the pricing mechanism of that market and its
efficiency. Any definition of public trading must focus on the con-
cept and definition of liquidity.55 3 A recent definition of liquidity
states that it is "a quality of assets which . . is not a very clear
or easily measurable concept" and indicates the general view that
there is a lack of precision in defining and measuring liquidity. 54
For example, a market can be viewed as highly liquid when the
volume of trading is high and the corresponding variance of price
is low, regardless of the speed at which a particular transaction is
consummated. 55 Another definition of liquidity, important to the
seller, requires that ownership interests be tradable "quickly and
at a predictable price. 556
1. Realization and Speed
Liquidity is a relative condition measuring both the time it
takes to have an asset exchanged for money and the loss of capital
value in the exchange . 5 7 Liquidity may in fact be a "bundle of
553. Professor Marschak defined "liquidity" in the context of pricing assets as "the
ratio of two contemporary prices." Marschak, Role of Liquidity Under Complete and In-
complete Information, 39 AM. ECON. REV. 182 (1949). This makes liquidity "independent
of any price changes in the time between the buying and the selling of an asset." Id.
Marschak also found that the demand of a rational person for a commitment (an asset or a
contract) depends on its liquidity under various degrees of available information. He con-
cluded "that differences in the liquidity of various assets affect the relative demand for
them even under conditions of certainty." Id. at 187.
554. K. BOULDING, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 310 (3d ed. 1955).
555. For a definition of liquidity that follows this format, see Economides & Siow,
The Division of Markets is Limited by the Extent of Liquidity (Spatial Competition with
Externalities), 78 AM. ECON. REV. 108 (1988)(The futures markets in financial assets have
very few maturity dates. The presence of maturity dates would cause the market to be
thinner and would cause greater price fluctuations. Traders prefer fewer maturity dates so
that liquidity is enhanced in the remaining markets. The resulting choice is one of liquidity
versus the number of markets.).
556. Lippman & McCall, An Operational Measure of Liquidity, 76 AM. EcON. REV.
43, 48 (1986). The definitions in infra notes 557-67 and accompanying text owe much to
the Lippman and McCall research.
557. The relativist view of liquidity has an impressive origin. As stated by John
Maynard Keynes, "The conception of what contributes to 'liquidity' is a partly vague one,
changing from time to time and depending on social practices and institutions." J. KEYNES,
THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 240 (1936)(Keynes also
stated that "there is, clearly, no absolute standard of 'liquidity' but merely a scale of li-
quidity - a varying premium of which account has to be taken . . . in estimating the
comparative attractions of holding different forms of wealth."). See also Makower & Mar-
schak, Assets, Prices and Monetary Theory, 5 ECONOMICA 261, 284 (1938)(" '[L]iquidity'
has so often been used to cover all properties of money indiscriminately that it seems better
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measurable properties. '558  Liquidity relativism includes the
Keynesian concept of distinctions among assets. According to
Keynes, one asset is more liquid than another if it is "more cer-
tainly realizable at short notice without loss. '559 Another view of
liquidity is "an asset's capability over time of being realized in the
form of funds available for immediate consumption or reinvest-
ment - proximately in the form of money. ' 60
Thus, liquidity has two facets: "realization" - whether the
asset can be bought or sold at or near the prevailing market price
- and "speed" - whether a trade can be effectuated quickly.
There is generally a trade-off between price realization and trans-
action time that will be reflected in the ultimate price of the as-
set. 561 A shorthand definition of liquidity is the relative ease with
which an asset can be converted into cash without a loss of
value. 56 2 Any deviation from the ideal is a form of illiquidity.
2. Time, Valuation, and Market
The fact that liquidity is a relative concept is easily illus-
trated by the time references for transaction sales and settlements
that are set forth in the various world stock exchanges.56 a Liquid-
ity and marketability generally have been viewed as synonymous
concepts, but there are some distinctions. Marketability generally
denotes the speed at which an asset can be turned into cash. Li-
quidity refers not only to the time involved to complete the trans-
action but also to the certainty of the price obtained. Therefore,
marketability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to en-
sure liquidity.564 Price continuity - prices that do not vary
greatly from one transaction to another - is a second component
not to use it for any of the separate properties of money. We thus resign ourselves to giving
up 'liquidity' as a measurable concept: it is, like the price level, a bundle of measurable
properties.").
558. Makower & Marschak, supra note 557, at 284.
559. II J. KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY 67 (1930).
560. Lippman & McCall, supra note 556, at 43 (quoting J. Hirshleifer).
561. Id. at 43-44.
562. J. FINNERTY, CORPORATE FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 257 (1986).
563. Settlement times vary from five days on the New York Exchange, two days on
the Belgium Exchange, and a fixed monthly settlement date in France, to 44 days if the
exchange is settled at all in the Italian stock market (because of the 40% fail rate, deliv-
eries often take months) and 120 days in the case of sales on the Spanish stock market. See
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 417, at V-72 n.146.
564. Reilly, Secondary Markets, in HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 150-51 (F.
Fabrozzi & F. Zarb eds. 2d ed. 1986).
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necessary to a liquid market. A third component of a liquid mar-
ket is depth, which ensures that prices will not be volatile despite
major market moves.5"5
The ensuing analysis will focus on three liquidity factors: (1)
the time it takes to convert an ownership interest to cash - "time
risk liquidity," (2) the pricing mechanism by which the interest is
so converted - "valuation liquidity," and (3) the economic status
of the participants in the market - "market risk liquidity." Mar-
ketability will be presumed to exist, since an asset cannot be liquid
without it. Opportunities to sell firm equities will be evaluated
under these three criteria of liquidity to formulate standards for a
liquid ownership test.
Time risk liquidity includes delays in both the opportunity to
offer an ownership interest for sale and the time at which payment
for the ownership interest is made. An asset is said to be liquid in
this sense "if it can be sold quickly at a predictable price."56 Va-
rious forms of trading delays increase time risk and thereby de-
crease liquidity. Time risk illiquidity is also present when an in-
vestor seeks to profit from the arrival of a golden opportunity to
sell an ownership interest.56 7
Valuation liquidity requires the mechanism by which the
ownership interest is priced to include an assessment of all rele-
vant information by knowledgeable purchasers and sellers. The
strongest version of valuation liquidity is a strong form of the effi-
cient market hypothesis 56 8 in which all available information, pub-
lic or private, is reflected in the price of the ownership interest. 69
While there is little evidence that this strong form of efficiency
exists,570 most financial economists hold that it is highly likely
565. Id. See also Lippman & McCall, supra note 556, at 48 (discussing Marschak's
view that liquidity denotes two properties, one of which is low variance in price).
566. Lippman & McCall, supra note 556, at 48. The time risk prong of liquidity can
also be viewed as an attribute consisting of two properties. One of these is "plasticity," that
is the ease of "maneuvering into and out of various yields after the asset has been ac-
quired," and the second is the "low-variability of its price." Marschak, Money and the
Theory of Assets, 6 ECONOMETRICA 311, 323 (1938).
567. D. HICKS, THE CRISIS IN KEYNESIAN EcONOMics 43-44 (1974) (By choosing a
less liquid asset, the investor has "narrowed the band of opportunities which may be open
to him" or "locked himself in.").
568. Efficiency of markets consists of both internal efficiency (i.e., minimized trans-
action costs) and external efficiency (i.e. sensitivity to new supply and demand informa-
tion). Reilly, supra note 564, at 141-49, 151. External efficiency requires that market par-
ticipants operate with general levels of information so that prices can adjust to information.
569. See S. Ross & R. WESTERFIELD, supra note 105, at 305-06.
570. Id. at 307.
1130 [Vol. 39:965
1988-891 CORPORATE TAX 1131
that a weak form of efficiency exists and probable that the semi-
strong form of valuation efficiency exists. 71 Other evidence, how-
ever, points to the market's efficiency in processing information
but does not indicate valuation efficiency. 7 If the most that can
be said about the existing public market is that a weak or semi-
strong form of valuation efficiency exists, then the presence of
weak or semi-strong valuation efficiency outside of the public mar-
ket, perhaps created by private contract, should be sufficient to
satisfy the valuation liquidity test for nonpublic markets. 73
Market risk illiquidity arises when the economic status of po-
tential purchasers or market makers produces a greater than ex-
pected risk that a sale at a reasonable price in a reasonable time
frame will not take place.574 A classic example is the case of mar-
ket makers with insufficient resources to effect a sale. At a mini-
mum, regulation of the market makers requires that they be ade-
quately capitalized. Therefore, if liquidity is provided by private
contract, the assets of the contractually obligated purchaser must
be analyzed.
Time risk liquidity, valuation liquidity, and market risk li-
571. Id.
572. See supra notes 452-57 and accompanying text. See also Gordon & Korn-
hauser, supra note 457, at 825-30, 831 n.192 (markets may be speculatively efficient in
that prevailing securities prices are the best guide to financial returns or allocatively effi-
cient in that prices are the best guide to real economic returns (a result not claimed by the
efficient market hypothesis), but at the same time market trades may be inefficient even
though the market is perfectly price revealing in that there is a lack of perfect information
for all traders).
573. There are differences between markets and in each of them private contract
handles both time risk liquidity and market risk liquidity differently.
574. Amihud, Ho and Schwartz refer to this concept as price reasonableness. The
liquidity of the asset is important, since traders avoid markets where inefficiency in the
price discovery process and inadequate information systems cause poor executions. The
result is a lack of interest in options on exchanges other than the New York Exchange and
a lack of trading on the pre-NASDAQ over-the-counter market. See Y. AMIHUD, T. Ho &
R. SCHWARTZ, supra note 486, at 25.
Price reasonableness is related to liquidity since: (1) the individual investor views an
asset as illiquid if price volitility creates uncertainty concerning the convertibility of that
asset into cash; (2) the investor who holds a substantial portion of the stock's outstanding
shares views his position as illiquid if a change in position will adversely affect the stock's
share price; and (3) a macro point of view concludes that a market is illiquid if actual
prices do not conform to the market clearing values that would prevail if the market were
frictionless (this depends, in turn, on the size of bid-ask spreads and the location of the
spread with respect to a frictionless market price). Id. at 25-26. Price discovery efficiency
thus depends upon both the bid-ask spread and a liquidity measure called the liquidity
ratio, which is the value of the shares traded per a one percent change in the stock's price.
The larger the ratio the more liquid the market. Id. at 26-27.
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quidity often overlap. The forms of liquidity within markets and
created by private contract must be evaluated in light of these
three concepts, beginning with the existing market structure.
3. Liquidity in Existing Markets
Prior to Black Monday, October 19, 1987, empirical evidence
suggested that the decision to have a stock listed on either the
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) or the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE), or traded on the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers National Market System (NASDAQ/NMS), did not
depend on asset size, industry group, or trading volume.57 5 While
575. S. PHILLIPS & J. ZECHER, EXCHANGE LISTING AND THE COST OF EQUITY CAPI-
TAL 20 (March 1982)(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Capital Market Working
Paper). The lack of efficiency in the entire National Association of Securities Dealers Au-
tomated Quotations System ("NASDAQ") over-the-counter market on Black Monday, if
not reformed, may lead to an effect on the risk associated with holding securities traded
through NASDAQ and affect prices. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS VI-62 to VI-63 (1988)(Task Force
chaired by Nicholas Brady)[hereinafter BRADY COMMISSION REPORT]; accord DIVISION OF
MARKET REGULATION, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, THE OCTOBER 1987 MAR-
KET BREAK 9-24 to 9-28 (Feb. 1988); see also Sanger & McConnell, Stock Exchange
Listings, Firm Value, and Security Market Efficiency: The Impact of NASDAQ, 21 J. FIN
& QUANT. ANALYSIS 1, 22 (1986)(The liquidity efficiency of the exchanges was superior to
the over-the-counter market prior to NASDAQ. NASDAQ, however, removed that edge.
This improvement notwithstanding it is still possible that signalling and other features of
listing on an exchange could enhance a firm's stock price "due to factors other than im-
provements in liquidity.").
Liquidity within secondary markets responds to the market efficiency and differences
found within these markets. See, e.g., Titus, Secondary Trading - Stepchild of the Secur-
ities Laws, 20 CONN. L. REv. 595, 602-04, 626-27 (1988)(the company information re-
quired in selling restricted securities in a secondary market under Rule 144, codified at 17
C.F.R. § 230.144 (1987), should be like § 4(l) of the Securities Act of 1933, codified at 15
U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1986), under which no public information requirement is made). See also
Resales of Securities, Securities Act Release No. 6286, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 5 82,821, at 83,993 (Feb. 6, 1981)(amending Rule 144 to eliminate its
overly burdensome requirements as to the company information required for secondary
market sales of public firm's registered securities).
The New York Stock Exchange secondary market is a benchmark against which the
liquidity offered by other secondary markets should be viewed. The New York Stock Ex-
change market is made by a combination of specialists assigned to particular stocks and
functions as an auction market and a dealer market. See BRADY COMMISSION REPORT,
supra at VI-4. As in an auction market, members of the New York Stock Exchange trade
directly with each other either for their own account or as agents for others. As in a dealer
market, members also trade with the specialist in order to maintain price continuity and
reasonable depth. Id. NASDAQ is an interdealer quotation network with no limit on the
number of market makers or the number of stocks a market maker may trade. The "inter-
action of the multiple market makers in a stock, each with different order flows and a
different perception of the risks and rewards of effecting a transaction at a particular price
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there is disagreement as to whether any or all securities markets
are efficient,5"6 exchange listed securities are the benchmark
against which the liquidity risks of less optimal markets are mea-
sured." ' However, as the October 19, 1987 crash demonstrated,
small holders of securities are generally at a disadvantage com-
pared to institutional holders, and a negotiated market is generally
.* is supposed to determine the appropriate price for a security at a given moment of
time." Id. at VI-12. The capital requirements of market makers are governed solely by
Rule 15c-3-1 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which generally can be inter-
preted as a minimum capital requirement of $100,000. Id.
576. Louis Lowenstein questions the efficiency and meaning of efficiency in all mar-
kets. See L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 164, at 53-54. Many note that the over-the-counter
market is not as efficient as the market for exchange-listed securities. See Banoff, Regula-
tory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration:' An Analysis of Rule 415, 70
VA. L. REV. 135, 179 n.209 (1984)(citing Barry, The Economics of Outside Information
and Rule lOb-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1307, 1349 (1981))(arguing that the market is less
efficient for over-the counter stocks, stocks traded on regional exchanges, and foreign ex-
changes); see also H. KRIPKE, THE S.E.C. AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 85-87 (1979)(the hypothesis that efficient markets offer little oppor-
tunity for supernormal returns drove many analysis into the "inefficient" segment of the
market with the result that those segments are now efficient). The over-the-counter market
may be nevertheless reasonably efficient. See generally Grant, Market Implications of Dif-
ferential Amounts of Interim Information, 18 J. AccT. RES. 155 (1980)(although data is
limited, available results indicate OTC markets are relatively efficient).
577. Presumptions that exchange traded stocks are liquid and that stocks not so
listed may be illiquid underly the margin loan rules. These rules automatically qualify
exchange and NASDAQ/NMS traded securities, while other over-the-counter stock must
individually be qualified. See supra note 319; see also Grube & Joy, Some Evidence on the
Efficacy of Security Credit Regulation in the OTC Equity Market, 11 J. FIN. REs. 137
(1988)(analyzing efficacy of Federal Reserve security credit regulation of OTC stocks and
demonstrating that the stocks selected for margin loans are selected after they experience a
relative decline in price variance which is consistent with curbing speculation, protecting
investors, and improving the quality of the credit market).
The clearing, settlement and payment process is the process by which sales are made
and cash transferred. It is standardized and automated in the case of exchange and NAS-
DAQ trading. "Clearing is the comparison or reconciliation of the trading process - the
post trade agreement between involved parties that the trade was, in fact, executed in ac-
cordance with the stipulations of buyer and seller." BRADY COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 575, at VI-15. Settlement is the actual exchange of the securities for payment, usually
in a depository book entry environment in which the seller has a sufficient book entry posi-
tion in the security for the delivery to occur. Once a book entry is made and payment is
completed, a legal transfer of ownership is effected. Payment is the manual exchange of
checks between the clearing house and its participants and is netted daily. Id.
The National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) clears and settles trades in the
New York, American, and certain regional exchanges. It guarantees each transaction as it
clears, but the guarantee runs only to the broker-dealer and not to the broker-dealer's
customer. Customer accounts held by broker-dealers in stocks and bonds, but not commod-
ities including futures contracts, are insured by the Securities Investor Protection Corpora-
tion (SIPC). It is a non-profit, quasi-governmental agency that provides coverage up to
$500,000 per customer. Id. at VI-17.
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less efficient than an automated or specialist market. 7 a In negoti-
ated markets, clearing and settlement are not automated and the
markets are generally not as well run.579
The Pink Sheet over-the-counter (OTC) market, which was
the entire OTC market before the NASDAQ system went on line
in 1971,580 is a good example of a market that is clearly less liq-
uid.5 81 Unlike stock trading on the NASDAQ, where there is usu-
ally a firm retail price, stock trading on the Pink Sheet market
can be treacherous. When a stock is on the Pink Sheets, the mar-
578. For a recent view on the markets, see Symposium on the Regulation of Second-
ary Trading Markets: Program Trading, Volatility, Portfolio Insurance, and the Role of
Specialists and Market Makers, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 799 (1989). While there were
problems on the NYSE on Black Monday in terms of price continuity, market depth and
quotation spread, see BRADY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 575, at VI-38 to VI-47, on
NASDAQ, the problem was much worse. "For many investors, both large and small, the
over-the-counter market broke down when it failed to perform its function of providing
liquidity for buyers and sellers and many customer and dealer orders did not get promptly
executed if they were executed at all." Id. at VI-49. Problems included withdrawal of mar-
ket makers, reduction in the depth of the market, failure to answer telephones, widening of
bid-offer spreads, failure of automatic execution systems (which are required to be used
only on a voluntary basis), market maker withdrawals, locked and crossed markets delay-
ing the execution of smaller transactions, lack of price continuity, and late reporting. Id. at
VI-49 to VI-63. The high degree of automation in the OTC market created unique weak-
nesses in trading procedures. Id. at VI-52. The basic problem in the NASDAQ system is
that "the NASD found it necessary to build in trading procedures and rules which were
not necessarily aimed at achieving the most efficient trading system but were believed nec-
essary by the membership to protect their economic interests." Id. After Black Monday
N.A.S.D. made several proposals to avoid similar problems with the OTC market in the
future: (1) mandatory participation in SOES for all market makers in each of the NMS
securities; (2) a limitation on the acceptable reasons to withdraw from a market; (3) limi-
tations on the ability to return to a market after withdrawal has been made; (4) elimina-
tion of preferencing market makers in locked and crossed markets; (5) maximum order
limitations; and (6) the continuing of SOES executions when quotes are locked or crossed.
The Task Force concluded that "had the proposed rules been in effect during the market
break it is possible, if not probable, that most of the problems encountered in the execution
of small orders in the over-the-counter market would not have occurred." Id. at VI-63.
579. See, e.g., Garbade & Silber, Structural Organization of Secondary Markets:
Clearing Frequency, Dealer Activity and Liquidity Risk, 34 J. FIN. 577 (1979)(liquidity
risk is based on the number of market participants and equilibrium price volatility plus the
frequency of market clearing and the level and effect of dealer participation). The Pink
Sheet market, even for firms on the electronic bulletin board, will not have automated
clearing and settlement. Telephone interview with Gary W. Guinn, Associate Director,
N.A.S.D. (May 12, 1989).
580. BRADY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 575, at VI-13.
581. Estimates of Pink Sheet stocks range from 11,000 issues to 25,000. Wiggins,
Market Place: Analyst Choices in 'Pink Sheets', N.Y. Times, June 3, 1988, at D4, col. 3
(11,000 issues) [hereinafter Market Place]; R. IRWIN, PROFITS FROM PENNY STOCKS: AN
INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO LOW-COST STOCKS AND COMPANY START-UPS 32-33 (1986)(25,000
issues).
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ket maker is dealing with a very thin market and "frequently can
adjust the/price without notice." 582 The volatility of the Pink
Sheet market reflects the effort of the market maker to decrease
risk by not acquiring a large inventory in a thin market. The re-
sult is that a seller cannot sell for the profit anticipated. Empirical
data confirms the randomness of prices on the Pink Sheet market,
thereby enforcing a perception of volatility.588 NASDAQ an-
nounced that it will add certain Pink Sheet securities to its auto-
mated quotation system, 584 possibly as early as the beginning of
1990.585 However, even if the Pink Sheet market is an electronic
bulletin board system of "on-line, real-time price information," it
is still doubtful that an efficient market will exist for the 3,000 to
4,000 stocks for which pricing information is now usually provided
only daily. "Many of these issues will remain illiquid because of
the scant number of shares outstanding and will continue to 'trade
by appointment,' whereby a market maker must search for availa-
582. R. IRWIN, supra note 581, at 120 (although a pink might have one bid/ask
quotation, a big order to sell stock could cause the bid price to drop 25 %); see also Market
Place, supra note 581 ("The sheets are distributed daily and the prices listed in them by
broker-dealers are highly negotiable.").
583. See Hamilton, Market Information and Price Dispersion: Unlisted Stocks and
NASDAQ, 39 J. ECON. & Bus. 67, 77 (1987)(studies of the over-the-counter market prior
to and after the implementation of NASDAQ show that NASDAQ reduced dispersion
among price quotations by one-quarter to one-third); Sanger & McConnell, supra note
575, at 11-19 (liquidity on the non-NASDAQ over-the-counter market is less than that of
the exchanges and NASDAQ market). While NASD regulations prescribe a maximum
5 % bid/ask spread, many over-the-counter companies trade with a higher spread, and the
lack of a sufficient float (less than 5 million shares) also raises liquidity risks. NEW YORK
INSTITUTE OF FINANCE, TRADING STOCKS ON THE OVER THE COUNTER MARKET 37-41
(1989).
584. 'Pink Sheet' Listing Plan, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1988, at D22, col. 4. A
N.A.S.D. officer notes that:
[the] up-to-date price and volume data will provide investors with the ability to
track stocks as they would on all other publicly-traded issues, identify new buy-
ing opportunities, offer a better capability to monitor stock price performance,
and make it easier to ascertain that the current levels of trading activity ...
will give real-time information for market makers instead of data that are
printed the day before they are distributed, as under the present system.
Market Place, supra note 581 (statement of Douglas F. Parrillo, Senior Vice President,
N.A.S.D.).
585. Telephone interview with Gary W. Guinn, Associate Director, N.A.S.D. (Nov.
3, 1989); see also telephone interview with Gary W. Guinn, supra note 579 (the bulletin
board will display price changes during trading day). An earlier version of this same bulle-
tin board was considered for limited partnership interests. ABA Committee on Partner-
ships and Unincorporated Business Organizations, Publicly Traded Limited Partnerships:
An Emerging Financial Alternative, 39 Bus. LAW. 709, 717-21 (1984)[hereinafter Emerg-
ing Financial Alternatives].
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ble buyers or sellers to complete a transaction. 586 Although such
Pink Sheet firms may exhibit separation of ownership from con-
trol, their equity holders cannot rely on the market to produce
efficient pricing.5 87
Similarly unsatisfactory is the liquidity of the ownership in-
terests of firms traded in other unlisted markets such as the
Euroequities market, 588 the London Unlisted Securities Market,58
and the United States secondary market for partnership inter-
ests.59 "While the limited-partnership secondary market gives in-
vestors at least some liquidity, it more closely resembles a swap-
meet for baseball-card collectors than a securities market."'591
586. See Market Place, supra note 581. On the other hand, a number of these stocks
were lightly traded, and have many of the characteristics most sought after by value-ori-
ented investors.
587. Cox, supra note 412, at 63-64 & n.64 (noting literature on the lack of efficiency
in the Pink Sheet over-the-counter market). This is arguably a different consideration from
finding fair market value in a less than efficient market. See Andrews v. Commissioner,
135 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 748 (1943)(even if the market is "rigged," if
the investor could have disposed of the shares at the market price and the market could
have accomodated the trade, the market price will be used for valuation).
588. The Euromarket, where the debt and equity securities of countries and corpora-
tions are bought and sold outside of their home markets, is crucial to the world's major
investment banks and securities houses. "It is the forerunner of the international capital
markets of the future, and any investment bank that aspires to a place in the emerging new
order of global finance must be successful in it." Lohr, Hard Times for the Euromarkets,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1987, § 3, at 1, col. 2. The Euroequities market, a sector of the
Euromarket which barely existed in 1983, has expanded rapidly and employs a distribution
channel set up for Eurobonds. For the first seven months of 1987 the Eurobond and new
international equity issues almost matched the 1986 level of slightly under $200 billion. Id.
589. For a discussion of the rapid changes occurring in the London markets and
elsewhere in Europe, see Hot Startups from Hong Kong to Hamburg, BUSINESS WEEK,
May 23, 1988, at 134. Not all equity on stock markets is the same. See Kristof, Stock
Markets' Role Grows in Chinese Economy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1989, at D10, col. 3 (in
China stock is similar to a chance to win a prize and prices, which are set by the govern-
ment sometimes as infrequently as once a month, show only an upward trend).
590. There is a small but well-defined "secondary market" in limited partnerships
(which may not have the essential characteristics of a secondary market since it is largely
unregulated and the market makers do not acquire an inventory). It consists of organized
electronic exchanges (such as the National Partnership Exchange (NAPEX)), investment
firms which have formed their own partnerships to purchase limited partnership interests,
and informal sources of sales and purchases, such as major brokerage houses. Partnership
Secondary Markets, THE STANGER REGISTER, Sept. 1987, at 36, 37-38. The total volume
of such activity is at least $300 million annually (or one-half to two percent of all outstand-
ing units). Id. at 36. In general, the purchasers of such units are interested in three year or
older units, id., and in income-oriented products or those with income-producing assets, id.
at 38.
591. A Look at Trading on the Secondary Market, Wall St. J., June 10, 1988, § 2,
at 25, col. 5 (noting the lack of published quotes and independent analyst valuations in
limited-partnership secondary markets). However, it is argued that even one who is rela-
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When the market becomes further attenuated, it is important to
ask whether the form of liquidity that is based on efficient infor-
mation and valuation is actually present. On the other hand, the
fact that an efficient market does not require a trading floor is
illustrated by the trading desks in investment banking houses for
institutional investors. 92
C. Proposal
If double taxation of an equity return is to be based on the
existence of liquidity, a test must be constructed that identifies the
value of liquidity to the firm and its owners. Liquidity is present
for exchange and NASDAQ securities because of structural fea-
tures that eliminate time risk, market risk, and to some extent,
valuation risk illiquidity. In cases of securities traded over-the-
counter, but not on NASDAQ, the value of liquidity decreases
since there is a diminution of the valuation mechanism. A thinly
traded market is less correctly predictive than an actively traded
market in reflecting equity value."'3 A thinly traded market con-
tains fewer of the liquidity benefits generally associated with pub-
lic trading,594 and the cost of acquiring information in such a mar-
tively unsophisticated can read a partnership income statement and form an idea as to
where the bids will be. Id. The secondary market in limited partnerships is characterized
by lack of liquidity, high transaction costs in the form of broker commissions and markups
by offering firms, and generally a small amount of research by offering firms and market
services. Korn, A New Market for Old Partnerships, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1989, § 3, at
11, col. 1.
592. For a discussion of the efficiency of trading desks used by large institutional
investors, see L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 164, at 81.
593. See Karpoff, The Relation Between Price Changes and Trading Volume: A
Survey, 22 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 109, 112 (1987)(finding that trading volume is
positively related to changes in price, thus proving the old Wall Street adage that "It takes
volume to make prices move."); see also Smirlock & Starks, An Empirical Analysis of the
Stock Price-Volume Relationship, 12 J. BANKING & FIN. 31, 40 (1988)("[K]nowledge of
the behavior of volume can marginally improve conditional price change forecasts based on
past price change forecasts alone.").
594. See Ho & Michaely, Information Quality and Market Efficiency, 23 J. FIN. &
QUANT. ANALYSIS 53, 54 (1988) (if information costs are the same for all stocks at equilib-
rium at the margin and depend upon the investor's risk preferences and since investors in
small stocks do not rationally purchase high quality and more costing information on the
firms, it suggests that the prices of small stock do not incorporate all publicly available
information and that the market alone cannot develop an informational efficient market for
thinly traded stocks); see also Amihud & Mendelson, Trading Mechanisms and Stock
Returns: An Empirical Investigation, 42 J. FIN. 533 (1987)(comparing the price of the
same stock in opening and closing transactions); Garbade & Silber, supra note 579 (estab-
lishing relationship between certain aspects of liquidity and key structural characteristics of
secondary markets); Ho, Schwartz & Whitcomb, The Trading Decision and Market
1138 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:965
ket may mean that the market is less efficient. Even the courts
share this view when called upon to value ownership interests for
tax purposes3 95
Regardless of whether one accepts any version of the efficient
market hypothesis, an efficient capital market depends on the
processing of information to determine price and value.596 Infor-
mation and its cost is a factor in judging market efficiency.597 A
Clearing Under Transaction Price Uncertainty, 40 J. FIN. 21 (1985)(comparing the effects
of trading friction due to batch trading to the Pareto efficient ideal); Smidt, Continuous
versus Intermittent Trading on Auction Markets, 14 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 837
(1979)(questioning assumptions normally made about market efficiency by introducing evi-
dence that systematic trading patterns depend on the processes which produce
transactions).
595. Long-standing judicial precedent has already adopted this principle. It holds
that the sales prices for thinly traded issues will be entitled to "very little weight" in deter-
mining fair market value. See Wood v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 853, 860 (Ct. Cl. 1939).
596. See Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New
Information, 10 INT'L ECON. REV. I (1969)(indirectly testing the efficient market hypothe-
sis by measuring the speed of price adjustments when specific types of new information
enter the market).
597. Information processing is the mechanism by which a market is efficient and the
cost of that information is a crucial determinant in efficiency. See Gilson & Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 556-57, 612 (1984)(conclud-
ing "that the cost of information critically determines market efficiency because it dictates
not only the amount of information attending a particular security but also the distribution
of that information among traders, which in turn determines the operative capital market
mechanism. . ." and that the "shorthand" descriptions of the forms of market efficiency
"impl[y] that different market dynamics are involved in the reflection of different kinds of
information into price, and that varying degrees of market efficiency might well be the
consequence"). For example, the number of sophisticated traders in the market may also
reflect whether prices fully reflect the information of the most sophisticated traders. See
Grossman & Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Information Efficient Markets, 70 AM.
ECON. REv. 393, 394-95 (1980)(model positing that prices fully reflect such information
only if all traders are sophisticated). Many studies view the role of information and the
setting of prices. See, e.g., Pincus, Information Characteristics of Earnings Announce-
ments and Stock Market Behavior, 21 J. AccT. Res. 155 (1983)(information announce-
ments are associated with differences in the speed of stock market adjustments and varia-
bility of expected returns); Ho & Michaely, supra note 594. The cost of information
relative to the return may make the market less efficient as has been argued for the initial
public offering market. See infra note 882, New financial instruments, such as unbundled
stock - a 30-year bond paying interest at the rate of the current dividend, a share of
preferred stock yielding dividends equal to the increase of the dividend on the common, and
an "equity appreciation certificate" which is a warrant to purchase common in the future
that replaced the common stock - which were proposed to be marketed to tax exempt
investors with a dilution of their voting rights, require information for valuation. Notwith-
standing their tax and alleged financial accounting attractiveness, see Sheppard, Unidenti-
fied Financial Object, 42 TAX NOTES 656 (1989), unbundled issues allegedly failed to gen-
erate market support, id. This may be precisely in part the failure of information due to its
relative cost that can result in a less than efficient valuation of the securities. See Gilson &
Kraakman, supra at 597-98, 615-16. Finally, the proposed issues failed to win the support
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less active market is less efficient in processing this necessary in-
formation. 598 Securities traded in a relatively inactive market
should not qualify as highly liquid for purposes of this author's
proposal. This conclusion is supported by valuation assumptions
about market efficiency applied by the courts. 99
The infrequent trading of ownership interests that can occur
in an over-the-counter market has been well documented. 600 Fre-
of the S.E.C. See Norris, S.E.C. Objection Dooms "Unbundled Stock Units", N.Y. Times,
Mar. 29, 1989, at D6, col. 3. Based on the cost and availability of information, the effi-
ciency of the market for limited partnerships interests is of limited efficiency. See supra
notes 590-91 and accompanying text. The Hamilton results supply strong support for the
hypothesis that the extent of price dispersion in the market is an economic decision based
on the costs and benefits of price information. See Hamilton, supra note 583. In the mar-
kets for unlisted common stock, the implementation of the NASDAQ system was a dis-
crete event that raised the marginal value and reduced the marginal cost of price informa-
tion. See id. at 69 (offering five hypotheses that relate the costs and benefits of information
to the extent of equilibrium quotation dispersion: (1) quotation dispersion relates inversely
to the volume of trading; (2) dispersion is greater as prices have greater temporal volatility,
since as supply and demand conditions are less stable, the value of market information
depreciates more rapidly; (3) if an investor has large or frequent transactions, the expected
benefit of search is greater than for smaller or infrequent transactions, and since financial
institutions are the large traders of unlisted stock, the third hypothesis is that stock held by
a larger number of institutions has less dispersion; (4) a large number of market-makers in
a stock increases quotation dispersion, for if each market-maker simply draws randomly
from the information set, then more market-makers increase dispersion and since more
searches are required to gather the same information, the cost of information is greater;
and (5) dispersion is greater for higher-priced stocks).
598. For example, the regional securities sub-market (NASDAQ-reported, geo-
graphically-based firms) which exhibits low trading volume, is not widely held, and has
only a limited national exposure has been shown to have a higher systematic risk compo-
nent. Senchak & Beedles, -Price Behavior in a Regional Over-the-Counter Securities Mar-
ket, 2 J. FIN. REs. 119, 119 (1979)(five-year study of price behavior and investment char-
acteristics of the common stock of 47 southwestern firms). "This investment medium may
provide relatively frequent opportunities for extremely large yields for the individual inves-
tor. In return, the investor must cope with the high risk, which may be caused by the
infrequency with which important information arrives, inadequate monitoring of the infor-
mation by others, and the illiquidity associated with positioning in a thinly traded stock."
Id. at 129.
599. Generally the market price for traded shares is accepted as the correct valua-
tion under the view that the market has dealt with all the available information correctly.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Commissioner, 673 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1982)(information if known on
valuation date would have depressed the price of stock not considered). But see, e.g., Estate
of W.E. Telling, 1944 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (P-H) 44,222 (lack of public information
regarding merger negotiations and the value of certain intangibles one of rationales for
disregarding market quotations). If the market is made up of relatively sophisticated inves-
tors, see Downer v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 86, 94 (1967)(presence of unsophisticated in-
vestors in market considered in discounting value of stock in question).
600. See, e.g., Dimson, Risk Measurement When Shares Are Subject to Infrequent
Trading, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 197 (1979). The disadvantages of thin trading, see supra notes
593-94 and accompanying text, support proposals to limit to public trading status, if not
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quent offers and acceptances ensure liquidity while maintaining
low price volatility.6°' The price assigned by the market to thinly
traded shares is demonstrably lower than the actual value of those
shares.6"2 The value of volume trading has been well docu-
mented.60 3 These observations lead to the conclusion that any
market other than an exchange or NASDAQ market must be
tested for adequacy of liquidity. An appropriate test of liquidity
might be based on NASDAQ listing requirements for number of
owners and firm size.60 4 Similarly, the Federal Reserve's margin
requirements restricting marginable stock to exchange and NAS-
DAQ/NMS traded (and selected other) stocks, based on factors
that target firms with a low price variance, could be helpful in
determining a presumption of liquidity. The decision to view size
as relative to the value of liquidity is not the same as the un-
focused application of the graduated corporate tax rates to aid
capital formation for small business. The liquidity that institu-
tional investors will enjoy upon adoption of proposed Rule 144A
will satisfy the liquidity based test and will result in a growing
category of corporations subject to the corporate tax that do not
have public ownership in the traditional sense.6 °0
However; liquidity tests alone may be insufficient to establish
which firms should be subject to double taxation. Numerous em-
pirical studies demonstrate the "small-firm effect" which postu-
lates that small firms have higher risk-adjusted returns than larger
firms and a higher cost of capital.60  Thus, the lack of liquidity in
more than a certain percentage of the ownership interests are traded during the year. See,
e.g., Letter from Blake D. Rubin on Behalf of the National Partnership Exchange, Inc. to
Dep't of Treasury (Mar. 16, 1988)(found in full in the Tax Notes Microfiche Database
Doc. No. 88-3027)(proposing safe harbor if 10% or fewer of the interests in a partnership
are traded annually)(88 TNT 69-49).
601. Cf. Lippman & McCall, supra note 556, at 47-48 (liquidity increases with the
thickness of the market, defined by the frequency of transactions in highly organized mar-
kets characterized by brisk trading, but not stating a relationship for thin markets).
602. For example, see the going private transactions of Piece Goods Shops, Inc. and
Perfect Fit, Inc. Each had a thinly traded market which discouraged institutional investor
interest. As a result, the companies traded at a discount relative to comparable companies
whose stocks were actively traded. E. CRAWFORD, A MANAGEMENT GUIDE TO LEVERAGED
BuYouTs 13, 114-21, 147-53 (1987).
603. See supra notes 593-94.
604. The NASDAQ listing requirements are discussed infra note 934.
605. See supra notes 65-67 and infra notes 1065-69 and accompanying text.
606. See supra notes 510-25 and accompanying text.
607. Banz, The Relationship Between Return and Market Value of Common
Stocks, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1981)(smaller firms have, on average, higher risk-adjusted
yields); Reinganum, Misspecification of Capital Asset Pricing: Empirical Anomalies
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the over-the-counter market could be coupled with an economic
size test for the imposition of the corporate tax on the equity com-
ponent.6 08 Small firms do not survive long in the market. 09 Where
Based on Earnings' Yields and Market Values, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 19 (1981)(arguing that
firm-size effect subsumes earnings-price effect and that the one-period capital asset pricing
model is either misspecified or capital markets are inefficient).
It has been argued that understating the risk of small firm portfolios does not explain
the small firm effect. See James & Edmister, The Relation Between Common Stock Re-
turns Trading Activity and Market Value, 38 J. FIN. 1075 (1983)(although firm size and
trading activity are related, differences in trading activity are not the underlying reason for
the firm size anomaly); Reinganum, A Direct Test of Roll's Conjecture on the Firm Size
Effect, 37 J. FIN. 27 (1982)(while direction of bias in estimated beta may contribute to
small firm effect, magnitude of bias is too small to entirely explain firm size effect). Other
explanations of the small firm effect have been offered. One is that firms listed for short
periods of time have larger excess returns. See Brown & Berry, Anomalies in Security
Returns and the Specification of the Market Model, 39 J. FIN. 807 (1984)(excess returns
explained by misspecifications relating to listing periods of securities in the model used to
measure systematic risk). Another explanation is found in the anomalies associated with
biases in measuring data. See Roll, On Computing Mean Returns and the Small Firm
Premium, 12 J. FIN. ECON. 371 (1983)(concluding that models estimating systemic risk are
biased whenever securities are classified by any variable related to trading volume). A third
explanation is that the actual risk effect is not caught by beta or variance measures based
on actual Standard and Poor quality ratings. See Friend & Lang, The Size Effect on Stock
Returns, 12 J. BANKING & FIN. 13 (1988)(explaining size effect as the result of inadequate
measures of risk and proposing that quality rankings for common stock are superior to beta
and variance measures). A fourth explanation is that information relative to the firm may
explain the small firm effect. See Collins, Kothari & Rayburn, Firm Size and the Informa-
tion Content of Prices with Respect to Earnings, 9 J. AccT. & ECON. 111, 136 (1987)(firm
size is a proxy for the amount of available information about a firm and the number of
traders and professional analysts processing that information; empirical results support the
hypothesis that price-based earnings will outperform univariate time series forecasts by a
greater margin for larger firms than for smaller firms based on the predictive accuracy of
price-based earnings forecasts); Freeman, The Association Between Accounting Earnings
and Security Returns for Large and Small Firms, 9 J. AcCT. & ECON. 195 (1988)(securi-
ties prices for large firms anticipate accounting profits earlier than those for small firms
and, for a given level of unexpected returns, the cumulative abnormal returns for small
firms are larger); see also Ho & Michaely, supra note 594 (prices of small stocks may not
incorporate all public information, and general publication of information, as in a newspa-'
per, can affect stock prices). Finally, the small firm effect has been explained as the result
of the market signaling effect created by "good" firms that find it necessary to underprice
initial public offerings to separate themselves from the perception that only the "bad" firms
come to the market for equity. See F. Allen & G. Faulhaber, Signaling By Underpricing in
the IPO Market (Wharton School Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania, Sept.
1988). For a review and synthesis of firm size effect research, see Schwert, Size and Stock
Returns and Other Empirical Regularities, 12 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1983).
608. For example, Ward's Business Directory of Public Firms lists only 315 firms in
the non-NASDAQ over-the-counter market that have sales in excess of $500,000. Data
compiled by research assistant from WARD'S I, infra note 930
609. Queen & Roll, Firm Mortality: Using Market Indicators to Predict Survival,
FIN. ANALYSTS J., May - June 1987, at 9 (size is the most reliable variable for predicting
survivability of firm, with small firms having only even odds of surviving).
1142 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:965
issuing costs are higher for smaller public firms offering new eq-
uity issues,61 0 the lack of trading opportunities plus higher equity
capital costs could negate the presumed presence of liquidity as a
basis for the tax. Thus, the proposal could also eliminate firms on
the basis of economic size measured by both an assets and a sales
test,61' with the amounts to be determined by the relevant evi-
dence on the financial capability of such firms. To the extent that
the risks of small firms in initial public offerings have been coun-
tered by liquidity enhancing features, such as "puttable stock"
with downside valuation protection, the value of that liquidity
should be considered.61 2
Finally, the value of liquidity created by private contract
must be analyzed to see if it provides the lower cost of capital that
is provided by liquidity in the public market. The well-known the-
ory of bounded rationality61 suggests that a private contract may
610. Data from 1974 to 1975 on the costs of underwriting new equity issues offerings
shows an increasingly small cost of floation for larger issues than for smaller issues. See
Smith, Alternative Methods for Raising Capital: Rights Versus Underwritten Offerings, 5
J. FIN. ECON. 273, 276-77 (1977)(Table 1). Moreover, leverage ratios may be related to
firm size and the higher cost of borrowing for small firms. See Ang, Chua & McConnell,
The Administrative Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A Note, 37 J. FIN. 219 (1982)(dis-
cussing bankruptcy costs as a determinant of corporate capital structure); Warner, Bank-
ruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337 (1977)(concluding from models of capital
structure that direct bankruptcy costs fall as the firm's market value increases). This sug-
gests that large firms should be more highly leveraged than small firms since direct bank-
ruptcy costs appear to constitute a larger portion of the firm's value as the value decreases
and that relatively large firms tend to be more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy. See
Titman & Wessels, supra note 212, at 5-6 (suggesting that small firms may be more lever-
aged than large firms and prefer to borrow short term through bank loans rather than issue
long-term debt because of the lower fixed costs associated with the former). Issuing costs
may also include the fact that investment bankers are conservative and provide insurance
by underpricing new issues for both IPOs and seasoned new issues of small firms. See
Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43 J. FIN. 718, 819 (1988).
611. The proposal is correlated with the data from Ward's on the number of small
over-the-counter firms with sales over $500,000. See supra note 608.
612. Puttable stock consists of a share of common stock with a right guaranteed by
the issuer (together a "unit") that allows the unit holder to claim more stock if its market
price falls below a stated level. Puttable stock is similar to convertible bonds in that it
provides downside protection while allowing full participation in the upside potential. See
Chen & Kensinger, Puttable Stock: A New Innovation in Equity Financing, FIN. MGMT.
Spring 1988, at 27.
613. "The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex
problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required
for objectively rational behavior in the real world." H. SIMON, supra note 442, at 198
(emphasis omitted); March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiquity and the Engineering of
Choice, 9 BELL J. ECON 587 (1978). For a description of bounded rationality, see Simon,
Theories of Bounded Rationality, in 2 MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 408 (H. Simon ed. 1982).
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be less likely than the market to produce an efficient result. Re-
demption, put, and other arrangements within firms must be
tested for whether they provide the time, market risk, and valua-
tion certainty of a liquid public market. While negotiated con-
tracts may fail because of the lack of information necessary for an
informed agreement, safeguards in contractual arrangements
which seek to produce fully informed results through audit, ap-
praisal, sophistication of the participants, and the like must be
tested.614 The infrequency of sales and redemptions strains valua-
tion risk liquidity, time limitations strain time risk liquidity, and
the lack of a guaranteed market and capitalization to fund re-
demptions strains market risk liquidity. Many of these issues were
faced within the framework of the safe harbor notice of the 1987
publicly traded partnership legislation. 615 These issues must be ad-
dressed again in a specific inquiry into the value of liquidity,
rather than through a test that is based on "resemblance" to a
secondary market and that does not look into the function that
that secondary market is asked to perform.
614. Private contractural arrangements also raise questions as to whether valuation
liquidity will exist. Agency theory suggests that larger information assymetries exist in the
private rather than public market due to absence of public information and lesser competi-
tion for the firm. In preliminary data, an empirical case is made for the private information
leading to higher returns for bidders for acquisitions of small, private firms and over-the-
counter firms compared to exchange listed targets. See N. Giannaris & W. Megginson,
The Returns to Bidders in Small Versus Large Firm Acquisitions, (University of Georgia
Working Paper, Apr. 1989). Nonetheless, the ability of an efficient market to exist between
pairs of traders who are agents with incomplete information has been demonstrated. See
Deere, Bilateral Trading as an Efficient Auction over Time, 96 J. POL. ECON. 100 (1988);
Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8
(1961)(first-price, reserve auctions generate efficient outcomes). This occurs even though
the actual trades between the agents are inefficient. See Myerson & Satterthwai, Efficient
Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, 29 J. EcON. THEORY 265 (1983). The negotiation in a
firm for a buyout where others may possess more complete information is not the same
process. Accurate pricing can occur where there are significant information asymmetries
among participants as long as there are enough sophisticated investors to understand the
contract terms. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 597, at 569-70; Schwartz & Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 640-51 (1979); cf. Brudney, Corporate Governance,
Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1420-27 (1985)(ar-
guing that market pricing cannot substitute for actual bargaining). Liquidity by a single
firm or individual places the residual owner in the position of having to rely on the credit-
worthiness of that party which may be a greater risk than that afforded by a market where
there are literally thousands of investors willing to buy at a price and who have access to
the purchase. The illiquidty factory for repurchases in some industries is classic. See
Jarchow, The Real Estate Liquidity Crisis, 15 REAL ESTATE REv. 48 (1986).
615. See infra notes 661-71 and accompanying text.
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IV. PRESENT AND PROPOSED PROVISIONS THAT DRAW THE
LINE FOR DOUBLE TAXATION ON THE BASIS OF PUBLIC
TRADING
The United States has not distinguished between public and
private firms under the classical corporate tax system. No tax on
undistributed profits has been adopted that makes any distinction
between public and private firms, nor have split rate systems,
other than a graduated rate on corporate income, been adopted.
While a publicly traded or readily tradable standard has never
been used to identify those entities subject to double taxation, a
similar standard has been used for other tax law purposes. For
example, public trading is a definitional mechanism for valua-
tion,6 16  control, 617  and targeted economic incentives. 18  Since
1987, the publicly traded concept has been used to identify enti-
ties subject to the double tax.
A. Proposals by Congressional Committees and the Treasury
In 1983, the Staff of the Senate Finance Committee, in its
616. See I.R.C. § 453 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989). See also Temp. Treas. Reg. §
15A.453-1(b)(3)(i), -l(e)(4)(i)-(iv) (1981). An interest is readily tradeable if the interest
is "regularly quoted" by brokers or dealers who make a market in the interest or if the
interest is part of a security issue, a portion of which is in fact traded in an established
securities market. Id. at § 15A.453-1(e)(4)(iii). The established securities market is de-
fined as a market where quotations are distributed among brokers and dealers in a publica-
tion of general circulation. Id. at § 15A.453-1(e)(4)(iv). The installment sale regulations
do not address whether a thin market constitutes a regularly quoted interest. The original
issue discount rules also operate based on distinctions between whether the instrument is-
sued is publicly offered or traded. See I.R.C. § 1273(b)(1)-(3) (West 1988 & Supp.
1989)(defining issue price).
617. I.R.C. § 170(e)(5) (West 1988). See T.D. 8199, 53 Fed. Reg. 16,076 (1988).
Publicly-traded securities under I.R.C. § 170(e) are limited to securities which are: regu-
larly traded on the over-the-counter market for which published quotations are available,
listed on an exchange in which quotations are published on a daily basis, or represent a
share in an open-end investment company for which quotations are published on a daily
basis. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi) (1988). Under the definition of an over-the-
counter market, trades are public if average trading and total volume during weekly and
monthly periods are circulated in a newspaper of general circulation within a month follow-
ing the computational period. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)(B) (1988). In addition,
restrictions that "[m]aterially affect the value of the securities to the donor or [which]
prevent the securities from being freely traded" keep the securities from being treated as
publicly traded. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)(C) (1988). Fair market value is not
necessarily equal to market price, average trading price, or face value. Treas. Reg. §
1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)(D) (1988).
618. See I.R.C. § 1042(c)(l)(West 1988)(ESOP rollover treatment for sale of secur-




Preliminary Report on the Reform and Simplification of the In-
come Taxation of Corporations, proposed public trading as a sepa-
rate criterion for imposition of the corporate tax on unincorpo-
rated entities.619 This proposal would have affirmed neutrality by
taxing similar organizations to the same degree. In hearings on
the proposal, the Treasury and others opposed the Staff's recom-
mendation on the ground that it was beyond the intended scope of
the report, which was originally directed at the structure of corpo-
rate taxation. 20 After a review of the taxation of all similar busi-
ness organizations, including REITs, the Treasury stated that
"one would conclude that the degree of marketability of an organ-
ization's equity interests should [not] determine the manner in
which the organization is taxed."'6 21 The Treasury noted that "a
concern of the Staff may be that adoption of the other significant
proposals in the report would increase the disparity between the
taxation of partnership[s] and corporate profits and thereby pro-
vide incentives for conducting in partnership form many activities
presently conducted by corporations. 622 In October of 1983, how-
ever, the Treasury felt that the concern of "migration" to partner-
ship form was "overstated". due to the "increased reporting and
record-keeping requirements, and the uncertainties and state-to-
state inconsistencies relating to the substantive law of partner-
ships.1 623 However, evidence shows that the Treasury overesti-
mated these tax and nontax restraints.624
619. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., IST SESS., STAFF PRELIMI-
NARY REPORT ON THE REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF COR-
PORATIONS 80 (Comm. Print 1983). Based on neutrality principles, the Report recom-
mended that limited partnerships be treated as associations and taxed as corporations if
their ownership interests are publicly traded as measured by "an established securities
market" (as might be defined under the installment sales regulations). The Report also
noted the problems of administering such partnerships under Subchapter K. Id. at 106.
620. Reform of Corporate Taxatior" Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1983)[hereinafter 1983 Corporate Taxation Hearing] (statement
of Ronald Pearlman, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Dep't of the Treasury). Other grounds
included: (I) that the conclusion should be reached only after review of the taxation of all
similar business organizations, and (2) that at that time the Treasury was not prepared to




623. Id. at 64.
624. Less than two months earlier, at the annual meeting of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, knowledgeable practitioners exhibited great familiarity, skill, and patience in cop-
ing with the extremely difficult tax and securities law problems that publicly traded limited
partnerships engender. Emerging Financial Alternatives, supra note 585. Notwithstanding
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The final Staff Report on corporate taxation, issued in 1985,
eliminated the recommendation for classification based on public
trading, apparently because the report was issued after the Trea-
sury had published its broader proposal requiring limited partner-
ships with more than thirty-five partners to be treated as corpora-
tions. 25 In 1986, the Treasury, influenced by concerns about the
administration of publicly traded entities under Subchapter K, re-
vived the public trading test 26 and reversed its attitude toward
some of the problems it had earlier perceived. 27 Its revival of the
test was based on administrative concerns, the migration of public
corporations to publicly traded limited partnerships, and the spec-
ter of start up firms as publicly traded limited partnerships. 2
B. Public Trading as a Worldwide Standard in Taxation
The concept of a publicly traded entity has been recognized
in different tax contexts throughout the world. United States tax
treaties typically bar firms from "treaty shopping," but refuse to
look behind the ownership of corporations that are publicly traded
on an exchange in either of the contracting states.629 Other coun-
these difficulties, one panelist was able to predict that "[t]he deals in progress mentioned
today will soon lead us to the point where we have publicly traded partnerships in areas in
which we have not traditionally seen partnerships used as operating entities." Id. at 736
(statement of S. Million).
625. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 99TH CONG., IsT SEss., THE SUB-
CHAPTER C REVISION ACT OF 1985, at 8, 9 (Comm. Print 1985); 1985 CORPORATE PRO-
POSALS, supra note 300, at 56-57 n.109. That provision was not incorporated in the Trea-
sury report to the President. PRESIDENT'S STUDY, supra note.8, at 147.
626. 1986 House Passthrough Hearings, supra note 30, at 28-30, 30 n.13, 31-32
(statement of J. Roger Mentz)(noting that although the 1977 Blueprint study recom-
mended corporate integration in a pure partnership passthrough model, the more recent
1984 study proposed a system of dividend relief based on the unfeasability of the full inte-
gration system).
627. 1987 Senate MLP Hearing, supra note 30, at 53 (statement of J. Roger
Mentz)(anticipated problems included: the inability of an MLP to determine profit or loss
shares for a partner who only participated for a portion of the year, the classification of
MLP income as passive income, and whether it could be offset by passive losses). See also
1983 Corporate Taxation Hearing, supra note 620, at 64 (statement of Ronald Pearlman).
TEFRA in 1982 eliminated or reduced many problems, but allocation problems are to a
certain degree present in every partnership. However, these problems are diminished in
publicly traded partnerships because "the reporting requirements imposed on publicly
traded and registered partnerships and the public scrutiny these organizations receive make
them less likely to engage in abusive activities than partnerships with fewer partners." Id.
628. See infra note 659.
629. Under the June 16, 1981 proposed draft of the United States Treasury Model
Treaty, relief from double taxation is only available for corporations trading on an ap-
proved exchange, which is defined as any exchange registered with the S.E.C. and NAS-
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tries impose different rates on public and private companies by
either taxing publicly held firms at a higher rate, as in Canada,630
or at a lower rate, as in Australia,6 3 1 Cyprus,632 India,633 Paki-
stan,634 Thailand, 635 and South Korea.6 3 6 While Canada proposed
DAQ. See U.S. TREASURY MODEL TREATY art. 16 (1981), reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES
(CCH) 152.A. A similar provision is included in the Convention Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of Australia for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income,
Aug. 6, 1982, United States-Australia, art. 16(1)(b), (2), T.I.A.S. No. 10773 (entered into
force Dec. 1, 1983). The public trading provision appears in a section designed to limit
treaty benefits to residents of the treaty partners. Its effectiveness, since it fails to look to
the nationalities of the owners, is questioned in Comm. on U.S. Activities of Foreign Tax-
payers, New York City Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Report on Proposed United States Model
Income Tax Treaty, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 219, 261-63 (1983).
630. Upon paying a dividend, only a Canadian-controlled, private corporation is al-
lowed a refund of a portion of the tax under the refundable "dividend on hand" procedure.
See 4 Can. Tax Rep. (CCH) I 20,044a, at 19,039 (1988); Income Tax Act, ch. 63, §
129(1), (3), 1970-72 Can. Stat. 1307, 1648-50 (1971), reprinted in 9 Can. Tax Rep.
(CCH) 58,000, at 37,434-37 (1988).
631. Australian tax law continued to distinguish between public and private compa-
nies even after the July 1, 1987 effective date for the Imputation System for the Taxation
of Dividends, although since the effective date for the imputation system, private or public
status does not affect the tax liability. See Berg & Orrock, Business Operations in Austra-
lia, Tax Management: Foreign Investment Portfolios (BNA) No. 127-4th, at C&A-8 to -9,
B-1801 (1987). Public companies are defined as: (1) those with shares (other than fixed
dividend shares) listed on any stock exchange on the last day of the year, and (2) compa-
nies that are subsidiaries of other public companies throughout the whole year. A listed
company is deemed to be a private company if twenty or fewer persons either control 75 %
or more of the voting power or equity in the company or possess the right to 75% or more
of .he dividends or return of capital. Prior to integration, the primary tax rate for all com-
panies was the same (46% of taxable income). See I. WALLSCHUTZKY, AUSTRALIAN IN-
COME TAX LAW 338-39 (1986). But private companies were liable for an additional tax
equal to 50% of the "undistributed amount." Id. at 339. The distinction between private
and public companies is based on the idea that a private company is able to make decisions
to accumulate income at lower rates and thus avoid distribution.
632. The basic Cypriote corporate tax rate is 42.5%. PRICE WATERHOUSE INFORMA-
TION GUIDE, CORPORATE TAXES: A WORLDWIDE SUMMARY 95 (1988). "Public companies,
including private companies which became public, are taxed during the first ten years from
commencement of operations or from the date when they became public at the reduced
rate of 25% instead of the standard company rate of 42.5 %." Id. at 98.
633. Widely held Indian companies are taxed at a rate of 50% to 55%, depending
on the amount of taxable income; whereas closely held Indian industrial companies are
taxed at a rate of 55% to 60%. Id. at 187.
634. "The term 'public company' implies a company listed on any stock exchange in
Pakistan, or one in which not less than 50% of the shares are held by the Pakistan govern-
ment or a trust formed under Pakistan law." Id. at 329. The general income tax rate for
companies other than banks is 30%. There is also a supertax of 25% that allows rebates
for public companies depending on industry. Id.
635. Juristic companies and partnerships in Thailand pay taxes at a rate of 35%,
while companies registered on the securities exchange of Thailand are taxed at a rate of
30%. Id. at 430.
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full integration on both undistributed and distributed profits, it en-
acted a system that provides full dividend relief for Canadian-con-
trolled private companies and partial dividend relief for others.63 7
This distinction remains in force even after the most recent tax
reform. 38 At least one country, France, recognizes that firms that
can offer ownership interests on the public market in a manner
analogous to corporations should be included within the corporate
tax regime.639
These foreign practices show that public trading is recognized
as a test for distinguishing between firms. The variety of uses for
which the public trading distinction is employed indicates a num-
ber of different policies at work. Taxing public firms at a lower
rate than private firms is based on the presumed tendency of pri-
vate firms to improperly accumulate income. When public firms
are taxed at a higher rate, the presumption is that smaller enter-
prises ought to pay lower taxes. The split rate systems implement
a policy that encourages both domestic capital formation and the
establishment of smaller firms. Tax treaties that favor firms that
are domestically incorporated and traded on local exchanges ac-
cept the principle that the firm is a separate entity from the
owners.
C. The 1987 Publicly Traded Partnership Legislation
The stop-gap 1987 legislation on publicly traded partner-
ships640 was without a theoretical basis or a fully delineated con-
stituency. The rationale for including publicly traded partnerships
in the double tax regime was based on a statutory determination
636. The first 50 million of income is taxed at the same 20% rate for general Korean
corporations, large non-listed corporations, and nonprofit corporations; the balance of the
firm's income is taxed at 30% for general corporations, 33% for large non-listed corpora-
tions, and 27 % for nonprofit corporations. Id. at 235.
637. For a description of the classification of Canadian corporations, see Andison,
Categories of Corporations, in REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE 24TH ANNUAL TAX CON-
FERENCE 73 (1972).
638. See Bucovetsky & Bird, Tax Reform in Canada: A Progress Report, 25 NAT'L
TAX J. 15 (1972)(discussing the process by which the Canadian Income Tax Code was
comprehensively revised in 1972). In 1988 Canada adopted significant new tax legislation
that does not alter the treatment of corporations.
639. Limited partnerships with shares (societe en commandite par actions/SCPA)
which with the possibility of offering negotiable shares enables it to make a public offering
of its shares also are subject to varying degrees to the corporate income tax. See 1 SIMEON
MOQUET BORDE & ASSOCIATES, DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE T 5.5[2], at 5-128.1 (1987).
640. I.R.C. § 7704 (West Supp. 1989).
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that a partnership is publicly traded if its interests are "traded on
an established securities market" or if "interests in such partner-
ship are readily tradable on a secondary market (or the substan-
tial equivalent thereof)."641 Congress acted to prevent the prolifer-
ation of business structures that it believed violated the neutrality
principle. 42 These structures included any that resembled corpo-
rations in general 43 and publicly traded corporations in particu-
lar,644 but that were taxed as partnerships. Congress did not base
the double taxation of publicly traded partnerships on the unique
value of a public market, but rather on the "unique administrative
difficulties"6 45 inherent in taxing like entities differently. The leg-
islation was directed only at publicly traded partnerships under an
actual trading or readily tradable standard. The House version of
the bill, which was not enacted, would have broadened the test to
include an "expectation" of public trading.646 Nonetheless, the
legislative history of the Conference Report left the definition of
"readily tradable" very broad. According to some commentators
and the language of the Report, the definition was based on a
market trading benchmark.647
The "readily tradable" standard of the 1987 legislation is
supported by the legislative history that states, "[a] secondary
market is generally indicated by the existence of a person standing
ready to make a market in the interest. 61 48 The relevance of ready
tradability in a secondary market or a substantially equivalent
641. I.R.C. § 7704(b) (West Supp. 1989).
642. "[T]he committee believes that these types of entities and their holders gener-
ally should be treated similarly for tax purposes." 1987 House REPORT, supra note 46, at
1066.
643. Id. ("in important respects, publicly traded partnerships resemble cor-
porations").
644. Id. ("Publicly traded partnerships resemble publicly traded corporations in their
business functions and in the way their interests are marketed, and limited partners as a
practical matter resemble corporate shareholders in that they have limited liability, may
freely transfer their interests, generally do not participate in management, and expect con-
tinuity of life of the entity for the duration of the conduct of its business enterprise.").
645. Id. at 1067.
646. See id. at 1070 (investors expect that a secondary market exists "where the
interests are marketed with representations that there is likely to be a ready market for
resale or other disposition of the interests or rights to income or other attributes thereof (or
that the promoter or issuer intends to take steps so that such a market is created)").
647. See Committee on Partnerships, New York State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Re-
port on Issues Concerning the Definition of Publicly Traded Partnerships (June 15, 1988)
[hereinafter N.Y. Bar Report] (found in full text in the Tax Notes Microfiche Database
Doc. No. 88-5534a-d, 88 TNT 130-8 (June 27, 1988)).
648. 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 224, at 948.
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market is more cryptic. Ownership interests traded in secondary
markets have been described as readily tradable in a number of
instances, including where: (1) "the interest is regularly quoted by
persons such as brokers or dealers who are making a market in
the interest . . on a market essentially equivalent to an over the
counter market,"64 (2) "there is not an identifiable market maker
but the holder of an interest has a readily available, regular and
ongoing opportunity to sell or exchange his interest through a
public means of obtaining or providing information of offers to
buy, sell or exchange interests,6 50 (3) "prospective buyers and
sellers have the opportunity to buy, sell or exchange interests in a
time frame and with the regularity and continuity that the exis-
tence of a market maker would provide,"6 51 or (4) there is "[a]
regular plan of redemptions or repurchases, or similar acquisitions
of interests in the partnership such that the holders of interests
have readily available, regular and ongoing opportunities to dis-
pose of their interests."6 52 The House and Conference reports did
not discuss the duties of market makers or the quality of informa-
tion necessary to provide a sufficient public or private means of
disposing of an interest. Nor did the reports address the effective-
ness of those mechanisms in creating liquidity. 53
According to the Conference Report, "[a]n over the counter
market is characterized by an interdealer quotation system which
regularly disseminates quotations of obligations by identified bro-
kers or dealers, by electronic means or otherwise." 54 One of the
649. Id. See also 1987 HousE REPORT, supra note 46 at 1070.
650. 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 224, at 948.
651. Id. at 948.
652. Id. at 949. See also 1987 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 46, at 1070.
653. In language not present in the House Report, the Conference Report described
interests that would not be treated as readily tradable as follows:
If interests can be traded in a market that is publicly available, but offers to buy
or sell interests are normally not accepted in a time frame comparable to that
which would be available on a secondary market, then the interests are not
treated as readily tradable on the substantial equivalent of a secondary market.
For example, if interests are quoted and traded on an irregular basis as a result
of bid and asked prices listed on a computerized system, and such interests can-
not normally be disposed of within the time that they could be disposed of on an
over the counter market, then the interests are not considered as readily tradable
on the substantial equivalent of a secondary market.
1987 Conference Report, supra note 224, at 948. This language was directed at the infor-
mation regarding sales of limited partnership interests provided by third party matching
services and desks maintained by brokerage houses that had sold the interests. N.Y. Bar
Report, supra note 647, at 27-31.
654. 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 224, at 947.
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main problems with the definition is that it focuses on the mere
existence of a market rather than the efficiency of that market.
While the legislative history finds that time delays indicate non-
equivalence to a secondary market, other features indicating illi-
quidity are not mentioned. Finding an effective secondary market
for publicly traded shares listed on the various exchanges or in the
NASDAQ system is not difficult. The legislative history indicates
that the statute would also apply to an over-the-counter market
such as the pink sheet market. Although time, market, valuation,
and liquidity risks received some attention from Congress, they
were not addressed explicitly.6 55
In any test involving public trading of a security, the goal
should be to identify an efficient market or contract rather than to
identify the mere existence of a market or an ability to sell. In
most cases, efficiency will follow from the existence of the market
or the contractual right.6 56 While a market maker may be recog-
nized as a source for obtaining stock, in the over-the-counter mar-
ket the market maker has no obligation to continue to deal in a
security,"'7 and in the non-NASDAQ markets the requirements
are even less stringent. While a firm or an individual may stand
ready to purchase an interest at any time, they may lack the
reserves to make good on the promise. Thus, in establishing a
market reference, the legislation failed to discuss the quality of
market makers or contractual provisions giving rise to liquidity.
The value of liquidity was never explicitly discussed in the
655. The legislative history included some discussion of illiquidity in secondary mar-
kets. The Conference Report stated that partnership interests that cannot "normally be
disposed of within the time that they could be disposed of on an over the counter market
• . . are not considered as readily tradeable on the substantial equivalent of a secondary
market." Id. at 948. It also stated that partnership interests should not be treated as read-
ily tradeable "where there are occasional accommodation trades of partnership interests
• . . not pursuant to a put or call right, or where the underwriter that handled the issuance
of the partnership interests occasionally arranges such accommodation trades." Id. These
include buy-sell arrangements among partners. Id. at 948-49. On the other hand, the
House Report stated that "[a] regular plan of redemptions or repurchases, or similar ac-
quisitions of interests in the partnership such that holders of interests have readily available
opportunities to dispose of their interests . . . indicates that the interests are readily trade-
able .... " 1987 HousE REPORT, supra note 46, at 1070.
656. There are various dangers posed by inefficient markets. See, e.g., $250,000 Fine
Imposed on Penny Stockbroker, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1988, at D2, ol. 3 (securities firm
charged excessive and fraudulent mark-ups on penny stock securities where 97% of the
market in one company's stock was controlled by the firm and it charged mark-ups of 11 %
to 150% above the price it paid for the stock).
657. BRADY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 575, at VI-50 to VI-54.
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Committee reports or in the prior hearings on the Master Limited
Partnership (MLP) issue; nor did Congress discuss a different ra-
tionale for deciding that "public" firms or firms with traded eq-
uity resemble corporations more than private ones. 58 Even though
the legislation was aimed at firms that resembled corporations and
the problem of disincorporation, the underlying focus was to pre-
vent start up businesses from forming as publicly traded partner-
ships.659 While the legislation focused on publicly traded limited
partnerships, it included any "publicly traded partnership" as
well. In addition, the test for trading - the "substantial [ly]
equivalent" to a secondary market test - was broad in scope.
The legislation was directed at a perceived problem and no
explicit normative rationale was given for the focus on liquidity.
The legislative history included references to market concepts of
timing but did not focus specifically on valuation.6 ' As a result,
further guidance from the Service was required. This guidance
came in the form of an administrative notice (pending final regu-
lation) that created safe harbor limitations on the definitional sec-
tion of the legislation 6 1 and added both a market-based and
transaction-based context to the legislative intent.662 The theoreti-
658. See supra note 274.
659. The dialogue at the MLP hearings made it clear that the main focus was the
further erosion of the corporate tax base and the creation of start-up MLPs. After noting
the fact that changes in the corporate tax base in 1986 were geared to raise significant tax
revenue from the corporate sector, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy
testified that allowing new start-up companies favorable tax treatment by organizing as
MLPs would be as unfair as having a "rule that said all corporations doing business in
Montana would not have to pay a corporate level tax." See Senate MLP Hearing, supra
note 30, at 46-49 (statement of J. Roger Mentz).
660. No mention of valuation seems to have been made in the House, Senate, or
Conference Reports.
661. See Advance Notice 88-75, 1988-27 I.R.B. 29 (issued June 15, 1988) [hereinaf-
ter Advance Notice]. The safe harbor will be incorporated into regulations that have not
yet been issued. Id. For a discussion of the safe harbor, see Loffman, Presant & Lipton,
The Impact of Notice 88-75 Concerning Publicly Traded Partnerships, 40 TAX NOTES 747
(1988); Adler, Master Limited Partnerships, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 755, 775-77 (1988).
662. Publicly traded partnerships may also be protected from double taxation if their
partnership income is mostly passive income. I.R.C. § 7704(c) (West Supp. 1989). Fur-
thermore, many publicly traded partnerships enjoy a five-year exemption from association
status by the 1987 legislation's grandfather clause. This clause will protect a partnership
unless it adds "a substantial new line of business" after the legislation's effective date.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10211(c)(2)(B), 101
Stat. 1330, 1330-405.
Publicly traded partnerships are also singled out for special treatment under the pas-
sive loss rules, I.R.C. § 469(k) (West 1988), and under the provision that treats income
from such partnerships as unrelated business taxable income for tax-exempt investors.
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cal basis of the notice is unclear. Nevertheless, practitioners were
satisfied with the guidance since the variety of partnership trans-
fer mechanisms caused concern in the business community.
The notice provides a safe harbor for three separate forms of
transactions. First, private placements are protected if: (1) the in-
terests are issued in a transaction not registered under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, and (2) "either (A) the partnership does not
have more than 500 partners, or (B) the initial offering price of
each unit" is at least $20,000 and the units cannot be subdivided
for resale into units with initial offering prices of less than
$20,000.66a Second, certain gift, large block, involuntary, and re-
tirement transfers are disregarded in determining whether a part-
nership is publicly traded.6 64 Third, two alternative tests exist to
determine if the interest is readily tradable. First, the interest is
not readily tradable if the sum of the interests in the partnership
that are sold or otherwise disposed of (including all redemptions,
which are not limited to redemptions under closed-end plans,665
but excluding transfers not deemed to be trading) 66 during the
partnership's taxable year does not exceed 5 % of the total part-
nership capital or profits. Second, the interest is not readily trad-
able if no more than 2% of the interests are traded during a cal-
endar year,667 where qualified matching service transfers involving
time and volume limitations, 6 8 and qualified redemption and re-
purchase agreements are disregarded (excluding redemptions
under closed-end plans that have frequency of price setting and
transaction completion limitations) .669 The percentage safe
I.R.C. § 512(c) (West 1988).
663. See Advance Notice, supra note 661, § II, at 29-30. Arguably the restrictions
in private placement offers would provide sufficient protection in and of themselves. See
N.Y. Bar Report, supra note 647, at 25-27.
664. Advance Notice, supra note 661, § II.B, at 30.
665. Id. § II.E.2, at 32. A closed-end partnership is one in which "the partnership
does not issue any interest after the initial offering, and the general partner or a person
related to the general partner . . . does not provide contemporaneous opportunities to ac-
quire interests in a similar or related partnerships [sic] which represent substantially iden-
tical investments." Id.
666. Id. § II.B, at 30.
667. Id. § II.C, at 30-31. A multiple transfer of the same interest is counted as many
times as it is transferred.
668. Id. § II.D, at 31. Transactions that are accomplished through a matching ser-
vice, which is a listing system that matches partners who wish to dispose of their interests
with persons who wish to buy them, will not cause the interest to be treated as readily
tradable if certain time requirements and volume limits are met. Id.
669. For the two circumstances in which a redemption or repurchase plan will not
11531988-89]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
harbors; either the 5 % or 2 % version, are likely to be relied upon
by many partnerships that currently offer some form of liquid-
ity.6 70 These partnerships are less likely to rely on the broad lan-
guage of the legislative history that may provide them similar
protection.
The existence of a buy-sell agreement among the partners, with-
out more, will not cause a partnership to be treated as publicly
traded. Neither will the occasional and irregular purchase or re-
demption by the partnership, nor the acquisition by the general
partner, of interests in the partnership cause the partnership to
be considered as publicly traded under the provision.67 1
While the 1987 legislation and the accompanying safe harbor
notice provide guidance as to one view of the value of liquidity in
treating a firm as a corporation, they fall far short of formulating
an overall test based solely on liquidity. The main distinction be-
tween the public trading test of the 1987 legislation and the au-
thor's liquidity test is the treatment of redemption rights in the
form of unrestricted put rights to the firm. A public trading test
would treat the ability to resell these rights as analogous to the
ability to buy and sell firm interests. Thus, the notice does not
treat redemptions under a closed-end redemption plan qualifying
for the 2 % safe harbor as public trading, but as a form of liquida-
tion of the firm. A liquidity of ownership test, on the other hand,
might treat all redemptions under a closed-end plan as public
trading of liquid investments in a firm. The basis for the closed-
end limitation under the 2% safe harbor is less than clear. Cer-
tain private placements not accompanied by public trading are ap-
parently treated analogously to closed-end repurchase plans, with-
constitute public trading or the creation of a substantially equivalent secondary market, see
id. § II.E.1-.2, at 32.
670. It is estimated that most publicly registered partnerships, other than those that
are specifically listed on exchanges and thereby grandfathered by the 1987 legislation for
five years, have a trading volume of less than 5%. N.Y. Bar Report, supra note 647, at 30
n.54.
671. 1987 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 224, at 948-49; 1987 HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 46, at 1070. Provisions of the notice conflict with the standards of public trad-
ing under ERISA, which require investment interests held by plans to be "freely tradable."
The Department of Labor issued a notice that partnership agreements, which contain a
provision allowing general partners to disallow trades that would cause the partnership to
be treated as an association, should not be held to violate the "freely-tradeable" rule. It has
issued no such ruling on the current allowance of the safe harbor limitations. See Notice on
Publicly-Traded Partnerships Welcomed, But Key Issue Remains Unresolved, 40 TAx
NOTES 123, 124-25 (1988)(statement of R. Donald Turlington).
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out any inquiry as to put rights to the firm. Under the general
definition of a market adopted by both the legislation and the Ser-
vice, such transactions are not defined as public trading but might
be treated as liquidity of an ownership interest under a liquidity
test.
V. OTHER PROPOSED RATIONALES FOR THE DOUBLE TAX ARE
INEFFECTIVE IN FORMULATING A UNIFIED THEORY
Other proposals have been made for drawing the double-tax/
single-tax line into a tax system which does not fully integrate the
corporate and individual tax bases. Characteristics that might be
helpful in determining when an entity ought to be subject to two
tiers of tax and when it ought to be allowed to have passthrough
taxation have been enumerated. 67 12 Several of these proposed tests
are considered below. Others, such as capital size and complexity,
are not considered since they should be viewed as speaking solely
to administrative concerns such as whether a tax ought to be col-
lected at the entity level rather than the owner level. All of the
alternative tests are rejected in a fiat tax world in favor of a test
that concentrates on both the liquidity of the ownership interest
and economic size.
A. Misuse of Material Participation Standard
The historical approach to the appropriateness of double tax-
ation has been twofold: eliminate double taxation for entities
with income that is largely identified with the personal efforts of
their owners and retain double taxation for entities that have been
granted valuable legal privileges that are "worth money. "617 The
first approach focuses on owner participation and firm size in de-
672. These characteristics include: (1) number of owners, (2) capital size and com-
plexity of debt and equity structure, (3) participation of owners and centralization of man-
agement, (4) publicly traded ownership interests, (5) economic size measured by sales,
income, net worth, and total assets, (6) nature of assets - financial intermediary-type
assets or service businesses, (7) nature of owners - C corporations, trusts, and the like, (8)
limited liability alone or in conjunction with any of the above, (9) continuity of life indicat-
ing entity status, and (10) liquidity of the ownership interest. ABA Passthrough Report,
supra note 51, at 609.
673. E. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 182 (10th ed. 1925). Compare R. Goode,
supra note 10, at 217 (partnership plan for "small closely held corporations"). with C.
GAA. THE TAXATION OF CORPORATE INcOME 117 (1944)("[T]here is a business entity in
any enterprise, distinct from the human being associated with [it]. This ...has been
carried far enough to include single proprietorships and partnerships, as well as
corporations.").
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termining which entities should be subject to double taxation.674
This approach has recently been reworked to mirror the material
participation standard of the passive loss rules which distinguishes
between an "aggregate or collection of individuals" and an "en-
tity" and applies the corporate tax to firms that constitute
"entities." 7 5
674. A participation standard is an extension of the conduit theory of the firm. See
infra note 675. This theory has not always been uniformly applied. In order to qualify for
passthrough taxation under prior law, one had to be passive in a real estate investment
trust (REIT) and active in a Subchapter S corporation. Under present law, both passive
and active income in an S corporation is allowed to be passed through and taxed only once.
An alternative would be to bifurcate the firm as is done in France for limited partnerships
in which the names of the limited partners are not disclosed. 2 SIMEON MOQUET BORDE &
AssociEs. DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE § 13.01[3][c][ii][A] (1987).
If the tax is viewed as an excise tax on income that has been derived without the
participation of the owner, then the same inquiry that led to the distinction between earned
income, favorably taxed and passive income, which suffered an excise, is relevant. Distinc-
tions between earned and unearned income are based on the relative costs of acquiring
each form of income. See Blum & Kalven The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19
U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 480-82 (1952), reprinted as W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY
CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 65-66 (1953). The idea of material participation also
harkens back to the notion of income tax as an ability to pay involving sacrifice, or to use
gladstone's phrase, the contrast between "industrious" and "lazy" incomes. See E. SELIG-
MAN, THE INCOME TAX 23-24 (191 1)("The sacrifice involved in earning a given amount of
income is a very different thing from the sacrifice involved in receiving an equivalent
amount of unearned income."). Human capital is overtaxed by not allowing deductions for
education or undertaxed by not taxing unrealized human potential. Rationalizations under
the present tax system can be found for this position, see Stephan, Federal Income Taxa-
tion and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1375 (1984). The more troubling issues are
yet to be resolved. See Boskin, Notes on the Tax Treatment of Human Capital, in OFFICE
OF TAX ANALYSIS, DEPT. OF TREASURY, CONFERENCE ON TAX RESEARCH, 1975, at 185,
186, 193-95 (1975)(focus should be on empirical data and theoretical models to determine
whether human capital accumulation is discouraged under the current tax regime).
675. This theory was fully elaborated in Lee, supra note 267, at 83-93, 139 (analyz-
ing resemblance test and suggesting that only policied "deep structure" approach is to
classify separate taxable units based on a "passive/active participation-by-owners dichot-
omy" with the "hallmark of an entrepreneurial situation requiring aggregate pass through
taxation . . . the interest-holders active, or 'material,' participation in the business and
perhaps, in a small enough venture, his acting as the financier."); 1987 House MLP Hear-
ings, supra note 30, at 344 (statement of John W. Lee). See also Hobbet, Limited Partner-
ships: Associations or Partnerships?, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 113 (1985). I character-
ize this view as a reformulation of the aggregate-entity conflict in operative provisions of
the tax law.
Limited sanctity for essentially passive investors in a firm is not without precedent.
See Peterson, Corporate Control and Capitalism, 79 Q.J. EcON. 1, 23 (1965). Under the
Berle view that "the shareholder's business is 'primarily to receive' . . . owners seem ex-
travagantly over-rewarded. . .. Beardsley Ruml once argued that most corporate earnings
should go to the one or two top officers mostly responsible for the firm's success." Id. The
suggestion has been made that passive owners should get only a capital wage in the form
and rate of interest, and that management should occupy the residual equity position. See
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Use of a material participation standard is supported by the
centralized management prong of the corporate resemblance test,
which focuses on whether the owners participate as the firm's
managers. 76 Application of the standard to management buyouts
or leveraged buyouts has not been adequately explored.67 The
material participation standard might be useful if the goal were to
Mason, The Apologetics of "Managerialism," 31 J. Bus. 1, 4 (1958) (arguing that such a
system should be the result if ownership is completely divorced from control). See also E.
NOURSE, PRICE MAKING IN A DEMOCRACY 94-96 (1944). While supporting the argument
for entity level taxation from the argument for the corporate double tax, he concludes that
both the fact of entity level taxation and, in a nonintegrated tax system, the imposition of
the double tax and corporate tax burden unmitigated by graduated corporate tax rates
follow the entity level taxation result. See Lee, supra note 267, at 88, 102-09.
676. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(3) (as amended in 1983). The value of the owner-
manager's interest relative to the firm's total capitalization is generally the crucial determi-
nant. See Glensder Textile Co. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 176, 185 (1942), acq., 1942-1
C.B. 8 (the general partners "were acting in their own interest. . ., which constituted five-
twelfths of the partnership, and not merely in a representative capacity for a body of per-
sons having a limited investment and a limited liability"). See also Zuckman v. United
States, 524 F.2d 729, 738 (Ct. Cl. 1975). Zuckman emphasized the importance of repre-
sentative capacity rather than centralized management in determining whether a limited
partnership should be classified as an association:
In the corporate context, there could be no centralized management unless the
management power is held and exercised in a representative capacity . . . . In
the limited partnership context, however, centralized management meant that
the general partner has the exclusive management power. . . and acts primarily
in his own behalf. . . . The focus of inquiry must therefore be on the "represen-
tative" rather than the "centralized," character of management, inasmuch as
centralization per se is generally common to both corporations and limited part-
nerships and, hence, immaterial in distinguishing between the two.
Zuchman, 524 F.2d at 738.
A general partnership formed under the UPA cannot have centralized management
because of the mutual agency relationship among its members. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
2(c)(4)(as amended in 1983). Limited partnerships formed under the ULPA also lack the
characteristic of centralized management unless the general partners hold less than a sub-
stantial portion of all partnership interests. Id. See W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHIT-
MIRE, supra note 245, § 3.06[4], at 3-50. This is true because if the general partners own
only a small interest in the partnership, then they are acting predominantly as representa-
tives for the limited partners and not for themselves. The present law line is defined by case
law. Id. at T 3.06[4], at 3-50 (20% is a brightline from the case law). Accord Rev. Proc.
89-12, supra note 297. But compare Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h), example 1 (as
amended in 1984)(20% is not a "substantial interest" and therefore the general partner
will be considered to be acting in a representative capacity) with id. at example 4 (40% is
a "substantial interest").
677. A management buyout is argued on efficiency grounds to make management
more entrepreneurial by aligning the interest of management with the interest of owners.
See supra notes 44, 173 & 520. A management buyout where management owns substan-
tially all the equity in the firm, whether directly or through an ESOP, is precisely the kind
of structure that a material participation standard appears to require: risk and lack of
diversification.
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tax only diversified participants under a belief that the incidence
of the tax on capital falls on investing shareholders rather than on
the original entrepreneur or capital providers in general. 7 8 The
argument would be that owners that invest significant human cap-
ital in the firm are less likely to be diversified 7 9 and should be
singly taxed. However, advocates of the material participation
standard have not proposed a single tax line based on risk diversi-
fication68 0 or other theories of firm structure choice.681
A focus on participation begs the question of whether there is
justification for viewing a firm as a separate taxable unit that pro-
duces economic rents or pure profits. Participation may identify
the character of income in a schedular world 82 but it does not
identify the appropriate taxable units for that income. There is
some evidence that owner controlled68 3 firms outperform manager
678. Analytical explanations of how individuals choose between entrepreneurial posi-
tions which pay off through risky efforts and employee positions where wages for services
are assured generally separate entrepreneurs from hired laborers solely on the basis of the
degree of risk aversion of the individual. See, e.g., Kihlstrom & Laffont, A General Equi-
librium Entrepreneurial Theory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion, 87 J. POL
ECON. 719, 720 (1979). Risk sharing also affects the capital structure and organizational
form (i.e., limited partnership, general partnership, or corporation) chosen for the enter-
prise. See, e.g., M. Millon, Essays on the Theory of Institutional Structures 63-66 (Dec.
1983)(Ph.D. thesis, available in Indiana University School of Business library). The choice
between private and public firm ownership also is based on risk preferences. See Shah &
Thakor, Private vs. Public Ownership: Investment, Ownership Distribution, and Optimal-
ity, 43 J. FIN. 41, 42 (1988).
679. See Coffee, supra note 376, at 78-79.
680. While Lee speaks of entreprenuerial risk in a populist vein, see Lee, supra note
267, at 86 & n.118, 87 n.120, 88, 92 & n.134, he does not make a risk diversification
argument.
681. See supra note 278.
682. The income tax is certainly more schedular after the 1986 Act and the addition
of the passive activity loss and interest allocation rules of I.R.C. §§ 163 & 469.
683. Control has been used to determine whether certain forms of management pro-
duce greater firm performance. See also infra note 684. Control has been measured by a
variety of methods. See, e.g., J. MUNKIRs, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CAPITAL-
ISM: FROM COMPETITIVE MARKET STRUCTURES TO CENTRALIZED PRIVATE SECTOR PLAN-
NING 68-72 (1985)(listing the Williams Act control test, Berle and Means test, and other
tests for distinguishing between owner-controlled and manager-controlled firms).
The dual class recapitalization and leverage buyout case studies are also useful in
evaluating control. Both of these transactions represent control solidification by manage-
ment, although in the first the public shareholders receive stock with increased dividend
participation and in the second the public shareholders have taded their shares for cash.
Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L.
REv. 807, 812-14 (1987). Gilson argues that in perfect capital markets both the public
shareholder and the management group would consider these two transactions to be sub-
stantively identical. Id. at 814-15. The management characteristics of companies choosing
dual class transactions are evidence of the point at which management, in effect, operates
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as an owner rather than as a representative of the public shareholders. Dual class recapital-
izations of existing companies are argued to occur when there are dominant pre-transaction
shareholder groups who put management in a position to coerce the public shareholders.
Id. at 832-35. This demonstrates a need for a restriction on dual class transactions but not
dual class capital structures that are freely chosen by new investors. Id. at 844. In the
studies to date, the average company proposing a dual class transaction is already 30% to
48% controlled by a dominant shareholder group. Id. at 821-22. See also Gordon, Ties
that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF.
L. REv. 3, 52 & n.71 (1987); Jarrell & Poulsen, Dual-Class Recapitalizations As An-
titakeover Mechanisms, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 129, 141 (1988); Partch, The Creation of a Class
of Limited Voting Common Stock and Shareholder Wealth, 18 J. FIN. EcON. 1, 9
(1987)(table 3).
The S.E.C. adopted the Gilson view and issued a ruling on listing firms with dual class
stock that narrowly construed the limitation on "one share, one vote" to instances of "dis-
enfranchisement." In effect, companies that reduce or limit shareholder's existing rights
can no longer trade those shares on the nation's stock exchanges or in the major over-the-
counter market. The S.E.C. "grandfathered" existing exchange listed companies with dis-
parate voting rights such as "super voting" stock, which is generally issued as a defense
against hostile takeovers. An exemption was also made for state anti-takeover laws, such as
Indiana's, that place conditions on the voting rights of big holders seeking control of a
company. At the time of issuance, there were sixty firms traded on the NYSE that have or
plan to issue such plans, 11.7 on the AMEX, and 182 on NASDAQ. See S.E.C. Adopts
Narrow Rule to Eliminate Extremely Unequal Stock Voting Rights, Wall St. J., July 8,
1988, at 3, col. I. See Rule 19c-4, Exchange Act Release No. 25891, 53 Fed. Reg. 26376
(1988), reprinted in [1988-89 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) t; 84, 247 (July
7, 1988). The allowance of dual class structures in initial public offerings and the promise
of the Gilson view has been criticized.
See Lowenstein, Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response to SEC Rule 19c-4 and to
Professor Gilson, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 979, 1009 (1989) [hereinafter Lowenstein, Response]
(criticizing S.E.C. Rule 19c-4 which allows new issues to adopt dual class voting under the
belief that shareholders can freely waive and assess the waiver of voting rights, Lowenstein
finds that the "IPO investor's 'agreement' is unfocused and essentially nonexistent. . ." and
given the short investment horizon, "the voting rights are not even their own . . .[m]ore
realistically, they belong to future shareholders, as yet unknown.").
The sparse data on leveraged buyouts indicates a much lower management ownership
percentage. One study found about 23.2%. See DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Rice, supra note
502, at 383 (table 2). In their study, the mean management pre-offer ownership fraction of
common stock in all going-private proposals was 45.2% and in successful proposals it was
46.3%. The median was 50.9% and 48%, respectively. Id. As for merger proposals, the
mean management ownership was 52.9% for all merger proposals and 54.6% for the suc-
cessful ones, with medians of 53% and 60%, respectively. Id. Tender or exchange offers
involved a mean percentage of 54.4% for all such offers and 56.6% for the successful ones,
with median percentages of 54% and 56.5%, respectively. Id. For 28 companies with an
average size of $498 million, one study found management ownership averaged 6.5%.
Lowenstein, supra note 44, at 736-39.
Firms going private also exhibit control characteristics. Maupin, Bidwell & Ortegren,
An Empirical Investigation of the Characteristics of Publicly-Quoted Corporations Which
Change to Closely-Held Ownership Through Management Buyouts, 11 J. Bus. FIN. &
AccT. 435 (1985)(noting the distinguishing characteristics of firms most likely to achieve a
management buyout as (1) a majority of company stock held by management and the
board, (2) a significantly higher industry average cash flow to net worth ratio, (3) cash
flows comparatively high in relation to total assets, (4) shares of stocks selling at a rela-
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controlled firms.6 84 Employee ownership has also been found to
produce greater results in some studies.685 The value of en-
trepreneurial control has been noted even in public companies. 86
It is one of the argued efficiency gains from management and
leveraged buyouts.6 87 However, this evidence of the value of en-
trepreneurial control does not alleviate neutrality concerns raised
by a material participation test for passthrough taxation. The
ability of large non-managerial shareholders to constrain manage-
ment from acting in its own self-interest and to ensure that the
firm is operated more from an investor perspective illustrates the
non-neutrality of such a test. 88 Evidence of the value of the firm
tively large discount from book value, and (5) a stable and above industry average dividend
yield ratio). See also Lawrence, A Comparative Analysis of Public Firms Going Private,
21 REV. Bus. & ECON. RES. 1 (1986). Lawrence found financial conditions and perform-
ances of companies going private statistically distinguishable from those of similar firms
remaining public. Stockholder voting control was found to be much more concentrated in
firms about to change ownership status, suggesting that the ability to control the voting and
terms of the exchange offer weighed heavily in the private investor groups' decisions to
make the firm private. Id. at 14. While public statements released to the financial press
often stress other factors, including the relatively low stock price, little empirical support
could be found for this emphasis. Id. at 12-14.
684. See, e.g., Krause, Ownership Control and Stock Market Performance, 15 J.
BEHAV. EcON. 113 (1987)(finding that annual stock market returns of owner-controlled
firms exceeded the returns of other firms by an average of 12% during the three year
period of 1981-1983 in 390 fortune 500 firms). In Krause's study, manager-controlled firms
were defined as those in which no single holding of stock was greater than 5% of the
outstanding common stock, while owner-controlled firms were defined as those firms whose
largest shareholder owned 20% or more of the voting common stock. Firms that did not
fall into either category were treated as neutral. Id. at 114. Other studies produced con-
flicting results. See id. at 113. These studies have been criticized on the basis of both their
statistical methodologies and their results. See, e.g., Zeitlin, Corporate Ownership and
Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class, 79 AM. J. Soc. 1073, 1085-115
(1974).
685. See Cohen & Quarrey, Performance of Employee-Owned Small Companies: A
Preliminary Study, J. SMALL Bus. MGMT., Apr. 1986, at 58, 59 (employee-owned compa-
nies "out-performed their competitors by 30 percent in sales growth and by three-to-one in
employment growth"). Other studies on ESOPs show mixed results. See supra note 200
(discussion of ESOPs). See also Cook, The Ownership Culture, FORBEs, Oct. 6, 1986, at
72 (examining Avondale Industries, Inc., which implemented an ESOP); Labor-Managed
and Participatory Firms, 18 J. ECON. ISSUES 1189 (1984)(debate on whether labor-man-
aged firms are more or less efficient).
686. See Scardino, How Murdoch Makes It Work, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1988, § 3,
at 1, col. 2 (since Murdoch's family owns the controlling interest in the Murdoch News
Corporation, he can reach an agreement far faster than most competitors and has estab-
lished a major acquisition record over the past three years).
687. See supra notes 44 & 173.
688. See Friend & Lang, An Empirical Test of the Impact of Managerial Self-
Interest on Corporate Capital Structure, 43 J. FIN. 271, 280 (1988). When corporations
have large non-managerial investors, the average debt ratio is significantly higher than that
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founder's ability to act as a manager demonstrates that manage-
ment ownership by founding families, where the founder is a top
officer or has stock control, ceases to be an entrepreneurial asset
during the final growth stage of the firm.689 Classifying firms
based on participation destroys tax neutrality for capital deploy-
ment and has a tenuous connection with the targeting of tax based
on ability to pay or efficiency grounds to certain business
activities. 90
By introducing a preference for certain forms of capital, a
material participation standard would increase transaction costs as
firms reorganize themselves to protect items from double taxation.
of corporations with no principal stockholders. This suggests that the existence of large
non-managerial stockholders might make the interest of managers and public diversified
stockholders coincide. A debt ratio is negatively related to management shareholding,
meaning that there is a lower debt-to-equity ratio in firms with managers who own little
equity, reflecting the greater non-diversifiable risk of debt to management than to public
investors. Id. See also Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 650, 653-54 (1984); Shleifer & Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate
Control, 94 J. POL ECON. 461, 462, 464-65 (1986).
689. R. MORCK, A. SHLEIFER & R. VISHNY, MANAGEMENT OWNERSHIP AND COR-
PORATE PERFORMANCE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 18 (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search Working Paper No. 2055, 1986). The authors argue that performance declines
when managers are protected against the discipline of the market due to very large man-
agement holdings and are thus free to pursue their own objectives instead of value-max-
imization objectives of the firm. Id. at 3, 18. Additionally, founding families were shown to
have a negative impact on the performance of older firms. Evidence of this negative impact
in very large and therefore usually older corporations, may be irrelevant to newer, faster
growing firms where managerial holdings may play a more important signalling role than
they are likely to play for larger firms. Analysis of the impact of officers' stakes in perform-
ance would incorporate other compensation data. Id. at 19; Murphy, Corporate Perform-
ance and Managerial Remuneration An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 11, 12
(1985). Evaluation of directors should also focus on how the distribution of ownership on
boards affects performance.
690. This argument is related to the neutrality criticisms levied against the passive
activity loss rules. See Peroni, A Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62
S. CAL L. REV. 1, 72 (1988)("material participation, or lack thereof, tells one nothing
about the underlying nature of the loss"); see also Bankman, The Case Against Passive
Investments: A Critical Appraisal of the Passive Loss Restrictions, 42 STAN. L. REV. 15,
26-45 (1989)(critique of the rules and their effects on moving the tax system to the taxing
of economic income). The critique of the passive activity loss rules is based on a belief that
insiders should not benefit through a reduction in the ability of non-insiders or passive
investors to participate on an equal footing in tax-advantaged investments. See,, e.g., Rock
& Shaviro, Passive Lasses and the Improvement of Net Income Measurements, 7 VA. TAX
REV. 1, 16-19 (1987). Arguably, insiders are better able to determine the value of an in-
vestment than are outsiders, and this may have resulted in much of the mispricing of tax
shelter investments. See Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and Controlling
Income Tax Avoidance, 85 CoLuM. L. REV. 657, 667 (1985). For a discussion of the in-
sider-outsider problem under I.R.C. § 469, see Johnson, Why Have Anti-Tax Shelter Leg-
islation? A Response to Professor Zelenak, 67 TEX. L. REV. 591, 623-24 (1989).
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The logic of material participation in a schedular income tax
world does not transfer to the structuring of a double tax regime.
B. Ineffectiveness of Small Number of Owners Standard
A desire to simplify administration and an aggregate view of
income produced in small firms as directly stemming from the in-
dividual effort and capital of the owners formed the basis of much
of the reasoning behind prior proposals that extended passthrough
taxation to corporations with a small number of owners and a sim-
ple capital structure.6 9' In 1958, Subchapter S passthrough taxa-
tion was adopted for corporations with ten or fewer shareholders
producing active business income in a simple equity capital struc-
ture precisely under that reasoning.692 Other evidence suggests 693
that the closely held firm is not defined by its small number of
owners or by its domination by participating owners, but rather is
defined by the absence of a regularly operating liquid public mar-
ket.694 Other discussions of the small number of owners criterion,
691. In both 1926 and 1928, proposals to allow small corporations the option of filing
their returns as corporations or partnerships were made to the tax-writing committees. On
both occasions the proposals were rejected. See R. BLAKEY & G. BLAKEY, supra note 98,
at 258 & 284 (latter suggestion rejected because view of smallness should not be limited to
number of owners but should also include size of profits). A partnership option for small
corporations of ten or fewer shareholders was again proposed in 1929. See Weiner, Legisla-
tive Recognition of the Close Corporation, 27 MICH. L. REv. 273 (1929). In 1946, the
Treasury studied a proposed passthrough election for corporations with a limited number of
individual shareholders and only one class of shares. TREASURY DEP'T, DIVISION OF TAX
RESEARCH, THE POSTWAR CORPORATION TAX STRUCTURE (Dec. 6, 1946), reprinted in
Revenue Revisions, 1947-48: Hearings on Corporation Tax Problems and General Revi-
sions Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. part 2, at 1136
(1947) [hereinafter TREASURY DEP'T, POSTWAR], reprinted in part in J. EUSTICE & J.
KUNTZ, supra note 6, 11 B.1, at A-24 to A-30. In 1954, the Senate proposed that firms with
ten or fewer active shareholders be allowed to elect to be taxed as partnerships. H.R. 8300,
83rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 1351 (1954). The Senate proposal was supported by the existing
views of tax commentators who believed there were strong grounds for providing small and
closely held corporations with partnership treatment. See NAT'L TAX ASS'N, COMM. ON THE
FED. CORPORATE NET INCOME TAX. FINAL REPORT, reprinted in 1951 NATIONAL TAX
ASSOCIATION PROC. NAT'L TAX ASS'N 54, 61-62. This aggregate versus entity view of a
corporation with a small number of owners and of the administrative and assignment of
income rationales for the limitation on capital structure choice is continued in the present S
corporation regime. See J. EUSTICE & J. KUNTZ, supra note 6, at 1.02[11]-[3] & [5]-[6],
1.03[2] [b].
692. See id. at 1.02, at 1-3 to 1-39.
693. See supra notes 426-41 and accompanying text.
694. See supra notes 426-41 and accompanying text; see also Soderquist, supra note
426, at 1394-95; cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 1203(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1988)(closed corporation defined as one having share transfer restrictions). This supposi-
tion has been recently put to the test. See TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 12.01-.54
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while raising investment protection issues, 95 say little about the
essential elements of the firm that arguably distinguish forms of
production 696 from forms of raising capital. 9 7 Evidence on dual
class common stock recapitalizations suggests that less than a sub-
stantial majority of the shareholders is needed to affect the form
of governance of the firm. 98 In determining the desirability of
firm-level versus owner-level collection of the tax, the small num-
ber of owners criterion has little value other than administrative
convenience for tax collection and audit adjustments. Similarly,
the approaches that follow the simplified structure approach of S
corporations are based on a rationale of income allocation and are
not a rationale for single-level taxation. 699 Without economic size
limitations,700 both simplicity and small number of owners criteria
(Vernon Supp. 1989)(unlimited number of shareholders, no share transfer restrictions, and
no restriction for public status for new close corporations).
695. A number of owners criterion is used by the S.E.C. in two ways. Section 4(2) of
the 1933 Act sets no limits on the number of offerees or purchasers. In practice, however,
the higher those numbers become, the more apt the S.E.C. is to view the offering as "pub-
lic" and hence subject it to the section 5 registration requirements of the Act, especially if
those offerees are deemed in need of the protection disclosure provides. See, e.g., SEC v.
Ralston Purina Corp., 346 U.S. 119 (1953)(finding an offering to "key" employees in vio-
lation of section 4(2) and subject to disclosure requirements). A number of owners criterion
is also used more formally by the S.E.C. in several of the rules of Regulation D. For
instance, rules 505 and 506 both limit the number of purchasers in a private placement to
35. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b) & .506(b) (1988). However, under the definition section
of Regulation D, accredited investors are not deemed purchasers because of their presumed
ability to fend for themselves in the marketplace, and thus do not count in the 35 limit. 17
C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(l)(iv) (1988). See generally J. HICKS, 1989 LIMITED OFFERING Ex-
EMPTIONS: REGULATION D (1989).
Federal securities laws also provide that firms with over 500 beneficial owners must
file periodic reports with the Commission. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(B) (1986)(section
12(g)(1)(B) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934). Using a number of owners test
developed in securities regulation to determine which entities should receive passthrough
taxation can be criticized because such a test is not based on tax policy or on a rationale
that can be directly related to tax policy goals. See ABA Passthrough Report, supra note
51, at 610 ("great concern was expressed with that kind of a standard because there is no
adequate determination in the rationale behind the S.E.C. requirements").
696. See supra note 278.
697. See Keyser, supra note 271, at § 10.01, 10.05 (criticizing the Treasury proposal
under which "an enterprise that raised $100 million apiece from thirty-four investors would
be treated as a conduit for tax purposes, while the candy store that had thirty-six limited
partners, each of whom had invested $500 would be treated as an association taxable as a
corporation, subject to double taxation on enterprise distributed income").
698. See supra note 683.
699. See infra notes 1049-52 & 1062-63.
700. In 1984, only 0.346% of net income from S corporations was attributed to S
corporations with assets greater than $250 million. In 1985, the same figure was 0.415%.
Data calculated from INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, SOURCE BOOK: CORPORATION IN-
